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"The civilized world stands appalled." 

The New York Herald. 


No cataclysm, not even the French Revolution or the 
Napoleonic Wars, nor earthquake or any other force of 
nature has so convulsed the whole current of human life 
and thought, or devastated property and destroyed life as 
has the great war which rages in Europe and affects a large 
part of the rest of the civilized world to-day. The effects 
of this war are now felt, consciously or unconsciously, by 
every man, woman, and child, and its results will influence 
and have direct bearing on the lives of unborn millions. 

No event so momentous in its results or so far reaching 
in its effects has ever been recorded in the history of man- 
kind. And no other event in the world's history has excited 
such tense interest as has the great drama of life and death 
now being played with the earth as a stage and all the 
millions of the civilized globe as spectators. It is only 
natural that mankind craves now, and will crave for years 
and centuries to come, for a history that will tell why this 
great catastrophe has come about, how it proceeded, and 
what its results. Of course, the whole truth about it will 
not be known for years; tens of thousands of volumes 
will be written about it, and a hundred years from now 
new facts will be discovered, just as to-day we are learning 
new things about our Revolution, and no one now living 
can expect to hear the last word on the subject. 

But no intelligent person will, for this reason, be content 
to go without having the best account that it is possible to 

Publishers' Note 

write with the data and knowledge that are available at 
present. We are of the opinion that every such person 
would be glad to have such a history for reading and 
reference now: as a result of this belief we have in course 
of preparation a series of volumes which we think will 
appeal to all thoughtful people. 

There has been no effort to make haste in the prepara- 
tion or issue of this history; the whole endeavor of the 
authors has been to gain perspective that would permit 
scholarly treatment, be as unbiased and non-partisan as 
possible, and of enduring value. The series is so planned 
that the early volumes form a very full and essential intro- 
duction to the record of the actual hostilities and enable the 
reader to grasp clearly the matters vital to a proper appre- 
ciation of the questions at issue and form a basis for a 
correct understanding of what this war actually is. 

The elaborate introduction by ex-President Taft is a 
masterly and statesmanlike analysis of the causes and pos- 
sible results of this great war and of America's position in 
regard to it. 

The authors are George H. Allen, Ph.D., of the Uni- 
versity of Pennsylvania, History Department; Henry C. 
Whitehead, captain in the United States Army; and Ad- 
miral F. E. Chadwick, U. S. N. 

Dr. Allen, who is a recognized authority on the subject 
of European history and a writer on military affairs, is 
particularly well equipped for the task, for his investiga- 
tions in modern European history have been made during 
long continued periods of residence and travel in Europe. 
He has lived four years in Germany; has made four jour- 
neys in Russia; has made a particular study of conditions 
in the Balkans, having had the special advantage of a 
meeting with King Nicholas of Montenegro. He has also 
studied the "Near Eastern Question" at Constantinople. 

Publishers' Note 

He was in Moscow when hostilities began, and as an 
American-born citizen of the United States was able to 
discuss conditions freely with officials. His various resi- 
dences and travels in Europe while connected with the 
American Academy in Rome and later with the Univer- 
sity of Cincinnati and as university extension lecturer in 
Berlin have been of invaluable assistance in the writing of 
this book. His work is a calm, judicial analysis, free from 
bias and prejudice: he stands as a historian should, aloof 
from the passions aroused since the outbreak of hostilities, 
and his sole object is to arrive at the truth. He makes 
plain many things obscure to the average person: for 
example, he shows how the struggle for the control of 
the Dardanelles and the "Near East" is one of the most 
important pivotal points and that the result of this struggle 
may be the final controlling factor in ending the war. 
Captain Whitehead is especially qualified for the reason 
that he has served in Europe, by official assignment, for 
observation. Admiral Chadwick's qualifications for treat- 
ing of naval affairs are beyond question. He is not only a 
distinguished officer of high rank but also ranks high as an 
author. His career has been remarkable: he was naval 
attache at the American Embassy, London; he has been 
Chief of the Intelligence Bureau and of the Bureau of 
Equij)ment; he was Chief of Staff of Admiral Sampson 
during the war with Spain and was advanced five numbers 
for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle ; he has been 
Commander-in-Chief of the South Atlantic Squadron and 
President of the Naval War College at Newport. 

The first volume is devoted to a consideration of the 
events and conditions forming the potential and positive 
causes of the war and contains a well tempered and non- 
partisan examination into the motives that have led to this 
great conflict. It shows us that the Welt-politik, or general 

Publishers' Note 

policy of Germany, was not, from Germany's point of view, 
fundamentally unjustifiable, and that the war between the 
western powers is only incidentally a commercial war ; that 
Great Britain and Germany would not have gone to war on 
their own impulse ; that aside from the invasion of Belgium, 
which was the positive, direct, and formal cause for Great 
Britain's participation in the war, there was only the appre- 
hension caused by the sudden growth of the German navy 
as a potential cause; it proves that commercial rivalry was 
only very remotely connected with the various reasons for 
the war and that it ought not to be regarded as a cause at all; 
that the war so commonly regarded as one between Great 
Britain and Germany for supremacy in the west grew out of 
the inevitable clash between the Slav and the Teuton in the 
Balkans; and that in the Balkan peninsula existed the critical 
situation out of which the conflict necessarily emerged. 

The second volume will be devoted to a review of the 
growth of the moral or spiritual factors which prepared 
the peoples' minds for war and brought the nations to the 
point of going to war, the preparation for war, offensive 
and defensive, in a physical or material way, — their resources 
in men, material, and money, etc., etc., and their mobiliza- 
tion, — indispensable to a proper understanding of the 
military and naval operations during the hostilities, and 
of immense value for reference when reading the later 
volumes and news of the day. 

The third volume will contain a very full record of the 
outbreak of hostilities, the attacks on Serbia, the invasion 
of Belgium, and the advance toward Paris. Other vol- 
umes of the series will give accounts of the varied definite 
phases of the hostilities which the war assumes, and of the 
final results. Each volume will be complete in itself and 
be a full and satisfying treatment of its subject. 







W. M. A. 


Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. 





GEORGE H. ALLEN, Ph. D., of the University of Penn- 
sylvania, History Department ; Fellow in Classical Arche- 
ology, American School of Classical Studies, Rome, Etc., 






Copyrighted, 1915, by 

Among the Illustrations in this Volume 
ARE Reproductions of Photographs Copy- 
righted BY Underwood and Underwood, 
BY Paul Thompson, and by the 
International News Service Company 
Entered at Stationers' Hall, London 




Introduction by W. H. Taft XIII-XXV 

Author's Preface XXVII-XXX 

I Motives and Forces in the Territorial Adjust- 
ment OF European States 1-32 

The present situation justifies a retrospect. The most powerful factor in 
moulding European states. Theory of nationalities. The Unification of 
Italy. Italia Irredenta; Irredentism. Unification of Germany. Bismarck; 
Real-politik. Exceptions to the application of the Principle of Nationalities; 
Alsace-Lorraine; Examples in the Russian Empire; prejudiced opinion of 
Russian expansion; Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and Poland. Hapsburg 
.Realm apparently the Negation of the Principle of Nationalities. Why a 
dual, not a federal monarchy. Races in Austria-Hungary; Slavs the most 
numerous. Poles in Austria, and in Prussia. Balance of Power. Standing 
alliances. Origin of the Triple and Dual Alliances. 

II The Nations on the Threshold of the 
Twentieth Century 33-79 

Great Britain: industrial and commercial supremacy in the nineteenth cen- 
tury; democratic development; imperialism and social reform; Egypt; South 
Africa; Imperial Federation Movement and Trade Preference; Irish Ques- 
tion; social legislation; Lloyd George's famous budget; suppression of Lords' 
veto; Home Rule Bill. France: miraculous salvation of the Republic; 
Boulanger; Dreyfus Case; Radical bloc. Russia: reforms and revolution; 
constitutional regime; peasant problem, agricultural Russia; Industrial Rev- 
olution in Russia, present condition of industry; commerce; government 
finances; German opinion of the condition of Russia. Germany: Prussian- 
ization of Germany; the army as a school of citizenship; the imperial and 
Prussian governments, measure of popular influence, political parties, Center, 
Conservatives, progress of agriculture, National Liberals, Social Democrats, 
Socialist program, state socialism; progress of German industry; govern- 
ment finances; general comparisons of Germany, United Kingdom, and 
France; the worlds' iron ore supply. 

VI The Great War 


III The Genesis of Anglo-German Reciprocal 
Suspicion 80-106 

Bismarck's foreign policy as Imperial Chancellor. Germany's unassailable 
position in 1890. Character of William II. "Dropping the Pilot." Dual 
Alliance formed. Kingship by the Grace of God. German fFelt-politik. 
The "Kruger Telegram." East Asiatic Expedition; Kiau-Chau. Naval 
Bill of 1898. Admiral von Tirpitz, Imperial Secretary for the Navy. 
German Navy League. Bundesrat incident. Naval Bill of 1900. Isola- 
tion of Great Britain. German attitude during the South African War. 

IV Conditions Fraught with Danger . . . 107-140 

Germany and Russia in 1904. Agreement between Great Britain and 
France, April 8, 1904, respecting Morocco. German press. Kaiser's speech 
in Bremen, March 23, 1905. Russian disasters destroy balance of forces in 
Europe. Morocco and French policy. Kaiser's visit in Tangier and speech. 
Germany's attitude. Crisis in Morocco Controversy; France yields; M. 
Delcasse resigns. Algeciras Conference, 1906. Significance of Germany's 
Moroccan policy. The "open door." "Matin disclosure." The first 
"Dreadnought." German Navy Law of 1906. Race in armaments. 
British naval panic in 1909. Anglo-Russian reconciliation and Triple 
Entente. "Daily Telegraph Interview," October 28, 1908. Franco-German 
agreement of February 9, 1909. French occupation of Fez. Panther sent 
to Agadir. Proposal for "compensations." Speech of Mr. Lloyd George, 
July 21, 1911. Germany accepts a compromise. Disappointment and re- 
sentment in Germany. 

V The Unavoidable Collision in the 

Balkans 141-203 

The series of declarations of hostilities in the world-war. All indications point 
back to the Balkan Conflict of Slav and Teuton. Geographic and historic 
conditions in the Balkans. The Southern Slavs. Russia's interests in the 
Balkans; their origin. The traditional hostility of Russian and Turk. Pan- 
Slavism. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8. Treaty of San Stefano. Treaty 
of Berlin; its inherent injustice and folly. Russia's vital interest in the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles water-way. Germanic penetration in the Balkan 
penmsula; Austria's motives and intentions; Germany as Turkey's "disin- 
terested friend." Anatolian Railway. The Kaiser's memorable visit in the 
Turkish Empire in 1898; his protection offered to 300,000,000 Moham- 
medans. The Deutsche Bank and the Bagdad Railway. Herr von Gwinner. 
British preoccupations. Macedonian question. Young Turkish party. 
Revolution of 1908 and Turkish constitution. Annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Serbia's resentment and submission. 
German influence and the Young Turks; difficulties for German diplomacy. 
Significance of Italy's campaign in Tripoli. Balkan league; Balkan War 
and policy of the Dual Monarchy. Second Balkan War, and Treaty of 
Bucharest, August 10, 1913. Austrian chagrin at the outcome; the effect 
upon Teutonic military calculations; increase in armaments in Germany, 
and consequently in France; three years' obligatory military service in 
France. Russia and the Balkan situation. The field of Greater Serbian 
propaganda. Political crisis in Croatia. Archduke Francis Ferdinand; the 
tragedy at Sarajevo, June 28, 1914; the ultimatum, July 23, 1914. 



VI Fruitless Attempts to Localize the 

Conflict 204-245 

Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia. The extent of the Pan-Serbian danger 
to the Dual Monarchy. Motives of Austria-Hungary and attitude of 
Germany. The German communication to the powers defining her posi- 
tion; German view as to localizing the controversy. Russia's attitude. 
Count Berchtold denied that Austria-Hungary intended to annex Serbian 
territory. Sir E. Grey on the Austro-Serbian conflict. The request for an 
extension of the time limit for Serbia's reply. Sir E. Grey's idea of media- 
tion by four powers. Reception of the Austro-Hungarian note in Serbia. 
Serbia's reply, July 25, and Austria-Hungary's objections to it. Rupture 
of diplomatic relations between Vienna and Belgrade. Sir E. Grey's 
proposal for an ambassadors' conference. Italy and France accepted it, 
Germany refused. Kaiser's return from Norway, July 26. Austro- 
Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia; and German imperial govern- 
ment's message to the German states, July 28. The Kaiser's exchange of 
telegrams with the Tsar. Russian partial mobilization. Russian formulas 
for an agreement with Austria-Hungary. Russian general mobilization. 
German ultimatum to Russia. German declaration of war against Russia, 
August 1. Germany demands statement of French attitude; declaration of 
war against France, August 3. The Kaiser's activity as mediator. Did 
Austria-Hungary adopt a conciliatory attitude at the last moment? 

VII Great Britain and the War .... 246-274 

Sir E. Grey's final efforts for peace. Germany's proposal for British 
neutrality, July 29. Belgian neutrality; guaranteed by the powers in 1839. 
Belgian neutrality in 1870; the temporary treaties; Mr. Gladstone's speech. 
Treaty of 1839 still binding. Belgium and the Congo; both were neutral- 
ized territory. Great Britain protests against Germany's demand for free 
passage across Belgium. Ultimatum and declaration of war, August 4. 
German views of causes and motives for Great Britain's intervention. 
Chancellor von Bethmann-HoUweg's speech, December 2, 1914, on Great 
Britain's position with respect to the war. Partial obligation for Great 
Britain to help France. Other possible causes of Great Britain's declaration 
of hostilities; commercial rivalry and alarm at development of German 
naval power. Commercial rivalry not a direct cause. 

VIII Was the War Deliberately Pro- 
voked? 275-295 

The accusation against the Teutonic powers. Increase in Germany's 
military establishment. Extension of military railways on the Belgian 
frontier. Opening of enlarged Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, July 1, 1914. Russian 
military development. Internal conditions in Russia. Home Rule con- 
troversy in Ireland. The king's conference. Events in Dublin, July 26. 
Militarism; how it endangers peace. Expressions of the militaristic spirit; 
duelling, artificial conception of honor. Dangerous influence on political 
policies by insisting upon exaggerated standards of honor and prestige, 
and subordinating diplomacy to its professional point of view. 

VIII The Great War 


IX Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy . 296-343 

Transformation of Japan, War with China, 1894-5. Interference of 
Germany, France, and Russia. Japan deprived of her spoil. Russia in 
Manchuria and at Port Arthur. Anglo-Japanese Treaty signed, January 
30, 1902. Russo-Japanese War; its termination by the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth, September 5, 190S. Second Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Russo- 
Japanese understanding. Japan's present ministry. Japan's ultimatum 
and declaration of war against Germany. Position of Turkey at the out- 
break of the war. Aspirations of Pan-Islamism. The Turlush ministry. 
Said Halim Pasha, Djavid Bey, Djemal Pasha, Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha. 
German military commission. German influence. British intentions mis- 
represented. Arrival of Goeben and Breslau, August 10. Turkish duplicity. 
Capitulations abolished. Turkish military preparations. British protests. 
Commencement of hostilities. Jihad, or holy war, proclaimed. Motives 
for Italian hostility for Austria, sentimental, strategic, economic. Italy's 
domestic politics. Declaration of neutrality. Albanian occurrences. Austro- 
Italian negotiations; three stages; the intervention of Prince von Bulow, 
December 20, 1914; Austria's definite offer, March 27, 1915; Italy's counter- 
proposal, April 8; the repudiation of the Triple Alliance, May 4. The 
triumph of the Salandra ministry; the session of the Chamber, May 20; the 
declaration of war. May 23. 

X General Conclusions 344—358 

Potential causes: Principle of Nationalities not thoroughly realized; problems 
of Austro-Hungarian populations, and their possible solution; geographic 
and ethnographic boundaries will not always harmonize; rivalry of Ger- 
many and Great Britain; German aspirations and British and French im- 
perialism; war viewed as a biological necessity; the saner German attitude; 
exaggerated notions relative to foreign commerce, the trade of the United 
States with China, South America, and Canada furnishing an example; 
reasonableness of German Welt-politik; the development of German sea- 
power excessive in view of the commercial and political situation; 1911 a 
turning point. Positive causes: the conflict of the Teutonic powers and 
Russia in the Balkans; Constantinople the pivotal point; speculation on 
possible arrangements and the corresponding difficulties; outbreak and spread 
of the conflagration. 

Chronological Table 359-368 

Index 369-377 



Francis Joseph I, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary . .Title 
The Congress of Berlin, 1878. After the painting by Anton von 

Werner 1 

Map showing Italy in the Nineteenth Century 4 

Map showing the growth of the German Zollverein .... 12 

Helmuth Carl Bernhard, Count von Moltke 16 

William I, King of Prussia and German Emperor ... .16 

Prince Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck 16 

Map showing the Partitions of Poland 20 

Map showing distribution of races in the Austro-Hungarian 

monarchy 26 

The monument to Prince Bismarck in Hamburg 28 

Monument at Leipzig, commemorating the battle of Leipzig. . 28 

The Palace at Peterhof on the Gulf of Finland 33 

The Palace of Sans Souci at Potsdam 33 

Statue of Frederick the Great in Berlin 37 

Statue of the Tsar Alexander IH in Moscow 37 

Bismarck dictating conditions to Thiers. After the painting by 

Carl Wagner 44 

Surrender of Sedan. After the painting by Anton von Werner . . 44 

Joseph Chamberlain 48 

Count Serge Julievich Witte S3 

Peter Arkadievich Stolypin $3 

David Lloyd George 60 

Herbert Henry Asquith 60 

The Julius Tower in the citadel at Spandau 65 

Cartoon by Sir John Tenniel which appeared in Punch, March 29, 

1890, apropos of the dismissal by William II of Bismarck from 

the office of chancellor 80 


X The Great War 


Kaiser William II, wearing the uniform of an admiral of the Ger- 
man navy 85 

Prince Bernhard von Billow 85 

Frederick William, Crown Prince of the German Empire ... 92 

Prince Henry of Prussia, wearing the uniform of a German admiral 92 

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg 97 

Group showing the close relationof the dynasties of Europe brought 

about by the intermarriage of royalties 101 

Georges Eugene Benjamin Clemenceau, founder oi L' Aurore. . 108 

Theophile Delcasse 108 

Emperor William II after landing at Tangier, March 31, 1905 . 112 

Alphonso XIII, King of Spain, and Prime Minister Eduardo Date . 112 

Delegates at the conference held at Algeciras in February, 1906 . 116 

Mulay Hafid, former Sultan of Morocco, conferring in his gardens . 125 

Agadir 128 

The German cruiser Berlin, which relieved the gunboat Panther, 

off the closed port of Agadir, Morocco 132 

Plan showing dates of inauguration of hostilities 141 

The Yildiz-Kiosk, the palace of the deposed Sultan .... 145 

Abdul-Hamid II, Deposed Sultan of Turkey 145 

Nicholas Petrovitch, King of Montenegro, and Queen Milena at 

Cetinje in 1910 148 

Ferdinand I, Tsar of Bulgaria, on the ruins of the fortress of Kavala 148 
Sketch maps showing the territorial adjustments of the Balkan 

peninsula by the treaties of San Stefano, Berlin, and Bucharest 154 
Charles I, King of Roumania, 1866-1914, and his wife Elizabeth of 

Wied, known as "Carmen Sylva." 157 

Ferdinand of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who succeeded his uncle 

as King of Roumania, October 10, 1914 157 

Baron Kolmar von der Goltz ... 161 

Map showing route of the Bagdad Railway 164 

Statue of the German Empress as a Mediaeval Queen .... 172 

Statue of William II as King of Jerusalem 172 

The Sultan of Turkey, Mohammed V, reading the prayer at the 

sacrifice of Qurban Bairam 176 

House of Parliament, Constantinople 180 

The Russian Embassy at Constantinople 180 

The assassinated Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince, Archduke 

Francis Ferdinand with his wife and children 189 



The new Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince, Archduke Charles 

Francis Joseph with his wife and children 189 

Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia 193 

The arrest of Gavrilo Prinzip, assassin of the Archduke Franz 

Ferdinand of Austria . 197 

Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister 204 

Peter, King of Serbia 204 

Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia 204 

The Tsar of Russia and William II on the way to a hunt in 

Germany 208 

House of ParHament, Vienna 213 

Houses of Parliament, Budapest 213 

Belgrade, capital of Serbia 220 

The Royal Palace at Belgrade 220 

Sir Maurice William Ernest de Bunsen 225 

Count Albert von Mensdorff-Pouilly 225 

Pierre Paul Cambon 240 

Gottlieb von Jagow 240 

Count Leopold von Berchtold .... 245 

Serge Sazonoff 245 

Article VII of the treaty of 1839 which guaranteed the independ- 
ence and perpetual neutrality of Belgium 252 

Last page of the treaty of 1839 which guaranteed the neutrahty of 

Belgium . 252 

Sir Edward Grey . 256 

Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky . 273 

Jules Cambon 273 

Sir William Edward Goschen . . 273 

Rene Viviani . . 277 

Baron Wilhelm Edward von Schon .... .... 277 

Islam bestirs himself! Cartoon, which appeared in Jugend, show- 
ing German expectation that Great Britain would be em- 
barrassed by a Mohammedan revolt 284 

England's Pain. Cartoon, which appeared in Simplicissimus, 
showing German feeling in regard to the commercial aspect 

of the war .... .... . . 284 

Count Shigenobu Okuma ... . 293 

Yoshihito, Emperor of Japan ... . 293 

Baron Taka-Akira Kato .... 293 

XII The Great War 


Enver Bey 300 

Djemal Pasha . . • • • 300 

Said Pasha 309 

Sheich-ul-Islam 309 

Map showing the proportion of the earth's surface inhabited by 

Mohammedans 316 

Marquis di San Giuhano 325 

Victor Emanuel III, King of Italy 325 

Sydney Sonnino 325 

The Bosphorus at its narrowest point 332 

William II, King of Prussia and German Emperor, in field uniform 340 
Map showing the relative size of British, French, and German 

possessions 348 

Physical map of Europe 356 


Contemporaneous history is much less easy to study and 
learn than that of a preceding century. The difficulty is 
that the sources available to the ordinary reader are con- 
fined to fugitive magazine articles, or to the files of the 
daily press. The succession of events, as vv^e gather them 
from newspaper reading from day to day, does not give to 
us a due sense of proportion as to their importance. This 
is true of the social, political, and economic record of our 
own country, and still more of the annals of foreign coun- 
tries. When a cataclysm like the present European war 
makes a turning point in human progress and we are led 
to study its causes, with a view to a forecast of its effects, 
we find that if we have not been constantly and intimately 
engaged in a study of the international relations of the 
world we need the aid of a comprehensive summary of 
what has been going on in each country engaged in the 
war for a generation or more past: what have been its 
ambitions, its policies, the racial prejudices of its people, 
and where have been the points of conflict between its 
purposes and those of its antagonists. It may be conceded 
that an interval of at least half a century ought to elapse 
before history may be accurately, carefully, and judicially 
written. Then the heat of the issues has passed away, 
partisan controversy has faded out, and the post mortem evi- 
dence of witnesses, reluctant while in life, furnishes sources 
of information that are closed to the investigator dum fervet 


XIV The Great War 

opus. Such a lapse of time, too, gives an opportunity to 
the historian to judge of the significance of events in the 
light of their results. In contemporaneous history we 
cannot avoid dealing v^ith the future, because we must 
attach to the events we discuss an importance that is 
affected by our anticipation of their effect. Notwith- 
standing, however, the advantage that the historian who 
looks back fifty years or more has in painting a true picture 
of the life of a nation or the world, one who undertakes to 
recount, in their proper bearing, events of the current 
generation, serves a most useful purpose, aids much the 
future historians, and gives to one still taking part in the 
drama of nations a means of reviewing recent occurrences 
and summing them up as a useful predicate for future 
action. This is what Dr. Allen has done in the first vol- 
ume of this series which is intended to deal with the great 
European war now absorbing our attention. He has 
divided the causes of the war into those which were 
potential and those which were immediate. Among the 
potential, he reckons racial prejudice and hostility and 
rivalry, and racial attraction and sympathy, and those irri- 
tating limitations of a nation's progress and growth under 
peace which furnish a motive for war. He rapidly reviews 
the history of each belligerent nation in the last half cen- 
tury, noting its industrial and economic growth, the changes 
in its political and governmental character, and its domestic 
and foreign policy. He thus brings out the conflicts of 
prejudice and interest between the nations, as well as the 
offensive and defensive alliances entered into for the pur- 
pose of maintaining peace and a balance of power, but 
which in the end have expanded a quarrel arising in a 
remote corner of Europe into the greatest war of history. 
Dr. Allen is a Doctor of Philosophy, and a trained his- 
torian in the History Department of the University of 


Pennsylvania, and has had great opportunities for studying 
the European situation. He spent some years in Italy, 
Germany, England, and France; he made four journeys 
into Russia. He made a particular study of conditions in 
the Balkans and looked into the "Near Eastern Question" 
in Constantinople. He was in Moscow when the hostili- 
ties began. His residence and travels in Europe while 
connected with the American Academy in Rome and later 
with the University of Cincinnati and as a university exten- 
sion lecturer in Berlin fit him for his task. 

His is not a partisan book. Within the limits to which 
he is confined, of course he cannot give all the evidence 
on each side of each issue, but he states succinctly the 
claims of each contesting nation and its vindication of its 
own course and enables the reader himself to draw the 
proper inference. Dr. Allen says: "My impartiality is 
the equiUbrium of competing sympathy, not the empty 
neutrality of indifference. All the belligerent countries, 
excepting Serbia and Japan, are known to me through 
direct observation. But the fondest, most intimate asso- 
ciations unite me with Italy, Germany, France, and Great 
Britain. ... A war between these countries is a source 
to me of unspeakable sadness. It is a conflict in which I 
must lose, whoever is victor." Occasionally he expresses 
a conclusion with which the reader may not agree, but 
only after a fair review of the attitude of each party. 

My general information of European international rela- 
tions is not such as to make my judgment of this book 
valuable to earnest and exact students of current European 
history, but I have interest enough in the subject and 
general knowledge enough to assure the ordinary reader 
that this book is a very interesting resume of exactly what 
one desiring to keep abreast of current events would wish 
to find ready to his hand. 

XVI The Great War 

Dr. Allen approaches the subject from the standpoint of 
an American, which makes his opinion useful to Amer- 
ican readers. He says that in spite of a cosmopolitan 
experience, it is impossible for him to conceal two native 
prejudices, a predilection for democracy and an aversion 
for militarism. Our public is divided into three classes — 
those who are earnest partisans of the Allies, those who 
are earnest partisans of the Teutonic countries, and those 
who deplore the war as a halt in the progress of the world, 
but who are grateful to Providence that our isolated posi- 
tion has up to this time kept us out of the conflict. The 
last class hope that we may continue to occupy the posi- 
tion of mediator only, and are profoundly convinced of the 
wisdom of Washington's advice that we avoid entangling 
alliances with European and other foreign nations, and 
continue to avail ourselves of the inestimable advantage of 
our geographical remoteness. 

Those who are most earnest in their support of the 
Allies maintain the view that popular government and 
individualism and the guaranties of Anglo-Saxon liberty 
are all at stake in this war, that the success of Germany 
will mean the enforcement of the idea that human happi- 
ness is dependent only on efficiency in the administration 
of the government of the world, and that in the attainment 
of this, morality of nations and immediate considerations of 
humanity must be ignored or sacrificed. Their view is 
that if Germany overcomes her antagonists in this war, 
even if we of the United States are not drawn into it now, 
we shall be involved later, that the doctrine that "might 
makes right" in the general interest of progress must come 
into conflict with our purposes and principles, and must 
bring to the arbitrament of war the issue between German 
absolutism and American democracy; that a clash will 
necessarily come over our Monroe Doctrine, intended to 

Introduction XVII 

protect America against forcible appropriation of American 
territory and suppression of independent popular govern- 
ment, and therefore that the whole weight of Amer- 
ican influence should now be thrown upon the side of 
the Allies. 

The pro-German element of our people is not entirely 
confined to those who were born in Germany or whose 
fathers were, but these so-called German-Americans form 
the chief part of those who believe that the contest is 
really by Germany and Austria, fighting for their exist- 
ence, for the maintenance of Teutonic progressive civiliza- 
tion against Slav retrogression, and for the freedom of the 
seas. They represent the struggle to be against Russia 
with her Tartaric and Slavic hordes, against England and 
her claim to the monopoly of the ocean, and against France 
as the bound ally of Russia. 

The violations of international law with reference to the 
rights of 'neutrals upon land and sea by both England and 
Germany have been such as to furnish illustrations and 
arguments for each one of these views. Those who are 
in favor of the Allies point with great emphasis and force 
to the fact that Germany in the conduct of the war has 
exemplified the principle that to efficiency must be sacri- 
ficed all humane considerations. The instance of the 
Lusitania, and the hurrying into death of more than one 
hundred defenceless American citizens — men, women, and 
children — give much weight to this contention. 

I believe that the great body of American people wish 
to avoid a conflict. They are anxious that the President 
should assert our rights as neutrals and the rights of our 
people as neutrals under the accepted principles of inter- 
national law, and they are willing to go with him as far as 
he deems it wise to go, hoping that some solution may be 
found that will not make it necessary for us to range 

XVIII The Great War 

ourselves forcibly on the side of the Allies. Whether the 
persistence of Germany in her justification of the loss of 
Ufe on the Lusitania will lead to a breach, it would be 
unwise to forecast. There is a course short of declaring 
war that the United States might take, and that is, to sever 
diplomatic relations and decline to have association with a 
country whose methods of warfare are so lacking in human- 
ity. As long as the interference with trade is limited to an 
appropriation of property which may be recompensed in 
the future by a judgment of an arbitral tribunal, a protest 
may perhaps suffice; but where human lives of unarmed 
and defenceless Americans are taken and the unjust and 
inhumane policy is avowed which will involve the future 
taking of such lives, protest with the prospect of a mere 
claim and possible judgment for damages can hardly satisfy 
the national right and honor. 

As I write, the issue is before the President and we 
are all awaiting the conclusion with intense interest. Of 
course the President may not declare war — that is given 
by the Constitution to Congress — but so strong is the 
patriotic sentiment, so intense the desire to stand behind 
the pilot of the ship whom the people have selected, that 
under prevailing conditions, it is after all the President 
who must decide. If he calls Congress together with an 
intimation that in his judgment drastic action is needed, 
we can be confident that Congress will follow the intima- 
tion. The closeness with which we have been brought to 
the European conflict and the really critical situation in 
which we find ourselves make it important that our public 
should have clearly in mind just what the issues are upon 
which this European war has turned. 

The Napoleonic wars, of course, were world wide in 
their influence, and affected the United States seriously. 
But the progress since then made in the machinery of 

Introduction XIX 

war, in the range of artillery, in the resisting power of 
armor, in the use of the submarines and aeroplanes, in the 
destructive effect of high explosives, and in the speed of 
marine transportation, create conditions that make the 
ocean much less of a defence for us than then, and bring 
us much closer to the actual conflict. Those of us who 
are optimists are hopeful that the inevitable prostration of 
even the victors in the present controversy, due to the 
awful waste of men and treasure, will make the anticipated 
danger to our peace remote. In any view, the importance 
of keeping ourselves advised of the moving causes of the 
war and their effects is manifest. 

The unification of Germany as the direct result of the 
Franco-Prussian War furnishes a good starting point for 
the story of the war. The ultimate failure of the present 
Emperor to maintain the Triple Alliance and at the same 
time preserve a friendly intimacy with Russia, as advised 
by his grandfather, led to the Dual Alliance between Russia 
and France. In spite of the Berlin Congress and its impos- 
sible settlement "with Peace and Honor" of the Near 
Eastern Question, Mr. Gladstone's campaign, founded on 
the Bulgarian atrocities, and his unreconcilable antipathy 
for the Turks, led gradually to the substitution of Ger- 
many for England as the Friend of the Sick Man of 
Europe. Germany's consequent activity in the promo- 
tion of enterprises in Asia Minor and the construction by 
German capital, under Turkish concession, of the Bagdad 
railway, formed a line from Germany toward Persia which 
crossed the Dardanelles and Russia's outlet to the Mediter- 
ranean, and formed a probable route to India, midway 
between the northern land route from Russia, through 
Afghanistan and Persia, and England's route by the Suez 
Canal. This, with other circumstances, led to a com- 
mon policy between England and Russia in respect to 

XX The Great War 

Afghanistan and Persia and the northern railway to India 
and to precautionary steps to prevent the Bagdad rail- 
way plan from prejudicing EngHsh and Russian inter- 
ests. The Boer War, the fateful telegram of Emperor 
William, and the new naval policy of Germany, aroused 
the fears of England and prompted renewed activity on 
her part in naval construction. From this can be traced 
a grovsdng suspicion and strain between the two peoples 
of these nations. 

The evident understanding between Russia and Ger- 
many as to the Japanese war indicated a good feeling 
between them for the time being, which was not, however, 
strengthened by Austria's annexing Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina, with Germany's approval, after Russia's defeat. 

Dr. Allen describes the remarkable congeries of peoples 
under the Hapsburgs in the dual Monarchy of Austria- 
Hungary. The Germans of Austria, the Magyars of 
Hungary, the Czechs of Bohemia, the Poles of Galicia, 
the Roumanians of Transylvania, the Serbian Slavs of 
Croatia, the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
Italians of Trentino, Trieste, and Istria, have been here 
united in a curious mosaic. The Poles were given a 
milder and more enlightened government under Imperial 
Austria than their brethren of Russia or Germany. The 
Slavs of Croatia, a dependency of Hungary, however, were 
treated with less liberality by the ruling Magyars and their 
racial brethren of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while enjoy- 
ing a good government, also were kept under rigid control, 
due to the dangerous proximity and sympathy of Serbia. 
The Czechs of Bohemia, though Slavs, enjoy a more liberal 
autonomy and have greater influence in the Empire. The 
Imperial Government in its Italian territory has felt it 
necessary to cross the desires of its Italian subjects in 
language, education, and other matters. 

Introduction XXI 

That such an unnatural union could be maintained under 
one government is most noteworthy, and the difficulties of 
its maintenance fully explain the absence of uniform treat- 
ment of the different elements of the whole. The impa- 
tience and discontent of some of these peoples of the 
Austrian Empire at not having greater voice in the Im- 
perial Government, and the restlessness of others at being 
under that government at all, have produced a condition 
not making for quiet in southeastern Europe. The recal- 
citrant subjects of the Hapsburgs found encouragement for 
their separatist aspirations in the neighboring nations whose 
peoples were of the same race and language. The Slavs 
looked to Russia and the Russian people as their friends 
and protectors. When Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 
suzerainty of Austria, as provided by the Berlin Congress, 
were annexed by Austria, the change in actual government 
was not a great one, but taken as it was, with Germany's 
approval, when Russia had her hands tied by the conse- 
quences of the Japanese war, as already said, it left a scar. 
It injured Russia's prestige in the Balkans with her Slavic 
wards and made her more sensitive than ever to future 
aggression by Austria. 

The Morocco question forms another turning point, 
when Germany by thrusting herself forward to obstruct 
France's colonial expansion, in which Germany had little 
or no interest, manifested a spirit that did not bode good 
for future peace and had the effect of definitely ranging 
England among the friends of France and of confirm- 
ing the Entente Cordiale. The strained feeling between 
Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on 
the other, however, seemed to have abated after the Alge- 
ciras Treaty, and all were hopeful that danger of a breach 
was past. While this calm was reassuring, the inter- 
national grouping of Russia, France, and England against 

XXII The Great War 

possible German aggression was an accomplished fact, and 
was to be reckoned with, should occasion arise for its 

Just before the outbreak of the War, Russia was disturbed 
with great strikes indicating political unrest; France seemed 
much torn with socialistic resistance to her military prepa- 
rations ; and England was busy with the threatened rebellion 
in Ulster over Home Rule for Ireland. German diplo- 
matists were unable to put themselves into a Russian, 
French, or English frame of mind and correctly to esti- 
mate the real effect that such internal dissensions might 
have on the fighting spirit of either nation. They evi- 
dently deemed the three nations quite unprepared for war, 
in view of these domestic weaknesses. In this respect, 
German diplomacy was certainly at fault, though few could 
have anticipated the magnificent spirit of patriotism, the 
calm dignified determination, and the silent courage with 
which the French people have faced this awful trial. 

In the First Balkan War, much of Turkey's territory 
was taken by the Balkan Allies. This was followed by 
the ineffective Congress at London. Then came the 
Second Balkan War over the spoils, in which Bulgaria 
was humiliated by Serbia, Greece, and Roumania. These 
wars kept Russia and Austria in feverish excitement and 
diplomatic activity. Austria was determined to prevent 
Serbia's getting to the Aegean Sea at Salonica, and did so. 

Looking back over these rapidly succeeding events, and 
considering the clashing interests as they are brought out 
clearly, succinctly, and fairly by Dr. Allen, we can easily 
see what a Pandora's box the Balkans were and how the 
great war grew out of its opening. 

The murder of the Austrian Crown Prince and his wife, 
as the work of a pro-Serbian conspiracy, and Austria's ulti- 
matum to Serbia, set a spark to the powder that we all 

Introduction XXIII 

must now recognize as covering the whole of Europe. 
The Alliance and the Entente dragged all the powers in, 
and the train of circumstances leading to the War is as 
clear as possible, in the event. 

The invasion of Belgium and the avowed breach of 
international obligation by Germany requires from the 
author a summary of the history of Belgium's neutrality 
guaranteed by all the Powers, including Prussia and Aus- 
tria, and its reaffirmation by the North German Confed- 
eration for the period of the Franco-Prussian War. This 
breach of a sacred treaty obligation forms the basis of a 
capital indictment on which Germany will certainly be 
convicted at the bar of history. 

The subsequent joining of the Allies by Japan and Italy, 
and of the Teutonic Alliance by Turkey, calls for a chapter 
upon these three countries and a rapid resume of their 
recent history in its bearing upon their interests in the 
conflict. Japan's alliance with England and her desire to 
deal with China when the European powers could not 
intervene, Italy's insistence on the balance of power guar- 
anteed her in the Adriatic by her treaty with Austria, and 
her wish to add to United Italy the Italians of the Tren- 
tino, Trieste, and Istria, and Turkey's business association 
with, and friendship for, Germany, under the influence of 
the Young Turks, with Enver Pasha at the head, and her 
natural antagonism for Russia, furnish the respective 
motives for their coming into the fight. 

Dr. Allen discusses the evidence as to the immediate 
responsibility for the war, and considers the charge that 
the bringing on the war was of a deliberate purpose by 
Austria and Germany. He refers to the remarkable coin- 
cidence of the completion of Germany's preparation for 
war in the finishing of the Kiel Canal; the very great 
enlargement of her military forces in the years of 1913 

XXIV The Great War 

and 1914; and her construction of a remarkable network 
of railways, strategic but non-commercial, on the Belgian 
border, as circumstances tending to show that Germany 
had the war in mind. The possible explanation of this he 
offers is that the confirmation of the Entente Cordiale really 
convinced Germany that the war was likely, and that she 
must perfect preparations to meet it. He points out that 
the murder of the Heir Apparent, which was the immediate 
occasion for the issue, could not have been a matter of pre- 
meditation, and then shows by diplomatic correspondence 
that Germany and Austria really thought that Russia was 
in such a condition of unpreparedness and internal dissen- 
sion, a matter to which I have already referred, that Aus- 
tria's demands in respect to Serbia would be acquiesced in. 
He finds Russia's persistent mobilization at the critical 
juncture a moving cause for the breach, and attributes 
that to the military party in Russia, to which he thinks 
the Tsar was opposed. He credits the Tsar with an 
earnest desire for peace. 

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that had Germany 
desired peace she might have secured it by inducing Aus- 
tria to hold her hand in attacking Serbia until a conference 
of the Great Powers, or of those not immediately inter- 
ested, had suggested "a way out." Serbia seemed willing 
to conform to most of Austria's demands and to be anxious 
to do anything, not involving complete surrender of her 
independence, and Russia was not disposed to prevent 
this. The lack of preparedness on the part of all the 
AlHes is the strongest evidence of their wish to avoid a 
war. Probably Germany felt that a war must come in 
the near future, and that, with the odds against her and 
Austria in ultimate numbers and resources, now was the 
best time, when she was in the pink of preparation and 
her adversaries were not. 

Introduction XXV 

Our author considers the German Welt-politik and ex- 
presses some sympathy with Germany's impatience and 
protest against the appropriation by all the other nations of 
the face of the earth before her great industrial and political 
development and growth began. He likens the situation 
to the ownership by a few of the large estates in England 
and Ireland, and points to the policy to which England was 
forced in Ireland of ignoring private property rights and 
of compelling a redistribution. This is not the place to 
consider the other side of such a view, or the force of the 
analogy, which I would be much disposed to question. 

On the whole the volume is a most useful one for a 
practical survey of the European situation leading to the 
War, and bears on every page evidence of the impartial 
spirit in which it is written. 

If the other volumes, /. e., a second on the military pre- 
paredness of each belligerent country, a third on the 
diplomatic preliminaries, the mobilizations, the attacks on 
Serbia and the invasion of Belgium, and others on the 
progress of the War, are as clear, concise and helpful as 
the one now published, they will constitute a real addition 
to the literature on this great World disaster. 

William H. Taft. 


licet mthi praefari quod in principio summae totius profess! 

plerique sunt rerum scriptores, bellum mazime omnium memorable, quae 

umquam gesta sint, me scripturum Nam neque validiores opibus 

uUae inter se ciritates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum 
umquam virium aut roboris fuit Livy 21, 1. 

[/ nay be allowed to prefix a remark, which,, most writers of history make in 
the beginning of their performance, that I am going to write of a war, the most 

memorable of all that were ever waged For never did any other states 

and nations, of more potent strength and resources, engage in a contest of arms, 
nor did these same nations, at any other period, possess so great a degree of power 
and strength.] 

Nations, like individuals, pass through periods of crisis, 
when emotion and moral conflict are so intense that the 
experience of generations seems to be crowded into as many 
days. The current of human life was suddenly engulfed in 
one of these whirlpools of excitement and anxiety during the 
midsummer days of 1914, when the bewildering confusion 
of contrasted sensations, hope and despair, enthusiasm and 
rancor, impressed their vivid and ineffaceable mark upon 
the memory of those whose lives and happiness were 
involved in the momentous decisions which were in suspense. 

In times of tranquillity the imagination dwells with 
curiosity upon the crucial periods of the past and strives to 
conceive them as real and to derive from them definite im- 
pressions as of contemporary events. But as soon as our 
exertions are relaxed, they pass again into a nebulous state, 
leaving us with a lurking, half-conscious feeling that such 
sensational epochs are on the remote borderland of reality 
and will not return. 


XXVIII The Great War 

But almost without warning we were brought face to face 
with such a tremendous situation as our habitual thoughts 
and feelings had associated with another world of events, 
one entirely foreign to our own lives. The imagination was 
baffled, dazed, paralyzed, before the reality of what it had 
often pondered over as an abstraction. 

As I wandered through the pleasant, shaded streets of the 
Petrovsky suburb of Moscow, on Sunday, August 2nd, the 
strollers whom I encountered showed the peaceful unconcern 
of the weekly repose. On the verandahs, or through the 
open windows of homelike villas, one caught glimpses of 
family groups about the steaming samovars. An air of un- 
disturbed tranquillity was everywhere in evidence. I almost 
persuaded myself that, after all, the perturbation of the 
week just passed and the alarming despatches announcing 
warfare were a troubled dream which had departed. But 
the view from the bridge at the station of the Warsaw rail- 
way brought back the grim reality. Long trains of freight 
cars under military supervision filled the tracks as far as the 
eye could reach, and these were being loaded with all kinds 
of munitions and supplies which had been brought and de- 
posited wherever possible along the line. Constant pro- 
cessions of vehicles and commandeered horses were arriving 
from all directions. The scene of feverish activity con- 
trasted harshly with the Sunday calm. Mobilization — ^the 
word to conjure with, the word that loomed vaguely but 
ominously in our imagination — mobilization was in full 

The absorbing, overpowering feature of the great war is 
its dramatic character; the startling suddenness of its 
approach, the irrepressible rapidity of its extension, and, 
above all, the reckless, unhesitating determination with 
which interests of unmeasurable magnitude were staked 
upon the uncertain issue. 

Preface XXIX 

It is true that a definitive history of the war is impossible 
until we can view the events with calmer detachment and 
truer perspective, after they have dropped well astern in the 
wake of the progress of time. But it is just as truly incum- 
bent upon us to correlate the events of the mighty present, 
and to endeavor to understand, as adequately as our limited 
perception will allow, the forces in action which are reshap- 
ing the framework of society for future generations of man- 

The succession of circumstances and an ever increasing 
interest, stimulated by long residence in Europe, in the 
currents of politics and society which were converging to- 
wards the maelstrom have induced me to undertake the 
composition of the present work. Amid the myriad of 
books which have appeared even in this country dealing 
with the background and actual course of the war, it would 
be vain to claim for this work any unique characteristics. 
But whatever usefulness it may prove to possess is based 
chiefly upon its comprehensive scope and impartial treat- 

The more salient elements in the narrative are not likely 
to be greatly altered by future investigation. It has been 
my chief aim to provide a clear, unbiased account of these 
facts, to serve as a reliable foundation upon which the 
thoughtful reader may build, as time will reveal new data 
and points of vision. My impartiality is the equilibrium of 
competing sympathy, not the empty neutrality of indiffer- 
ence. All the belligerent countries excepting Serbia and 
Japan are known to me through direct observation. But 
the fondest, most intimate, associations unite me with Italy, 
Germany, France, and Great Britain. Their fields and 
forests, highways and byways, cities and villages, have 
become part of my life. A war between these countries is 
a source to me of unspeakable sadness. It is a conflict in 

XXX The Great War 

which I must lose, whoever is the victor. 

But in spite of a cosmopolitan experience it is impossible 
for me to conceal two native prejudices, a predilection for 
democracy and an aversion for militarism. 

Much of the material in the first volume is the gradual 
accumulation of travel and enquiry. An insoluble debt is 
due to German scholarship for the facilities which have 
always been cheerfully offered, and above all, for the inspira- 
tion and instruction of investigators in their scientific 
methods of work. 

The current periodical literature and daily press of the 
leading countries, the official correspondence and reports, 
and a large part of the special literature on the war have 
been brought into requisition for the present work; while 
the Annual Register, Schulthess' Geschichtskalendar, and 
U Annee politique have been of invaluable assistance in the 
verification of dates and in supplying the texts of speeches 
and the more important parliamentary proceedings. 

George H. Allen, Ph.D. 

History Department, 
University of Pennsylvania. 

^ ? 

^-1 ^ 

5! »• 

■5, ^ 

= b^ 



Motives and Forces in the Territorial Adjustment 

OF European States 

The present situation justifies a retrospect. The most powerful factor in 
moulding European states. Theory of nationalities. The Unification of 
Italy. Italia Irredenta; Irredentism. Unification of Germany. Bismarck; 
Real-politik. Exceptions to the application of the Principle of Nationalities; 
Alsace-Lorraine; Examples in the Russian Empire; prejudiced opinion of 
Russian expansion; Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and Poland. Hapsburg 
Realm apparently the Negation of the Principle of Nationalities. Why a 
dual, not a federal monarchy. Races in Austria-Hungary; Slavs the most 
numerous. Poles in Austria, and in Prussia. Balance of Power. Standing 
alliances. Origin of the Triple and Dual Alliances. 

It is surely no more than a modest assertion to predict 
that the Great War, which bewilders the intellect with its 
magnitude and horror, will mark the beginning of a new his- 
torical epoch. The governments of more than half the In- 
habitants of the world are at present engaged in the struggle. 
Our attention is enthralled as by a drama enacted on a world- 
wide stage. Our imagination Is alert to grasp some indica- 
tion upon which to build a conjecture of the coming age. 
The present is not a propitious time for tranquil retrospec- 
tion. And yet the key to the problems of the present and 
future lies in the immediate past, in the period which has 
just reached its termination. The old century, likewise, 
was ushered In with the turmoil of general warfare, and 
through it run the tendencies and forces which converge 
upon the present crisis. A brief review of some of the 
significant features of the last century will lead naturally to 
a discovery of the political, social, and industrial movements, 
and the national ambitions and policies, of which the more 

2 The Great War 

immediate causes of the present conflict are the consequence. 

If we consider the nature of causes of war, we shall perceive 
that they are capable of division into two great classes, 
which for convenience we may agree at the outset to call 
potential and positive causes respectively. Potential causes 
will Include all institutions, tendencies, movements, con- 
trasts, in short all features or elements of social life and 
organization, which are a fertile field for implacable discords. 
The class of positive causes will be made up of the actual 
situations, disagreements, collisions of interest, of which the 
state of hostilities is the direct consequence. The potential 
causes are the immanent, inherent, intrinsic, or general 
causes. The positive are the determinate, definite, explicit, 
or special causes. Examples as illustration of the distinc- 
tion between the two kinds of causes readily suggest them- 
selves. The potential cause of the war which resulted in the 
independence of the United States was the remoteness of the 
American colonies from the mother country. The positive 
cause was the question of taxation. The potential cause of 
the Civil War in the United States was slavery. The posi- 
tive cause was the assumption on the part of certain of the 
states of the right to withdraw from the Union. The re- 
sumption of hostilities by Great Britain and France in 1803 
had as potential cause the insatiable ambition of Napoleon. 
Its positive cause was the non-fulfilment by Great Britain 
of the terms of the Treaty of Amiens. The desire for 
Italian unity was the potential cause of the campaign of 
1859, the Intervention of Napoleon III In the affairs of Italy 
was the positive cause. 

In the following brief summary of the most fruitful political 
movements In the nineteenth century in Europe, and of 
the recent condition of affairs In the principal states, the 
causes of the war as such will not be directly discussed. But 
by choosing for treatment from the vast field that lies before 


US the tendencies that have an enduring significance these 
introductory observations will be made suggestive of the 
potential causes, although not explicitly indicative of them. 

To understand the problems that attend the progress of 
European states by reason of their mutual relationship, we 
must consider before all two political ideals of fundamental 
importance. These are the Principle of the Balance of 
Power, and the Principle of Nationalities. One is the rather 
evasive goal of diplomacy, the other the incentive of popular 
enthusiasm. The Balance of Power was a guiding motive 
in foreign policies of European states before the present 
conception of a nation had gained recognition. States were 
frequently recast in the eighteenth century, or bartered to 
and fro, to establish an equilibrium of power, or provide 
satisfaction for rival dynastic claims, without any thought 
for the feelings of their inhabitants, as though they were the 
estates of great proprietors. However, the Principle of 
Nationalities created in the nineteenth century several of the 
most important states, which are the units with which the 
Balance of Power is constructed. It is convenient, there- 
fore, to treat the younger principle first. 

In the French Revolution a whole people came to con- 
sciousness of its national solidarity, its mission, its ideals and 
aspirations, with the sudden fury of a mighty volcanic 
eruption and the resulting disturbances have vibrated 
throughout the nineteenth century, developing greater 
violence from time to time when it has been necessary to dis- 
engage weightier masses of political inertia and oppression. 
The development of national self-consciousness in the peoples 
of Europe was contagious. It made the Doctrine of Nation- 
alities a live principle. A state and a nation are not neces- 
sarily the same. A state is a conventional political organi- 
zation, a unit of sovereignty. A nation is a living organism, 
the result of a gradual process of growth. It is bound to- 

4 The Great War 

gether by the most intimate ties, a common language and 
literature, common customs, and a common consciousness 
of right and wrong. 

Formerly the system of states disregarded national divi- 
sions. Boundaries were frequently traced with supreme in- 
difference to national distinctions, not to mention national 
preferences. It is a singular fact that the nineteenth century 
has witnessed in Europe concurrently the rapid advance in 
means of communication, which tend to break down barriers 
and foster the growth of cosmopolitanism, and the remark- 
able revival of the spirit and consciousness of individual 
nationalities. The increased facilities for study and investi- 
gation and the cheapening and general diffusion of books 
probably contributed to the awakening of this national spirit. 

The Principle of Nationalities became an impelling force 
and one which continues to demand consideration. It 
affirms that states and nations should correspond; that each 
nation should have its own exclusive, independent political 
organization; that sovereignties and nationalities should be 
co-extensive. The nation is the proper social foundation 
for the state. The national state is the most modern pro- 
duct of political development. It affords the most favor- 
able field for the growth of free institutions. It diminishes 
or eliminates the friction between the central and local organs 
of government. The states with a composite population, 
where national unity does not exist, have lagged behind in 
the progress of the nineteenth century toward popular 

The most conspicuous achievements in consummating 
the popular yearning for national solidarity have been the 
unification of Italy and Germany. These movements have 
been central features in the political developments of the 
nineteenth century. 

Except for a few years under Napoleon, Italy was reckoned 

-ht, George Barrie's Sons. 


as merely a geographical expression in the early part of the 
nineteenth century. Though no larger in area than Arizona, 
Italy was divided between ten distinct sovereignties. Pied- 
mont alone in the northwest, including Liguria and the island 
of Sardinia, was ruled by a native dynasty. The Pied- 
montese were hardy, thrifty, conservative. Their institu- 
tions still exhibited vestiges of feudalism. The policy of 
the government was narrow and petty. The heavy atmo- 
sphere of Austrian absolutism depressed the heart and brain 
of Italy. Lombardy and Venetia, the richest part of the 
country, were under the direct authority of an Austrian 
viceroy. Bitterness against the foreigner has obscured the 
better features of Austrian rule. Order was maintained, and 
a fairly impartial administration of justice, excepting where 
political questions were involved. But the Austrian pro- 
vinces bore an excessive burden of taxation, and all agitation 
for political reform was repressed with the utmost severity. 
Many eminent men were arrested without trial and lan- 
guished for years In Austrian military prisons, their only 
crime having been their patriotism. The duchies of Parma, 
Modena, and Tuscany were governed by proteges of Austria, 
whose policy was usually directed from Vienna. The spirit 
of inertia and decay brooded over the Papal State, and the 
Neapolitans groaned under a Bourbon despotism, the most 
despicable tyranny In Europe, a government which Mr. 
Gladstone at a later period declared to be the negation of 
God. From such unpromising conditions Italy arose re- 
juvenated, purified by eager self-devotion to a common 
national aspiration. 

Secret societies eluding a despotic and inquisitorial police 
system carried on a liberal agitation leading to the two 
revolutions of 1820 and 1831, which were barren in Immediate 
results, but taught the people that liberty without unity was 
Impossible. Then little Piedmont assumed her heroic task 

6 The Great War 

as leader in the conflict for unity. She defied the haughty- 
oppressor of Lombardy and Venetia. Aided at first by 
contingents from the other states, whose people insisted 
upon co-operation, later deserted by them as the tide of 
revolution throughout Italy waned, the Piedmontese army 
was defeated at Custozza in 1848, and at Novara in 1849, 
and Piedmont had to make such terms of peace as she could. 
But she retained her liberal constitution, which had been 
proclaimed as the inauguration of her heroic policy, to serve 
as a beacon-light in the gloom that again spread over Italy. 
Though crushed in war, the fortunes of Piedmont were 
revived and lifted to immortal renown through the genius of 
a single individual, the most remarkable diplomat of the 
nineteenth century, Emilio Cavour. By causing Piedmont 
to participate in the Crimean War, he obtained the right to 
speak in a European congress, where he exposed the wrongs 
of Italy, and brought about the alliance with Napoleon III 
and the latter's intervention against Austria in 1859. After 
her defeats at Magenta and Solferino Austria yielded Lom- 
bardy. The next year witnessed an exploit which may 
challenge comparison with the narratives of epic poetry. 
The national hero, Giuseppe Garibaldi, slipped out of the 
harbor of Genoa by night with about 1100 volunteers 
embarked in two steamers. Landing stealthily at Trapani 
near the western extremity of Sicily, May 11, 1860, he cleared 
the island within a few weeks of the 24,000 troops of the 
Bourbon king of Naples. He was everywhere received as 
a deliverer. He crossed to the mainland, united his forces 
with King Victor Emanuel and the Piedmontese army, which 
had traversed the Papal State to enter the field, and dealt a 
death-blow to the power of the Neapolitan Bourbons on the 
banks of the Volturno, Oct. 1. Meanwhile the duchies 
threw in their lot with Piedmont, so that Victor Emanuel 
ascended the throne of the Kingdom of Italy, March 17, 

Territorial Adjustments 7 

1861. The process of unification was continued by the an- 
nexation of Venetia as a result of the alliance with Prussia 
in 1866, and the occupation of Rome upon the withdrawal 
of the French garrison in 1870. 

The Doctrine of Nationalities implies that a government 
should receive its sanction by the consent of the governed. 
For community of sentiment is the supreme test of common 
nationality. True to this principle the Italians submitted 
each of these annexations to the judgment of the popula- 
tions concerned and in each instance union with Piedmont 
or the Kingdom of Italy was confirmed by a plebiscite on 
the basis of universal suffrage with an overwhelming major- 
ity. There remains an Italian population of several 
hundred thousand souls still included in the Austrian ter- 
ritory, in Southern Tyrol about Trent, in Trieste, and in 
Istria, all adjacent to the Kingdom of Italy; and despite the 
connection with Austria-Hungary through the Triple Alli- 
ance, the hope that these people may ultimately be united 
with the great mass of their Italian brethren has been 
cherished by many, who call these territories Italia Irredenta, 
or Unredeemed Italy. Those who refuse to admit that the 
Unification of Italy has been completely achieved because 
this population has remained outside are called Irredentists, 
and their attitude, Irredentism. 

In the political development of the nineteenth century 
the liberal movement was less pronounced in Germany than 
in Italy. The forcible, warlike policy by which unity was 
finally achieved in Germany reduced the liberal movement 
to a subordinate, dependent position. The spirit of revolu- 
tion was relatively less vehement because the rulers were 
native princes by descent and tradition and their adminis- 
tration was in general less oppressive. Dynasties and people 
had grown together by long association. This was at the 
same time an advantage, and a hindrance. The present 

8 The Great War 

rather limited constitutional regime was obtained with very 
little bloodshed and violence. But on the other hand, the 
spirit of individualism of the different states was too strong 
to be entirely eradicated. And so the united Germany 
became a federal state, not a unitary, constitutionally com- 
pact, state like Italy. 

The ideal of a free, united Germany was born in the fer- 
vor of the national awakening when the armies of Napoleon 
were swept back into France. But in the disposition of 
affairs which followed in the Congress of Vienna, German 
patriots were cruelly disappointed in their hope of unity; 
liberals were deceived in their expectation of constitutional 
government. True, progress had been made in diminishing 
political chaos. In place of about four hundred states in 
Germany there were now less than forty. But these were 
joined in a very loose, inefficient confederation, with a diet 
meeting at Frankfort composed of the delegates of the vari- 
ous princes, without discretionary power, voting according 
to the instructions of those who sent them. The powers 
of the diet were chiefly negative, that is, repressive. Austria 
was always to have the presidency of it, although only one- 
third of the Austrian Empire was included within the bounds 
of the confederation. The Austrian policy of reaction 
dictated by Metternich predominated for more than a 

Each of the thirty-eight states comprising the confedera- 
tion after 1815 had its own customs boundary as a barrier 
against the sister states as well as foreigners. To the differ- 
ent parts of Germany, economically interdependent by 
nature, this was an intolerable obstacle, and Prussia took 
the lead in establishing a tariff union in 1819, which by 
1834 embraced seventeen states with an aggregate population 
of 23,000,000. This ZoUverein, as they called it, was geo- 
graphically a forecast of the present Empire. Thanks to this 

Territorial Adjustments 9 

fiscal union the states were effectively knit together by com- 
mercial ties before the way was clear for political unity. 

The whirlwind of revolution which swept over Europe in 
1848 prostrated for a time the power of reaction in Germany. 
A national parliament elected by the people assembled at 
Frankfort, drew up a federal constitution and offered the 
imperial crown to Frederick William IV, King of Prussia; 
but he refused it. Prussia was still a docile follower of 

The mid-century period of commotion in Germany, as in 
Italy, left no tangible results, except that Prussia, like 
Piedmont, emerged from it with a constitution. The par- 
liamentary method of achieving the political unification of 
the country had signally failed. The Liberals hoped that 
Prussia would Identify her policy with their ideals, and play 
the role of Piedmont in Germany. Prussia devoted all her 
energy to the unification of the Fatherland. But the ini- 
tiative, the spirit, and the guiding force of the movement 
were henceforth monarchical. Moreover, Prussia was not 
merged in the united commonwealth losing her identity like 
Piedmont. She transformed in large measure the rest of 
Germany, which received the characteristic stamp of her 

The failure to bring about unity by deliberation was 
clearly due to the tenacity with which the German rulers 
clung to their independence. The only practical means to 
overcome this difficulty was for one state to reduce the others 
to virtual subordination by force. Two states far exceeded 
all the others in power. But of these, Austria was poorly 
qualified to become the dominant member in a federal Ger- 
man union, because her spirit was not representative, and 
her attention was distracted by internal problems arising 
from her non-homogeneous population. Prussia was quali- 
fied by her character and traditions to assume the suprem- 

10 The Great War 

acy; and since It was hopeless to reduce Austria to a depen- 
dent position within the union, it followed that Austria must 
be excluded from it. 

After her crushing defeats and humiliation by Napoleon, 
Prussia had submitted her antiquated institutions to a 
thorough overhauling and reorganization. The state was 
in large measure reconstructed by Hardenberg, Stein, and 
Scharnhorst. The administrative reforms of that time are 
only less important as models for continental European 
practice than those inspired directly by the French Revolu- 
tion. The most conspicuous one was the establishment of 
the rule that all male subjects who are physically fit must 
serve for a limited period in the army. Prussia has faith- 
fully upheld the theory of universal obligation to military 
service, although the rule has not at all times been thoroughly 
enforced. William I, who became regent in 1858 and sove- 
reign three years later, perceived that German unity must 
be achieved by force, and accordingly insisted that the 
military establishment should be expanded so that all young 
men arriving at the military age could be admitted as re- 
cruits, and that the period of service In the active reserve 
should be doubled. The determination of his minister 
Prince Otto von Bismarck carried out this design in the 
face of the bitter opposition of the lower house of the par- 
liament and in practical violation of the provisions of the 
constitution guaranteeing the control of the budget by the 
chamber. The results of this policy while appearing to 
justify the irregularity of the means by its preeminent suc- 
cess might easily have established a very dangerous pre- 
cedent for constitutional government In Prussia. 

Bismarck possessed a clear perception for reality, and an 
unusual quality of intellectual astuteness and subtlety. He 
was endowed with an iron will and tenacity of purpose. He 
was capable of conceiving the most audacious projects of 


Statesmanship and had the capacity and resolution for 
bringing them to sucessful issue with startling precision and 
assurance. He was a representative of the sturdy Prussian 
landed aristocracy with many of their prejudices. He ex- 
emplified the harsher quality of the Prussian temperament, 
which is in harmony with the less genial soil and climate, 
and the stern conditions under which the Prussian people 
have asserted their claim to live and to expand. His dis- 
position was in accord with the spirit of materialism which 
had mastered the temper of the age, substituting sober 
realism for idealism, prose for poetry, facts for fancies, and 
applied science for abstract speculation. He held in con- 
tempt the liberal ideas of 1848-9. He upheld the monarch- 
ical traditions of Prussia, and he steadfastly maintained 
that the English system of the parliamentary control of 
government was neither constitutional nor desirable in his 
own country. 

We may appropriately dwell upon the character and aims 
of Bismarck. He left an enduring impression upon the in- 
stitutions of Germany, where his spirit is still alive, and 
exerts a profound influence. His diplomacy was not free 
from criticism on ethical grounds. It was not infrequently 
characterized by artifice and duplicity, which are often ex- 
cused as unavoidable. The unparalleled sucess of his 
diplomacy contains a possible element of danger, because it 
might commend his methods to later, and less capable, 
statesmen inclined to the belief that the end justifies the 
means. But Bismarck's spirit stands primarily for organ- 
ized administrative efficiency, for a carefully trained,well 
disciplined bureaucracy, things that in an age of science and 
specialization may as justly claim our attention as the hal- 
lowed organs of popular and representative government. 

Bismarck's career embodies a conception of the proper 
attitude and aim of the state in its relation to other states 

12 The Great War 

which is accepted by leading political philosophers in Ger- 
many, and called Real-politik. It is based upon the as- 
sumption that the chief aim of the state is power. It means 
the exclusion of ideal objects from foreign policy, and con- 
centration upon material ends. But the exponents of the 
system urge a clear perception of the attainable and the 
strict exclusion of all that Is impractical, visionary, or 

Bismarck's resolute policy is illustrated by a famous 
speech which he delivered in parliament, in 1863, in the 
course of which he declared; "Prussia must keep her strength 
intact for the favorable moment, which is too often missed. 
Prussia's boundaries are not favorable to the develop- 
ment of a strong body politic. Not through fine speeches 
and majority resolutions will the questions of the hour be de- 
cided — that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 — but by Blood 
and Iron". His "blood and iron" policy became proverbial. 
The stern temperament of her great leader and the struggles 
attending her rise impressed upon the new Germany a pro- 
found appreciation for strength, and the conviction that in 
the last resort a nation is based on force, and only by force 
can by held together. 

The repeated blows of the mighty Prussian hammer for- 
ged in three wars within seven years the rivets that were to 
bind together the German Empire. Bismarck foresaw 
events with never-failing clearness of perception, and not 
the least proof of his ingenuity is his success in isolating the 
powers which were in succession the enemies of Prussia. 
Bismarck did not shrink from promoting conflicts which he 
knew to be unavoidable. The annexation of Schleswig by 
Denmark offered a pretext for the regulation of the unsatis- 
factory situation of the two duchies Schleswig and Holstein 
by Prussia and Austria together in 1864. 

Bismarck manipulated the problems arising in connection 

Territorial Adjustments 13 

with the administration of these duchies in such a way as to 
embroil Prussia and Austria In 1866, and make the latter 
appear as aggressor. The consequences were the dissolu- 
tion of the old confederation, the decisive Prussian victory 
of Sadowa or Koniggratz, the termination of the war in 
seven weeks, and Austria's exclusion from Germany. Prus- 
sia rounded out her territory by annexing small neighboring 
states which had sided with Austria, together with the two 
duchies which had been the bone of contention. She or- 
ganized the North German Federation including all the 
territory of the present empire north of the River Main, in 
1867. The South German states, Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, 
Baden, and Hessen Darmstadt entered into a military al- 
liance with Prussia, and it was evident that the slightest act 
of foreign aggression would create a flood of patriotism so 
irresistible as to carry away all the barriers between them. 
For this and other reasons Bismarck perceived the necessity 
of squaring accounts with the French Empire of Napoleon III. 

A casual opportunity for discord was treated in such a 
way that France declared war, July 19, 1870. The South 
German states threw in their lot with Prussia, with whose 
system they had already brought their own military or- 
ganizations into conformity. The military machine per- 
formed its function with bewildering accuracy and tho- 
roughness. The military power of France was crushed in 
six months. By the Treaty of Frankfort, May 10, 1871, 
France was constrained to cede a territory of 5603 square 
miles, Alsace and a part of Lorraine, containing a population 
at that time of about 1,500,000, to pay an indemnity of five 
billion francs, and to grant to Germany in commercial re- 
lations the treatment of the most favored nations. 

The successful war with France made a closer union of the 
states inevitable. The negotiations to this end were being 
carried on during the course of the war, and just before its 

14 The Great War 

termination, on Jan. 18, 1871, William I was proclaimed 
German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in the 
presence of the princes of Germany and the generals of the 
army. Bismarck continued to guide the policy of his 
country as Imperial Chancellor until 1890. 

A thorough application of the Principle of Nationalities 
in Europe would have removed most of the causes of inter- 
national friction during the nineteenth century. It might 
very likely have eliminated the most immediate cause of 
the present war. Unfortunately many of the nationalities of 
Europe occupy territories so intricately arranged, and the 
geographical requirements of great political and commercial 
interests are so imperative, that it is doubtful whether the 
principle can ever be adopted in all instances. Some of the 
exceptions to the application of the doctrine havebeen a source 
of bitterness and suspicion, contributing in large measure to 
the irritation and inflammation of spirits which has developed 
concurrently with the more certain causes of the present war. 
It will contribute materially to our purpose to consider 
briefly the more noteworthy examples of the non-fulfilment 
or violation of the principles of national unity and inde- 
pendence in Europe. 

Alsace and the part of Lorraine where French had not 
supplanted German as the spoken language were ceded by 
France to Germany in 1871. • This territory was admitted 
by law to the German Empire, June 9, 1871, as the Relchs- 
land, or Imperial Territory. The sovereignty is excercised 
by the Kaiser through his viceroy in Strassburg. On May 
31, 1911 a new constitution with local self-government was 
inaugurated, the legislative organ being a diet of two 
chambers. The representatives in the lower chamber are 
elected by general, direct suffrage. Alsace and Lorraine 
have three votes in the Bundesrat, or Imperial Federal 
Council, and fifteen representatives in the Reichstag, or 

Territorial Adjustments IS 

Imperial Pariiament. They contained a population of 
1,874,014 in 1910, but their economic importance is out of 
all proportion to this number. Their mineral wealth was 
still largely a matter of conjecture at the termination of the 
Franco-German War. A subsequent development has , 
shown that the richest iron deposits in Europe are con- 
cealed in an area embracing part of Lorraine, a section of 
northeastern France, and the Grand-duchy of Luxemburg. 
Thus the Reichsland makes an annual contribution of about 
18,000,000 tons of iron ore to German industry, about four 
times as much as all Prussia. This fact is of capital im- 
portance in any considerations touching the disposition of 
the territory. France together with the land to which 
France lays claim is vastly richer in iron ore. But Prussia 
contains more abundant supplies of coal, and in the economy 
of industry the ore generally seeks the coal, not the coal the 
ore. Another very legitimate consideration of both a 
military and commercial nature must be duly weighed in 
connection with the question of the proper delimitation of 
the two countries, France and Germany. History teaches 
that rivers are not, as a rule, to be considered as suitable 
boundaries of national units. Mountains are far more ad- 
equate to provide the degree of isolation useful for setting 
off the national territory. Besides, rivers are highways of 
commerce, and therefore more appropriate as interior lines 
of communication with intimate political association of their 
two banks. For this reason, on geographic grounds, the 
line of the Vosges Mountains, and not that of the Rhine, is 
the appropriate boundary between France and Germany. 

Union with any state must be treated as an exception to the 
Doctrine of Nationalities for the people of the Reichsland until 
the vexed question of their nationality is determined. They 
were part of the mediaeval empire, the Holy Roman Empire, 
which was established on a German foundation. Alsace be- 

16 The Great War 

came entirely French territory in 1697. 

The historical situation respecting the present German 
Lorraine is more complicated. In the mediaeval period the 
term Lorraine was applied to a vastly larger territory than to- 
day. It even included part of the Low Countries. There was 
Upper and Lower Lorraine. Later the name was limited in 
its application to Upper Lorraine. The dukes of Lorraine in 
this restricted sense were in authority until well into the eigh- 
teenth century. Lorraine was nominally part of the Germanic 
body, but in reality stood in intimate relationship with France, 
with which it was finally united In 1766. France had annexed 
the Bishopric of Metz as early as 1552. The German Lor- 
raine of the present time is a comparatively small part of the 
former duchy. 

It appears that both geographically and historically Alsace 
is more appropriately attached to Germany than Lorraine; a 
circumstance which we might mildly put forward as pos- 
sible basis of compromise in the famous controversy rela- 
tive to the future of the Reichsland. 

German blood predominates in the present Reichsland. 
But blood alone does not constitute nationality. Spiritual 
or cultural qualities outweigh it. For a long time the Alsa- 
tians did not assimilate with the French; but after the Rev- 
olution the upper classes at least became quite thoroughly 
Gallicized in spirit. The upper classes and clergy were very 
emphatic in their opposition to German influences after 1871. 
The people in the conquered provinces were required in 1872 
to declare whether as individuals they chose to become 
German, or remain French citizens. At that time more 
than 150,000 announced their adherence to France, of 
whom nearly 50,000 removed across the border. 

Conciliatory and harsh policies on the part of the German 
government have alike failed to bring about a complete 
assimilation of the people of the Reichsland. Many are 

Territorial Adjustments 17 

reconciled to German rule, others are irreconcilables; but 
in neither case does this circumstance determine the question 
of nationality. The fact is, with the unique conditions of 
their historical experience, they have developed, like the 
Swiss, some independent characteristics of nationaHty,which 
tend to differentiate them in their sentiments and feelings 
from both the French and Germans. 

Weighty problems of nationality await our attention in 
examining the situation in Russia. 

In judging the charges against Russia for violating the 
Principle of Nationalities it will be well to adopt a broader 
point of view and consider Russia's territorial expansion in 
general, so as to survey the individual transgressions in their 
proper perspective. And at the outset, impartiality requires 
that we should not accept unchallenged the traditional impres- 
sion of Russia's insatiable, inordinate, inhuman land-hunger, 
or land-avarice. It might seem to be a rather gratuitous 
undertaking to defend in this connection a state that has 
already absorbed one-seventh of the land surface of the 
world, and is apparently still striving after more. The fol- 
lowing observations are only to suggest that the grounds 
for such a sweeping and unfavorable impression ought to be 
submitted to a rational examination, even though appear- 
ances seem so convicting. 

Russia in Europe is a vast plain without internal natural 
barriers. The characteristic feature of Russian history has 
been an expansion over contiguous territory. We find no 
evidence in history to support a prior claim to the greater 
part of the Russian plain. The advance across Siberia began 
in 1581 and within a century the eastern boundary was 
carried to the Pacific Ocean. To condemn on ethical grounds 
the Russian occupation of Siberia would be as petty as to 
arraign the United States for extending its sway over the 
Great West disregarding the original sovereignty of the Red 

18 The Great War 

Man. Peter the Great determined the principal aim of 
Russian policy regarding expansion, and to it Russia has 
steadfastly adhered, in her constant endeavor to acquire 
open ports. Peter founded his new capital in 1703, but its 
harbor is closed by ice four or five months every year. Arch- 
angel on the White Sea suffers from the same restriction. 
During the eighteenth century the present Baltic Provinces 
of Russia were annexed. Peter attempted to secure an open- 
ing onto the Black Sea. Catherine II secured the site and 
founded Odessa. The conquest of the southern seaboard 
from the Turks was really a recovery of old Russian territory. 
Russia took Finland from Sweden in accordance with an 
agreement with Napoleon I. 

The immense empire of the Tsar constitutes a natural 
geographic unit. In general its boundaries are clearly defined. 
But on the south-west towards Austria-Hungary the political 
boundary had not, up to the beginning of the war, been 
carried forward to the Carpathian Mountains, which would 
constitute a suitable natural frontier. On the west the North 
German plain is like a boldly projecting angle of the Russian 
plain with no unmistakable intervening feature to define the 
limit of each. The political frontier between the Slav and 
Teuton powers has swayed back and forth throughout the 
centuries, and the fate of Poland, a Slav nation, is closely 
connected with the lack of natural defining features in this 

The feeling of suspicion and aversion for Russia's imputed 
injustice in subjugating alien peoples rests mainly on condi- 
tions in Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and Poland. 

Russia took Finland from Sweden in 1809. While the 
Finns are not a Slavic people, they are not Swedish either. 
There is no logical reason, therefore, why Finland should not 
continue under the protection of the Tsar, provided he re- 
spect the self-government and liberties of the people. The 

Territorial Adjustments 19 

Finns are a nation with historic personality. They are prog- 
ressive and energetic. Their educational system has banished 
illiteracy from the land. Finland is a grand-duchy with the 
Tsar of Russia as grand-duke. The Tsars have sworn to up- 
hold the fundamental laws, which cannot be altered without 
the consent of the diet. But an imperial manifesto in 1899 
virtually abrogated the constitution by establishing that all 
general legislation, all legislation, that is, which had any bear- 
ing on the Empire as a whole, was henceforth to be enacted 
in the customary way, or in other words, in St. Petersburg. 
The Tsar was to decide what legislation was "general." At 
the same time the Finnish army was incorporated with the 

A general strike in Finland at the time of the revolution- 
ary disturbances in Russia secured a complete restoration of 
Finnish liberties and privileges in 1905. This was followed 
by a sweeping change in their constitution by the Finns them- 
selves in 1906, when universal suffrage including both sexes 
was introduced. But the Russian government began again 
in 1908 to show a tendency to interfere in the self-government 
of Finland by demanding a closer control in financial and 
military matters, and at the present time the existence of the 
national independence of the Finns seems precarious. 

The Baltic Provinces of Russia have no distinct nationality. 
The upper classes are largely German; the mass of the people 
Letts. Agitation among them has never had as its goal sep- 
aration from the Russian Empire, or complete local independ- 
ence. They wish to preserve intact their Protestant religion, 
the control of their schools, and the use of their language. 
But the situation Is only in a limited sense a violation of the 
Principle of Nationalities. 

The ancient Kingdom of Poland was destroyed by three 
successive partitions of her territory in 1772, 1792 and 1795, 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria participated in the first and 

20 The Great War 

last of these; Russia and Prussia acted without Austria in the 
second. In these partitions Russia received for the most part 
territory which was not essentially Polish, either land which 
had formerly been Russian, or regions where the population 
was mainly Lithuanian. Napoleon constituted the Grand- 
duchy of Warsaw, the nucleus of old Poland, at the expense 
of the Prussian and Austrian apportionments. The Congress 
of Vienna transformed this into the Kingdom of Poland and 
made Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, King of Poland, with the 
understanding that the connection with Russia should be 
merely personal, through the sovereign. Alexander I acting 
in good faith appointed his brother to rule Poland as viceroy, 
and granted the country a very liberal constitution. Mutual 
misunderstandings resulted In the failure of the arrangement. 
The Poles were discontented without the complete territorial 
restitution of their state. The Kingdom embraced only about 
one-sixth of the former territory. The unsuccessful revolution 
of 1830 led to the virtual annexation of the Kingdom of Poland 
to Russia. The Poles have never abandoned the aspirations for 
a restoration of their national existence. Now Russia stands 
pledged before Europe to preserve the independence of the 
territory entrusted by the Congress of Vienna to the sover- 
eignty of Alexander I. 

The verdict of the nations relative to Russia's attitude 
toward minor nationalities in future will be chiefly deter- 
mined by her treatment of Finland and Poland. 

The existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the union 
of the Hapsburg dominions seems to be a flagrant violation of 
the Principle of Nationalities. This political combination con- 
tains a population speaking no fewer than eleven distinct 
tongues, or nearer thirty If minor fragmentary languages are 
included. The nucleus of the political association is not con- 
stituted by a single prominent nationality as in the British 
Empire, but there are two principal centers, each represent- 

Territorial Adjustments 21 

ing one of the two major partners in the society, the Germans 
and the Magyars, or Hungarians. The agglomeration of lands 
and heterogeneous peoples under the rule of the Hapsburg 
family was due in large measure to a succession of fortunate 
matrimonial alliances. An old proverb celebrated the good- 
fortune of the Hapsburgs, who could increase their estates by 
this amiable method : Sed tu, felix Austria, nube. Their posses- 
sions were formerly more scattered; but the far-reaching ter- 
ritorial pruning processes of the past hundred years or more 
have lopped off the too diffuse outgrowths of Austrian sover- 
eignty. The Austrian Netherlands were absorbed in the first 
French Republic, and included in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands in 1815. The Hapsburgs were shorn of their 
Italian possessions in the manner which we have observed. 
But what the Austrian domains have lost in extension has 
been more than counterbalanced by the greater advantage 
of territorial compactness. To-day the monarchy forms in 
general a convenient geographic unit, although its surface pre- 
sents the most varied features. 

Hapsburg policy depended largely on the ability to establish 
a sort of equiUbrium of racial jealousies, by opposing the inter- 
ests of one nationality to those of another. Emperor Francis I 
is reported to have formulated the guiding principles of his 
statecraft as follows: 

"My peoples are strangers one to another. So much 
the better. When fever attacks the body politic in France, 
it seizes you all the same day. I send Hungarians to Italy, 
and Italians to Hungary. Each watches his neighbor. 
Their incapacity to understand one another gives rise to 
mutual hatred. Public order is based on their antipathy, 
and their enmity is the guaranty of general peace." 
This attitude of suspicion is exhibited by the maintenance 
of the internal customs barriers separating provinces much 
longer than in Prussia. Popular institutions develop early 

22 The Great War 

where there is national homogeneity as in England. They 
were naturally very tardy in their development with the 
conditions prevailing In the Austrian dominions. National 
unity Is almost indispensable to a sound popular form of 

History alone can explain the causes of the peculiar insti- 
tutions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Why, for 
instance, have the Hapsburg dominions, with their varied 
population, a dual rather than a federal constitution? 
Dualism is the outcome of a long contest. Its chief cause 
is the tenacity of the Magyars in adherence to a national 
Ideal. Hungary was crushed in a military sense in 1849. 
Her constitution was abrogated, and she was treated as 
conquered territory; but her spirit did not yield. Her 
people adopted an attitude of passive protest. In 1861 
the Austrian government adopted a conciliatory policy. 
Francis Joseph promulgated a liberal, federal constitution 
for all his dominions. The representation In the popular 
house of the Imperial parliament was to be apportioned 
among the nationalities according to population. 

It often happens that one of the partners In an associa- 
tion by sheer stubbornness, by a determination to sacrifice 
every Interest of his associates and even himself rather 
than fail to assert his will, makes himself the dominant 
factor. The others prove eventually to be more compliant 
and go to him because he will not go to them. This was 
the role of Hungary. The imperial parliament assembled, 
but no Hungarian deputies appeared, and from 1861 until 
1867 the Magyars persisted In their invincible campaign of 
negative resistance. By no official act would they recognize 
the existence of the new institutions. Their objections 
were varied. In the first place Hungary was a historic 
kingdom with definite boundaries and Its own traditions 
and ideals. The Magyars felt that they would be untrue 


to their historic personality If they accepted such a collec- 
tive arrangement. The head of the House of Hapsburg 
could claim their lawful allegiance solely as King of Hungary, 
after he had taken the oath to uphold their fundamental 
laws. Any proposals touching their constitution or dim- 
inishing their Independence were a subject for deliberation 
between themselves and their monarch, and no change 
could be made without their formal sanction. It was only 
a casual circumstance to them that their king happened to 
be ruler at the same time of other lands and peoples. The 
plan for a federal union was distasteful for other reasons as 
well. The Magyars were out-numbered in their own terri- 
tory by other nationalities, Roumanians and Slavs. The 
Magyars claimed the right to hold these nationalities In 
political subordination, and their pride revolted at the 
humiliating prospect of a union on terms of equality 
with their subjects. 

The situation was like Mohammed and the Mountain. 
Francis Joseph finally resolved to go to the Mountain. 
The military disaster In 1866 and the exclusion from 
Germany were persuasive factors in this decision. The 
Ausglelch, or Compromise, of 1867, was the consequence. 
It has remained the organic law of the Austro-Hungarlan 

It has been expedient to unfold the persistence of Hun- 
garian temperament and its result at greater length, be- 
cause it remains the most distinctive quality In the political 
nature of the Monarchy to this day. 

The Compromise recognized as a fundamental principle 
the independent existence of the two states, Hungary, In- 
cluding Transylvania and Croatia, and the Austrian Empire, 
comprising all the other Hapsburg possessions. The two 
states have the same sovereign, who is king in Hungary, 
emperor In Austria. They form an association with joint 

24 The Great War 

ministries for a limited range of common interests, foreign 
affairs, war, and finance. Each parliament choses a delega- 
tion of sixty of its members to supervise the three joint 
ministries. These delegations meet alternately in Vienna 
and Buda-Pesth. There is a common tariff system, and 
the proceeds of the customs are applied to the common 
expenses, the expenditure in excess of the income from 
customs being contributed by the states in the proportion 
of 63.6% for Austria and 36.4% for Hungary. The joint 
expenses amount to about 3120,000,000 annually. 

The Compromise was satisfactory to the Germans and 
Magyars only; for they are the dominant elements, although 
each people constitutes a minority in the state in which 
it occupies the position of political prominence. The other 
races refuse to acquiesce in the dual arrangement as final. 
Even the relations between Austria and Hungary, particu- 
larly at the periodic regulation of common financial affairs, 
have been the source of so much friction, that if Francis 
Joseph had scrupulously endeavored to impersonate con- 
sistently the double role of king and emperor, he must 
frequently have found himself in the embarrassing situation 
of the Lord Chancellor In Gilbert and Sullivan's "lolanthe". 

The policy of Austria has been more liberal than that of 
Hungary. The Austrian Empire as partner in the Dual 
Monarchy is divided into seventeen provinces, each with 
its own diet for local affairs. The Austrian ministry is 
responsible to parliament. Universal suffrage was granted 
in 1907, and in the first elections on the broader basis the 
Socialists polled nearly one-third the votes. 

The Kingdom of Hungary includes Transylvania and 
Croatia. The Hungarian policy has been characterized by 
a determined effort to Magyarize the subordinate nation- 
alities, as shown in the refusal to allow them the use of their 
own languages in official business. Croatia has in large 


measure been excluded from the scope of this process. The 
franchise is very restricted in Hungary, because the propor- 
tion of non-Magyars is much higher among the poorer 

Bosnia and Herzegovina have been administered con- 
jointly by the two states. 

The present size and population of the Monarchy and its 
fundamental parts are as follows: 

Area in u i »■ 

Sq. Miles Population 

Austrian Empire 115,831 28,571,934 

Hungary 125,641 20,886,387 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 19,767 1,931,802 

Total 261,239 51,390,123 

In the Austrian Empire, German is spoken by 36% of the 
population; Bohemian, Moravian, and Slovak by 23%; 
Polish by 17%. In Hungary, Magyar is spoken by about 
48%; Roumanian by 14:% ; the other languages are all 
members of the Slav family. If we consider the Monarchy 
as a whole, the Germans (12,010,669) and Magyars 
(10,067,992) form together (22,078,661) considerably less 
than half the entire population. They are outnumbered 
together by the total of the Slav peoples ; and yet the Slav 
element is disregarded in the organic partnership upon 
which the Monarchy is based. 

Before dismissing the subject under discussion we must 
consider briefly the fragments of the Polish nation which 
are not included in the Russian Empire. After the settle- 
ment of European boundaries in 1815, Galicia was retained 
by Austria, and West Prussia and Posen by the Kingdom of 
Prussia, all three having been parts of dismembered Poland. 
The treatment of Poles in the Austrian and Prussian terri- 
tories presents a striking contrast. In the former they 

26 The Great War 

enjoy autonomy, and even an opportunity of oppressing 
others, in the latter every means is employed to crush their 
national spirit. 

Galicia occupies the north-eastern part of the Dual 
Monarchy between the Carpathian Mountains and the 
Russian frontier. It embraces about 30,000 square miles 
and contains a population of about 7,000,000. Geographi- 
cal conditions associate it with Russia, as we have already 
observed, but a majority of the inhabitants would probably 
not welcome with much enthusiasm a political union with 
the Russian Empire, although they are nearly all Slavs. 
For Galicia is attached to the Austrian division of the Dual 
Monarchy, and the policy of Austria in respect to the sub- 
ordinate nationalities is much more tolerant than that of 
Hungary. Thus in the Austrian Empire, as distinguished 
from the Kingdom of Hungary, there are seventeen diets, 
legislating in local affairs; in Hungary there is only one such 
subordinate legislature, the diet of Croatia. Galicia enjoys 
a larger measure of autonomy than any other part of Austria. 
But Galicia is divided between the Poles in the west and the 
Ruthenians in the east, both of them branches of the Slav 
family, but the latter more closely related to the Russians. 
The Poles are Roman Catholics; the Ruthenians are partly 
Uniates, partly members of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
The Uniates retain the Slav liturgy but acknowledge the 
supremacy of the pope. The distinction between the Poles 
and Ruthenians has caused much friction in Galicia. 
Austrian policy has favored the Poles, and has refused 
independent autonomy to the Ruthenians, thus subjecting 
them to the Poles who are somewhat more numerous, as 
well as superior in culture and wealth. 

The Kingdom of Prussia had an awkward outline before 
it acquired its present Polish possessions. For West Prussia, 
which was Poland's only outlet to the Baltic Sea, divided the 

Territorial Adjustments 27 

HohenzoUern realm in two, cutting off East Pnissia from the 
main part of the territories. Fortunately for the compact- 
ness of Prussia, Germans are now in the majority in West 

The case is far different in Posen. This province contains 
about 11,000 square miles with a population of two million. 
In outline it is like a wedge driven into the eastern flank of 
Prussia. As a part of Prussia it makes the sharp angle 
between the outlying eastern stretches of Prussian territory 
less acute. The Polish population is all Roman Catholic. 
Not only are the Poles a very large majority in the popula- 
tion of Posen, but their number tends to increase more 
rapidly than that of the Germans by reason of their larger 
birth-rate, and a constant immigration from Russian Poland. 
They are also advancing rapidly in prosperity. Prussia has 
regarded this development of Polish nationality with intol- 
erance. Partly in view of the great strategic importance 
of the province of Posen, the Prussian government inaugur- 
ated a vigorous process of Germanization in the Polish dis- 
tricts, which has been largely a failure. In the first place, 
they Insisted that the German language should be the only 
medium of instruction in the schools wherever possible, and 
instructed the police to break up public meetings conducted 
in Polish. Then, in 1888, they adopted the policy of sub- 
stituting German for Polish farmers, established a commis- 
sion for buying lands of the Polish owners so as to rent them 
in turn to German colonists, and devoted nearly 325,000,000 
to this purpose. A like sum was added to this ten years 

History affords ample proof that persecution often stimu- 
lates the cause which It is intended to stifle. Even In 
Prussia, the government's policy was severely criticised, 
when it was learned. In 1902, that Polish children had been 
subjected to corporal punishment for refusing to repeat the 

28 The Great War 

Lord's prayer in German in the schools, while in some in- 
stances the parents, who had interfered, had been fined or 
imprisoned. Count von Biilow, as president of the Prussian 
ministry, admitted in parHament that the process of Ger- 
manization had thus far been a failure, but he persuaded 
them in 1903 to place about 262,500,000 at the disposal of 
the commission for purchasing Polish lands which were to 
be sold to German colonists. 

The repressive policy of Prussia culminated in a bill for 
the compulsory expropriation of Polish lands in Posen and 
West Prussia, which was introduced in the Prussian parlia- 
ment by Prince von Biilow, in 1907, and became a law the 
following year. As amended, the appropriation for land pur- 
chases contained in the bill amounted to about $68,750,000. 
Prince von Biilow asserted that the Poles had not appreci- 
ated the advantages of Prussian rule, but adhered stubbornly 
to their own nationality. This law was denounced by an 
important part of the press and public opinion. The cir- 
cumstances tempt us to make a comparison with the agra- 
rian policy of the British government in Ireland. In the 
Polish provinces, the Prussian government had voted sums 
aggregating about $181,000,000 to secure the eviction of 
Poles, the subordinate race. In Ireland, the British govern- 
ment down to 1906 had lent Its credit for more than $155,- 
000,000 to facilitate the purchase of land by the conquered, 
and the spoliation of land-lords, who as a class represented 
the conquerors. 

At the same time as the Prussian land bill, the Reichstag 
passed a law regarding public meetings, which prohibited 
the use of languages other than German with certain excep- 
tions, as during the period of political campaigns, and in 
international congresses. In their attitude towards 
languages the Germans present this striking paradox; as 
individuals, they aim to make themselves polyglots, and 

Territorial Adjustments 29 

their plan of education is wonderfully adapted to fulfilling 
their aspiration for proficiency in foreign languages; but as 
a nation, they sternly repress any alien tongues that linger 
in sections of their territory. A single example will serve to 
show to what extremes this jealous attitude toward alien 
tongues can be carried. In North Schleswig, where the 
majority of the people are Danish, and therefore suspected 
of separatist tendencies, the authorities refused to permit 
Captain Amundsen, the Norwegian explorer, to deliver a 
lecture in his own language, which differs only slightly from 
Danish, and would, therefore, be understood by the local 
population. Later the Prussian Minister of the Interior 
withdrew the prohibition. 

We must now turn our attention to the other great prin- 
ciple, which competes with the claims of nationality for the 
position of supremacy in the preoccupations of statesmen. 

The endeavor to maintain a balance of power, or equilib- 
rium of forces, between the more important states has been 
a dominating factor in European diplomacy, certainly since 
the time of Louis XIV. Great Britain is accused with the 
greatest bitterness of the policy of fomenting antagonism 
among the continental states for selfish aims in upholding 
this principle against whatever state was most powerful. 
However, the states which joined Great Britain in coalitions 
with a view to restoring the equilibrium are equally culpable, 
if the undertaking was reprehensible, and some of those who 
condemn this conduct most emphatically on other occasions 
uphold the theory that poHtical egoism is the appropriate; 
guiding motive for the foreign policy of a state. Moreover, 
Great Britain has only intervened once against a continental 
power since the down-fall of Napoleon, and in that single 
instance the general principle of a European equilibrium 
was not the principle motive. It seems petty, therefore, to em- 
ploy this subject as a pretext for international vituperation. 

30 The Great War 

The idea of even an approximately exact balance of power 
is absurd. It would be conceivable only if national areas 
could be adjusted under conditions of such ideal uniformity 
as prevailed on our western prairies before the period of 
settlement. If applied logically in Europe the principle of 
equilibrium would mean the violation of the Principle of 
Nationalities, because the conditions controlling the develop- 
ment and power of states are naturally of infinite variety. 
They cannot be reduced to uniformity. To overcome this 
difficulty, diplomacy has devised enduring alliances, groups 
of states of different sizes, so that the aggregate strength of 
such associations may be equivalent, just as a mason builds 
up walls of equal height, even though no two stones in them 
are of the same size. Unfortunately the units with which 
European diplomacy deals are too few in number to permit 
of offsetting entirely the individual discrepancies by com- 
binations. It cannot be maintained, however, that the 
result of this policy has been entirely a failure, nor that the 
alliances have been entirely without influence in preserving 
the peace. 

The two alliances with which we have to deal are the 
Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy, and 
the Dual Alliance uniting France and Russia. 

The maintenance of friendly relations with Russia was 
the traditional policy of the House of Hohenzollern. The 
mutual attitude of the two governments was very cordial 
throughout the greater part of the reigns of William I of 
Prussia and his nephew Alexander II of Russia. Russia 
declared her readiness in 1870 to intervene against Austria 
if she should stir to help France. After the termination of 
the war there were increasing signs of a friendly spirit in the 
relations of Germany and Austria. An interview of the 
three emperors and their ministers was arranged at Berlin, 
Sept. 1872, and the consequence of a neighborly interchange 

Territorial Adjustments 31 

of views was an understanding, little less effective than an 
alliance, which endured for about six years. The inter- 
views became annual affairs and the visits of the King of 
Italy at Vienna and Berlin in 1873 opened a prospect of a 
further extension of the association. There were no inher- 
ent causes of discord in the relations between Germany and 
Russia, but unfortunately the policies of Austria and Russia 
were of such a nature that misunderstandings would almost 
certainly arise; for both pretended to have vital interests in 
the Balkan peninsula. The time came when Germany had 
to choose between her two friends, and preference for one 
would almost inevitably alienate the attitude of the other. 
The cold impartiality displayed by Bismarck in directing 
the proceedings in the Congress of Berlin wounded the 
feelings of the Russian representatives. Bismarck had 
made his choice and committed Germany to it by a formal 
treaty of alliance for peace and mutual defence with Austria 
in October, 1879. According to the terms of this alliance, 
as made public in 1888, the powers pledged mutual assist- 
ance in case either were attacked by Russia; they promised 
friendly neutrality in the event that either were attacked by 
any other power. Italy, resenting the annexation of Tunis 
by France in 1881, joined the alliance in 1883, thus expand- 
ing it to a triple alliance. The terms of agreement were 
undoubtedly modified and extended to bring them into 
harmony with the new conditions and broader scope. 

France had been isolated since the war. Bismarck had 
repeatedly declared that Germany intended to maintain the 
peace of Europe. But the rapidity of her successes and the 
incontestable superiority of her military establishment kept 
alive a feeling of mistrust. The bill for the reorganization 
of the French army in 1875 was the occasion for a protest 
by the German ambassador in Paris and a demand by some 
German newspapers that France be crushed more thorough- 

32 The Great War 

ly before she should have time to recover. The danger of 
German aggression is said to have been averted in 1875 by 
a friendly intervention of Russia and Great Britain at 
Berlin. But France did not enjoy a feeling of assurance as 
long as her isolation continued. The impulse to closer 
relations between France and Russia seems to have originated 
in the latter country. The friendship between Russia and 
Germany had apparently not been destroyed by the im- 
portant event of 1879. Alexander III, although in general 
hostile to German influence, was determined above all to 
maintain peace. Accordingly, at an interview of the three 
emperors at Skiernevice in September, 1884, an agreement 
was solemnized between Russia and Germany, each binding 
herself to maintain friendly neutrality in case the other 
were attacked by another power. This agreement was 
commonly called the Re-insurance Treaty. 

The German government refused to renew this agreement 
in 1890. In the meantime the possibility of an alliance 
between Russia and France had been discussed from time 
to time in the former country since 1879. The motives 
of Russia in drawing near to France were not solely political. 
Russia was in need of capital. She stood at the threshold 
of her era of industrial development. Count Witte, the 
guardian angel of this movement, as Minister of Commerce, 
urged the advantage of attracting foreign capital to Russia. 
Paris was the best available money market. A Russian 
loan had been negotiated there in 1891. Probably from 
that time an understanding existed between the two coun- 
tries. The interchange of the customary international 
demonstrations of cordiality indicated the development of 
the understanding into the formal Dual Alliance, the exist- 
ence of which the visit of Tsar Nicholas II to Paris in 1896 
was calculated to confirm. 

The palace at Pctcrhof on the Gulf of Finland. Built by Peter the Great in 1720. 

The Palace of Sans Souci at Potsdam, the "German Versailles, 
the Great in the eighteenth century. 

Built by Frederick 


The Nations on the Threshold of the Twentieth 


Great Britain: industrial and commercial supremacy in the nineteenth cen- 
tury; democratic development; imperialism and social reform; Egypt; South 
Africa; Imperial Federation Movement and Trade Preference; Irish Ques- 
tion; social legislation; Lloyd George's famous budget; suppression of Lords' 
veto; Home Rule Bill. France: miraculous salvation of the Republic; 
Boulanger; Dreyfus Case; Radical bloc. Russia: reforms and revolution; 
constitutional regime; peasant problem, agricultural Russia; Industrial Rev- 
olution in Russia, present condition of industry; commerce; government 
finances; German opinion of the condition of Russia. Germany : Prussian- 
ization of Germany; the army as a school of citizenship; the imperial and 
Prussian governments, measure of popular influence, political parties, Center, 
Conservatives, progress of agriculture, National Liberals, Social Democrats, 
Socialist program, state socialism; progress of German industry; govern- 
ment finances; general comparisons of Germany, United Kingdom, and 
France; the world's iron ore supply. 

Great Britain occupied an enviable position among the 
states of Europe during the greater part of the nineteenth 
century. The industrial revolution, which had been in- 
augurated there in the second half of the previous century, 
did not affect the life of the continent until after 1815, did 
not triumph in Germany until after 1850, and hardly 
appeared in Russia before 1890. It placed England fifty 
years ahead of her nearest competitors. The great naval 
victories of the Napoleonic War and the driving of her 
rivals from the seas consolidated her maritime preeminence. 
Thus the industrial and commercial supremacy of the 
United Kingdom was firmly established in the early years 
of the century. It was never seriously challenged until 
after 1870. In some respects it has never been over- 
thrown. The ascendancy of the British Islands in the 
textile industries and the world's carrying trade is still 

34 The Great War 

maintained. (See the table of statistics, page 79, Nos. 12 
and 22). Englishmen formed the habit of assuming an 
unquestioned superiority in industry and trade, because 
their position had seemed unassailable for so long a time. 
Thanks largely to the profits of trade and the enterprise of 
her people as displayed in world-wide activity, England 
came to possess in London the leading money market in 
the world. 

It is remarkable that Great Britain attained so lofty a 
position in material prosperity with a government which 
was not only unbelievably antiquated in its forms, but 
which was abounding in injustice, abuse, and corruption. 
And it is a greater wonder that at the time when the British 
parliament was an object of high regard on the continent, 
when it was making its great contribution to the political 
institutions of other nations by serving as a model of sup- 
posed excellence, parliamentary institutions in Great Britain 
were appallingly unreasonable and debased. 

Parliament was the real ruler, and the real executive was 
the ministry of the hour, which was dependent for its tenure 
of office upon the majority in the House of Commons. But 
the House had become the organ of a small governing class 
in consequence of the archaic regulations for the election of 
its members. The apportionment of representation was 
glaringly unjust, and the suffrage was very restricted. 
Some of the boroughs retained their parliamentary privileges 
although they had gradually lost all their inhabitants, so 
that it was said that three niches in a certain stone wall 
sent two representatives to parliament, and a certain park, 
where no houses were to be seen, returned two others. 
Bribery, moreover, was carried on openly and on a vast 
scale. The great mass of the British nation did not acquire 
the opportunity for political articulation until late in the 
nineteenth century. 

TiETH Century 35 

The political enfranchisement of the masses was obtained 
by three successive Reform Acts which broadened the basis 
of suffrage and redistributed the seats in the House of 
Commons. The bill of 1832 gave the franchise to the 
middle class, the act of 1867 extended it to the better class 
of laborers in the towns, and the final measure of 1884 
admitted the majority of the laboring class, urban and 
rural. In the early part of the century three-fourths of 
the children received no instruction. There was no national 
system of schools until 1870. The chief interest in recent 
English history attaches to the fact that it deals with the 
period when the mass of the nation is finally master of its 
destiny and has received sufficient education to consider 
rationally what it wants. Two political tendencies have 
been clearly distinguished in the later period, the tendency 
to emphasize the importance of the empire, and the tendency 
to undertake great social and economic improvements at 
home. Toward the close of the period, with the ever in- 
creasing political intelligence of the people, the interest in 
social legislation seemed to be gaining decidedly the upper 

Two administrations, standing at the threshold of the 
age which we are considering, strike in turn the key-notes of 
the two motifs which are intermingled in the subsequent 
composition without losing their identity. The Gladstone 
administration of 1867-1874 devoted its attention almost 
exclusively to domestic reforms, carrying through Irish 
Disestablishment, the Irish Land Act of 1870, and the 
Education Act of 1870. The Conservative administration 
of 1874-80 turned its face to external affairs. The Prime 
Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, later Lord Beaconsfield, pur- 
chased for the nation the Suez Canal shares of the Khedive 
in 1875, undertook to maintain a vigorous attitude in 
connection with the Eastern Question, and annexed the 

36 The Great War 

Transvaal, or South African Republic, in 1877. The 
Prime Minister posed as the advocate of the imperial idea. 
It was the beginning of modem British imperialism. As 
early as 1872 he had said: 

'In my judgment no minister in this country will do his 
duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as 
much as possible our colonial empire, and of responding to 
those distant sympathies which may become the source of 
incalculable strength and happiness to this land." 

His versatile imagination conceived an appropriate sym- 
bol for his romantic imperial conception. On January 1, 
1877, Queen Victoria assumed the title Empress of India. 

The foreign problems of this ministry outlived it. In 
1882 the Gladstone ministry which succeeded it had to 
intervene in Egypt to protect British interests; and the 
consequence of this was the British occupation of the country 
which has continued until the present. The task of recon- 
struction was entrusted to Lord Cromer as British Consul- 
General in Egypt. The Boers rose in revolt and defeated a 
small detachment of British troops at Majuba Hill, Feb. 27, 
1881. Gladstone, who had already been occupied with 
the project of restoring the independence of the Transvaal, 
had the courage to persevere in his conviction of justice, 
although he was severely criticized at home, and the Boers 
accepted his concession as the prize of victory. By the 
Pretoria Convention in 1881 their independence was recog- 
nized subject to British suzerainty. This arrangement was 
modified by the London Convention in 1884, when mention 
of suzerainty was omitted, and the name South African 
Republic was restored, Great Britain retaining control of 
the foreign relations- 

This same year gold was discovered in great quantities 
in the Rand, which attracted a large number of outsiders, 
Uitlanders, as the Boers called them, and created a very 

ENTiETH Century 37 

serious problem. The Boers, who were exclusively engaged in 
farming and grazing, and were the embodiment of simplic- 
ity in their habits, were menaced with submersion by the 
flood of immigration. They refused to grant the rights of 
citizenship on reasonable terms, and yet laid the chief 
burden of taxation upon the Uitlanders, who were hence- 
forth, in a material sense, the progressive element in the 
population. The resulting complaints led to the famous 
raid, or filibustering expedition of Dr. Jameson, adminis- 
trator of Rhodesia, in 1895. Those who designed this 
undertaking did not appreciate the capacity for resistance 
of the Boers. Dr. Jameson and his followers were quickly 
made prisoners and turned over to the British authorities, 
tried in London, and given light penalties, a fact which did 
not tend to appease the suspicion of the republican burghers. 
These were the days when the tide of aggressive imperial- 
ism was running high in Great Britain, when a spirit like 
that of some of the conspicuous German jingoes of to-day 
animated a large portion of the British public. On the 
other hand, there seemed to be reason for believing that the 
Boers of the Transvaal were carrying on a propaganda in 
the Cape Colony, where the Dutch outnumbered the Brit- 
ish, with a view to creating a united South Africa with the 
Dutch race in supremacy. The Transvaal government 
seemed to be playing the role which at present Austria- 
Hungary imputes to Serbia. War was practically inevit- 
able from the time of the Jameson raid. It broke out in 
October, 1899, and continued nearly three years. The 
Orange River Free State threw in its lot with the South 
African Republic. The subjugation of the Boers required 
an enormous expenditure, and the presence of 250,000 men 
constantly in the field. As soon thereafter as it was reason- 
ably possible, the British government (a Liberal cabinet had 
succeeded to the Conservative war-ministry in 1905) 

38 The Great War 

granted self-government to the Transvaal (1906) and the 
Orange River Colony (1907), and the two provinces united 
with Natal and Cape Colony to constitute the South 
African Union, in 1910. Causes of discord in South Africa 
since the Union have been Premier Louis Botha's enthu- 
siasm for imperial defense, problems arising from the pres- 
ence of large numbers of indentured East Indian laborers, 
and serious strikes in 1913-14. 

An increasing pride in the extent and resources of the 
British Empire, and the prominence of colonial affairs have 
fostered a desire for a closer political union. This aspira- 
tion has found expression in a series of colonial conferences 
in London, beginning in 1887, on the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Queen Victoria's accession to the throne. 
After others had been held in 1897 and 1902, the conference 
in 1907 established the rule that they should assemble at 
regular intervals, every four years. Thenceforward they 
have been known as Imperial Conferences. Although the 
British Empire contains more than 420,000,000 inhabit- 
ants, not more than 60,000,000 belong to the British race. 
Any schemes for imperial federation are limited to the 
latter. In 1911, Sir Joseph Ward, Premier of New Zealand, 
proposed an imperial parliament of two houses; but the 
other representatives were not prepared to go so far. The 
difficulties are great, — ^to define its powers, to distribute 
representation, and to determine its relationship with the 
legislatures now existing, notably the British Parliament. 
A more fruitful field of endeavor has been opened by the 
proposal to form a commercial or customs union. The 
chief difficulty in this connection has been the traditional 
free trade policy of Great Britain. Sir Joseph Chamber- 
lain, the enthusiastic imperialist, favored the introduction 
of protective duties in the United Kingdom, so that while 
the bars were let down all around within the Empire, there 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 39 

would still be everywhere a defensive tariff barrier against 
the world outside. But the overwhelming defeat of the 
Conservatives In 1906 seemed to be a popular verdict 
against the proposed higher tariff in Great Britain. Canada 
and Australia both grant a preferential treatment to im- 
ports from the other parts of the empire. Another prac- 
tical imperialistic question has been that of the colonies 
assuming a share of the burden of common defense. Aus- 
tralia had already" contributed a warship, when, in the 
summer of 1912, Mr. Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, 
and some of the other Canadian ministers consulted inform- 
ally with the Imperial authorities concerning a much more 
extensive project for Canada. During the next session a 
bill passed the lower house of the Dominion Parliament to 
appropriate 335,000,000 for the construction of three 
super-dreadnoughts as Canada's contribution to imperial 
naval defense. The bill was rejected by the Senate, May 
13, 1913, until the people could express their judgment of 
the matter In the next general election. 

Undoubtedly the attempts to bring about a closer associa- 
tion of the scattered dominions have been watched with 
lively interest, if not apprehension, by other nations. The 
proposal to modify the fiscal policy was a matter of grave 
concern to Germany; for German trade had enjoyed the 
advantage of the "open door" throughout the British 
Empire, which was Germany's best customer. Moreover, 
naval assistance from the colonies might soon relieve Great 
Britain from the necessity of sending any considerable part 
of her own ships to distant stations. In Germany, where 
the national history had developed exclusively on a continu- 
ous territorial area, and where experience had emphasized 
the need of force in rendering effective the consciousness of 
unity, the dispersed members of the British Empire, which 
It would be impractical to coerce, seemed to be a very 

40 The Great War 

insubstantial material for the erection of a strong, united 
nation. It was predicted that the colonies awaited only an 
opportunity to go their own way. The rejection of the 
naval proposal by the Canadian Senate, even though it had 
been adopted by the popular house, was received as corro- 
borative evidence of the opinion already held; the colonies 
were unwilling to concern themselveswith Britain's problems. 
The recent domestic politics of Great Britain far out- 
weigh in fundamental importance, and even in sensational 
interest, the course of imperial affairs. A large part of 
Gladstone's career was spent in endeavoring to solve the 
Irish Question. During his third administration he intro- 
duced the first Home Rule Bill, April 8th, 1886, which led 
to the disruption of the Liberal Party, the Liberal Unionists 
withdrawing from it, and resulted in the defeat of the minis- 
try. Lord Salisbury succeeded Gladstone with a Conserva- 
tive cabinet, which secured the passage of an act to facilitate 
the purchase of their holdings by the Irish tenants. The 
Conservatives' policy, as later expressed, was to kill Home 
Rule by kindness. Their land-purchasing policy has since 
been greatly extended by an act in 1903, so that to-day the 
condition of the Irish peasantry has been economically 
vastly improved. During the next Liberal administration 
(1892-1895) Gladstone brought in a second Home Rule 
Bill, which was passed by the House of Commons, but 
thrown out by the Lords. The next Conservative admin- 
istration (1895-1905), first under Lord Salisbury, then Sir 
Arthur Balfour was dominated, as we have seen, by imperial- 
istic interests. The Radicals have been in power since 
1905, and their legislation has aimed at an extensive trans- 
formation of established usages. They have been fearless, 
Impatient opponents of deep-rooted social injustice. They 
have introduced startling innovations into British institu- 
tions. Their opponents characterized their policy as rev- 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 41 

olutionary; but a thoughtful consideration of the record of 
the past ten years reveals the temper of the great majority 
of the nation. They had roused themselves to carry out a 
thorough renovation of the whole political structure, and 
all considerations of foreign policy were subordinate to this 
purpose. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was Prime 
Minister until April 5, 1908, when he was succeeded by 
Mr. Herbert Asquith. 

The first great reform was the introduction of old-age 
pensions, taking effect Jan. 1, 1909, and adding more than 
335,000,000 to the budget. It was looked upon as justice, 
not charity. This measure and the expansion of naval 
expenditure increased the requirements of the government 
by more than 380,000,000. Mr. Lloyd George, Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer, met the unprecedented situation by 
a famous budget, by the provisions of which he proposed to 
promote certain social and economic reforms as a by-product 
in the process of taxation. He laid a tax on unused land, 
and appropriated for the public a portion of the unearned 
increment in land values. This budget was rejected by the 
House of Lords, Nov. 30, 1909, which resulted in a general 
election, in which the abolition of the Lords' veto and Home 
Rule were essential parts of the Radical program. The 
resulting strength of parties in the House of Commons, not 
sensibly altered since, was as follows; Unionists (Conserva- 
tives), 273; Liberals, 275; Laborites, 40; Nationalists, 71; 
Independent Nationalists, 11. The Parliament Bill was in- 
troduced, May 10, 1910. It provided that the Lords should 
have no power to veto a money bill, and that any other bill 
passing the Commons in three successive sessions could be 
submitted to the king for his approval in spite of the veto 
of the Lords, if two years had elapsed since it was first 
introduced. After a spirited contest, during the course of 
which there had been a fresh appeal to the country without 

42 The Great War 

material change in the numerical relation of parties, this 
bill was accepted by the Lords, Aug. 10, 1911. It cleared 
the way for the Irish Home Rule Bill, which was laid before 
Parliament, April 11, 1912. A threatening agitation began 
to spread through the Protestant population of Ulster, 
where the prospect of association with the rest of Ireland 
in autonomy was viewed as a threatening calamity. A 
covenant of resistance was sworn to, Sept. 18, and Ulster 
volunteers were enrolled with Sir Edward Carson as the 
animating spirit in the movement. The Ulsterites threat- 
ened to set up an independent provincial government as 
soon as an Irish parliament should meet at Dublin. The 
Home Rule Bill passed the House of Commons for the third 
time, May 25, 1914, in spite of the demand of the opposi- 
tion for a referendum. As it had been rejected twice by 
the Lords it eventually received the royal assent. The 
situation became continually more tense, and civil war 
appeared to be imminent. It is obvious that the nation 
was absorbed in these internal contentions, and was com- 
paratively indifferent to foreign issues in the first half of 
1914. The period of aggressive imperialism had passed, 
and the zeal for social reform which animated the govern- 
ment was proof of a sincere desire for the preservation of 
peace. We shall discover that France, too, had been 
largely engrossed in remodeling her institutions. 

The French Republic, which had been proclaimed in 
Paris, Sept. 4, 1870, upon reception of the news of Sedan, 
was accepted without enthusiasm by the majority of French- 
men at the termination of the war. Some looked upon it as a 
merely temporary expedient, others as a permanent necessity. 
It had proved a failure before, but so had all other forms of 
government, and therefore the obvious thing to do was to 
accept what circumstances had thrust upon them. It was a 
period of weariness, disillusionment, and exhaustion. The 

NTiETH Century 43 

greater glory is due to a few souls of loftier, far-reaching vision, 
who combined unusual practical ability in statesmanship 
with irresistible enthusiasm for an ideal. In consequence 
of their devoted efforts, the state was quickly reorganized, 
and the Republic began to acquire the devotion of the 

A unity of purpose in the apparently confused course of 
French history in the 19th century is perceived, if we con- 
sider the whole period since 1789 as the revolution, a rev- 
olution of which the different outbreaks were single incidents, 
and all the stages of which were not waged with material 
weapons. It has been a war of equality against privilege, 
of change against the established order, of independence 
against reverence and authority. In spite of seemingly 
decisive victories, apparent success at the outset was rather 
superficial. The real heart of the nation had not been 
completely won over and convinced. And so the tide of 
battle flowed backwards and forwards; the banners of de- 
mocracy now advanced, and now receded. But it will be 
observed that in each forward movement some ground was 
gained which was not lost in the ensuing retreat. Thus 
the Republic hastily proclaimed in 1870, though on several 
occasions in imminent peril, has been preserved almost as 
by a miracle, and appears stronger after every crisis. The 
victory is not yet complete, but the present outlook offers 
slight encouragement for the reactionary forces. 

The National Assembly, under the patriotic direction of 
Thiers, regulated the finances, paid the huge war imdemnity 
with unexpected quickness, and showed the world that 
France was not moribund. But a majority of this assembly 
was made up of monarchists, and only their dissensions 
afforded the Republic a chance to live. Thiers was suc- 
ceeded as president by Marshal MacMahon, in 1873, a 
pronounced royalist, who conceived it his duty to prepare 

44 The Great War 

the way for the advent of a king. A fusion of the Legiti- 
mists and Orleanists supported the claim of the Count of 
Chambord, as Henry V, to the throne of France. The 
romantic, but petty devotion of the Count to a symbol 
brought about the failure of the royaUst design and the 
salvation of the Republic. The Orleanists stipulated that 
the tricolor flag be retained as recognition of the more 
fundamental changes wrought by the revolution; but 
Henry Vcouldnotbeunfaithful to thewhite flag of Henry IV. 
The Bourbons — at least the elder house — could not forget. 

The Assembly grudgingly drew up a constitution in 1875, 
republican in substance, although scarcely avowing itself 
formally as such. The Senate of three hundred members 
was established, who are elected for nine years by electoral 
colleges, of which there is one in each department, composed 
largely of delegates from the communal councils. The 
Chamber of Deputies was to be elected by direct, universal 
suffrage for a period of four years. The two houses together 
constitute the National Assembly which has power to 
amend the constitution, and elects the president for a term 
of seven years. The ministers were declared to be jointly 
and severally responsible to the chambers for the general 
policy of the government. Republicans were a majority in 
both chambers from 1878, and MacMahon resigned the 
following year. 

The second great crisis through which the Republic had 
to pass came in 1888, when General Boulanger, some time 
Minister of War, was cultivating the engaging arts of Prince 
Louis Napoleon, later Emperor Napoleon HI, with a view 
to emulating his example. The Republic had not yet won 
general confidence. The clerical and military circles were 
largely hostile to it. The belief was quite generally enter- 
tained that the unstable republican regime was a military 
weakness. France was still isolated in the face of the 

react' terms, 

HisniareL dictadng eoiulitions t'.i 
painting by Carl H'agner. 

SniTiiuler of Sedan. After thf painting hy .■Jni.'"i -con it erner. 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 45 

greatly superior power of Germany. This fact was the 
cause, undoubtedly, of nervousness in. French policy. Bou- 
langer made known his program of rather vague proposals 
calculated to attract discontented persons of various parties, 
direct election of the president being the most plausible 
feature since it pretended to strengthen the popular influence. 
A summons to appear before the High Court to answer to 
charges of conspiracy and treason awaited Boulanger after 
he had been elected deputy, and he took refuge in Belgium, 
and died there. Soon after this, the intimacy and alliance 
with Russia added assurance to the Republic, and as it felt 
itself firmer, it became more radical. 

But there were still dangerous elements unwilling to 
acquiesce in the Republic, although it had proved its 
vitality by living longer than any previous government 
since 1789. The opposition to the Republic was without a 
rational foundation. Under whatever name it raised its 
headjit aimed to set up a principle of government which 
had repeatedly failed ignominiously. It is not to be sup- 
posed that any considerable number of intelligent persons 
continued to support this opposition. It was an alliance of 
simplicity, sentimentalism, and dishonesty; of the timid, of 
those whose emotions were deceived by obsolete shib- 
boleths, and of leaders who disguised the true nature of 
their designs by lofty expressions of piety and patriotism. 
The true purpose of the opposition was the exploitation of 
the many by the few. 

The recent history of France exhibits with exceptional 
clearness the dangerous currents in military and ecclesi- 
astical circles, and the policy of the government regarding 
them. In the celebrated Dreyfus Case, although nomin- 
ally one man alone was involved, the forces of reason and 
tradition were really arrayed on opposite sides. A contest 
was carried on for more than ten years with the utmost 

46 The Great War 

zeal of enlightened individuals to raise justice above artifice, 
prejudice, partisanship, and the irrational spirit of caste 
exclusiveness, which tends to develop in military establish- 
ments and to make itself invulnerable by the assumption 
of a sacred, inviolable character. 

Captain Alfred Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew, was arrested in 
October, 1894, on charges, submitted by one Major Ester- 
hazy, of selling military secrets to a foreign power, and con- 
demned by a court-martial the following January to public 
degradation and deportation for life to an unhealthy island 
off the coast of French Guiana. Later, Colonel Picquart 
became convinced that the document which had served as 
proof of the guilt of Dreyfus was Esterhazy's own forgery. 
The military authorities rid themselves of Picquart's incon- 
venient presence by sending him for service in Tunis and 
Algeria. Later he was imprisoned on charges preferred by 
Esterhazy. Then the novelist Zola, who had become con- 
vinced of Dreyfus' innocence, wrote for publication, in 
L'Aurore, a scathing letter addressed to the president. He 
was condemned to imprisonment in his absence, having 
crossed over to England as precaution. It is needless to 
say that each successive incident increased the publicity of 
the case, and nourished popular excitement. The foreign 
press alluded to this travesty of justice, as affording con- 
vincing proof of the moral decadence of France. 

General Cavaignac, Minister of War, now produced three 
new documents, and persons asked themselves, why, if 
Dreyfus had been rightly condemned, it was necessary to 
have recourse to this cumulative evidence of his guilt. 
Picquart declared that two of the new documents were 
irrelevant, the third a forgery, and very soon a Colonel 
Henry confessed to this forgery and shot himself. Cavaig- 
nac asserted that this incident did not afiFect the earlier 
trial; but it is obvious that its profound effect upon the 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 47 

general opinion concerning that trial was inevitable. The 
Court of Cassation, on June 3, 1899, ordered a new trial of 
Captain Dreyfus. This trial was conducted by a court- 
martial at Rennes with popular excitement at a fever heat. 
The trial was a mockery of justice. It was evident from 
the beginning that the officers who composed the court had 
agreed that a condemnation was necessary to maintain 
professional prestige. The defendant was found guilty with 
extenuating circumstances, and the President of the Re- 
public pardoned him. The court condemned themselves 
by this condemnation; for how can there be extenuating 
circumstances for treason? Finally, on July 12, 1906, the 
Court of Cassation, after reviewing the case, annulled the 
verdict of Rennes and declared all the incriminating docu- 
ments to be forgeries. Captain Dreyfus was promoted to 
major, and received the decoration of the Legion of Honor. 
Picquart's service to justice was appropriately rewarded 
when he became Minister of War. France was finally 
vindicated. The public had been torn with discord; but 
the successful issue of this long struggle added strength to 
the Republic. The accusation of Captain Dreyfus was 
part of an anti-Semitic movement in which some of the 
clerical party, and other reactionary groups were engaged. 
But the trial was also the battle-field for other issues, partic- 
ularly for a contest against military arrogance. It was 
necessary for the progress of the spirit of democracy in 
France that any arbitrary or partisan tendency in military 
circles should be restrained. 

The beginning of a new era in the history of republican 
France was the formation of the Waldeck-Rousseau Minis- 
try in 1898. Up to this time the executive had suffered 
from the paralyzing influence of political chaos in the Cham- 
ber. There had been no year since the establishment of 
responsible government which had not seen a change in 

48 The Great War 

ministry. The Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry reposed upon a 
bloc, or combination, of all the more progressive groups in 
the Chamber. This radical alliance, to which Socialists 
have at times been admitted, has endured to the present. 
Its existence, by the very fact that the other groups have 
united their forces in opposition to it, has tended to bring 
about a two-party division of political strength, which is 
essential to the parliamentary form of government. The 
bloc, under the leadership of a number of vigorous statesmen, 
has left a remarkable record of reforming legislation, the 
most striking feature of which has been the separation of 
Church and State. France, too, seemed more absorbed in 
the problems of internal improvement than in the more 
illusory aims of foreign policy, in 1914. 

We are mainly interested in Russia's foreign policy, 
because by it she became involved in an inevitable conflict 
which is one of the positive causes of this great war. But 
some acquaintance with her recent internal development 
and problems is indispensable for an intelligent appreciation 
of her foreign relations and the motives of her diplomacy. 
We may profitably consider in this connection the political 
development which culminated in the granting of the con- 
stitution, the economic situation of the peasants and agri- 
culture, and the progress of industry and commerce. 

It will be recalled that the reign of Tsar Alexander II 
(1855-1881) was ushered in with a series of amazing re- 
forms affecting directly and profoundly a larger number of 
souls than any similar innovations recorded in history. 
Forty-six million serfs were liberated from bondage, the 
judicial system was transformed according to western 
European standards, and elective provincial councils were 
established by means of which popular influence was intro- 
duced into the local administration. But during the latter 
part of the reign the imperial reforming activity was dis- 

Joseph Clianibcrlain. His political career began about iSf.S ami from tliat Llate beheld many 
offices, being prominent in parliament and the cabinet. He died July 2, 191+. 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 49 

continued, and the radical element in society awaited in 
vain what they expected as the crowning act, the conferring 
of a constitution. Impatience generated agitation. Secret 
societies were formed, especially among the university 
students. At that time the elements in Russian society 
which laid exclusive claim to the distinction of intelligence, 
the "intellectuals," suffered largely from a sort of mental 
fever caused by the imperfect assimilation of the elements 
of western learning and culture upon which their minds had 
been gorged. Those who formed this class looked upon 
sociology as the most distinguished and beneficial of the 
sciences, and in their inexperienced eagerness for social im- 
provement they brought forward many impractical and 
foolish schemes. The programs of the extremists were sub- 
versive of society. Nihilism was a revolt not against this 
or that institution, but against the whole established order. 
Agitation had recourse to terrorism, and on March 13, 1881, 
the Tsar Liberator was assassinated in St. Petersburg. 

The reign of Alexander III (1881-1894), the son and 
successor of the murdered Tsar, was a period of reaction, 
and of the repression of all tendencies towards liberalism. 
The Tsar stood for the resolute maintenance of the undim- 
inished principle of autocracy. Besides, the more sub- 
stantial elements in society had been disgusted with the 
extravagant vagaries of the extremists in social reform. 
Under Alexander III essentially national Russian ideals 
were cultivated in distinction to those which came from 
western Europe. Pan-Slavism was in high favor, which 
emphasizes the unity of the Slav race and idealizes their 
distinctive spiritual gifts and possessions. Pobyedonost- 
seff was the chief adviser of the Tsar, a man of positive, 
narrow convictions, intensely hostile to the liberal ideas of 
western Europe. 

Nicholas II, son of Alexander III, announced at the time 

50 The Great War 

of his accession his strict intention of following in his father's 
course. Nihilism had disappeared, and the more violent 
forms of agitation had largely subsided; but the desire for 
constitutional government gradually pervaded all classes. 
Pobyedonostseff's influence was powerful until 1904, but 
Sergius de Witte, who was appointed Minister of Finance 
and Commerce in 1892, believed that the experience of 
western Europe indicated the road to true national prosperity. 
The Trans-Siberian Railway, begun in 1891, was com- 
pleted in 1902, linking together with bonds of steel the 
extremities of the empire. But the construction of this 
line was part of a plan of expansion which led to the 
occupation of Manchuria, and the acquisition of Port 
Arthur. This brought on the war with Japan. The con- 
test, which was generally unpopular from the first in 
Russia, inflamed the indignation of the people more and 
more by the spectacle of administrative incompetence 
and corruption and the succession of disasters with which 
it was attended. The war began in February, 1904, and 
the assassination, July 28, of harsh, inflexible von 
Plehve, Minister of the Interior, released, as it were, a 
mighty volume of discontent. As the war progressed, 
this current swelled. The fall of Port Arthur was fol- 
lowed by Red Sunday, January 22, 1905, when the 
Cossacks fired a volley into the crowd before the winter 
Palace in St. Petersburg. The Zemstvos, or provincial 
councils, sent delegates to a succession of congresses where 
the necessary reforms were freely discussed, and the demand 
for parliamentary institutions formulated. The termina- 
tion of the Russo-Japanese War by the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth, September 5, did not relieve the domestic situation, 
but it released the enlightened Count Witte from his duties 
as envoy, so that he returned to Russia and soon became 
Prime Minister in place of the hated Pobyedonostseff. 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 51 

Russia was seething with discontent. Acts of violence 
occurred daily. A general strike, carried out in October as 
convincing protest against the hesitancy of the government, 
began with the railways and extended to the other occupa- 
tions. For a time the activity of almost the whole country 
seemed to stand still. The powers of opposition yielded, 
and on October 30 the Tsar issued his famous manifesto, in 
which he promised the fundamental rights of civil liberty, 
and the participation of an assembly of representatives of 
the people in acts of legislation. 

The elections for the first Duma, or parliament, took 
place in March and April, 1906, on a very democratic basis 
of suffrage. On May 5, de Witte resigned, and Stolypin 
took his place. The next day, the "fundamental laws" 
were issued by autocratic decree, limiting the scope of the 
popular concession by instituting the Council of the Empire, 
as a kind of upper chamber, to which the legislative bills of 
the Duma were to be submitted. One-half of its members 
are appointed by the Tsar, the other half are elected by the 
Zemstvos and other corporations. The first two Dumas 
were short-lived, sitting from May 10 until July 22, 1906, 
and from March 5 until June 16, 1907, respectively. They 
were both dissolved by decree of the Tsar. Their demands, 
such as for ministerial responsibility, and the immediate 
distribution of the crown lands to the peasants, seemed 
excessive. It was clear that no Duma chosen on so broad a 
suffrage basis could cooperate harmoniously with the govern- 
ment. Stolypin was putting down the lawlessness that 
survived the revolution with uncompromising severity. 
The government recovered its assurance, and after the 
dismissal of the second Duma, modified profoundly the 
voting system by decree in open violation of the constitu- 
tion, substituting a very complicated method of indirect 
elections, with a sort of combination of the Prussian timo- 

52 The Great War 

cratic classification with the native Russian division of 
society as basis. The result was that the influence of the 
masses in the composition of the Duma was reduced to a 
minimum. The third Duma was naturally much more 
conservative, although not always as submissive as had 
been anticipated. Its period of existence attained the 
normal limits, from 1907 until 1912. The restriction of the 
basis of suffrage was unavoidable, no doubt, in a country 
where three-fourths of the population is illiterate. The 
prevailing ignorance of the masses is commonly represented 
— and rightly — as a serious obstacle to the progress of the 
nation, particularly in a political sense. It is only fair to 
note, however, that the educated classes, who alone exercise 
any appreciable influence in the government of the country, 
compensate somewhat by their zeal in learning for the ignor- 
ance of the great majority of their compatriots. For, while 
12,967 books were published in the United Kingdom in 
1913, and 12,230 in the United States the same year, the 
annual publications in Russia amounted to 29,057 in 1910, 
the most recent year for which returns are available, and 
increase at the rate of about 3,000 yearly. One may be safe 
in assuming, therefore, that the 43,000,000 literate Russians 
read more books than all the 150,000,000 literates of the 
Anglo-Saxon race throughout the world. 

At Stolypin's initiative, valuable work in constructive 
legislation was accomplished; although, unfortunately, he 
encouraged, for support in carrying out his program, the 
development of a narrow, aggressive, nationalist party, 
hostile to the privileges of the subordinate nationalities, 
as Poles and Finns. In the Fourth Duma, elected in 1912, 
the conservative elements have a large majority. 

Popular rights are still limited in Russia, and the existence 
of parliamentary Institutions is somewhat precarious. The re- 
collection that the embarrassment of the Russian government 

NTiETH Century 53 

in the war with Japan had been seized upon immediately as 
an opportunity for revolution, the consideration that this 
movement had been repressed before reaching its intended 
goal and that therefore much bitter disappointment must 
lie hidden beneath the surface, and, finally, the observation 
that labor troubles were numerous, and that in some in- 
stances, at least, their motives had not been without some 
connection with political agitation, might altogether have 
supported the conviction as late as 1914 that a formidable 
hostile action against the empire would set in action a 
second time the forces of disintegration, which would 
facilitate enormously the progress of an invader. 

Agriculture is the fundamental occupation in Russia, and 
the empire is in large measure a peasant empire. The 
prosperity of thp empire advances or recedes in accordance 
with the progress or decline of the agricultural interests. 
Even now that an important industrial class has been 
created, of every 1000 inhabitants of the Russian Empire, 771 
are peasants, while 107 belong to the middle class, 23 are 
Cossacks, IS are nobles, 5 are ecclesiastics, and the others 
belong to other minor classes. Whoever would know 
Russia must make the acquaintance of the peasants. The 
character of the Russian peasant is variously judged. Some 
writers have shown a tendency to idealize his primitive, 
simple environment, and his direct, but often quaint, 
manner of thought and expression. A native shrewdness 
and good-sense is claimed for him. But the opinion is also 
common that he is submerged in ignorance, sloth, and 
drunkenness. The proportion of illiteracy is highest, of 
course, among the peasants. Climate and natural environ- 
ment have probably contributed somewhat to make the Slavs 
of the great plain less alert and strenuous than the peoples 
of western Europe. Statistics go to show that the evil of 
intemperance is not quite so extreme as has been supposed. 

54 The Great War 

While in late years the Russian has consumed 2.47 liters of 
spirits annually, the German consumption per capita has 
been 4.1 liters. 

Upon obtaining their personal liberty the former serfs 
continued generally in possession of the lands which they 
had been cultivating for themselves before the act of eman- 
cipation. The value of the customary services which they 
had rendered annually to their former proprietors was cap- 
italized at 6%, and this capital sum was reckoned as a 
redemption debt which the peasants must eventually pay. 
To facilitate the operation, the government turned over at 
once four-fifths of the sum to the proprietors, establishing 
as method of liquidation that the peasants should absolve 
this debt and interest together by forty-nine annual pay- 
ments, each equivalent to 6% of the sum thus advanced. 
The peasants were grouped in small, self-governing commu- 
nities, which Russians designate by the term mir. The 
land cultivated by the members of the individual mir was 
owned collectively by the community. It was commonly 
redistributed from time to time among the peasant house- 
holds; but as a fundamental division of all the land into 
three large portions was first made to serve as a basis for 
the annual rotation of crops, each family received its par- 
ticular allotment in detached strips, part in each portion of 
the communal domain. 

In 1905, of the land of European Russia, 40% belonged 
to the state, 35% to the peasant communities, and 25% to 
private proprietors. In the peasant communities there was 
an average apportionment of 27)4 acres for each house- 
hold. This, with the generally primitive, unscientific 
methods of agriculture, was insufficient, particularly in view 
of the prevailing generous size of peasant families. The 
organization of the mir was too rigid to respond to the re- 
quirements of the rapidly increasing population. Its terri- 

NTiETH Century 55 

torial limits had remained stationary, and therefore, with every 
redistribution, the amount of the individual allotment had 
diminished. The situation reached a crisis in 1905. If the 
government had been assured of the loyalty of the peasants, 
it might have rejected the demands of the urban popula- 
tion. But the peasants were in a violent ferment, and even 
the constitution brought them no direct advantage. 

The government finally undertook to relieve the situation 
in three ways, by dissolving the mir and substituting private 
ownership, by aiding the peasants to enlarge their holdings, 
and by encouraging emigration to Siberia. From 1907 to 
1912, the total emigration to Siberia amounted to 2,400,000. 

The buoyancy with which Russian finance responds to 
favorable agricultural conditions has been exemplified after 
the restoration of political order by the effect of two excel- 
lent crops in 1909 and 1910, and a medium harvest in 1911. 
The receipts of the treasury increased at once and industry 
and commerce were greatly stimulated. The increase of 
exports from 1907 to 1911 was 51%, and of imports, 37%. 

The plain extending from the Dnieper to the Volga, and 
even beyond, in southern Russia, is called the Black Earth 
Belt from the character of its incomparably fertile soil. 
This soil, varying in depth from one to twelve feet, is 
capable of yielding excellent crops many years in succession 
without artificial fertilization. Likewise in the south, in 
Little Russia, the cultivation of the sugar-beet is carried 
on very extensively. 

Russia is capable of becoming the granary of the world. 
Her crops in 1912 amounted to 727,011,000 bushels of 
wheat, 1,067,584,000 bushels of oats, 1,043,982,000 
bushels of rye, 464,124,000 bushels of barley, 1,176,055,000 
bushels of potatoes, and 1,808,800 tons of beet-sugar. 
Moreover, intensive agriculture has scarcely gained a foot- 
ing, machinery is only partially employed, and there are 

56 The Great War 

vast areas of virgin soil still awaiting the plow. 

The rapid development of industry in Russia began with 
the appointment of Count Witte as Minister of Finance and 
Commerce in 1892. 

His policy was to place the currency on a gold basis and 
make the empire industrially self-sustaining. To promote 
the industries of Russia, he persuaded the government to 
establish very high duties on imported articles. He also 
did everything in his power to attract foreign capital to 
Russia. Not only was foreign support necessary for build- 
ing up the infant industry of the country, but the influx of 
gold would contribute to the success of his currency reform. 
Witte succeeded in establishing the gold standard in Russia, 
which is his greatest single contribution to the welfare of 
his country. 

Unconsciously the Russian government cooperated by its 
high tariffs in developing the forces of opposition. For the 
rise of industry resulted in the formation of a numerous 
laboring class in the large cities possessing greater intelli- 
gence and solidarity of sentiment than the peasants. This 
factor was of decisive importance in the revolutionary 
movement of 1905. 

The first cotton factory was built in Russia in 1840, and 
now over 7,000,000 spindles are in operation spinning 
about 2,000,000 bales of cotton annually. The Russians 
are endeavoring to make this industry independent of 
foreign sources of supply of the raw material by developing 
cotton-raising in Turkestan, where it is already a flourishing 

The center of commercial gravity in Russia is moving 
southwards in the direction of the most productive natural 
sources of wealth. An immense bed of coal, apparently 
inexhaustible, has been discovered in the basin of the River 
Donetz, near its junction with the Don, northeast of the 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 57 

Seaof AzofF. As iron and coal are found here in proximity, 
nature seems to have equipped this region especially for 
becoming a bee-hive of industry. There are also valuable 
coal-fields in Poland, which has developed rapidly as a 
manufacturing region. 

The traffic in alcohol and spirits was made a government 
monopoly in Russia in 1894. The government purchased 
the product from private distillers and undertook the dis- 
tribution and sale. The receipts of this monopoly in 1913 
were about 3435,240,000, the expenses 3116,480,000, 
leaving a net income of 3318,760,000, a handsome profit. 

The annual production of Russian manufacturing enter- 
prises was valued at approximately 32,670,000,000 in 1913. 
The production of coal had only attained about 30,000,000 
tons before the war. The annual production of 68,019,208 
barrels of crude petroleum was nearly equivalent to that of 
the United States in 1902. In pig-iron, 4,131,248 tons, 
Russia's record was about that of the United States in 1881. 

European Russia is so nearly flat that its great rivers are 
very sluggish, and therefore navigable almost to their head- 
waters. The entire descent of the Volga, for instance, 
throughout a course of about 2,400 miles, is only slightly 
more than 800 feet; and a project has been elaborated for 
a ship-canal from the Baltic to the Black Sea with only two 
locks. The internal water-ways of Russia in Europe are 
navigable to the aggregate extent of 20,670 miles by 
steamer, those in Asia, 21,421 miles. Two thousand river 
steamers ply on the Volga alone. These and many of the 
locomotives consume as fuel crude petroleum from the oil- 
wells in the Caucasus. 

In 1913 there were 46,839 miles of railway lines in 
Russia. She holds second place in this respect among the 
great nations. Of the railway mileage, 60% is owned by 
the state, and the government lines produce a net annual 

58 The Great War 

revenue of about 3158,000,000. 

Russian exports in 1913, valued at 3823,264,000, were 
slightly ahead of those of the United States in 1895; the 
imports, valued at 3684,684,000, were slightly above the 
American record of 1894. 

' The exports of cereals attained the value of 3368,082,520 
in 1911. The Russians produce rye principally for their 
own consumption, but wheat forms the most extensive 
commodity for export; and without her exportation of 
grain, Russia would be unable to meet the annual interest on 
some35,000,000,000 of foreign capital invested in the empire. 

An approximate summary of the principal headings and 
total receipts and expenditures of the budget estimates for 
1914 will illustrate the condition of the imperial finances, 
before extraordinary war expenses* modified the customary 

Summary of Russian Imperial Budget reckoned in 
United States currency in 1914. 

Receipts Expenditures 

Direct taxes 137,280,000 Finances 256,880,000 

Indirect taxes 368,680,000 Public instruction. . 84,240,000 

Monopolies 555,880,000 Routes of commu- 
nication 384,280,000 

State property 579,280,000 War 311,480,000 

Other sources 189,800,000 Marine 130,520,000 

Debt 209,560,000 

Other expenses 340,080,000 

21,830,920,000 31,717,040,000 

ne 7,280,000 
Deficit 11,960,000 

Extraordinary Extraordinary 

sources of income 7,280,000 expenses 133,120,000 

Total 31,850,160,000 31,850,160,000 

The total is surely a colossal sum, in keeping with the 
bigness of Russia. It may be observed that the expenses 
are counterbalanced mainly by the receipts from monopolies 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 59 

(net income from alcohol and spirits alone 3318,760,000) 
and state property (railways, crown lands, etc.), so that the 
burden of direct taxation for imperial purposes is very light. 
The ordinary expenses for the military and naval extablish- 
ment is equivalent to about $2.52 per head of the popula- 
tion of the empire, as compared with 35.08 in Germany, 
37.72 in Great Britain, and 36.50 in France. The indebted- 
ness of the Russian government amounted inl911 to a little 
more than 34,500,000,000. The Bank of Russia, which 
alone issues paper currency, is virtually a government insti- 
tution. Its policy has been commendably conservative; for 
of late years the currency of the bank in circulation has been 
actually less than the value of the bullion stored in its 
vaults. Therefore, it was possible to finance the war in its 
early stages chiefly by expanding the paper currency, and 
still keep well within the danger line. Thus, on September 
14, 1914, the currency in circulation was equivalent to 
31,327,560,000, whereas the bullion in possession of the 
bank was 3958,880,000. On the basis of this reserve, the 
largest agglomeration of the precious metals in any reposi- 
tory in the world, the bank could have easily expanded its 
circulating medium another 31,000,000,000 without attain- 
ing the stage of recklessness, according to western European 

There were these numerous indications that the Russian 
Empire was entering upon an era of brilliant, sound pros- 
perity. Nevertheless, the change had been so recent, and 
the influence of favorable tendencies appeared to be still so 
superficial, that many German observers viewed the situa- 
tion with skepticism. General Bernhardi, in his work 
Germany and the next War, declared that the whole body of 
the Russian nation was so tainted with revolutionary and 
moral infection, and the peasantry was plunged in such 
economic disorder, that it was difficult to see from what 

60 The Great War 

source a vivifying force could spring up capable of restoring 
a healthy condition. 

We have noticed how the action of the intense, concen- 
trated energy of Prussia in achieving the unification of the 
Fatherland inevitably transformed the spirit of the rest of 
Germany, assimilating it largely to the character of the 
more robust portion. Heinrich von Treitschke, the famous 
professor of history in the University of Berlin, declared 
that the impartial observer must be convinced that "since 
the Great Elector the political history of Germany is entirely 
contained In Prussia," and that every "clod of land which 
was lost through the fault of the old Empire, and was won 
back again, was acquired by means of Prussia. In that 
state," he asserted, "lay thenceforth the political energies 
of the German nation just as certainly as she did not contain 
In her for a long time the Ideal energies, in fact almost thrust 
them from her." 

The doctrines of the great Prussian political teachers are 
a conspicuous Illustration of the purely relative value of 
all precepts of political philosophy, inasmuch as the institu- 
tions, which they emphasized as universal standards were 
precisely those of which Germany had stood In need. 
They were the institutions by virtue of which Prussia had 
grown strong, and which the other states accepted in adopt- 
ing the Prussian organization as a model. Chief among 
these institutions was universal obligation to military 
service. The national army had been a sort of school for 
Implanting the qualities most useful for German citizens. 
The Germans had been disunited. Irresolute, visionary. 
They were trained to cooperate, to be steadfast and practical. 
The directing and intellectual forces in Prussia seem to have 
collaborated with conscious unity of purpose in developing 
the cohesion and vigor of the nation. 

There Is a sense of national exhilaration and expansion of 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 61 

spirit in the harmonious action of a comprehensive organi- 
zation such as the German military establishment. It is the 
nation in arms. Naturally the Germans regard as a defect 
in any other nation the lack of this national organ of common 
effort and efficiency. 

In 1888, when at Bismarck's proposal the potential 
strength of the forces for war was increased by adding to the 
active reserve the Landwehr and Landsturm, the Chan- 
cellor affirmed that by this measure the German army 
became an even stronger guarantee of peace. "As matters 
stand," he said, "no war would be possible unless it were 
approved by all those who are liable to service, in other 
words, by the entire nation; and such a war would be con- 
ducted with the enthusiasm of 1870, when we were the 
object of an insolent attack. Under such circumstances all 
Germany would bristle with guns, and woe to the rash foe 
who should presume to defy the fury of the Germans (furor 
Teutonicus). I frankly warn foreign powers to discontinue 
their repeated menaces; we Germans fear God, but nothing 
else in the world." Bismarck's ''blood and iron" theory of 
Prussian and German evolution was reechoed by William II 
in addressing a gathering of officers at the palace in 1891. 
"The soldier and the army," said he, "not parliamentary 
majorities and decisions, have welded together the German 

A somewhat detailed examination of the German Consti- 
tution may assist us in weighing for ourselves the measure 
of truth in the widely divergent views which have been 
expressed concerning its character. The Imperial Con- 
stitution is doubtless the creation essentially of Prussian 
statesmanship. It is a continuation of the instrument 
of association of the North German Federation with the 
modifications introduced in consequence of the union with 
the South German States. The Empire Includes twenty- 

62 The Great War 

six states, and the sovereignty resides in the Bundesrat, 
or Federal Council, an assembly of the representatives of 
the governments of the different states. There are sixty-one 
members, or more strictly votes, in the Bundesrat, and their 
distribution among the states varies considerably with a 
tendency to correspond to the importance and size of the 
individual divisions, but without attaining a true propor- 
tionate adjustment. Thus Prussia has seventeen votes in 
the Bundesrat, while seventeen of the states have one vote 
each. The presidency of the federal government belongs 
to the King of Prussia, and he bears the title Deutscher 
Kaiser, or German Emperor, by virtue of the exercise of 
this function. The Kaiser declares war and makes treaties 
and other agreements in the name of the federation; but only 
in case the territory of the Empire or its coasts are attacked, 
is he empowered to declare war without the consent of the 
Bundesrat. He appoints the Reichskanzler, or Imperial 
Chancellor, his chief minister, who is one of the Prussian 
members of the Bundesrat. The Chancellor presides in the 
meetings of the Bundesrat, appoints the federal ministers 
and other officers in the name of the Emperor, and super- 
vises them in the performance of their duties. 

The Bundesrat adopts such general administrative meas- 
ures as are necessary for putting the laws into execution. 
The prominent position of the Bundesrat does not depend 
solely upon its executive prerogatives as repository of the 
sovereignty. It exercises a controlling influence in the 
legislative function, which it shares with the popular organ 
of the government, the Reichstag. The Reichstag consists 
of 397 members elected by the universal suffrage of all 
German citizens who have completed their twenty-fifth 
year of age. The original design was that the voting dis- 
tricts, returning individually a single member, should contain 
each 100,000 inhabitants. But no re-apportionment of the 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 63 

districts to keep step with the increase and movement of the 
population has ever been made; and, in consequence of this, 
the great industrial centers, which have grown very rapidly 
during the past generation, are now inadequately represented. 
Proposals for new legislation are usually first made in the 
Bundesrat. They are then submitted to the Reichstag by 
resolution of the more august body. Members of the 
Reichstag may also present proposals for legislation; but 
such bills after being voted by the popular chamber, must 
receive the final assent of the Bundesrat. The Kaiser 
does not have the power of veto in legislative matters, 
because the sovereignty is vested in the Bundesrat, which 
derives its authority from the sovereign states of which 
the federal union was composed. The members of the 
Reichstag represent the German people as a whole, while the 
members of the Bundesrat represent the governments of the 
individual states. The Reichstag is dissolved every five 
years. It may be dissolved oftener by decision of the 
Bundesrat with the Kaiser's consent. The life of the Bund- 
esrat is, however, by its very nature, continuous. 

The Bundesrat is sometimes looked upon as the upper 
chamber of the legislature, like the Senate, or House of 
Lords. The analogy is far from exact, a fact which is illus- 
trated by the circumstance that the Reichstag alone is 
frequently called the Parliament. The Bundesrat is not, in 
the fullest sense, a deliberative body. Its members are 
merely agents of the state governments which send them. 
The delegation from each state not only casts its votes as a 
unit, "votes solid" in other words, but it is under obligation 
to vote according to the instructions which it receives from 
the government which it represents. 

It will be observed that the cabinet system of government 
has not been established in Germany. By "cabinet system" 
is understood the adjustment of powers which prevails in 

64 The Great War 

England, and the European states which have imitated 
more closely English parliamentary institutions, by virtue 
of which the ruling power is exercised by a ministry chosen 
from the prevailing party in the popular legislative chamber, 
or in any case so sensitive to the opinion of that house, that 
it resigns as soon as it ceases to enjoy the support of the 
majority of its members. The German government does 
not admit this responsibility of the ministers to the people's 
representatives. The heads of the great departments of 
government are responsible to the Chancellor, he in turn to 
the Kaiser. Thus the Kaiser exercises greater personal 
authority than most of the heads of constitutional states. 

Amendments to the imperial constitution would be en- 
acted through the ordinary channels of legislation. Amend- 
ments calling for an enlargement of popular influence in the 
government would presumably be rejected by the Bundesrat, 
where Prussia could enforce her disapproval; since fourteen 
votes alone can defeat a constitutional amendment. 

As the influence of Prussia is so decisive, a few words 
about her own political organization are necessary, to show 
why the policy of her government is quite uniformly con- 
servative. The Prussian ministers are responsible to the 
king who appoints them without reference to popular 
opinion. The legislature, called Landtag, consists of two 
chambers, the Herrenhaus, or House of Lords, and the Ab- 
geordnetenhaus, or House of Deputies. The privilege of 
membership in the upper house is conferred by the king. 
The members are either hereditary peers, or life peers. The 
lower house is made up of three hundred and fifty-two 
members. The method of electing these deputies is the 
cause of serious popular discontent, and the object of bitter 
ridicule. It is probably the greatest obstacle to the exten- 
sion of the popular influence in the government, not only of 
Prussia, but of the empire. This peculiar character of 

^ ° 

NTiETH Century 65 

parliamentary institutions in Prussia is due to the fact that 
the constitution was granted in 1850, during a period of 
reaction which followed the liberal movement of 1848-9. 
Those who drew up the constitution proposed to satisfy a 
popular demand by establishing the principle of universal 
suffrage, but at the same time to make it practically ineffec- 
tive by the manner of electing the representatives. They 
devised what is called the "three-class system" of voting. 
The voters in each constituency, all men who have completed 
their twenty-fifth year, are divided into three classes on the 
basis of the taxes which they pay to the state, in such a way 
that the aggregate sum of the taxes paid by the voters in 
each of the classes is equal, or In other words, equivalent to 
one-third of all the taxes contributed by the district. The 
voters are apportioned to the three classes in such a way that 
the largest tax-payers are assigned to the first class, the next 
group of tax-payers in the descending scale to the second, 
and finally the poorest citizens to the third. Each class in 
an electoral district elects, without regard to the number of 
voters which it contains, the same number of secondary 
electors, who are called Wahlmanner. The number of 
Wahlmanner for each district is determined by the ratio of one 
for two hundred and fifty of the inhabitants. These secondary 
electors choose the representative to be returned to the 
lower house of the parliament by the district. The system 
is illogical and unjust. It is obviously not a uniform timo- 
cratic basis for the division of the voters into classes through- 
out the constituencies of the kingdom. For there is, of 
necessity, a bewildering variation in the property range of the 
classes according to the amount of wealth and the manner 
of its distribution In each of the districts. There are dis- 
tricts where a single tax-payer constitutes the first class; 
and a curious Instance is related of a man In Berlin who 
constitutes alone the first class In one of the poorer, eastern 

66 The Great War 

electoral districts of the city, but who, if he moved to a 
fashionable quarter near the Tiergarten, would be trans- 
ferred in consequence to the third voting class. The 
Imperial Chancellor himself votes as a Prussian subject in 
the third class in the district where he lives. The injustice 
of the system is most conspicuous, of course, in the practical 
exclusion of the poorer, and most numerous, elements of the 
population from representation. As the secondary electors 
representing the two upper classes very often vote for the 
same candidate, it follows that the third class, although it 
embraces an overwhelming majority of the population, is 
generally excluded from all influence in the elections. The 
actual figures in recent elections show that the first class of 
voters, electing one-third of the Wahlmanner, or secondary 
electors, contains in the aggregate about 200,000 voters, the 
second class about 900,000, and the third class more than 
6,000,000. The representative character of such a system 
is clearly illusory. The suffrage is practically limited to less 
than one-sixth of the citizens. The popular influence on the 
government of Prussia is confined to this small fraction, who 
represent the interests of property. The government of 
Prussia is the dominating factor in the Bundesrat by its 
seventeen votes, and the initiative in imperial legislation is 
practically confined to the Bundesrat, if not to the Imperial 
Chancellor and the Prussian delegation. The government 
of Prussia is not responsible to the Landtag, or Prussian 
Parliament, and therefore probably the small fraction of the 
Prussian people, whose influence is really effective in the 
Prussian elections, exercises no appreciable control through 
parliament over the federal, or imperial, policy of the Prus- 
sian delegation in the Bundesrat. It follows, therefore, that 
any popular control at all over the German imperial govern- 
ment is small. It is exerted chiefly by negative means. 
The really popular parties in the Reichstag are essentially 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 67 

parties of opposition. The question is frequently discussed, 
whether there is a movement in Germany in the direction of 
responsible, or parliamentary, government. Incidents will 
be mentioned later of the greatest interest in connection 
with this question. But the kernel of the whole matter 
can be briefly formulated. The independent position of the 
government is rendered possible, and even necessary, by the 
comparatively chaotic condition of political parties. Re- 
sponsible government could be readily won simply by setting 
up what is at the same time the indispensable basis for its 
operation, a two-party political system. Bismarck ex- 
plained this truth: "The parliamentary system works 
easily, and, so to speak, with elegance when there are but 
two parties, as in England, where there are only the Whigs 
and Tories." "If there were similarly with us a party com- 
posed of a majority, it would always be a pleasure for the 
minister in power to attach himself to it, if not openly, at 
least by a secret alliance, and thus to work in harmony with 
it. But we are still far from this ideal. We have here 
something like eight factions; the German holds strictly to 
the spirit of his party, and keeps aloof from others." 

The fragmentary condition of parties contrasts lament- 
ably with the marvellous capacity for cooperation displayed 
by the Germans in other fields. The internal organization 
of one of the parties, however, is a wonderful example of 
German system, thoroughness, and discipline, that of the 
Socialists. The government aims to keep itself in the clear 
atmosphere above the hazy confusion of party conflicts. In 
actual practice, however, it often descends to court the 
favor of individual groups or parties by timely concessions 
for securing a temporary majority. The Center, represent- 
ing the Catholics, is possibly the greatest obstacle to a 
rational alignment of parties as in Great Britain, France, or 
Italy. It is an unsound feature of German political life 

68 The Great War 

that a compact party of about a hundred members holds the 
balance of power in the Reichstag whose fundamental motive 
for association is not political in its nature. Politically the 
Center is an opportunist party. Without this un-political 
party the other groups could probably all be arranged along 
the same line, so to speak, according to the relative nature 
of their views, from ultra-conservative, or right, through 
various gradations to ultra-radical, or left. If this could 
be done, a cleavage would be conceivable at some point, and 
the groups on each side of this intersection might be drawn 
together for the common support of programs composed of 
practical measures consistent generally with their particular 
views and without compromising their individual theories. 

This summary of some of the provisions of the federal and 
Prussian constitutions and of the chief features of political 
activity will help to make clear the fact that while there is 
naturally a tendency to ascribe the policy of the German 
Empire exclusively to Prussia, the view has also been ex- 
pressed that Prussia's supposedly warlike attitude is due to 
a single class, the Junkers, or aristocracy of great land-lords. 

Large estates prevail in extensive parts of the north and 
east of Prussia. In fact, big estates include nearly one- 
fourth of all the agricultural land in Germany. It is said 
that in some of the more backward sections of the northeast 
the large proprietors often keep their laborers in a state of 
political tutelage. Tradition and environment have doubt- 
less contributed to make the character of the Prussian land- 
owning aristocracy somewhat inflexible. The members of 
this class are very conservative and intensely loyal to the 
throne. Their attitude is often narrow, and not free from 
the suspicion of selfishness. They are given marked prefer- 
ence in the military and civil service, and enjoy almost a 
monopoly of the positions at court and in the diplomatic 
field. When we consider the way in which Prussian deputies 

NTiETH Century 69 

are elected, and, in addition, the fact that the rural districts 
are manifestly over-represented in both chambers, we are 
not surprised that the Prussian Parliament is a strong- 
hold of conservative and agrarian interests. 

Current investigations of the responsibility for the war 
not only frequently charge Prussia with the blame, but 
discover within this kingdom the class or classes which are 
especially contaminated with the guilt. Now we are told 
that the Junkers precipitated the conflict so as to perpetuate 
their unjust oligarchical tyranny by diverting public atten- 
tion from domestic abuses to the glory of military aggrand- 
izement. Again we learn that the industrial and commercial 
class was the real instigator by its desire for colonies and 
additional foreign markets. In fact the intentions of the 
two are so frequently, and, as it were, so interchangeably 
invoked in this connection, that to bar an over-hasty in- 
ference that they were associated in a common warlike 
design, it is well to observe that the Junkers and Industrials 
are naturally discordant elements. Their differences were 
revealed and accentuated by Bismarck's introduction of a 
protective tariff in 1879. This measure, it is true, aimed to 
promote the Interests of both classes by encouraging German 
manufactures and by aiding to maintain agricultural self- 
sufficiency. But in placing duties on agricultural products 
the political intention was likewise prominent of consoli- 
dating the economic foundation of a class which is considered 
to be the chief prop to the Prussian throne. It can be 
shown that the duties as applied are almost exclusively 
favorable to the large proprietors. 

The advance In food prices in consequence of the higher 
duties was a burden for the working classes, and affected 
Indirectly the manufacturers by the resulting Increase In 
wages and the cost of production. 

Either the tariff or the enterprise and scientific methods 

70 The Great War 

of the agriculturalists haveaccomplishedwonders inGermany. 
Even since 1891 the most fundamental products of the soil 
show a remarkable increase, more than keeping pace with 
the population. (See Comparative Table of Statistics, 
page 79, Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16). The achievement of German 
agriculture, in view of the rather medium character of the 
soil, has been quite as remarkable, although less loudly 
proclaimed, than that of German industry. 

The agrarian interests are the back-bone of the Conser- 
vative Party, as industrial and commercial interests are 
represented chiefly in the National Liberal Party. The 
Social Democrats alone form an adequate democratic 
opposition. Unlike the Radicals in England and France, 
to whom they in a measure correspond, they cannot hope 
to be represented in the government, unless an almost 
revolutionary change should occur. The Socialists suffer 
political, and in large measure social, ostracism. German 
Socialism aims to remedy the evils, the economic tyranny 
for the masses, resulting from the tremendous power given 
to private capital by the industrial revolution, that is, the 
introduction of the factory system of production. The 
Socialists' program as drawn up at Erfurt, in 1882, contains 
the following passage indicating their view: 

"Only by transforming capitalized private possession of 
the means of production — such as land, mines, raw materials, 
tools, means of communication — into collective possession, 
and by making the production of goods a socialistic produc- 
tion carried on for and by society can it be possible to bring 
about a change, whereby the big industry and ever growing 
productive capacity of cooperative labor can become the 
possession of the classes hitherto exploited, and be trans- 
formed from a source of misery and oppression into a source 
of utmost prosperity and all-around harmonious improve- 
ment." Some of the particular reforms demanded by the 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 71 

Socialists are universal, direct suffrage including women; 
popular initiative in legislation; a militia instead of the 
standing army; the absolute separation of church and state; 
graduated estate as well as income taxes, and the abolition 
of all indirect taxes. 

Bismarck caused to be adopted very severe repressive 
measures against the socialistic propaganda; but proposed to 
give the people all the state socialism they wanted. Accord- 
ingly, he introduced the famous system of national compul- 
sory insurance for all employes receiving less than 2500 
marks yearly salary, to provide assistance for three distinct 
classes of disabled persons, (1) those temporarily ill, (2) those 
injured by accident, and (3) those invalidated through pro- 
longed incapacity or old age. There are about 13,500,000 
persons insured under this third heading, practically the 
whole laboring population and the government itself con- 
tributes to the amount of fifty marks annually for each 
pension. In this very important form of social legislation 
Germany has been the pioneer, and the United Kingdom 
has recently followed her example. 

The Germans of to-day are characterized by patience, 
adaptability, a remarkable capacity for organization in both 
the active and passive sense, and thoroughness in detail. 
These characteristics are invaluable in an age when the 
great achievements are accomplished by applied science, a 
division of labor, and an intricate cooperation of many 
processes and activities. The character of the government 
and that of the people interact and are intimately related. 

The qualities of thoroughness and discipline are exhibited 
in the work of legislation. A single note-worthy example 
will illustrate this, the enactment of the new civil code. 
Like other important legislative proposals it was first elabor- 
ated by a commission of experts. Frederic William 
Maitland praised this remarkable achievement of industry 

72 The Great War 

and thoroughness as follows: 

"Among the great things that he (the German) has done 
is this; he has codified the greater part and the most im- 
portant part of his law; he has set his legal house in order; 
he has swept away the rubbish into the dust-bin; he has 
striven to make his legal system rational, coherent, modern, 
worthy of his country and of our century." The commission 
worked on the project from 1874 until 1888, when it was 
published and freely criticized. It was referred back to a 
commission in 1892, and submitted in revised form to the 
Reichstag in 1896. Between January and July, 1896, the 
Reichstag passed this code of 2385 sections, and it was 
sanctioned by the Bundesrat, and went into force January 1, 
1900. Maitland observed that there was less discussion 
in the Reichstag over this very lengthy, and tremendously 
important, act of legislation, than in the British Parliament 
over the passage of a recent (1902) Education Bill. This 
is a form of legislative efficiency which seems to be incom- 
patible with party government. The periodic changes in 
government, and large absorption of energy in redeeming 
party pledges render impossible the sustained effort required 
for the creation of a supreme legislative monument of this 
kind in countries where the real sovereignty is not stable. 
The Germans have become by experience so convinced of 
the efficacy of cooperation, that they apply it to all im- 
portant forms of activity, as may be perceived in the alli- 
ance of government and business, the intimate association 
of the banking and industrial interests, and the formation 
of syndicates. In fact, Germany is a vast society, all of 
whose activities seem to be nicely coordinated and adjusted. 

There are eighteen railway systems in Germany, thirteen 
private, five state, and one imperial; but the public lines 
amount to 91% of the mileage. These are valued at 
34,757,579,750 and produce a net Income of 3191,943,190. 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 73 

The power to regulate the tariffs is vested in the Bundesrat, 
and exercised from time to time through a general conference 
of representatives of the different directorates. This is a 
powerful appliance for supporting German industry and 
commerce in international competition, for the central 
authority is empowered to grant special privileges, as re- 
bates for large shippers, and exceptional rates for goods 
crossing the country or being conveyed to the sea-ports for 
exportation. In fact, the German state-owned railways 
employ the same devices which are loudly condemned when 
practiced by private lines in the United States. In Germany 
this method is accepted as part of a system carefully and 
impartially planned with a view to promote the national 

A species of economic unification of the country has been 
accomplished through the intimate correlation of the bank- 
ing and industrial systems. About seven large Berlin banks 
form the nucleus of this organization. Such institutions 
own shares sufficient to give them a paramount interest in 
many provincial banks, so that altogether they can control 
the greater part of the effective banking capital of the 
country. They participate, likewise, in most of the great 
industrial enterprises by owning considerable blocks of 
shares in the companies, and having representatives on the 
governing boards. 

Most all of the great branches of industry in Germany 
have eliminated wasteful competition by constituting 
syndicates to control prices and regulate individual output. 
These organizations have been powerful engines for the 
expansion of German exports. At one time, when an 
incipient agitation against them led to an official investiga- 
tion, a report was made that their destruction would curtail 
the ability of the country to compete abroad. Not only 
are the freight rates on the railways favorable to the syndi- 

74 The Great War 

cates, but the government has entered into relations with 
them in a manner which may lead to far-reaching conse- 
quences. Thus the potash syndicate, which was constituted 
in 1879, included in its membership the governments of 
Prussia, Anhalt, and the Reichsland (Alsace-Lorraine) by 
reason of the mines of which each of these states was the 
owner. This syndicate was dissolved in 1909, upon expira- 
tion of the contract which had been the basis of association, 
because one member believed that it would be more advan- 
tageous for him to operate independently. Then, at the 
instance of the Prussian government, the Reichstag voted 
a bill establishing a compulsory syndicate, a startling inno- 
vation. It was urged that the potash industry was inti- 
mately connected with the welfare of the country, was in 
short a sort of public utility, and must be guarded from 
demoralization. Yet one may readily predict that this will 
be the first of many statutory syndicates. The Prussian 
fiscus extracts about one-fourth of the coal mined in Silesia, 
and more than one-half the production of the Saarbriicken 
district. The Prussian government is not a member of the 
coal syndicate; but it will probably obtain in future a vote 
in this, as well as other similar important combinations. 
The Socialists do not view these developments with dissatis- 
faction. The formation of syndicates, the nationalization 
of the railways, the encroachment of the government upon 
the field of industrial development, all these are interpreted 
by the Socialists as necessary steps in the normal progress 
of society. Small concerns must inevitably be merged in 
great organizations, and they in turn, as a safeguard against 
industrial feudalism, must become public. We are tempted 
to adopt the opinion that in spite of the political animosity 
which separates the government and the Socialists their 
points of view differ mainly in the fact that the attitude of the 
latter, as being more radical, and less practical, is about a 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 75 

generation in advance of that of the former. By means of 
the inter-relation of great interests which has been described, 
it is said that about fifty captains of finance control abso- 
lutely the economic situation in Germany. Likewise, the 
general cooperation, and the partnership of government and 
business are carried to such a point that in spite of political 
dissension at home Germany presents an undivided front in 
the world-competition for commercial opportunity abroad. 

The remarkable growth of German industry in recent 
times is too well known to require detailed description. The 
situation of the most important industrial districts has been 
determined largely by the position of the deposits of the 
minerals which are most fundamental for manufacturing. 
Coal and iron are found in proximity in Lorraine and 
Silesia, on opposite frontiers of the Empire. Westphalia 
is especially rich in coal; but the Silesian fields are said to 
exceed those of any other part of Europe in the probable 
duration of their supplies. 

The table at page 79 has been arranged, partly with 
reference to the present chapter, to present in convenient 
form a comparative summary of the progress of Germany 
during a significant period of twenty years, partly as a 
useful collection of important economic data relative to four 
leading industrial nations, to be cited from time to time as 
the treatment requires it. 

The reader will observe in consulting the table that in 
calculating the relative growth of exports, the percentage 
(No. 19) is based, not on the increase of the aggregate ex- 
portation of each nation, but on a comparison of the 
exportation per head of the population at the beginning 
and end of the period of twenty years. This seems more 
significant, especially in attempting to judge the influence 
of commercial competition in nourishing national animosity. 
Germany not only records a greater absolute increase in 

76 The Great War 

production than the United Kingdom, but in spite of the 
much more rapid growth of her population the rate of 
increase of the average share of each individual person in 
industry and commerce has advanced from 1891 to 1911 
much more rapidly than in Great Britain (compare nos. 9, 
11, and 19). 

The progress of German industry is in large measure due 
to the practical application of the results of scientific 
inquiry. Striking examples of this are offered by the 
chemical and electrical branches. Artificial indigo was dis- 
covered in Germany in 1897, and was at once substituted 
for the imported vegetable indigo. In consequence, the 
manufacture of dye-stuffs from formerly useless by-products 
of gas and coke quickly rose to a production exceeding 
330,000,000 annually. Reference has been made in another 
connection to the potash business. Germany has almost a 
monopoly of potash salts for fertilization, and the exporta- 
tion of this commodity amounts to more than 3^0,000,000 
annually. The development of the electrical industry 
during the last twenty-five years was made possible by the 
excellent technical schools. The annual exportation of 
electrical supplies amounts to about 340,000,000 in value. 

The Franco-German War in 1870-1 left Germany with- 
out an imperial debt, because the expenses of the struggle 
had been covered by the indemnity exacted from France. 
By 1891 an imperial debt of 3345,071,000 had been con- 
tracted, and its subsequent rapid increase to 31,224,808,000 
during the next twenty years, a period of peace, and for 
unremunerative purposes, is looked upon in some quarters 
as an example of national prodigality. These figures alone 
do not afford an adequate basis for comparison with unitary 
states, such as France and the United Kingdom, where the 
central government performs the functions which lie within 
the field of activity of the different states in federal Germany. 

Threshold of Twentieth Century 11 

Therefore, we ought to consider the aggregate indebtedness of 
the federal and state governments, which was $4,896,136,000 
in 1911, as compared with the national debt of $3,567,498, 
000 in the United Kingdom, and $6,280,791,000 in France. 
The German debt is still less per capita than either of the 
others, and there is this striking element of difference in the 
situation, that the aggregate German debt is more than 
counterbalanced by the productive assets of the German 
states, primarily the railways. Germany, in this sense, had 
no net debt at the beginning of the war. 

It is a well-known fact that after the termination of the 
war with France a quantity of gold, to the value of about 
$30,000,000 was deposited in a tower, known as the Julius 
Turm, in the fortress at Spandau about seven miles distant 
from the center of Berlin. This treasure was preserved as a 
military emergency fund, either to be actually used in case 
of mobilization, or to serve as additional security for issuing 
paper currency. 

Some features of the economic situation are common, in 
greater or less degree, to the greater nations of western 
Europe, which are so fundamental in their relation to any 
phenomenon of actual life, that they should at least be 
mentioned. The resources of Great Britain, France, and 
Germany are not limited to their home territories or mer- 
chant flotillas. They are money-lending nations, which 
have invested vast quantities of capital throughout the 
world. The British Investments outside the British Islands 
were estimated a few years ago at $13,000,000,000, those 
of France at $7,000,000,000, and Germany's at $5,000,000, 
000. British investments abroad are said to yield an 
annual return of 5.2%. British yearly savings for fresh 
Investment are said to amount to about $1,500,000,000, 
French to $400,000,000, and German to more than $1,000, 
000,000. The annual Increase in wealth in the United 

78 The Great War 

States, by way of comparison, is variously estimated at 
from 32,000,000,000 to 33,000,000,000. 

In becoming industrial nations they have ceased, to 
greater or less extent, to be self-sustaining in respect to 
food and raw materials for manufacture. The United 
Kingdom imports about 78% of its total supply of wheat 
and flour, Germany 35%, and France 3%. The United 
Kingdom depends upon outside sources for about 47% of 
its meat supply, and Germany for about 11%. Great 
Britain produces a surplus of coal, but finds it necessary to 
import more than a third of her supply of iron ore. France 
has an abundant iron ore supply but is dependent for about 
one-third of her coal consumption upon other nations. 
Germany produces a slight surplus of coal, and is nearly 
self-sustaining in iron ore. 

Since the possession of large deposits of iron ore is a very 
important factor in industry, and a source of strength in 
warfare, it may not be inappropriate to conclude this 
chapter with a summary statement, in tabulated form, of 
Germany's relative position in respect to the possession 
of these supplies: 

Estimate of Developed Supplies of Iron Ore in Tons. 

Germany including Luxemburg 3,878,000,000 

Great Britain 1,300,000,000 

France 3,300,000,000 

Whole of Europe 12,032,000,000 

America 9,855,000,000 

Australia, Asia, Africa 521,000,000 

World 22,408,000,000 

Germany's share of European Supply 32% 

Germany's share of World's Supply 17% 






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e>i«o^v)>et^adovO<-i £322t2I2w 

The Genesis of Anglo-German Reciprocal Suspicion 

Bismarck's foreign policy as Imperial Chancellor. Germany's unassailable 
position in 1890. Character of William II. "Dropping the Pilot." Dual 
Alliance formed. Kingship by the Grace of God. German fFelt-politik. 
The "Kriiger Telegram." East Asiatic Expedition; Kiau-Chau. Naval 
Bill of 1898. Admiral von Tirpitz, Imperial Secretary for the Navy. 
German Navy League. Bundesrat incident. Naval Bill of 1900. Isola- 
tion of Great Britain. German attitude during the South African War. 

Bismarck's practical, unromantic foreign policy as Im- 
perial Chancellor during twenty years was on the whole 
favorable to European peace. He concentrated his efforts 
on consolidating the position which Germany had acquired 
in central Europe, and in this purpose he was eminently 
successful. He knew that France cherished the hope of 
revenge and of an opportunity to recover the lost provinces. 
But he was convinced that France alone was powerless, and 
for protection against a possible combination of foes, he had 
forged the powerful Triple Alliance. He saw with satisfac- 
tion, moreover, the estrangement of France and Great 
Britain. He probably helped to make Russia harmless to 
Germany, and an object of dread to England, by encourag- 
ing her to extend her influence in Asia. Bismarck's fixed 
rules for German foreign policy were to keep In sympathetic 
touch with St. Petersburg, and never to quarrel with Great 
Britain. With regard to the position of Germany on the 
sea he said that if they should build up a navy as strong as 
England, they should still have to fear an alliance of England 
and France. Yet during his chancellorship most of the 
German colonial territory was acquired, and acquired, 


1 \^^^\ V. V\ \ 


Cartoon by Sir J*^)hn TL-nnitl which :ippeared In Punch, March 29, 1S90, apropos of the dismissal 
by William II of Bismarck, from the office of chancellor. 

Anglo-German Suspicion 81 

moreover, without arousing noteworthy suspicion. The 
colonial empire was inaugurated by a Bremen merchant in 
securing a cession of land from the Hottentots in 1883, which 
became the nucleus of German Southwest Africa. The 
Kamerun and Togo followed in 1884, and about the same 
time Dr. Carl Peters founded the German East Africa Com- 
pany and obtained concessions from the Sultan of Zanzibar. 
The narrow strip of territory on the coast fronting the pres- 
ent German East Africa was leased by the Sultan of Zanzibar 
to the Germans for fifty years in 1888; and two years later 
the Sultan's rights were purchased for about 31jOOO,0(X). 
A German protectorate had been established over what is 
now called Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, the northern section of 
south-east New Guinea, with adjacent islands, in 1884. 

In 1890 the position of Germany was unassailable. She 
was easily the strongest military state, and besides, she was 
supported by her two allies, while France was still alone, and 
Great Britain pursued her policy of magnificent isolation. 
But within a very short time France and Russia were linked 
together as allies, fourteen years later France and Great 
Britain had reached a cordial understanding, and eighteen 
years later Great Britain had been joined to France and 
Russia in a bond of friendship only one degree removed 
from an alliance. This profound, and decided alteration in 
the diplomatic aspect of Europe as affecting the position of 
Germany is a matter of the utmost historical importance. 
Investigation will be busy for a generation at least in ex- 
plaining the causes of this transformation. We may venture 
to make some general observations regarding them a little 
later. For the present, we must turn our attention to the 
young ruler who was about to supersede the veteran Chan- 
cellor in the guidance of the nation's policy. 

The present German Emperor, and King of Prussia, 
William II, was born January 27, 1859, the son of the late 

82 The Great War 

Emperor Frederick and the Empress Victoria, who was 
daughter of Queen Victoria. He ascended the throne, June 
15, 1888, after the death of his father, who had ruled only 
ninety-eight days. To his teachers, perhaps, is partly due 
his solemn conception of the responsibility of his office. The 
seemingly mystic, mediaeval trait in his character suggests 
the temperament of his romantic great-uncle Fredericlc 
William IV, and contrasts strangely with his well-known 
zeal for the modern, materialistic interests of life. He pos- 
sesses a broad, and sympathetic nature. His mind is well 
informed and intelligent, but probably not exceptionally 
profound. The versatility of his interests and enthusiasm 
makes him seem at times erratic. He has been inclined to 
emphasize the decorative element in government and foreign 
relations, perhaps shrewdly, although this tendency has 
frequently been criticized as sensational, or even theatrical. 
He has displayed independence, although not always pro- 
found discernment, in his choice of men and means. His 
tireless activity has not always permitted him the time to 
weigh carefully in advance the probable effect of his words 
and actions. 

William II at the age of twenty-nine, when he came to the 
throne, was impulsive, filled with generous intentions, and 
impatient of tutelage. The Chancellor was cautious, 
cynical, and accustomed to exercise authority. Misunder- 
standings between them were unavoidable. The details of 
the progress of their estrangement do not concern us. It 
will suffice to note the immediate cause of their final rupture, 
since it is significant. Bismarck protested against the un- 
usual conduct of William II, as King of Prussia, in communi- 
cating directly with the different ministers on official 
business. He declared that only the Minister President, 
not the ordinary ministers, should have audience with the 
Crown. His claim was based upon a royal order of 1852, 

Anglo-German Suspicion 83 

and his words may appropriately be quoted, since they 
represent the position of the two men in an interesting 

"If each individual minister can receive commands from 
his sovereign without previous arrangement with his col-, 
leagues, a coherent policy, for which someone is to be re- 
sponsible, is an impossibility. It would be impossible for 
any of the ministers, and especially for the Minister Presi- 
dent (of Prussia), to bear the constitutional responsibility 
for the cabinet as a whole. Such a provision as that con- 
tained in the order of 1852 could be dispensed with under 
the absolute monarchy, and could also be dispensed with to- 
day if we returned' to absolutism without ministerial respon- 
sibility. But according to the constitutional arrangements 
now legally in force the control of the cabinet by a president 
under the order of 1852 is indispensable." It was clearly a 
contest for the conception of the cabinet as an independent, 
united body against the disintegrating influence of monarchi- 
cal interference with the members individually. We respect 
the dignified remonstrance of the old Chancellor, calm in the 
assurance of a well-earned title to authority, in vindication of 
his conception of ministerial responsibility, even though it is 
not the variety of responsibility which is embodied in parlia- 
mentary government. The world naturally assumed that the 
Kaiser would establish his direct personal control in the affairs 
of state, that he would virtually be his own Imperial Chan- 
cellor. This belief, together with his picturesque personality, 
has made the Kaiser the most conspicuous monarch in 
Europe. Bismarck's resignation as Imperial Chancellor and 
Prussian Minister President, occurring March 18, 1890, was 
in this respect a turning point in the history of the modern 
German Empire. The Kaiser announced this event in the 
following despatch; — "I am as much afflicted as if I had lost 
my grandfather anew; but we must endure whatever God 

84 The Great War 

sends us, even if we should have to die for it. The post of 
officer on the quarter-deck of the ship of state has fallen to 
me; the course remains unchanged. Forward with all steam!" 

William II dropped his pilot, took his place on the quarter- 
deck, and with confidence in his own foresight and the 
destiny of the Fatherland soon changed the direction of the 
ship of state to a bolder, less familiar course. Since this 
memorable event four Chancellors have served under him, 
their individual character largely effaced beneath the im- 
pression of his masterful personality. These have been 
Caprivi, 1890-94; Hohenlohe, 1894-1900; von Biilow, 1900- 
09; and Bethmann-HoUweg since July, 1909. 

We shall review briefly the course of the reign of William II 
to the close of the international crisis of 1911, selecting the 
incidents of greatest significance for our purpose, and repeat- 
ing as far as possible the words of the principal personalities 
themselves, the Kaiser, his advisers, and his opponents, in 
explanation of their views. We may then undertake to 
formulate our conjectures relative to the causes of the 
greatly altered conditions in the political world, and an 
opinion as to the extent to which the policy and activity of 
Germany involved potential causes of the war. 

A short time after the resignation of Bismarck, the so- 
called Re-insurance Treaty with Russia, which had been 
negotiated by the great Chancellor, was dropped by Ger- 
many. Among the last words of the old Kaiser, William I, 
on his death-bed, had been an exhortation to maintain 
friendly relations with Tsar Alexander III, and never to 
quarrel in that quarter. The action of the German govern- 
ment in renouncing this mutual guarantee of friendship 
probably strengthened the forces that were drawing Russia 
and France together. A French naval squadron brought 
the greetings of the Republic to the Tsar at Cronstadt the 
following summer, and about this same time a secret treaty 

Anglo-German Suspicion 85 

of alliance between the two countries was probably signed. 
Its existence was revealed by the words of Tsar Nicholas II, 
during President Faure's official visit at St. Petersburg in 
1897, when he alluded to the "two friendly and allied 

Unfavorable comment has often been made on the Kaiser's 
belief that his authority has come to him "by the Grace of 
God." A few extracts from his own discourses will serve to 
illustrate the nature of this conviction. Speaking in 
Konigsberg, the ancient capital of Prussia, the Kaiser said: 

"Here my grandfather placed, by his own right, the crown 
of the Kings of Prussia on his head, once more laying stress 
upon the fact that it was conferred upon him by the Grace of 
God alone, not by parliament, by meetings of the people, or 
by popular decisions; and that he considered himself the 
chosen instrument of heaven, and as such performed his 
duties as regent and as ruler. Considering myself as an 
instrument of the Lord, without being misled by the views 
and opinions of the day, I go my way, which is devoted 
solely and alone to the prosperity and peaceful development 
of our Fatherland." 

At the ceremony of unveiling the colossal monument of 
William I, which rises at the extremity of the point, between 
the Moselle and Rhine at Coblentz, September 1, 1897, the 
Kaiser referred to his grandfather in these terms : 

"He came forth from Coblentz to ascend the throne as a 
chosen instrument of the Lord, and as such he regarded 
himself. For all of us, and particularly for us sovereigns, 
he again raised on high a precious jewel, and made it sparkle 
with bright rays, a treasure which I trust we may hold high 
and sacred. It is kingship by the Grace of God, kingship 
with its onerous duties, its endless, constant toils and tasks, 
with its tremendous responsibility before the Creator, from 
which no mortal, no minister, no chamber of deputies, no 

86 The Great War 

nation can release the sovereign." "For me it shall be an 
exalted duty to walk in paths designated for us by that 
great ruler, in my solicitude for my country to hold my hand 
over the glorious jewel to which I have referred, and in 
accordance with the old tradition which stands firmer than 
iron or the walls of Ehrenbreitstein, to take this province to 
my heart and tend it with a father's care." 

His expressions relative to the divine right of the kings of 
the HohenzoUern family were severely criticised by some of 
the German papers. 

On the occasion of the dedication of a monument to the 
Great Elector in Berlin, the Kaiser, after remarking upon 
the glorious record of his predecessors, continued as follows : 

"How is this wonderful success of the House of Hohen- 
zoUern to be explained? Solely in this way, that every 
prince of the House is conscious from the beginning that he 
is only an earthly vicegerent, who must give an account of 
his labor to a higher King and Master, and show that he has 
been a faithful executor of the high commands laid upon 

In spite of the Kaiser's emphatic repetition of his convic- 
tion of a divine calling, it is possible that too much impor- 
tance has been ascribed to his claim to rule "by the Grace of 
God." The formula passes entirely unnoticed when em- 
ployed with the titles of other monarchs, who do not exert 
themselves to lay stress upon it. It is somewhat difficult, 
moreover, to determine precisely the practical meaning 
which the Kaiser himself would ascribe to the oft-asserted 
theory. It is a historical fact, no doubt, that the Hohen- 
zoUern princes did not obtain their power by popular 
authority. Since the Kaiser seems to be a very devout 
man, perhaps to his own consciousness the commission to 
exercise royal authority by divine command is different in 
degree only from the duty of every mortal to perform with 

Anglo-German Suspicion 87 

energy and a deep sense of responsibility the function, to 
which the will of God, manifesting itself through the cir- 
cumstances of human environment, has called him. One 
cannot but be impressed by the deep sense of responsibility 
which the Kaiser appears to bear in consequence of his 
belief in the divine sanction of his prerogative. 

The practical constitutional significance of the theory of 
"divine right" for the German Empire and Kingdom of 
Prussia is restricted to the fact alone that ministers are not 
responsible to parliaments. If parties were developed 
strong enough to control compact majorities in the Reichstag 
and the Prussian Diet, the vitality would fade from this 
arrogant doctrine at the mere threat of withholding supplies, 
and it would be reduced to the shadowy state of a meaning- 
less historical formula. 

German policy was profoundly modified during the con- 
cluding decade of the nineteenth century. We shall not 
endeavor at present to define the new aims of German 
diplomacy, except to note that it intended to make its 
presence felt in all parts of the world. German foreign 
policy became a Welt-politik. The enlargement of its scope, 
and the intensifying of its activity were due to a variety of 
causes. The rapid development of German commerce, 
industry, and capital required room for expansion. The 
territorial extension of German influence was absurdly re- 
stricted in proportion to the intellectual vigor, physical 
robustness, and military superiority of the nation. The 
conviction was growing, based upon the manifold national 
achievements, that the Germans possess superiority in 
civilization, and are therefore called by destiny to a posi- 
tion of leadership among the nations. 

At the same time the emigration of thousands of sturdy, 
energetic Germans to foreign countries, where they would 
be lost to the Fatherland, was regretted as a serious national 

88 The Great War 

misfortune. Great Britain and France, which had become 
consolidated by centuries of national unity, had secured a 
prior claim by occupation or conquest to the most desirable 
lands for European colonization before Germany solved her 
most pressing internal problems and could employ her 
energies abroad. A feeling gained strength in Germany that 
any opportunity to obtain compensation for these unfavor- 
able conditions ought to be immediately seized. German 
Welt-politik was in part, therefore, the response to a popular 
demand for a more forcible expression of the national life. 

The Kaiser made himself an interpreter and leader of the 
expansive tendency. On his youthful visits to England, his 
ardent, imaginative spirit must have been deeply impressed 
by his grand-mother's title. Empress of India, the imperial 
range of English political life, and the proud supremacy of 
the seas. In comparison, German life, doubtless, seemed 
in those days rather provincial and confined. As Kaiser, 
William II retained an admiration for all that was excellent 
in England, and naturally enough he endeavored to repro- 
duce the elements of English superiority in Germany. 
German imitation of things English has been conspicuous 
in different ways during the past century. As long as the 
Germans confined their imitative zeal to the comparatively 
harmless field of letters or of sports or even to awkward 
attempts at setting up amongst themselves the constitu- 
tional machinery of English parliamentary government, the 
British public looked on with approval or good-natured 
condescension. But as soon as this surest form of flattery 
was extended to the sphere of naval enterprise, the spirit of 
friendly criticism was suddenly transformed into a feeling 
of apprehension. The relationship between the two powers 
became the subject of anxious consideration. 

The Kaiser preached the doctrine of the expansion of 
German enterprise, and as a necessary companion to It, the 

Anglo-German Suspicion 89 

idea of a big navy. In Berlin in 1896 he said: "The 
German Empire becomes a world-empire. Everywhere 
in the farthest parts of the earth live thousands of our 
fellow-countrymen. German subjects, German knowledge, 
German industry, cross the ocean. The value of German 
goods on the seas amounts to thousands of millions of 
marks. On you, gentlemen, devolves the serious duty of 
helping me to knit securely this greater German Empire to 
the Empire at home." 

And at Hamburg in 1899, during a noteworthy address, 
of which the following extracts reveal his cherished ambition, 
as well as his problems, he said : "A strong German fleet is a 
thing of which we stand in bitter need." "In Hamburg 
especially one can understand how necessary is a powerful 
protection for German interests abroad." "Our people 
must resolve to make some sacrifice. Above all they must 
put aside their endeavor to seek the excellent through the 
ever more sharply contrasted party factions. They must 
cease to put party above the welfare of the state as a whole. 
They must curb their ancient and inherited weakness, to 
subject everything to the most unlicensed criticism; and 
they must stop at the point where their most vital interests 
become concerned. For it is precisely these political sins 
which revenge themselves with such effect on our sea inter- 
ests and our fleet. If the strengthening of the fleet had not 
been refused me during the past eight years of my govern- 
ment, in spite of all appeals and warnings — and not without 
raillery and abuse for my person — how differently could we 
not have encouraged the extension of our trade and the 
expansion of our interests beyond the seas." 

The same year in Stettin the Kaiser coined the expression 
which more concisely than any other signifies the new 
policy; — "Our future lies on the water." 

Toward the close of 1895, when conditions in the South 

90 The Great War 

African Republic were approaching a crisis, the Pretoria 
government sent a message to Beriin inquiring what attitude 
the German government would assume if hostilities broke 
out between themselves and the British Empire. Also, a 
few days before the famous Jameson Raid, the German 
I residents in the Boer capital requested by cablegram to 
Berlin the protection of a detachment from a German war- 
ship that lay in Delagoa Bay, on the coast of Portuguese 
East Africa. A reply by letter had already been sent to 
the Transvaal government. Yet the two communications 
from South Africa help to explain the momentous "Kriiger 
Telegram," which startled the British Empire, and aston- 
ished the world. 

Dr. Jameson's misguided venture occurred on December 
29, 1895, and January 3, the Kaiser repaired to the Chancel- 
lor's palace to meet some of his ministers for the discussion 
of the event. We must not forget that the German Empire 
in its colony of Southwest Africa was almost a neighbor 
of the Transvaal. The text of an imperial telegram of 
congratulation to President Kriiger had been prepared at 
the instance, very likely, of Baron Marschall von Bieber- 
stein, the energetic Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who urged 
that the upholding of the independence of the South African 
Republic was in Germany's interest. After some hesita- 
tion, and alteration, the Kaiser signed the fateful message, 
believing, probably, that in its final form it was sufficiently 
non-committal and inoffensive. 

The following is the text of this historic message : 
"I congratulate you most sincerely on having succeeded 
with your people, and without calling on the help of foreign 
powers, by opposing your own force to an armed band 
which broke into your country to disturb the peace, in re- 
storing quiet and in maintaining the independence of your 
country against external attack." 

Anglo-German Suspicion 91 

Harmless as well as affable it may seem at the first glance; 
but we must recall the London Convention of 1884, by 
which the foreign relations of the South African Republic 
were committed to Great Britain. In its sudden effect, the 
"Kriiger Telegram" was an electric spark igniting a mine of 
excitement and emotion. The violence of the explosion 
reverberated for years. A wave of indignation passed over 
Great Britain, and the press expressed emphatically the 
general feeling of resentment. It seemed to the English 
that the German government assumed the right to ignore 
treaties between third parties and themselves. Vigorous 
measures were demanded of the government, which at once 
responded by an official statement affirming unequivocally 
the British control of the foreign affairs of the Transvaal. 
Extraordinary naval activity followed immediately as a 
demonstration to enforce the British position. Six battle- 
ships were gotten ready to form a flying squadron, measures 
were taken for mobilizing a part of the reserve fleet, and a 
flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers was brought together. 
The German government, surprised at the effect of their 
message, explained within twenty-four hours that no offence 
was intended, and the inspired press reiterated their 

Technically the German government had committed a 
diplomatic blunder. The practical effects of the "Kriiger 
Telegram" were deplorable. If the motive which had 
prompted it was disinterested, the telegram was certainly 
superfluous, and the risk of misunderstanding gratuitous. 
If it was part of a design for extending German influence, It 
was manifestly fruitless, since it was not followed up even 
by diplomatic action, when the occasion for it was offered. 
It encouraged the Boers to entertain a delusive hope of 
German assistance, and it made the German foreign policy 
appear either vacillating or timid. 

92 The Great War 

On the other hand, the excitement in Great Britain was 
excessive. The EngHsh could logically protest at the send- 
ing of a communication from the German government 
directly to the head of the South African Republic. But 
the expression of sympathy in itself was no just cause for 
indignation, since Jameson's Raid had been entirely un- 
justifiable. A'loreover, in view of the very prompt dis- 
avowal of any unfriendly intention on the part of the German 
government, the naval demonstration might well have been 
discontinued. As it was, the unusual parade of naval 
power seemed to be intended to overawe and intimidate the 
Germans. And by impressing upon them a sense of their 
own weakness on the sea, it was one of the factors that 
eventually induced them to build up a strong navy. From 
this time, unfortunately, the relations between Germany 
and Great Britain have never been free from suspicion. 

Certain events of 1897-8 are significant for the light 
which they throw on the development of German Welt- 
politik. News of the murder of the two Catholic mission- 
aries in the Chinese province of Shantung was received, 
November 1, 1897, and orders were promptly despatched 
to the East Asiatic squadron to proceed at once to Kiau- 
chau Bay, a convenient harbor, lying nearest to where the 
crimes had been perpetrated, for the purpose of demanding 
reparation. On November 23, Prince Henry, the Kaiser's 
brother, was made commander of a second squadron, to be 
sent from Germany to the support of the first. In view of 
the Kaiser's enthusiasm for naval affairs, we are not sur- 
prised that he made the departure of the first naval expedi- 
tion undertaken by the German Empire an occasion of 
great solemnity. 

In a farewell banquet to Prince Henry at Kiel, December 
15, the Kaiser, after alluding to the former maritime glorj-- 
of the Hanseatic League, remarked that the Hansa decayed. 

< ^ 


















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)— 1 














Anglo-German Suspicion 93 

"and could not but decay, for the one condition, imperial 
protection, was wanting. Now things are different. As the 
first preliminary condition the German Empire has been 
created. As the second preliminary condition, German 
commerce is flourishing and developing; and it can develop 
and prosper securely only if it feels safe under the power of 
the empire. Imperial power means naval power, and they 
are so mutually dependent that the one cannot exist without 
the other." As explaining the spirit of the instructions to 
his brother, he continued ; "May it be clear to every European 
foreigner out there, to the German merchant, and above all, 
to the foreigner whose soil we may be on, and with whom we 
shall have to deal, that the German Michael has planted his 
shield adorned with the eagle of the Empire firmly on that 
soil, in order once for all to afford protection to those who 
apply to him for it." "Should, however, any one attempt 
to affront us or infringe our good rights, then strike out with 
the mailed fist, and if God will, weave round your young 
brow the laurel which nobody in the whole German Empire 
will begrudge you." In the course of his reply Prince Henry 
employed the following expression; "I am not allured by 
hopes of winning glory or laurels; I am only animated by 
one desire — to proclaim and preach abroad to all who will 
hear, as well as to those who will not, the gospel of your 
Majesty's anointed person." 

Derision of the romantic tone of this ceremony, more than 
opposition to the undertaking itself, was the chief feature of 
the observations of the leading British journals. It is note- 
worthy that intelligence of the arrival of a Russian fleet at 
Port Arthur, with evident intention of making it a perman- 
ent winter port, was received four days after the farewell to 
Prince Henry. The German expedition obtained a lease for 
ninety-nine years of the Chinese sovereign rights over a 
territory of about two hundred square miles, including the 

94 The Great War 

ports, Kiau-Chau, and Tsing-Tau, together with an exclu- 
sive concession for the construction of a railway to connect 
these ports with the great Chinese railway system. It 
was equivalent to a German economic protectorate over the 
populous province of Shantung, with the actual possession 
of points of tremendous commercially strategic importance. 

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs, von Biilow, addressed 
the Reichstag, February 8, 1898, relative to the expedition 
to China, as follows: "The expedition of the cruiser 
squadron to Kiau-Chau was not the result of a sudden 
impulse but of a decision reached through careful delibera- 
tion of all the circumstances. It is the expression of a 
prudent, consistent poHcy. We were already fully alive to 
the necessity of a territorial foothold in East Asia, without 
which our economic, maritime, and political interests would 
be deprived of the security afforded by a definite point of 
coordination. In an economic connection we require such 
a door to the Chinese exploitive area as France possesses 
in Tongking, England in Hongkong, and Russia in the north. 
The Chinese Empire with its population of nearly 400,000,000 
is one of the world's richest markets of the future. We 
cannot allow ourselves to be excluded from this market, 
upon which our economic and material, and consequently 
political and moral, progress depends." 

The words of the Kaiser in bidding farewell to his brother, 
especially the allusion to imperial protection as a necessary 
condition for commercial prosperity, were the reflection of a 
proposed fundamental change in the financial policy of the 
government regarding the naval establishment, a bill for 
which had already been submitted to the consideration of 
the Reichstag. The adoption of this proposal, as embodied 
in the famous Navy Law of 1898, was a turning-point in the 
reign of William II. This innovation was to sanction in 
advance a comprehensive program of naval construction 

Suspicion 95 

covering several years, together with the necessary current 
expenses of the fleet, instead of voting yearly appropria- 
tions as heretofore. It extended to the navy the system 
according to which the funds were granted for the army, 
formerly for periods of seven years, but at that time for 
terms of five years' duration. Thus the Reichstag was to 
pledge in anticipation the annual contributions required for 
the fleet, and in return the government bound itself not to 
increase within the specified time the measure of its require- 
ments. In introducing these proposals on December 6, the 
Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, remarked that under the old 
system disputes often arose over appropriations for a cruiser 
or two which in their violence were out of all proportion to 
the object in view. "The result of this method of handling 
naval questions has been," he said, "that in spite of consider- 
able appropriations our fleet has not developed in such a way 
as the vital interests of the country require. The navy has 
had to live from hand to mouth, so to speak, and it has been 
impossible to follow a consistent policy in its development. 
We have, accordingly, become convinced that the system is 
faulty. A substantial building cannot be erected unless the 
builders have a definite plan, according to which the founda- 
tions are laid, and the walls are reared. The proposal which 
has been submitted to your deliberation is calculated, in the 
same way, to unify all the cooperating factors." He went 
on to say that while the measure placed a limitation for 
some years on the freedom of the Reichstag in voting 
supplies, it supposedly tied the hands of the government 
also. With reference to Germany's naval intentions, he 
remarked that Germany had no idea of vying with the 
great maritime powers, but that if her interests were affected 
she must be able to speak plain German through her navy. 
At that time the German navy consisted of seven first, 
five third, and eight fourth class ironclads; four first, six 

96 The Great War 

second, three third, and eight fourth class cruisers; thirteen 
armored gunboats; and smaller craft. It was proposed to 
reduce the different classes of larger war-vessels to three, 
namely, battleships, first-class cruisers, and second-class 
cruisers; and the bill called for seven battleships, and nine 
cruisers, to be constructed within seven years at an aggregate 
costof about 3105,000,000. This non-recurring expenditure, 
together with the usual, or recurring expenses, was to be 
distributed over the period in such a way that the total 
appropriation for naval purposes each year would increase 
gradually from 329,208,000 for the fiscal year 1898-9 to 
335,928,000 for 1904-5. The large cruisers to be provided 
were a rather unique class at that time, having a tonnage 
of 8860, engines of 15,000 horse-power, triple screws, and a 
high speed, about twenty-one knots. 

On the occasion of the discussion of the naval proposals 
the Foreign Secretary, Count von Biilow, cited the oriental 
situation as illustrating the intention of the government to 
maintain a firm, but not aggressive, foreign policy, and 
employed an oft quoted expression. "We are animated," 
he said, "with the most benevolent and friendly intentions 
regarding China, and have no wish either to offend or pro- 
voke her." "It is our duty to insist that the German mis- 
sionary, the German merchant, German goods, the German 
flag, and German shipping enjoy the same respect in China 
as those of other powers. We cheerfully observe the same 
consideration for the interests of other great powers in East 
Asia, which we expect that they will display towards ours. 
In short, we desire to put no one in the shade, but we too 
demand our -place in the sun. We shall endeavor in accord- 
ance with the traditions of German policy, without unnec- 
essary rigor, but also without weakness, to guard our rights 
and our interests." 

During a subsequent debate on the Navy Bill he said 

Theobald von Bcthmann-Hulhvcg, Chancellor of the German Empire and President 
of the Prussian Ministrj-. 

Anglo-German Suspicion 97 

that Germany had to provide against being excluded from 
competition in promising countries, and that the day was 
past when the German was content to resign the land to 
one power, the sea to another, and to allot to himself only 
the heavens, the abode of pure and abstract doctrine. The 
Navy Bill passed the Reichstag, March 28, 1898. 

Late in the same year Germany further strengthened her 
position in the Orient by purchasing from Spain the Caroline 
and the Ladrone Islands, with the exception of Guam, for 
a sum equivalent to about 34,000,000. 

The Kaiser was the prophet, the apostle, and might even 
be called the high-priest of the modern German navy; for 
the project of a powerful navy was proclaimed and cherished 
with the fervent devotion of a religious cult. But the 
maker of the navy, if the title can be conferred upon any 
individual, was Chief Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, and his 
commanding personality has been inseparably connected 
with the development of German sea-power from the time 
when he was appointed Minister of Marine in 1897 until 
to-day. An eloquent commentary upon his association with 
German naval policy is the growth of the annual appropria- 
tions for naval purposes, while he has been minister, from 
about 330,000,000 in 1898 to 3116,700,000 in 1913. His 
comprehensive experience in naval affairs, acquired in the 
course of a career extending from cadet through various 
grades, in an orderly line of promotion, to minister, is a 
foundation for unwavering assurance in his authority. He 
is a character of indomitable energy and determination. 
As chief-of-stafF at the Kiel naval station he displayed con- 
spicuous executive ability by introducing into naval admin- 
istration the standard of efficiency which prevailed in the 
army. As minister he exhibits a rare combination of prac- 
tical seamanship, administrative talent, and discerning 

98 The Great War 

The diplomatic shrewdness of this great naval minister 
has been repeatedly demonstrated in the cleverness and 
tact with which the government, under his leadership, has 
employed every available means of exerting influence on the 
public for creating a favorable atmosphere just before in- 
augurating each successive scheme for the enlargement of 
the fleet. The Navy League has been an effective auxiliary 
in this propaganda. It is a voluntary association which 
undertook to spread the gospel of German sea-power. It 
mobilizes the forces of public opinion favorable to a vigor- 
ous naval policy. It has branches in all parts of the empire, 
publishes a periodical, sends out lecturers, arranges for ex- 
cursions of school-children to visit units of the fleet, and dis- 
seminates its message to the people in other practical ways. 

The South African War had a most unhappy influence 
upon Anglo-German relations. A short time after the be- 
ginning of hostilities a British cruiser stopped a German 
mail-packet steamer, the Bundesrat, off the east coast of 
Africa, because she was suspected of carrying contraband. 
Although the Bundesrat was quickly released, the incident 
excited general indignation in Germany. The government 
seized upon the feeling of exasperation as an opportunity of 
securing popular support for a vastly more extensive naval 
program. In spite of the agreement covering seven years 
impHed in the Naval Law of 1898, passed about eighteen 
months before, the Chancellor complacently informed the 
Reichstag that a bill was being prepared to amend the 
earlier measure. The ensuing Naval Law of 1900 may be 
considered the real beginning of the momentous naval 
rivalry of Germany and Great Britain. 

The government regarded the further expansion of their 
sea forces as indispensable in consequence of the far-reaching 
changes in the international situation recently brought 
about, particularly by the Spanish-American, and South 

N Suspicion 99 

African, Wars. The sudden disintegration of the Spanish 
colonial power was an object lesson of sudden revolutions 
that might be expected, when the vigorous nations with 
strong navies at hand would derive profit. Portugal, for 
example, was even weaker than Spain. In fact, her empire 
seemed to be on the point of collapsing from bankruptcy. 
Her population was about 5,300,000, and her public debt 
about 3600,000,000. Her dependencies embraced an area of 
801,060 square miles with a population of 9,216,707, and the 
largest part, Portuguese East Africa, was admirably situated 
for becoming an addition to the German colonial empire. 

The Foreign Secretary, Count von Biilow, in a rambling 
speech before the Reichstag, made the following remarks, 
which fairly represent the government's attitude: "Germany 
cannot stand aside while other nations divide the world 
among them. The rapid increase of our population, the 
growth of our industry, the capacity of our merchants, in 
short, the keen vitality of the German people, have drawn 
us into the international market and bound our interests up 
with those of the whole world." 

But the impression was immediately produced in some 
quarters that the naval policy of the German government 
was directed against Great Britain, with the hope of ulti- 
mately wresting from that power the supremacy of the seas, 
and henceforth every fresh proposal for increasing the navy 
has encountered this suspicion in the Reichstag. Is it any 
wonder that what many Germans suspected, many English 
believed? A speech of Herr Richter of the radical opposi- 
tion in the Reichstag expressed the view of those who 
denounced an attitude of hostility against England: 

"It is not true," he said, "that England is hostile to us in 
our colonial aims. England could have taken all our col- 
onies long ago, if she had thought it worth her while, for 
they all lay at her door. It has been possible for all our 

100 The Great War 

Imperial Chancellors from Prince Bismarck downwards to 
delimit our colonial spheres of interest with England in a 
business-like manner. Who would ever have imagined that 
England would have ceded Heligoland (in 1890) to us? All 
these agreements were successfully concluded without any 
regard to our navy, but as a result of the general attitude of 
Germany to England." 

Admiral Tirpitz introduced the bill, February 8, 1900. 
It embraced a scheme of constructive activity continuing 
until 1920, and providing for two double squadrons of 
seventeen battle-ships each, fourteen cruisers of the first 
class, thirty-eight smaller cruisers, and ninety-six torpedo 
boats and destroyers. The aggregate sum which it was 
necessary to raise to 1920 for non-recurrent expenses was 
about 3200,000,000. In the course of the debate, Herr 
Bebel, the veteran chieftain of Social Democracy, affirmed 
that it was evidently the intention of the government to 
create a fleet capable of coping with that of England, and 
that a conflict with that country would be the greatest 
calamity that could befall Germany; for France and Russia 
would wait until Germany was exhausted and then fall on her. 
England and Germany, in his opinion, were natural allies. 
Von Tirpitz denied, however, that the increase of the navy 
had necessarily any connection with a conflict with England; 
it was imposed upon them by general considerations of 
policy. The preamble of the bill itself sets forth as motive 
the proposition that "Germany must possess a battle-fleet 
so strong, that a war with her would even for the greatest 
naval power be accompanied with such dangers as would 
render that power's position doubtful." The opinion of 
von Tirpitz himself has been that the general position of 
Germany required her to maintain a naval establishment of 
two-thirds the British strength. The bill was finally passed, 
June 12. If the flying squadron was England's answer to 

Anglo-German Suspicion 101 

Germany's blunder in the "Kruger Telegram," the Navy 
Bill of 1900 was Germany's reply to England's mistake in 
stopping the "Bundesrath." The race of armaments had 

Count von Biilow, who had been Foreign Secretary since 
1896, was appointed Imperial Chancellor to succeed Prince 
Hohenlohe, October 18, 1900. His tenure of this office 
continued until July 14, 1909, longer than that of any other 
Chancellor since Bismarck. These were memorable years 
for Germany in a variety of ways, and von Biilow stands 
out as the most conspicuous personality among the suc- 
cessors of the Iron Chancellor. He is the embodiment of 
affability and suavity of manner. He has none of the 
narrow spirit of the Prussian aristocratic caste. He was 
distinguished by his skill in debate before the Reichstag. 
While free from an unreasonable spirit of Chauvinism, he 
was ready at all times to uphold Germany's right to "a 
place in the sun." 

At the time of the South African struggle Great Britain 
stood alone amongst the nations. France harbored a feel- 
ing of resentment for the continued British occupation of 
Egypt, and more especially for the humiliation of the recent 
Fashoda incident of 1898, when England mobilized a flying 
squadron and imposed her own view upon the French in a 
territorial question touching the upper valley of the Nile. 
A traditional rivalry and suspicion separated Great Britain 
from Russia; and mistrust and prejudice were daily broad- 
ening the spiritual gulf between Great Britain and Germany. 
This was the state of affairs in 1900. Fourteen years later 
we find Great Britain leagued with six other states. This 
transformation from isolation to far-extending alliances is 
one of the most astonishing diplomatic developments in 
modern history. The change was not planned deliberately. 
For the Triple Entente between Great Britain, France, and 

102 The Great War 

Russia was not the work of a single statesman, nor the 
result of a single clearly-defined project. It developed step 
by step under the influence of circumstances and a broader 
view of national advantage. It will be instructive to observe 
that the way began to be smoothed for the first step in these 
national reconciliations with Great Britain not very long 
after the great German Naval Law of 1900. 

The tone of the continental press was generally unfriendly 
to Great Britain during the South African War. It was 
possibly not more bitter in Germany than in France. But 
the virulent anti-British attitude of most of the German 
papers was more irritating in its effect, because Germany 
had sent the "Kriiger Telegram," because Germany was 
supposed to entertain sentiments of envy and jealousy 
against Great Britain, and because Germany had less cause 
for resentment than France. During all this time the 
ofiicial attitude of the German government was commend- 
ably correct. When President Kriiger with his associates 
visited Europe in the hope of obtaining a diplomatic inter- 
vention of the powers, he was received by the president and 
foreign minister of France. But a telegram from Potsdam 
informed him that the Kaiser was not in a position to receive 
him unless he were presented by the British ambassador. 
The Kaiser's position in the face of the passionate indigna- 
tion of a large part of the people was a difficult one, as he 
himself afterwards declared. There were some who insinu- 
ated that the government maintained a scrupulously neutral 
attitude on account of the dynastic connection with Great 

The irritation on both sides of the North Sea was intensi- 
fied by finding expression in the public utterances of prom- 
inent political personalities. Thus Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, 
Colonial Secretary, in a speech In Edinburgh, October 25, 
1901, after announcing that severer measures might be 

Anglo-German Suspicion 103 

necessary against the guerilla bands, which continued an 
obstinate resistance prolonging the war to no purpose, went 
on to say that the British government could find precedents 
for anything it might do in the action of the nations who 
criticized the British "barbarity" and "cruelty," but whose 
example in Poland, in the Caucasus, in Algeria, in Tong- 
king, in Bosnia, in the Franco-German War they themselves 
had never even approached. Singularly enough, the refer- 
ence to a German example was the only one of these which 
seems to have been seriously resented; but German Anglo- 
phobia broke all bounds in consequence of the allusion to the 
measures taken in the Franco-German War. Indignation 
meetings of the intellectual classes were held all over Germany 
to protest against the insolent comparison of the national 
German army, their own fathers and brothers, with the 
ruffian mercenaries of the British army. It was immaterial 
that among these "hired ruffians" there were about 60,000 
colonials, including the cream of the youth of Canada, not 
to mention the yeomanry and volunteers of the better 
classes from the Mother Country. 

If any unfavorable comment is ever made on the conduct 
of the German army, an important element in Germany 
immediately rallied in anger to its defense, without first 
inquiring whether the reproach is justifiable, and this 
principle of the army right or wrong appears to be incul- 
cated in the schools. It is strangely at variance with the 
attitude of calm detachment of German scholarship in 
scientific research and abstract speculation. A nation that 
consecrates any one of its institutions by an intolerant, un- 
reasoning devotion becomes excessively sensitive to the in- 
considerate thrusts of those who are strangers to the impres- 
sive quality of the object of veneration. The element in 
German society which cherishes this irrational attitude is 
more impatient of criticism directed against the army than 

104 The Great War 

against the nation itself; and yet they insist that the army 
is the nation. This shows that to them the institution 
itself possesses a character of sanctity which it is impious to 
violate by word or thought. 

In France the Socialists and Radicals laid profane hands 
on the military cult. It received its death-blow in connec- 
tion with the Dreyfus Affair. Yet French soldiers, and what 
is perhaps more significant, French officers, are just as 
spirited in defending liberty and their country as when 
impelled by mystic devotion to a traditional fetish, upon 
whose altar independence of judgment and criticism must 
be sacrificed. 

The German government maintained, outwardly at least, 
an attitude of moderation during this crisis of popular 
emotion. The semi-official press admitted, however, that 
Chamberlain's words had in some measure justified indigna- 
tion, and when the Reichstag re-assembled, January 8, 1902, 
Imperial Chancellor von Biilow referred to the prevailing 
state of excitement in the following terms : 

"It was altogether intelligible, that in a nation which is so 
closely bound up with its glorious army as is the German 
people, the general feeling rose high against the attempt, 
and even against the appearance of an attempt, to misrepre- 
sent the heroic character and the moral basis of our struggle 
for national unity. The German army, however, stands far 
too high, and its escutcheon is far too clean, for it to be 
affected by distorted judgments. With regard to anything 
of that kind, the remark of Frederick the Great holds good, 
when he said, on being told that some one had attacked him 
and the Prussian army: 'Let the man alone and don't 
excite yourselves, he is biting at granite'." In the course of 
the debate Herr Bebel said that he failed to understand the 
outcry against Chamberlain, while Herr Liebermann von 
Sonnenberg exclaimed that Chamberlain was "the most 

^N Suspicion 105 

accursed scoundrel on God's earth," and said that "Germany's 
veteran soldiers must be protected against comparison with 
gangs of robbers and packs of thieves; for it is evident that 
the greater part of the British army is composed of such 
elements." The cordial relations between the Kaiser and 
the English royal family were not interrupted at this time. 
On the contrary, the Prince of Wales, now King George V, 
visited Berlin for the celebration of the Kaiser's birth-day, 
January 26, 1902, eighteen days after the above-mentioned 

The Germans affirmed throughout the war that their 
sympathy for the Boers was disinterested; that it was the 
natural result of admiration for a small people struggling 
courageously for their liberty, and of national affinity, since 
the Boers, as Dutch colonists, were an offshoot of Low 
German stock. These protestations were the expression of 
a sincere conviction, but a thoughtful analysis might have 
brought to light less conscious, but more fundamental, 
causes. An accession to the British Empire in any part of 
the world would have been a source of bitterness at that 
time, and this is quite intelligible in view of the hopelessly 
disproportionate territorial extension of the two powers. 
Moreover, both the German government and people had 
doubtless allowed themselves to speculate vaguely upon ad- 
vantages which might eventually be secured from friendly 
cooperation with the Boers. A Teutonic South Africa, 
under German economic hegemony, if not political leader- 
ship, had been a shadowy possibility of the future. The 
British annexation of the two Boer republics crushed these 
hopes unceremoniously. It seemed to consolidate the 
British power, and perpetuate the separation of the German 
spheres of control in East and West Africa. If the Germans 
had been deeply moved by a disinterested spirit of sympathy 
for the Boers themselves, they would have rejoiced at the 

106 The Great War 

generosity displayed towards them by the victors, and the 
subsequent formation of the Union, in which the Afrikanders 
of Dutch descent are the strongest element. But there has 
been little indication of such a sentiment. On the contrary, 
the German press showed annoyance at the conclusion of 
hostilities, and has been alert ever since to observe any 
signs that might indicate an unsatisfactory condition of 
affairs in South Africa. 


Conditions Fraught with Danger 

Germany and Russia in 1904. Agreement between Great Britain and 
France, April 8, 1904, respecting Morocco. German press. Kaiser's speech 
in Bremen, March 23, 1905. Russian disasters destroy balance of forces in 
Europe. Morocco and French policy. Kaiser's visit in Tangier and speech. 
Germany's attitude. Crisis in Morocco Controversy; France yields; M. 
Delcasse resigns. Algeciras Conference, 1906. Significance of Germany's 
Moroccan policy. The "open door." "Matin disclosure." The first 
"Dreadnought." German Navy Law of 1906. Race in armaments. 
British naval panic in 1909. Anglo-Russian reconciliation and Triple 
Entente. "Daily Telegraph Interview," October 28, 1908. Franco-German 
agreement of February 9, 1909. French occupation of Fez. Panther sent 
to Agadir. Proposal for "compensations." Speech of Mr. Lloyd George, 
July 21, 1911. Germany accepts a compromise. Disappointment and re- 
sentment in Germany. 

Germany had never given up the policy of cultivating 
quite friendly relations with Russia, and the increasing 
cordiality between England and France probably suggested 
renewed efforts to secure an intimate understanding with 
the Tsar, as a sort of safeguard. We must recall that 
Russia was at this critical period engaged in her struggle 
with Japan. But during 1904 the military situation did not 
seem to preclude the possibility of a favorable result for her 
armies, and the revolutionary agitation had not yet taken 
on the character of a national upheaval. The friendship of 
Russia was still desirable; and Germany's neutrality in the 
war was conspicuously benevolent as far as her great 
neighbor was concerned. Complaints were frequently made 
in Germany at that time that the government's attitude 
toward Russia was unworthily subservient. Herr Bebel 

108 The Great War 

with characteristic frankness denounced Germany's policy 
as one of blacking Russia's boots. Russian deserters escap- 
ing across the frontier were promptly arrested and sent 
back. Russian subjects suspected of revolutionary activity 
against the Tsar were expelled from Germany. Not only 
did the Prussian police cooperate with Russian officials who 
were attached to the Russian Embassy in Berlin for the 
purpose of observing their fellow subjects in Germany, and 
who exercised an extraordinary liberty of search, but even 
nine Germans were brought to trial in Konigsberg for con- 
spiracy, sedition, and lese-majeste against the Tsar! 

There were convincing indications that an intimate under- 
standing existed between the two governments. In the first 
place, the Russians withdrew most of their regiments from 
Poland, which would have been impossible if the Germans 
had not guaranteed the security of the frontier, a pledge 
which probably included the promise of cooperation of some 
sort in the event of a Polish uprising. Then, on July 28, a 
new commercial treaty was signed, which was very favorable 
to Germany. For, although the higher scale of duties on 
grain, which had been lately introduced in Germany to 
favor the agrarians, was incorporated in the new agreement, 
Russia granted very favorable treatment to imports of 
German manufactured articles. Under this agreement 
German trade with Russia prospered amazingly. Moreover, 
an old arrangement was revived in October, which had 
existed during several generations between Prussia (later 
Germany) and Russia, by which the military attache of each 
power held the rank of military plenipotentiary at the court 
of the other, with personal access to the sovereign to whom 
he was accredited. This institution set up a channel 
of communication parallel with, but independent of, the 
customary diplomatic connection. It may have put the 
monarchs into closer personal touch, but probably mvolved 


Conditions of Danger 109 

the danger of confusing the orderly progress of negotiation. 

The events of 1904 and 1905 deserve our closest attention. 
These were years when some decisive factors in international 
policies made their presence felt. Currents in diplomacy, 
which had been somewhat uncertain until then, took the 
course to which they have steadfastly adhered until the 
present time. The most important of these was the tendency 
for Great Britain and France to act together. 

Directly after the Fashoda Incident in 1898, when Anglo- 
French relations were very strained, M. Cambon was sent 
to London as representative of the French government with 
the hope of bringing about a better understanding between 
the two nations. The process of reconciliation proceeded 
very slowly at first, but about the time of the termination 
of the South African War relations began to improve very 
rapidly. The two nations suddenly became convinced that 
no insurmountable difficulties prevented the establishment 
of harmony between them. One by one the outstanding 
questions were readily settled. A convention signed April 
8, 1904, was the final act of agreement consummating the 
Entente Cordiale, or sincere understanding, between the two 
countries. This agreement was a recognition by each 
nation of the other's position in Egypt and Morocco respec- 
tively. France was to have a free hand in Morocco, England 
in Egypt. The provisions regarding Morocco authorized 
France to take measures to tranquillize the country, and to 
assist the Sultan in introducing the necessary financial, 
economic, and military reforms. Furthermore, there were 
to be equal commercial opportunities for all, as in Egypt. 

An agreement was made by France and Spain in October, 
1904, relative to Morocco, on about the same basis, with 
a general understanding that French interests took prece- 
dence in about four-fifths of Morocco, and Spanish interests 
in the other one-fifth. 

110 The Great War 

One of the natural results of the understanding with 
France was the geographical reapportionment of the units 
of the British fleet, involving the withdrawal of a large part 
of the naval strength from the Mediterranean Sea, and a 
corresponding increase in the North Sea. 

Mr. Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, in a speech 
at Eastleigh, February 2, 1905, said that there had been a 
complete redistribution of the British fleet, in order to be 
prepared for possible enemies. The balance and center of 
naval power in Europe had been shifted during the last few 
years. They had not so much to keep their eyes upon 
France and the Mediterranean as they had to look with 
more anxiety, though not with fear, towards the North Sea. 
It was for that reason that the fleets had been distributed 
to enable them to deal with any danger in that direction. 
He concluded this analysis of the naval situation by saying: 
"If war should unhappily be declared, under existing con- 
ditions the British navy would get its blow in first, before 
the other side had time even to read in the papers that war 
had been declared." Not unnaturally, the Berlin papers 
looked upon the tone of these remarks as menacing, although 
it is more than doubtful whether, if the likelihood of such a 
sudden act of aggression were really contemplated, it would 
be thus openly proclaimed. The inspired North German 
Gazette, in an article appearing about this time, denied that 
there was a state of tension in the relations between the two 
countries, or cause for any. 

In considering events of comparatively recent occurrence 
which still loom large on the horizon of the memory, the 
zest of curiosity at renewing our first sensations, grown a 
little dim with the passing of time, impels us frequently to 
consult the most tangible immediate record of public im- 
pressions, the daily press. Whoever would employ the 
contents of this store-house of contemporary historical 

Conditions of Danger 111 

evidence for Germany, must use care and discrimination, in 
consequence of conditions which may be briefly explained. 
The tenacity of the intellectual importance of the old 
local capitals in Germany has retarded the concentration of 
journalism in a great metropolitan press representing 
broadly the principal currents of national opinion, such as 
we find in London and Paris. Some of the other large 
cities have papers which are no less prominent than the 
leading journals of Berlin itself. Moreover, the govern- 
ment recognizes the great value of the press as a medium 
for controlling popular sentiment, and for this reason brings 
influence to bear upon it in different ways. Some papers, as 
the North German Gazette (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung) 
reflect very faithfully the attitude of the government, being 
virtually official organs of publicity. There are other 
papers, such as the Cologne Gazette {Koelnische Zeitung), 
which are semi-official; experimentally inspired, as one 
might say. The official origin of the government's views, 
when expressed in these, can be denied, if it is unfavorably 
received. The Lokal Anzeiger, Berliner Tageblatt, and 
Morgenpost, are modern Berlin papers with an enormous 
circulation, but limited political influence. The Frankfurt 
Gazette {Frankfurter Zeitung) is a leading Radical organ, 
and the Vorw'drts in Berlin, like the Social Democrat party, 
of which it is the official mouth-piece, represents with un- 
compromising steadfastness a partisan attitude in opposi- 
tion to the government. As for a large number of the 
smaller local sheets, the economic advantage of official adver- 
tising keeps them quite subservient to the government's 
influence. The German papers, on the whole, therefore, 
must be consulted with discernment, whether one wishes 
to discover the official attitude, or gauge the popular 
opinion. The interpretation of leading articles in the semi- 
official papers presents a baffling, but, perhaps, at the same 

112 The Great War 

time enticing, problem for the scholar of recent history. 

Events of momentous consequence will directly suggest 
references to the press to test the responsive beating of the 
public pulse. 

The Kaiser assisted at the dedication of a monument to 
his father in Bremen, March 23, 1905, and delivered an 
address which is noteworthy for its apparent ambiguity and 
the sensational proceeding of which it seems to have served 
as a prologue. The most striking, and at the same time 
sharply contrasted, parts of his speech were the following: 

"The lessons of history have impelled me to vow never to 
strive for world dominion. For what has become of the 
world-empires? Alexander I, Napoleon I, and all the great 
conquerors swam in blood, and left subjugated peoples, who 
grasped the first opportunity to assert their independence 
and shatter the empires of force. The world dominion of 
which I have cherished the dream consists in this; that the 
recently amalgamated German Empire should enjoy on all 
sides the most profound confidence as a tranquil, upright, 
peace-loving neighbor; and that if future history should 
speak of a German or HohenzoUern world, dominion, it 
would be founded, not on a policy of the sword, but on the 
reciprocal confidence of the nations in their struggle towards 
a common goal; in short, as a great poet has said, 'confined 
without, but unrestricted in its capacity for development 

"Our military preparation on land had fulfilled its nec- 
essary development; the time had come for naval armaments 
to advance. I thank God, that there is no need for the cry 
of alarm which I once uttered in Hamburg. Our fleet is 
already on the water, a reality, and naval construction is 
still proceeding. We have an abundance of seamen; and 
the zeal and spirit are displayed which characterized the 
Prussian officers at Hohenfriedberg, Koniggratz (Sadowa), 

Emperor William II after landing at Tangier, March 31, 1905, on his way to the German 
Legation, escorted by the uncle of the Sultan of Morocco. 

-er Eduardo Dato. 

Conditions of Danger 113 

and Sedan. And every German ship that is launched is an 
added guarantee of peace on earth, since it discourages our 
enemies and raises us in the estimation of our allies." 

The prospect of a German Empire dedicated to peace and 
actively engaged in launching war-ships to ensure the 
general repose was thus solemnly announced to the aston- 
ished nations. The same speech contained a further passage 
which did not pass without comment: 

"We are the salt of the earth; and we must prove our- 
selves worthy of our high calling. Our young generation 
must, therefore, learn to deny itself all that is not good for 
it, to shun the contagion of evil that steals in from foreign 
lands, and to preserve good morals, discipline, order, rever- 
ence, and religion. Then can the German people merit the 
device inscribed on the helmets of my First Life Guards — 
Semper talis — ^Always the same." 

The world was not left long in doubt as to the significance 
of this rather incoherent speech, which seemed to be at the 
same time an attempt to overawe and to reassure. For the 
Kaiser sailed from Cuxhaven the same day, on the mail 
steamship Hamburg, for a journey to the Mediterranean 
with Tangier, the commercial metropolis of Morocco, in- 
cluded in the proposed itinerary. 

For nearly a year after the conclusion of the Franco- 
English agreement the German government had shown no 
signs of solicitude respecting the results of this convention 
for the affairs of Morocco. The French Foreign Minister 
M. Delcasse had informed the German ambassador in Paris 
that the agreement touching Morocco recognized the integ- 
rity and independence of the country, and the sovereignty 
of the Sultan, and authorized the restoration of order under 
the friendly direction of France. Chancellor von Biilow had 
declared in the Reichstag, April 12, 1904, four days after 
the agreement had been concluded, that German interests 

114 The Great War 

in Morocco seemed to be in no danger. About the same 
time, in an interview with King Alfonso of Spain at Vigo, the 
Kaiser had declared that Germany desired no acquisition of 
territory in Morocco. 

In the mean time, however, disaster after disaster had 
befallen the Russians in the war with Japan in the extreme 
Orient. Port Arthur had fallen, January 1, 1905, the Battle 
of Mukden, March 6-10, had been an Irreparable defeat for 
the Russian army, and the last hope of the Russian sea- 
power had been shattered in the naval battle in the Straits 
of Tsushima, May 27. It was commonly believed that 
Russia had received a blow from which her military power 
could scarcely recover within twenty years. The equilib- 
rium of military power seemed to have been subverted. 
The powers of the Dual and Triple Alliances had been facing 
each other for a number of years. The pressure of one 
group neutralized the opposing pressure of the other, and 
thus a balance of forces was effected, and consequently 
stability. But when the pressure on one side was partly 
removed, the forces on the other almost inevitably expanded. 
The expansive vigor of German diplomacy quickly made 
itself felt in connection with Morocco. 

Morocco occupies an area of about 219,000 square miles, 
and has a population of about 5,000,000 souls. Its soil Is 
fertile In parts, and conceals valuable mineral deposits, 
notably iron-ore. If one considers first the advantageous 
situation of Morocco, fronting on the Mediterranean Sea 
and Atlantic Ocean and flanking the Straits of Gibraltar, 
and then the character of Its native Inhabitants, who are 
entirely Incapable of developing the many opportunities 
which they have at hand. It appears extraordinary that the 
country was not brought under the controlling influence of 
any European power before the twentieth century. Natur- 
ally France, whose important colony Algeria bounds Morocco 

Conditions of Danger 115 

on the east for a long distance, had the greatest Interest in 
the establishment of peace and prosperity in the country. 
The Sultan exercised a precarious authority over the turbu- 
lent tribesmen to whom the greater part of Morocco was 
abandoned. The state of anarchy in Morocco was a subject 
of grave consideration for the rulers of Algeria. 

The natural consequence of the Anglo-French agreement 
of 1904 was the decision of the French government to press 
upon the Sultan the necessity of an improvement in the 
internal situation of Morocco, which was to be undertaken 
with their friendly assistance. Accordingly, in January, 
1905, a special French minister was sent to Fez, the capital 
of the country, to lay before the Sultan a program of the 
reforms that were considered necessary. 

The Sultan hesitated to accept these proposals, and the 
French minister, to overcome his reluctance, was reported 
as having declared that he was acting in this negotiation as 
practically the representative of all Europe. As early as 
July, 1904, a loan for the Sultan had been raised in Paris, in 
consequence, undoubtedly, of the Anglo-French agreement. 
At that time the Sultan must have known the provisions of 
the agreement regarding Morocco and must have accepted 
them, at least tacitly. His opposition to the proposals of 
the French government in 1905 can best be explained on the 
assumption that he was encouraged to resist by the German 
diplomatic representative in Fez. The Sultan even de- 
manded information of the German envoy respecting the 
character of the French minister's professed commission as 
representative of Europe, and received the information that 
Germany, for her part, had not given her authority for such 
a mandate. 

On March 29, a few days after the Kaiser's departure for 
the Mediterranean, Chancellor von Biilow addressed the 
Reichstag on Germany's position with regard to Morocco, 

116 The Great War 

employing during his speech the following expressions : 

"We have in Morocco, as in China, a great interest in the 
maintenance of the 'open door'; that is to say, equal oppor- 
tunities for all commercial nations. The German interests 
are considerable in Morocco; and we must see to it that 
they have equal treatment with those of other nations." 
"While the attitude of the diplomat must adjust itself to 
Individual circumstances, the general attitude of German 
policy has not changed." "If any attempt should be made 
to change the international status of iMorocco, or restrict 
the 'open door', we must with greater watchfulness than 
heretofore guard our economic interests from harm." 

Two days later, the Kaiser addressed the German colonists 
in Tangier in a speech which created a world-wide sensation, 
since it was undoubtedly intended as an emphatic, official 
statement of the attitude of the German government. He 

"I rejoice to make acquaintance with the pioneers of 
Germany in Morocco, and to be able to say to them that 
they have done their duty. Germany has great commercial 
interests there. I shall promote and protect our trade, 
which shows a gratifying development, and make it my 
care to secure full equality with all nations. This is only 
possible when the sovereignty of the Sultan and the inde- 
pendence of the country are preserved. Both are for 
Germany beyond question, and for that I am ready at all 
times to answer. I think my visit to Tangier announces 
this clearly and emphatically, and will doubtless produce 
the conviction that whatever Germany undertakes in 
Morocco will be negotiated exclusively with the Sultan." 

The Kaiser's visit in Tangier was a very drastic assertion 
that Germany recognized no influence in Morocco obscuring 
the Sultan's full sovereignty. The existence of a Moroccan 
Question had scarcely become known to the world at large. 

OF Danger 117 

when it passed into the acute stage. The Kaiser's visit was 
like a Kriiger Telegram rendered many times more em- 
phatic. But there was no diplomatic blunder this time. 
The German government had assumed a logically defensible 
position. They were prepared to back argument by force. 
They won their point, scoring thereby a diplomatic victory, 
which was considered a serious humiliation for France. 
The German view was based upon an international agree- 
ment. At a conference of powers in Madrid for the consid- 
eration of Moroccan affairs, a convention had been signed 
July 3, 1880, declaring the independence of the country, 
and guaranteeing the treatment of the most favored nation 
in Morocco to all the signatories of the agreement. Germany 
had been one of the powers which participated in the Madrid 
Convention in 1880. Germany took the logical view that 
France could not assume a special position In Morocco 
tantamount to a protectorate without the consent of all the 
powers which had signed that agreement. The German 
papers spoke of the Impending "Tunlslfication" of Morocco. 
On the other hand, the impression was current in France 
that German interests in Morocco were so small, about one- 
tenth of the foreign commerce, that Germany's interven- 
tion was an inexcusable act of provocation. 

The North German Gazette observed on April 5 that the 
Kaiser's words were In harmony with the statement of the 
Chancellor In the Reichstag, March 29, that Germany de- 
sired equality of treatment in an economic sense for all 
powers in Morocco. It went on to affirm, however, that 
France demanded, according to M. Delcasse's own words, an 
exceptional position In that country, which was apparently 
inconsistent with the principle of the "open door." The 
French representative at Fez had assumed the character of 
mandatory of all Europe, but Germany for her part had 
conferred no such mandate. Other German papers ex- 

118 The Great War 

pressed the opinion that German interests had not suffered 
injury up to that time, and hoped that Morocco would not 
undergo the fate of Tunis, from which foreign enterprise 
had been almost entirely excluded. 

Germany's sudden intrusion into Morrocan affairs had 
probably been entirely unforeseen by the French govern- 
ment, which was devoting its energy and attention to the 
passage of the bill for the separation of church and state, 
the most radical act of legislation of the whole period of the 
third republic, and one which threatened to convulse the 

On April 27, the Matin published a violent arraignment 
of Germany's attempt to disturb the peace of Europe, and 
as this article was thought to have been inspired by M. 
Delcasse, the Foreign Minister, there was a sudden panic. 
The situation remained very tense for about six weeks. 
But it is noteworthy, as indication of the increasing disin- 
clination for war in France, that the policy of M. Delcasse 
in the foreign office encountered much severe criticism. 

Finally, at the suggestion of Germany of course, the 
Sultan rejected the reform proposals of France, and asked 
for a conference of the signatories of the Madrid Convention 
to determine what measures were necessary for improving 
the administration of Morocco, and how they were to be 
introduced. This brought the crisis to its decisive point; 
for Germany promptly accepted the Sultan's proposal, and 
announced in a note to the French government her view 
that the questions could be settled only by a conference. 
It is reported that the German government conveyed 
through some appropriate diplomatic channel its determina- 
tion to appeal to arms, if necessary, in support of its position. 
M. Delcasse's colleagues were unwilling to carry the matter 
to this extreme point, and forced him to resign, June 6. 
Three days later, the Kaiser honored Count von Biilow by 

Conditions of Danger 119 

conferring upon him the title Prince (Fiirst), a reward, as it 
would seem, for the conspicuous diplomatic victory which 
he had won. The French government accepted the con- 
ference with certain preliminary stipulations which were 
accepted by Germany, and embodied In an agreement signed 
July 10. These conditions were the sovereignty and inde- 
pendence of the Sultan, the territorial integrity of his empire, 
commercial equality for all nations, and a recognition of the 
exceptional position of France with respect to Morocco on 
account of the long frontier In common. 

The Gaulois published an Interview, July 10, In which 
M. Delcasse explained his leading views on foreign 
policy, namely, that France and England should form an 
alliance, and that such a combination would probably sur- 
prise the world by bringing about a reconciliation between 
England and Russia, and thus expand Into a triple alliance. 

It has been asserted that the action of Germany In the 
Moroccan Question In 1905 was due solely to the irritation 
of wounded pride, since she had not been consulted In the 
agreement between Great Britain and France concerning 
the Sultan's dominion. But a broader motive Is suggested 
by a general consideration of the nature of German diplo- 
macy, as embodied in her Welt-politik, and this position 
was formulated by Chancellor von Biilow in a subsequent 
review of the negotiations in the Reichstag. He affirmed 
that It was a matter of essential Interest to Germany that 
the unapportioned parts of the earth should not be further 
reduced, and that the roads should not be closed to the 
extension of German industry and trade In a land which 
gave rich promise for the future. The demands of the 
French envoy were Incompatible with the maintenance of 
the status quo and equality for all In Morocco. The actual 
present extent of German Interests in the country was not 
the essential factor. If Germany allowed her interests to 

120 The Great War 

be compromised without a protest on this occasion, the 
nations would be encouraged to act with the same disregard 
towards Germany in other cases where the stake might be 
far greater. 

On the other hand, M. Rouvier, the French Prime Min- 
ister, who had taken the foreign portfolio upon M. Delcasse's 
resignation, made the following statement in a report on the 
Moroccan situation in the Chamber of Deputies: 

"Our proposals to the Sultan were not calculated to 
establish in Morocco a state of affairs similar to that of 
Tunis. We never assumed the alleged mandate from all 
Europe. Our envoy, M. Taillandier, performed his func- 
tion with absolute correctness, which infringed neither the 
sovereignty of the Sultan, nor the rights of other powers, 
as based on treaties. We shall confine our policy to the 
same limits. The question to be submitted to the confer- 
ence is simple. Every power has rights in Morocco which 
shall be respected — but it is our duty to indicate to the 
conference the nature and peculiar importance of our 

The Moroccan conference convened, January 16, 1906, at 
Algeciras, a Spanish port situated on the Strait of Gibraltar, 
and was composed of the representatives of Morocco, Spain, 
France, Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Portugal, and 
the United States. The most important questions for 
deliberation were those regarding the organization of a 
reliable police system and the establishment of a state 
bank. In the discussion concerning both of these necessary 
institutions, there was a serious divergence of views between 
the French and German representatives; since the former 
claimed for France a prominent or controlling share in their 
management. A compromise was finally effected mainly 
by the moderating influence of Austria-Hungary, which had 

Conditions of Danger 121 

no direct interest in Morocco. Spanish officers were to be 
associated with the French officers in the command of the 
poHce in the parts where impartiality was especially required 
on account of international commerce. But the general 
inspector of the entire police system was to be appointed by 
Switzerland, supposedly the most disinterested power. Of 
the capital for the proposed national bank, three-fifteenths 
were to be furnished by France, and one-fifteenth by each of 
the other signatory powers. The fact that Italy supported 
France in this conference, not Germany, was the subject of 
much comment, and was interpreted in some quarters as an 
indication of the weakening of the Triple Alliance. Italy 
had originally been impelled to form the compact with 
Germany and Austria by resentment at the annexation of 
Tunis by France, and fear that France would extend her 
dominion farther along the North African coast. Since 
that time, the jealousy of Italy and Austria as joint rulers of 
the Adriatic had increased, and on the other hand France 
had probably engaged herself secretly to recognize Italy's 
dominating interest in Tripoli. It must suffice for the 
present to make note of this ominous phenomenon. 

The great importance of a study of Germany's policy in 
Morocco consists in the fact that it reveals the most prom- 
inent feature of German Welt-politik. For, at a time when 
Russia was almost powerless to interfere, and the Entente 
Cordiale had as yet given no certain proof of its firmness, 
we may fairly assume that Germany's demands were a 
specific indication of the kind of place which she required 
for herself "in the sun." Germany demanded no enlarge- 
ment of her colonial territory, but only the maintenance of 
the "open door," that is, of impartial treatment for all 
commercial nations. Great Britain was the only colonial 
power which had consistently adhered to the practice of 
treating all alike, and even in the British Empire, the move- 

122 The Great War 

ment for imperial federation, and the establishment of trade 
preferences seemed to threaten the "open door." A con- 
sideration of the movement of German population supports 
the theory that the principal object of Germany's world- 
policy was to maintain the "open door." The tide of 
German emigration reached its highest level in 1881 when 
220,902 persons departed from the Fatherland, and began 
to recede at once, falling to 149,065 in 1884, when the 
schemes for a German colonial empire were fairly launched. 
Emigration varied in inverse ratio to the growth of the 
empire. One might almost be tempted to affirm that the 
very existence of German colonial territory exerted a dis- 
couraging influence on emigration. A comparison with the 
corresponding movement of British population affords a 
striking contrast: 

Germany United Kingdom 

Population Emigration Population Emigration 
1881 45,234,061 220,902 35,019,918 243,002 
1911 64,925,993 22,690 45,369,090 440,821 
Germany was willing to run the risk of war in support of 
equal opportunities for her industries and commerce in the 
parts of the earth which had not been partitioned among , 
the Great Powers. But why should we assume that land 
hunger has been a controlling motive in her policy, when the 
colonies which she possesses have been an economic burden, 
and Germany, as statistics show, has not an excess of popu- 
lation for colonization? During recent years, in fact, the 
immigration into Germany has more than counterbalanced 
the emigration from the country. Germany had found an 
opportunity within her own territory to employ the bulk of 
her increase in available labor as well as capital. The 
quotation from the Kaiser's Bremen speech, — "Aussen hin 
begrenzt, das innere unbegrenzt" which has been freely 
translated above, — "Confined without, but unrestricted in its 

F Danger 123 

capacity for development within," appropriately symbolises 
the economic position of the German Empire in connection 
with the guiding motives underlying the race of the nations 
in securing colonial territory. 

An incident happened in the autumn of 1905 which re- 
vived for a time the excitement of the situation in the 
preceding spring, and contributed in part to the increasing 
current of international animosity. In October, the Matin 
published a "disclosure" by M. Delcasse of the considera- 
tions which had prompted his policy as foreign minister. 
According to this report, he had received Great Britain's 
promise to support France in the Moroccan affair, even in 
the event of war, by mobilizing her fleet for hostile action, 
and by disembarking 100,000 troops in Schleswig in order to 
seize the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. This important waterway 
extends from Kiel to the Elbe below Hamburg, connecting 
the Baltic and North Seas, and permitting the Germans to 
employ their naval forces interchangeably in either body of 

This article had a sensational effect in Germany, and the 
rather perfunctory way in which the French government 
denied its truth was not calculated to allay the general 
feeling of uneasiness. The Cologne Gazette observed that it 
made little practical difference whether the disclosure were 
true or false. M. Delcasse evidently believed that England 
had offered aid, and a delusion might have had just as 
lamentable results as a reality. In fact, M, Delcasse's con- 
viction had all but precipitated Europe into a war, which 
would have been the most horrible catastrophe that the 
imagination could conceive. Other journals denounced 
British perfidy, and the middle class generally believed that 
Great Britain was awaiting a favorable opportunity to 
attack them. 

The critical events of 1905 were reflected in the renewed 

124 The Great War 

naval exertions of the leading nations. The laying down of 
the keel-plate of the British battleship Dreadnought, October 
2, 1905, inaugurated a new era in naval construction. She 
was of 17,900 tons, and her engines of 23,000 horse-power. 
Her speed was twenty-one knots. Her armament included 
ten twelve-inch guns. She was launched February 10, 1906, 
and made her trial trip October 1, 1906, a year, less a day, 
from the beginning of her construction, which was con- 
sidered a record in speed. 

The collapse of Russian military power gave Germany 
an unusual degree of assurance respecting her relative 
strength on land so that she could divert a larger portion 
of her resources to increasing her navy. This circumstance, 
together with the progress of the British navy, and the 
general political situation — the suspicion, for instance, 
aroused by Delcasse's disclosure — induced the German 
government to urge the acceptance by the Reichstag of a 
measure greatly accelerating naval construction. The new 
navy bill for revising the program of 1900 increased the 
number of units, and the size of the larger ships, and advanced 
the date for the completion of the entire navy, as planned, 
from 1920 to 1917. 

The number of torpedo-boats was to be augmented from 
ninety-six to one hundred and forty-four. Six cruisers of a 
special type, nearly as large as battleships, rejected in 1900, 
were introduced into this bill. There was to be a large 
increase in the tonnage, and consequently the cost, of the 
ships that remained to be constructed according to the 
Naval Bill of 1900. The average cost of a battleship would 
be raised from 35,827,000 to 38,760,000, and that of a cruiser 
of the larger class from 34,560,000 to 36,600,000. Two of 
the ships, whose keels were to be laid at once, were to be of 
"Dreadnought" size. The plan for future construction as 
thus amended would involve the addition annually of two 

Conditions of Danger 125 

battleships, and of one large and two small cruisers from 
1906 until 1910, of one battleship annually from 1911 until 
1916, of eight large and fourteen small cruisers altogether, 
from 1911 to 1917, and of two battleships in 1917. The 
total naval expenditure, recurring and non-recurring, for 
the twelve years covered by the bill was estimated at 

Herr Bebel immediately protested, saying: "I am un- 
able to see what other object this agitation could have than 
to arm for a war against England. The German navy is not 
required to fight France and Russia, as the latter power will 
be paralyzed for many years to come by the effects of its 
war with Japan, while a war with the United States is out 
of the question." The figure of the veteran leader of the 
Socialists raising his warning voice in the Reichstag every 
time increased naval construction was demanded to predict 
the inevitable consequence of the government's course recalls 
the dramatic dignity of an old Hebrew prophet. 

The naval bill was passed. May 20, against the opposition 
of the Social Democrats and some of the Radicals. It is 
significant that extremists in Germany were not satisfied 
with this bill as brought in by the government. Their 
chauvinistic views were most effectively represented by the 
Pan-German League and the Navy League. The preposi- 
tion "pan" in such titles as Pan-German should convey the 
aspiration for the union of all the elements of the nationality 
or ethnic group indicated by the other part of the word. 
But the real aim of the Pan-German League was undoubt- 
edly more comprehensive. They wished to have Germany 
acquire a much greater colonial empire. The extremists 
demanded that the time for completing the navy, as 
planned, should be advanced to 1912, instead of 1917. This 
would have been an unmistakable challenge for absolute 
mastery on the seas. The government emphatically dis- 

126 The Great War 

claimed any participation in this view formulated by the 
Navy League. There was a temporar\' period of discom- 
posure in the counsels of the society, and its president re- 
signed. But it soon recovered its ardor, passed the million 
mark in membership, and was a powerful auxiliary in 
obtaining the passage of another naval bill in 1908 provid- 
ing a further acceleration of activity in construction. 

The German Navy Law of 1906 was the signal for the 
beginning of the critical stage of the race in naval arma- 
ments. Germany set the pace, and Great Britain substi- 
tuted for her earlier "two-power standard" a scale of con- 
struction calculated upon the basis of Germany's activity, 
endeavoring to preserve a margin of superiority sufficient 
to guarantee her safety and independence. But the annual 
sums spent in Great Britain on naval construction do not 
show the effect of the ever increasing German competition 
until 1909. In fact, during the previous four years the 
annual appropriations diminished, a proof of the pacific 
tendency of the Liberal government, which was severely 
denounced by their political adversaries as a betrayal of the 
interests of the country. The following comparative table 
of annual expenditure for naval construction in the two coun- 
tries will show whence the impulse to greater exertion came : 


United Kingdom 























Although it is not the design of the present volume to dis- 
cuss the details of military and naval strength, the frenzied 

Conditions of Danger 


competition in naval armaments is so largely responsible for 
the feeling of mutual apprehension and suspicion which 
unhappily took root in the two countries, that a summary 
analysis of their respective elements of sea-power at signifi- 
cant points in the race is indispensable for an intelligent 
understanding of the international attitude in the period 
directly preceding the war. The following table is intended 
to provide the necessary data for a comparison of the 
progress of the two fleets In vessels of the more important 
classes during the crucial years, all ships of the Dreadnought 
size, or larger, being grouped under the heading "Dread- 
noughts" : 

United Kingdom 




Pre- Dreadnought 
























The battleships of the Dreadnought type, or larger, of 
which none were in commission at the beginning of 1906, 
have assumed a position of such supreme importance that 
the contest for naval ascendancy has confined itself mainly 
to this class. Such vessels, variously classified as super- 
dreadnoughts, dreadnoughts, and battle-cruisers, are called 
collectively capital ships, or capital naval units. We must 
not forget, however, in comparing the naval exertions of the 
two countries on the basis of their annual expenditure for 
construction that Germany can devote a larger propor- 
tion of her appropriation to ships of the largest size, which 
are chiefly intended for aggressive action, and that she can 

128 The Great War 

concentrate a larger part of her fleet in the North Sea, 
because Great Britain has a very much larger merchant 
marine and more vital interests to defend in all parts of the 
world. Therefore, a continuation of equal appropriations 
for new ships by the two countries would result eventually 
in naval superiority for Germany. 

The diminishing margin of British naval ascendancy 
resulted in a feeling of panic in England, when it became 
evident that Germany was only about a year behind the 
Mistress of the Seas in the construction of the largest types 
of battleships, and might by a stealthy acceleration of 
activity overtake her. This situation drove the Liberal 
government very unwillingly to appropriate much larger 
sums for naval construction, although this necessarily re- 
duced the scope of their social legislation, to which they 
were most earnestly devoted. 

When the British budget had been presented in 1908, the 
naval program provided for seven dreadnoughts and three 
super-dreadnoughts to be in commission in 1910. The 
German program at that time provided four dreadnoughts 
and one super-dreadnought for 1910. Then the new 
German Navy Law of 1908 prescribed the laying down 
during the year of the keels for three more dreadnoughts 
and one super-dreadnought. On this basis the British 
government assumed that the Germans would have nine 
battleships of the largest types ready in the spring of 
1911. Accordingly, parliament authorized two more battle- 
ships, so as to have twelve in 1911 with which to confront 
the German nine. Later it appeared that the com- 
mencement of the construction of the next German set 
of four great battleships had been anticipated somewhat, 
so that the Germans might possibly have thirteen capital 
ships by 1911. 

Accordingly the British government asked in the budget 

Conditions of Danger 129 

of 1909 for authority to lay four keels for ships of the largest 
types, so as to have sixteen of them in 1911 with which to 
face Germany's thirteen. But at the same time the British 
government informed the House of Commons that the length 
of the interval before the next German keels were laid and 
the period of construction might be reduced, so that the 
Germans might have another set of four ships in readiness as 
early as the spring of 1912, which would give them seventeen 
altogether at that time. Therefore, they asked authority 
to take the necessary steps for the construction of four more 
ships of the largest type during the year, if it should appear 

Prince von Biilow repeated in the Reichstag the govern- 
ment's view that German construction of new ships was 
determined by Germany's own requirements without refer- 
ence to competition with any individual power, and that 
there was no intention of accelerating the legally established 
rate of construction. He affirmed that they would not have 
the thirteen large ships before the spring of 1912, and 
Minister of the Marine von Tirpitz made the same declara- 
tion. The British government recovered a feeling of some- 
what greater assurance, and decided that the keels of the 
four supplementary ships did not need to be laid until April, 
1910, which would assure their completion in March, 1912. 

The Germans had perhaps expected a modification of 
British foreign policy when the Liberals came into power in 
December, 1905. But in reality, the Liberal government 
drew even closer to France, and began to cultivate a cordial 
understanding with Russia. At the Algeciras Conference 
the Russian and British representatives discussed in a 
friendly and informal way the Anglo-Russian position, and 
each party became satisfied as to the honorable intentions 
of the other. Then in 1907, Great Britain and Russia 
formulated an agreement, by which all their differences in 

130 The Great War 

Asia were settled. Persia was to be divided into three 
parts, one to be a Russian sphere of influence, another a 
British sphere, and a third lying between these two a neutral 
zone. The Russian government pledged itself not to carry 
on any negotiations of a political nature with Afghanistan 
except through the medium of Great Britain. On the other 
hand. Great Britain bound herself not to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of Afghanistan. Both parties, moreover, 
promised to hold aloof from Thibet. It is a commentary 
upon the character of international relations that an agree- 
ment to adjust misunderstandings is immediately inter- 
preted as a combination with an aggressive purpose. The 
reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia was looked upon 
with serious apprehension in Germany. Especially the 
following year, when King Edward VII had a personal 
interview with Alfonso XIII at Cartagena and one with 
Victor Emanuel III at Gaeta in the spring, and was splen- 
didly entertained at Reval by Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 
in the summer, German anxiety increased, and the Germans 
were convinced of the existence of a Machiavellian project 
to surround them with a ring of possible enemies. 

The Russian policy of the Liberal government in England 
is variously judged. Its friends look upon it as an honor- 
able recognition of the favorable transformation of the 
Russian government, while hostile critics condemn it as a 
debasement of liberal principles. From 1908 the existence 
of the Triple Entente, or cordial understanding between 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, has been a chief factor in 
European diplomacy. The formidable naval program of 
Germany had not been without some influence in promoting 
international amity, although not precisely along the lines 
intended. The increase of annual appropriations for naval 
construction in Germany from 311,784,000 in 1898 to 
320,778,000 in 1904 had been a potent influence in bringing 

Conditions of Danger 131 

about the entente between Great Britain and France, and 
the further advance to 334,882,000 in 1908 probably stimu- 
lated very much the inclination of British and Russian 
statesmen to eflFect a settlement of the differences between 
the two nations. 

The present chapter would not be complete without men- 
tioning an occurrence of the autumn of 1908, which throws 
an interesting light upon Anglo-German relations, and itself 
probably influenced in some measure their course. The 
Daily Telegraph of October 28 published an interview "from 
a source of such unimpeachable authority" that it could 
"without hesitation commend the obvious message which it 
conveys to the attention of the public." It was made up of 
a number of statements made by the Kaiser, who had 
sanctioned their publication. The aim of the interview was 
to prove the Kaiser's sentiments of cordiality for the British 
nation. The Kaiser deprecated the suspicion which he en- 
countered in trying to bring the nations together. The 
English themselves, he said, made his task of reconciliation 
difficult, and as he had to contend against an unfriendly 
sentiment toward England among a large part of the German 
people, English prejudice was all the more distressing and 
unjust. He went on to show that his actions proved the 
sincerity of his many public assertions of friendship. Thus 
at the time of the South African War public opinion in 
Germany was very hostile to England. "But what of 
official Germany?" he asked. "Let my critics ask them- 
selves what brought to a sudden stop, and, indeed, to abso- 
lute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates who 
were striving to obtain European intervention ? They were 
fSted in Holland; France gave them a rapturous welcome. 
They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people 
would have crowned them with flowers. But when they 
asked me to receive them, I refused. The agitation immedi- 

132 The Great War 

ately died away, and the delegation returned empty-handed. 
Was that, I ask, the action of a secret enemy?" The 
Kaiser went on to say that when the struggle was at its 
height, France and Russia invited Germany to join with 
them in calling upon Great Britain to put an end to the war, 
and that he not only refused to associate himself with this 
plan for humiliating England, but communicated his reply 
to the English sovereign in a telegram, which is preserved 
in the archives of Windsor Castle. 

The publication of this interview aroused unusual excite- 
ment in Germany, and all parties in the Reichstag insisted 
that guarantees must be secured that the Kaiser would re- 
frain in future from his practice of expressing himself on the 
most weighty matters without previous deliberation with 
his ministers. The Chancellor, Prince von Biilow, under- 
took to present the view of the Reichstag to the Kaiser, and 
in a speech before that body a few days later, he assured 
them of his firm conviction that the Kaiser "would hence- 
forth maintain the reserve that is equally indispensable in 
the interest of a uniform policy and for the authority of the 
crown." There was a suspicion in some quarters that the 
account of a proposal for intervention in the Boer War was 
a deliberate fabrication calculated to undermine the cor- 
diality of Great Britain for her entente associates. But it is 
more in keeping with the Kaiser's temperament, and the 
unstudied tone of the interview, to suppose that it was all 
due to an impulsive outburst. If this is accepted as proof 
of the Kaiser's sincerity in the interview, we must admire 
the courage and independence with which he defended an 
unpopular position in the interests of moderation and good 

Like many other international congresses, the Algeciras 
Conference failed to make a radical, definite settlement 
either on account of timidity, or by reason of its eagerness to 

The German cruiser Berlin, which relieved the gunboat Vanther, oft' the closed port of Agadir, 
Morocco. On July i , i q 1 1 . jjn _orders_fiQ)ii_ the Gemian_ o-overnment the Panther anchored off 

ct the lives and interests of German 
— led did not exist. 

Conditions of Danger 133 

establish an acceptable compromise between the discordant 
interests. The Act of Algeciras was too limited in scope to 
provide an enduring basis for dealing with the difficulties in 
the situation in Morocco. It proclaimed the sovereignty 
of the Sultan and the independence of the country, and 
established a native police force under foreign officers. But 
what if the Sultan should be powerless to assert his sovereign 
rights and the poHce incapable of stemming the rising tide 
of anarchy? In 1907, Mulay Hafid, brother of Abdul Aziz, 
who was then reigning, was proclaimed Sultan by the war- 
like tribes in the south. A civil war ensued, and Abdul 
Aziz was compelled to retire to Rabatt, whence he could 
more easily flee the country. In the mean time the fanati- 
cism of the Mohammedan population was inflamed and 
several French and Spanish were killed in Casablanca, July 
31, 1907. In consequence of this, French and Spanish 
marines were landed there, and only after some sharp fight- 
ing succeeded in restoring order. The French and German 
accounts of these events are at variance, the former repre- 
senting the natives as impelled to these deeds of murder by 
their own unprovoked ferocity, the latter representing them 
as aroused to bloodthirsty actions by the aggressive attitude 
of the French. Soon the French found themselves com- 
pelled to occupy a number of places in Morocco. 

Mulay Hafid reached Fez, June 7, 1908. He had already 
sent to Paris, London, and Berlin to obtain recognition by 
the respective governments. Abdul Aziz was decisively 
defeated in August and was compelled to take refuge on 
French territory. The German government advocated the 
recognition of Mulay Hafid, and sent their consul, Dr. 
Vassel, to Fez, although the signatory powers, including 
Germany, had withdrawn their representatives a short time 
before to avoid the appearance of recognizing the pretender. 
The step taken by Germany was apparently intended to 

134 The Great War 

secure special favor with Mulay Hafid. He finally received 
the recognition of the powers upon condition of signing the 
Algeciras Act. Morocco seemed a little more tranquil, and 
the French expeditionary force at Casablanca was reduced 
from 15,000 in March to 9,000 in December. 

Rather unexpectedly, as it would seem, the German gov- 
ernment concluded an agreement with the French ambas- 
sador in Berlin, February 9, 1909, in which Germany 
recognized the special political interests of France in 
Morocco, renouncing thereby her policy of upholding the 
independence and integrity of the Sultan's rule. On the 
other hand, France pledged herself to maintain the "open 
door" and to encourage the cooperation of French and 
German business interests. Perhaps the German govern- 
ment felt that the favor of the new Sultan, which they 
enjoyed, would counterbalance any unfavorable influence 
on their commercial interests due to the preponderant posi- 
tion of France. The foreign offices of Europe felt a grateful 
sense of relief. They fondly believed that the Moroccan 
question had been settled; but a rude disillusionment 
awaited them. 

In April, 1911, France found it necessary to send a military 
force to Fez to preserve order. At first, the German govern- 
ment made no protest. Later, they concluded that this 
was equivalent to abrogating the Act of Algeciras and that 
the impending "Tunisification" of Morocco would probably 
begin. Accordingly, in June, the German ambassador in 
Paris undertook to sound the French government relative 
to possible compensations for Germany on account of the 
more commanding position which France had assumed in 
Morocco. The German government was disappointed that 
France made no definite offer of compensations; but they 
were preparing a demonstration which did not yield pre- 
cedence to the Kaiser's Tangier visit in sensational and 

OF Danger 135 

dangerous effects. For on July 2, 1911, it was officially- 
announced that the German gun-boat Panther had been 
sent to Agadir, a closed port on the western coast of Morocco. 
The Panther was replaced after a few days by the Berlin, a 
larger vessel. A river of some consequence has its outlet at 
this point. The hinterland of Agadir is fertile in parts and 
contains mineral deposits. Agadir Bay is said to be not 
unsuitable for a naval station. Some semi-inspired sheets 
declared that Germany wanted a harbor in Morocco; but 
the German government maintained the transparent fiction 
that the presence of a war-vessel was required in the harbor 
of Agadir for the protection of German subjects, although 
some of the opponents of the government's policy declared 
that there were no Germans there to protect. Evidently, 
Germany was determined not to be thrust aside without 
compensation, if Morocco was fated to pass under a French 
protectorate. Therefore, on July 15, Germany proposed 
that France cede to her the French Congo from the sea to 
the Sanga River, and renounce in her favor the French con- 
tingent claims to the former Congo Free State, in case 
Belgium should ever vacate it. This proposal was not 
accepted by France. 

One motive which may have influenced Germany in forc- 
ing an issue in Morocco was the desire to test the strength 
and scope of the Anglo-French entente. The British govern- 
ment promptly took an occasion to declare their attitude. 
For this is the significance generally ascribed to a speech 
delivered by Mr. Lloyd George at a dinner given by the 
Lord Mayor at the Mansion House, July 21. He said that 
it was essential to the highest interests of the world that 
Great Britain should maintain her place and her prestige 
among the Great Powers, since her influence had often 
rendered invaluable services to the cause of human liberty. 
He was disposed to make great sacrifices to maintain peace, 

136 The Great War 

but if a situation were to be forced upon Great Britain in 
which peace could only be secured by surrendering her 
great and beneficent position won by centuries of heroism 
and achievement, by allowing her to be treated, when her 
vital interests were at stake, as if she were of no account in 
the family of nations, peace at that price would be an intol- 
erable humiliation. 

The expression of these sentiments was doubtless intended 
to convey the declaration — and in this sense they were cer- 
tainly Interpreted — that Great Britain was prepared to 
stand by France. It therefore had the effect of a threat 
in Germany. For nearly two months the nations were on 
the verge of war. But at last Germany accepted a com- 
promise. According to some, the decisive factor was Ger- 
many's financial inability in September, 1911, to mobilize 
for a warlike demonstration. 

Two treaties were signed by the German and French 
governments, November 4, 1911. The first countenanced 
the virtual establishment of a French protectorate in 
Morocco, with the stipulation for equal rights for all nations 
in trade, customs duties, and mining and railway concessions. 
The second provided for the cession by France to Germany 
of a territority in the French Congo, containing 107,270 
square miles, to form an eastward extension of the German 
province of Kamerun, and a cession by Germany to France 
of 6,450 square miles of the upper part of the same colony 
of Kamerun. 

This conclusion of the troublesome Moroccan Question 
was very severely criticized by a large part of the German 
people. The discussion of it in the Reichstag was made the 
occasion for an attack on the government's policy by all 
parties. Although Chancellor Bethmann-HoUweg declared 
in the Reichstag that the attitude of the German govern- 
ment had been consistent throughout the Moroccan con- 

Conditions of Danger 137 

troversy, and not modified by any circumstance, there was 
a general impression that they had receded in the face of 
the British government's scarcely veiled threat, and the 
resentment against England was very strong. The extreme- 
ly bitter attitude found expression in a speech of Herr von 
Heydebrandt, the Conservative leader, during the discus- 
sion of the government's policy in the Reichstag, November 
9. The following selection may serve for illustration: 

"The Imperial Chancellor has declared that foreign gov- 
ernments were informed in advance that we expected no 
territorial concession (in Morocco). If, after the British 
government had been informed of this attitude, a speech, 
such as Mr. Lloyd George's, was delivered as a deliberate 
expression of the position of the entire cabinet, it was a 
threat, a challenge, an Insulting challenge. Such speeches 
are not so readily excused as dinner speeches. They are a 
most singular kind of dinner speech, which the German 
people will not put up with. I can well believe that the 
English are willing to let these matters pass into oblivion, 
since they failed to involve France and Germany in a war 
which would have brought them no disadvantage. But we 
Germans have not forgotten them; and we ask ourselves 
whether we have been dreaming, or these things have 
actually taken place. Now we know where our enemy is; 
like a lightning flash in the night these events have revealed 
to the German people where its real foe is lurking." The 
Crown Prince, who had left his military duties at Dantzig 
to attend this session of the Reichstag, created a sensation 
by applauding the more emphatic denunciations of the 
government's policy. On the following day the Chancellor 
conveyed a rebuke to the extremists of the Heydebrandt 
stamp, saying that "such words with regard to a foreign 
state with which we stand in normal relations may serve 
party interests, but do injury to the German Empire." 

138 The Great War 

We have considered in these two preceding chapters some 
of the most important indications of Germany's relations 
with her neighbors, from the resignation of Prince Bismarck 
to the termination of the Moroccan controversy in 1911. 
We may suitably pause here for a few moments to sum- 
marize the general conclusions to which this evidence leads. 
But in the first place let us recall the conspicuous features 
of the German political organization, that the Prussian 
method of voting is the corner-stone of a system of political 
inequality and class exclusiveness, but yet, paradoxical as 
it may seem, that Germany offers models to the world of 
efiicient administration and beneficent socialistic legisla- 
tion. Germany is almost the only country in the world 
which has made no substantial change in its constitution 
since 1871. All the others have modified their fundamental 
laws in a liberal direction. The relative stability of 
Germany's institutions is a feature to be taken into ac- 
count. Her government aims to hold itself aloof from 
parties. It does not identify its policy with the views of 

The international position of Germany down to 1890 was 
very strong; she enjoyed almost a military hegemony in 
Europe. It is true that the black shadow of the French 
desire for revenge was never entirely absent from the 
horizon; but on the other hand Germany had formed the 
Triple Alliance, and France was isolated. Germany culti- 
vated friendly relations with Austria and Russia at the same 
time. Yet the inevitable antagonism between Austria and 
Russia was a disturbing factor in Russo-German friendship, 
and it is doubtful whether even Bismarck could have pre- 
served this threefold understanding intact so as to prevent 
the establishment of the Dual Alliance of Russia and France. 
There was still, however, a balance of forces between the 
Triple and Dual Alliances, and the position of Germany 

OF Danger 139 

remained tolerably secure. This security would be en- 
dangered if the forces of the Dual Alliance received an acces- 
sion in strength, unless the forces of the Triple Alliance were 
increased in like measure. Accordingly, the position of any 
great power standing outside the two alliances would inev- 
itably become very important, and hence Anglo-German 
relations claim our chief attention. The relations of Great 
Britain and Germany were cordial in 1890, when Great 
Britain ceded the island of Heligoland to Germany, and the 
latter in return gave up her protectorate over Zanzibar. 
Unfortunately, this state of friendliness was transformed into 
one of suspicion and distrust a few years later. The re- 
sponsibility for this deplorable alteration has been charged 
in part to the Kaiser, but probably with injustice. It is 
true that some of his speeches have made an unfortunate 
impression abroad, creating a feeling of uneasiness. The 
words of monarchs and statesmen pass into circulation with 
a large premium of implied significance. But in spite of 
some apparent evidence to the contrary, the Kaiser has 
probably been a sincere friend of peace, especially with 
England. The tension in Anglo-German relations was one 
of the results involved in a fundamental change in the 
general attitude of Germany. 

Soon after the accession of William II, Germany enlarged 
definitely the range of her foreign policy. She adopted the 
so-called Welt-politik to which she has adhered until the 
outbreak of the war. The last two chapters have been 
devoted chiefly to an illustration of the nature of this new 
attitude, and the evidence seems more than sufficient to 
show that this "world-policy" embraced two cardinal prin- 
ciples, the maintenance of the "open-door" wherever it 
existed, and no reduction of the unallotted parts of the earth 
without Germany's consent as one of the great commercial 
powers, or without reasonable compensation, that is, corres- 

140 The Great War 

ponding territorial advantages for Germany. This was 
virtually the expansion of the principle of European equilib- 
rium into that of a world equilibrium, which was surely 
reasonable, because the progress in means of communication 
, had brought all lands so much nearer. Germany was only 
formulating for herself a diplomatic doctrine which was 
justified by her own economic situation and the general 
economic conditions in the world at large. 

Thus the fundamental element of German foreign policy 
was not unfair. The suspicion of the other powers was chiefly 
due to the manner in which this policy was asserted, which 
produced very unfortunate results. In the first place, the 
Germans enlarged their fleet with such rapidity that Great 
Britain quite naturally believed that her position as a great 
power was threatened, and for this reason associated herself 
with France and Russia in the Triple Entente. Then, the 
foreign intercourse of Germany was frequently conducted 
in such a tactless, peremptory fashion that she forfeited the 
sympathy of even neutral nations while supporting demands 
which in themselves were not unreasonable. In short, 
Germany's general policy was one of fairness, but her practi- 
cal methods were unfortunate, and, above all, the tremen- 
dous expansion of her naval power was the most threatening 
potential cause of war that we have thus far encountered. 

Austria vi. Serbia, 
July 2S. 

Montenegro -vs. Austria, 

Germany njs. Russia, 
August I. 

Germany vs. France, 
August J. 


Germany z-s. Belgium, 
August ^. 

w \ 

Great Britain vs 
August 4. 

Austria 'vs. Russia, 
August 6. 

Montenee^roT'.f. Germany, 
August 12. 

Great Britain 'vs. 


August 12. 

France us. Austria, 
August 10. 

Belgium a'j. Austria, 
August 12. 

Japan us. German- . 
August 2^. 

Turkey is Russia, 
October 21). 

Turkey -ui. France, 
October 21^ 

Turkey us. Great 


Uctober 2y. 

Plan showing dates of inauguration of hostilities. The nenus of Italy's entrance 
into the 'war ijuas recei-ued after this chapter had gone to press. Italy's declaration of 
'war is distinctive in the fact that it is not directly connected, by the link of causality, 
'with any other indi'vidual inauguration of hostilities. It cannot, therefore, he added to 


The Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 

The series of declarations of hostilities in the world-war. All indications point 
back to the Balkan Conflict of Slav and Teuton. Geographic and historic 
conditions in the Balkans. The Southern Slavs. Russia's interests in the 
Balkans; their origin. The traditional hostility of Russian and Turk. Pan- 
Slavism. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877—8. Treaty of San Stefano. Treaty 
of Berlin; its inherent injustice and folly. Russia's vital interest in the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles water-way. Germanic penetration in the Balkan 
peninsula; Austria's motives and intentions; Germany as Turkey's "disin- 
terested friend." Anatolian Railway. The Kaiser's memorable visit in the 
Turkish Empire in 1898; his protection offered to 300,000,000 Moham- 
medans. The Deutsche Bank and the Bagdad Railway. Herr von Gwinner. 
British preoccupations. Macedonian question. Young Turkish party. 
Revolution of 1908 and Turkish constitution. Annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Serbia's resentment and submission. 
German influence and the Young Turks; difficulties for German diplomacy. 
Significance of Italy's campaign in Tripoli. Balkan league; Balkan War 
and policy of the Dual Monarchy. Second Balkan War, and Treaty of 
Bucharest, August 10, 1913. Austrian chagrin at the outcome; the effect 
upon Teutonic military calculations; increase in armaments in Germany, 
and consequently in France; three years' obligatory military service in 
France. Russia and the Balkan situation. The field of Greater Serbian 
propaganda. Political crisis in Croatia. Archduke Francis Ferdinand; the 
tragedy at Sarajevo, June 28, 1914; the ultimatum, July 23, 1914. 

In our consideration of events and conditions preceding 
the war, we have thus far noted only potential, or general, 
causes. Now that we are about to approach the positive, 
or direct, causes, we may for the sake of definiteness pro- 
ceed at once to the successive declarations of hostilities, and 
follow back to their source the continuous lines of causation 
of which these are the landmarks and the culmination. For 
the world-war, in a formal sense, is the consequence of a 
series of inaugurations of hostilities announced in a variety 
of ways. 

It will be convenient to enumerate these different initia- 

142 The Great War 

tory acts to show how one is dependent on another. We 
begin with the latest. 

Turkey commenced hostile operations, without any formal 
declaration, October 29, 1914, which involved her in war 
with Russia, France, and Great Britain, on account of her 
close connection with Germany, who was engaged in war 
with these three countries. 

Japan declared war against Germany upon the expiration 
of her ultimatum, August 23, in conformity with her alliance 
with Great Britain. 

Belgium declared war against Austria-Hungary, August 
12, because the latter was an ally of Germany, who was at 
war with Belgium. 

Great Britain declared war against Austria-Hungary, like- 
wise on August 12, because the latter was assisting Germany, 
who was already at war with Great Britain. 

Montenegro declared war the same day against Germany, 
because the latter was an ally of Montenegro's enemy, 

France declared war against Austria-Hungary, August 10, 
because the latter was aiding Germany, who was engaged 
in war against France. 

Montenegrodeclared war against Austria-Hungary, August 
7, in consequence of her very intimate relations and alli- 
ance with Serbia. 

Austria-Hungary declared war against Russia, August 6, 
professedly because Russia had committed hostile acts 
against her ally Germany. 

Great Britain declared war against Germany, August 4, 
because the latter had violated the neutrality of Belgium. 

Germany announced the existence of a state of hostilities 
between herself and Belgium, August 4, because Belgium 
had refused to allow the German armies to cross her territory. 

Germany announced that she considered herself at war 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 143 

with France, August 3, really because the latter was an ally 
of Russia. 

Germany declared war against Russia, August 1, In con- 
sequence of the latter's menacing attitude on account of the 
Austro-Serbian conflict. 

Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, July 28, 
asserting that the latter had not given a satisfactory answer 
to her ultimatum. 

As each inauguration of hostilities, subsequently to the 
first, is related individually to a preceding one, the relation- 
ship of all of them can be graphically represented in a plan 
with connecting lines to show the association of cause and 

Wherever, we encounter a trail of these events, the land- 
marks guide us unerringly back to a conflict which arose In 
the Balkans, a conflict which Is commonly regarded to be a 
struggle between the Teuton and Slav powers for supremacy 
in that peninsula. The lines in our plan are like the Intricate 
passages in a mine, where the routes, though complicated, 
lead back eventually to the original shaft, by which one 
ascends to the daylight. The conflict In the Balkans is the 
clear initial stage, which serves us as definite starting point 
for threading the baffling maze in which the successive series 
of causation is involved. 

The antagonism which finds expression in the conflict 
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is the central positive 
cause of the world-war. Of all the other breaches of peaceful 
relations, it has at least been asserted that each was due to 
some kind of obligation for rendering assistance, made in an- 
ticipation of a war. Only this original declaration of hos- 
tilities by Austria against Serbia is universally admitted to 
have had its own independent cause. 

There were serious potential causes for war In Europe, as 
we have seen, boundaries that did not conform to natural 

144 The Great War 

geographic conditions, or which violated national unity, 
bitterness due to former wars, conflicting colonial aspira- 
tions, naval competition, international suspicion. Europe 
was like a group of warehouses stored with inflammable 
material, threatening a general conflagration. One of these 
warehouses suddenly burst into flames, and the fire very 
quickly spread to the others. But nobody will ever know 
whether combustion would have taken place in one of the 
others spontaneously. It is our purpose at present to inves- 
tigate the actual source of the conflagration. 

We must consider the respective claims and interests of 
the Slav and Teuton races in the Balkan peninsula, where 
they have become involved in this struggle for supremacy; 
and we shall direct our attention first to the Slavs, whose 
interests forestalled those of the Teutonic nations by many 
centuries, and are based upon the actual possession of the 
greater part of the peninsula. Some prominent historic and 
geographic facts are of great importance in explaining the 
position of the Slavs in the Balkans. 

During nearly sixteen hundred years Constantinople has 
been the capital of empires, and during nearly two-thirds of 
this long period the capital of empires which were declining 
in power. This unfortunate condition has been ascribed to 
the hopeless moral decadence of the nations which succes- 
sively made ancient Byzantium, on the Bosphorus, the seat 
of their government. But it would have been an unparallel- 
ed injustice of destiny to have arbitrarily inflicted so fair a 
region with a thousand years of decrepitude, if no natural, 
or physical, circumstances were partly responsible for it; 
and, in fact, a careful consideration of the situation suggests 
that certain geographic factors were unfavorable to the 
maintenance of a vigorous administration of the adjacent 
parts of Europe and Asia from the city on the Golden Horn 
as a center. Not only do the Balkan peninsula and Asia 

The Vildi/.-Kiosk, the palace <if the deposed Sultan Abdul-Hamid is the building on the hill; 
on the right is the Hamidieh Mosque. 

Abdul-Hamid II, Sultan of Turkey. Deposed, April 17, 1909. 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 145 

Minor not form together a natural geographic unit, particu- 
larly with the imperfect means of communication which 
have existed there heretofore, but even the Balkan peninsula 
alone does not constitute such a unit. True, it has a mari- 
time boundary on all sides but the north, and there the Car- 
pathians, turning westwards before they reach the Black Sea, 
define clearly the northern limit of the lower Danubian plain, 
as far west as the famous Iron Gate. But the opening be- 
tween these mountains and the sea leaves the plain more inti- 
mately linked with Russia than with the remainder of the 
peninsula. Then, farther westward, Serbia and Bosnia are 
more accessible from the north, from regions outside the 
peninsula, than from the other Balkan lands. The most 
conspicuous natural feature of the peninsula is the Balkan 
range forming a natural barrier running lengthwise for about 
four-fifths of the distance from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. 
In the extreme west the coast ranges terminate the Balkan 
range by running athwart it. There is no natural geographic 
center for the peninsula. Its contour favors the develop- 
ment of small nationalities. Italy, whose leading geographic 
features are not ideally arranged for national unity, did not 
become united until 1870, although her population had 
really constituted a single nationality for centuries. In the 
Balkans, therefore, we are not surprised to find several dis- 
tinct, though mostly related, nationalities ; for the boundaries 
and contour of the peninsula are less favorable for political 
unity than those of Italy. It was clearly futile to expect 
that the Eastern Roman Empire could maintain its frontier 
at the Danube. The Eastern Romans practically abandon- 
ed the Danube in the sixth century, and within a short time 
the whole interior of the peninsula was overrun by Slavs. 
The Slavs played a far more important role in the history of 
the Balkan peninsula than the German barbarians in the 
Italian. Each race failed to secure possession of the capital 

146 The Great War 

of the peninsula, and this was in each case one of the causes 
for the lack of political centralization. The Slavs in the 
Balkans belong to the southern branch of the race, as dis- 
tinguished from the Eastern Slavs, the Russians and Ruthe- 
nlans, and the Western Slavs, the Poles, Bohemians and 
Moravians, and Slovaks. The principal Slavic nationalities 
in the Balkan peninsula are the Bulgarians in the eastern 
part, numbering about 5,000,000, and the Serbo-Croats, 
Including the Bosnians and Montenegrins, in the western 
part, about 9,000,000. And though the Roumanians and 
Greeks both claim a more distinguished and ancient lineage, 
they have received an extensive Slavic element Into their 
national composition. Just beyond the limits of the penin- 
sula, or on its very borders, dwell other divisions of the 
Southern Slavs, the Dalmatians, about 500,000, and the 
Slovenes, about 1,500,000 In number. 

The statement that the Balkans are not naturally a 
political unit is true with the conditions of communication 
which still prevail. But with a more developed system of 
transportation the physical obstacles to unification may in 
future be vanquished; for the railway defies the barriers 
of nature. In any case, the peninsula offers great commer- 
cial advantages by reason of Its three seas, whilst Important 
trade-routes traverse It, notably the one formed by the 
Danube, and the land-route from Europe to Asia Minor 
and the Orient, broken only by the Bosphorus, and rendered 
famous for all time by the march of the Crusaders. 

The Slavic nationalities of the Balkans were submerged 
beneath the Turkish flood of invasion, but did not lose their 
identity. They began to struggle for their independence 
when the Turkish power lapsed into decline; and their big 
brother, and co-religionist, the Russian, came to their aid. 

A combination of Ideal and material causes has Impelled 
Russia to push southwards, to assume an aggressive attitude 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 147 

towards the Ottoman Empire, and to intervene in the 
Balkan peninsula, by virtue of her position as the dominant 
Slavic power, for the purpose of liberating the Christian 
peoples of the same race from the tyranny of the Sultan. 

Two momentous marriages symbolized the association of 
Russian aspirations with Constantinople. The marriage of 
the Greek princess Anna with the Russian grand-prince 
Vladimir at KiefF in the tenth century signalized the intro- 
duction of Christianity, which the Russians, in common 
with nearly all their Slavic brethren of the Balkans, received 
from Constantinople. The princess Sophia, niece of the last 
Greek emperor of Constantinople, brought to her bride- 
groom, Ivan III, grand-prince of Moscow, in the fifteenth 
century, the double-headed eagle as imperial emblem, the 
traditions of the Byzantine court, and the notion that the 
Muscovite rulers were heirs in a way to the dignity of the 
Greek emperors, which had been handed down from ancient 
Rome. As indication of these pretensions the Muscovite 
princes assumed the proud title Tsar, which is supposed to 
signify Caesar. 

To convince oneself of the inveterate character of Russo- 
Turkish hostility, it is only necessary to glance down the 
following list of the periods of warfare between the two 
nations since the time when Peter the Great gave definite- 
ness to the instinctive aims of Russian policy: 


1683 — 1700: Russia received the port of Azoff. 

1710 — 1711: Peter the Great was forced to resign Azoff. 

1736 — 1739: France supported Turkey, first recognizing 
that the curbing of Russia was a European interest. The 
treaty of peace closed the Black Sea to Russian navigation. 

1768 — 1774: Russia obtained freedom of navigation on the 
Black Sea, and acquired fortresses on the Sea of Azoff. 

148 The Great War 

1787 — 1792: Russia acquired the territory between the 

Rivers Bug and Dniester, including the site of Odessa. 
1806 — 1807: The definite treaty signed at Bucharest, in 
1812, estabHshed the frontier at the Pruth and lower 
1828 — 1829: The treaty signed at Adrianople established 
the independence of Greece, and the autonomy of the 
Danubian principalities, now Roumania. 
1853 — 1856: The war with Turkey involved Russia in the 
Crimean War with Great Britain, France, and Piedmont. 
The Russian frontier was pushed back from the lower 
Danube, a part of Bessarabia being transferred to Rou- 
mania. The navigation of the Danube was made free to 
all nations and intrusted to an international commission. 
The Black Sea was closed to Russian war-ships, but this 
restriction was removed, in 1871, with the approval of 
Prussia, in return for Russia's friendly neutrality during 
the war against France. 
1877 — 1878: The severest blow to the integrity of her terri- 
tory was inflicted upon Turkey in Europe. Russia recov- 
ered the part of Bessarabia of which she had been deprived 
in 1856. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were made 
entirely independent, and Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia 
received autonomy. 
1914— ?. 

The unsophisticated soul of the Russian people is deeply 
stirred by primitive and simple impulses, such as religious 
devotion or fanaticism, and an emotional enthusiasm for 
racial brotherhood. The only popular wars in Russia are 
those whose object is believed to be the liberation of the 
fellow Slavic peoples from oppression. The Pan-Slavic socie- 
ties utilize these sentimental forces to promote their designs 
for acloser associationof the different parts of the race, in which 
Russia would presumably be the predominant partner. 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 149 

Russian religious societies animated the hopes of the 
Christian populations which were still undef direct Turkish 
rule, by contributing money for the erection of churches and 
sending books for schools. An insurrection breaking out 
July 29, 1875, in Herzegovina, was the first event in an un- 
broken series, linked by the successive relation of cause and 
effect, which reaches down to the great world-war of to-day. 
The insurgents solemnly announced their determination to 
fight for liberty and union with Serbia, and to die to the last 
man rather than to submit to the unspeakable yoke which 
they had endured. The Dual Monarchy was already 
alarmed at the idea of a Greater Serbia, and suggested 
mediation by Germany, Russia, and herself for recom- 
mending the Christian demands to the consideration of the 
Turkish government, so as to prevent a perilous subversion 
of the existing arrangements. The Sultan's reply announc- 
ing general reforms was in keeping with the usual deceptive 
practices of the Ottoman Empire in dealing with the powers. 
The Porte accepted the Andrassy note demanding definite 
measures of reform, January 31, 1876, but the insurgents, 
rendered wary by past experience, did not lay down their 
arms. A slight movement in Bulgaria was a pretense for 
turning loose the bloodthirsty Moslem irregular soldiery 
on the defenseless country, and an orgy of butchery ensued, 
known as the "Bulgarian atrocities." About 15,000 persons 
were massacred, and seventy-nine villages were burned. At 
this time, Sultan Abdul-Aziz was murdered; his successor 
Murad V represented the uncompromising Turkish party. 
Serbia declared war, June 30, and from their mountain 
eyries the unconquered Montenegrins hurled defiance at 
their ancestral enemy, the infidel. The fact is not without 
significance that there were pro-Turkish demonstrations 
In the streets of Buda-Pesth; for Hungarian suspicion of 
the Balkan Slavs is not a recent development. The negoti- 

150 The Great War 

ations of the Porte were characterized by the usual duplic- 
ity and procrastination. The Serbians suffered a severe 
defeat. Murad V was deposed and his brother Abdul- 
Hamid substituted for him, destined to a long reign with 
events of far-reaching significance. The Turkish gov- 
ernment enacted a parody for the benefit of the powers, 
which for consummate satiric genius has not been excelled. 
The powers demanded reforms; the Turks proceeded to 
outbid them in magnanimity. They solemnly proclaimed 
a Turkish constitution, and the summoning of a parliament 
of representatives of all the peoples in the Ottoman Empire, 
January 20, 1877. Henceforth all questions concerning the 
integrity of the empire could be considered only by the 
legally constituted organs. The Turks were encouraged in 
all their subterfuges by the conviction that they had a stead- 
fast friend in the Disraeli Conservative administration in 

Russia alone remained resolute in her attitude toward the 
Turks. A wave of generous enthusiasm for the cause of the 
oppressed Christians swept over the country, and the people 
demanded armed intervention, while the government, re- 
luctant to undertake a war, patiently exhausted the last 
resources of diplomacy. As early as January IS, 1877, in 
a secret convention, Austria's consent to Russia's eventual 
military intervention in Turkey had been obtained by 
the agreement that Austria might "occupy" Bosnia and 

Although Great Britain abandoned the Turkish govern- 
ment for a time to the punishment which it merited, a limit 
to her concession was clearly announced, while at the same 
time her traditional attitude was firmly expressed in a note 
to the Russian government. May 6, 1877, as follows: 

"The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a 
military, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 151 

well understood to require explanation. It is, therefore, 
scarcely necessary to point out that her Majesty's govern- 
ment are not prepared to witness with indifference the 
passing into other hands than those of its present possessor 
of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position." 

The Russian declaration of war reached Constantinople 
April 24, but owing to the deficient means of communication 
and unfavorable weather conditions the Russian armies did 
not cross the Danube until June 27. Roumania had been 
induced to allow the Russian forces to traverse her territory, 
and, as an almost inevitable consequence, she united her 
forces with Russia as an ally. Bulgaria was soon overrun 
and the Shipka Pass through the Balkans occupied. Then 
came a set-back. Osman Pasha took up a position at 
Plevna on the right flank of the Russian line of advance, 
and made one of the most brilliant stands in history from 
July 20 until December 10, surrendering at length to a force 
three times his own. This long delay was followed by a 
winter campaign. The resistance of the Turks was finally 
crushed, the Russians poured over the Balkans, their lines 
converged at Adrianople, January 20, 1878, and they were en- 
camped on the Sea of Marmora, within sight of the minarets 
of Constantinople, on the 31st, when preliminaries of peace 
were signed. The Treaty of San Stefano, between Russia 
and Turkey, was concluded March 3. The terms of the 
treaty reveal the good sense of the Russian government, 
and a comparison between its provisions and those of the 
Treaty of Berlin, which was substituted for it, is most in- 
structive. Every alteration made by the powers in the 
Russo-Turkish arrangements, as embodied in the earlier 
treaty, has been fraught with dissension, international antag- 
onism, and bloodshed. 

The essential feature of the terms of San Stefano was the 
creation of a big Bulgaria as an autonomous principality 

152 The Great War 

with a section of sea-coast on the Aegean as well as on the 
Black Sea, and embracing most of Macedonia. Russia was 
to accept, in place of part of the war indemnity a territory 
of about 12,000 square miles in Armenia, and her boundary 
was pushed forward to the Danube by the restoration to 
her of the part of Bessarabia of which she had been deprived 
in 1856. Roumania received the Dobrudscha in compensa- 
tion for this cession of territory, and, together with Serbia 
and Montenegro, became entirely independent, whilst 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were to receive autonomy. The 
treaty was a disappointment to the Christian states of the 
peninsula, with the exception of Bulgaria, and it encountered 
the determined opposition of some of the Great Powers, 
particularly Austria and Great Britain, who demanded that 
it be submitted to revision by a European congress. Austria- 
Hungary insisted upon her share in the booty, although she 
had contributed neither men nor money to the liberation of 
the Balkans. Her intervention was limited to the exaction 
of toll, as it were, from the power that actually performed 
the task, by requiring some sort of promise of compensation. 
Now Austria mobilized, and assumed a threatening attitude. 
The war had been costly in lives and treasure. Russia was 
further embarrassed by the Nihilist propaganda, which had 
become a serious problem. She adopted, necessarily, a 
course of moderation, and accepted the demand that the 
regulation of boundaries within the former Ottoman Empire 
should be made a subject for decision by the powers. 

The diplomats of Europe assembled at Berlin, June 13, 
1878, and the ill-starred document containing the results 
of their deliberations was signed on July 13. At the sugges- 
tion of the British envoy, Austria-Hungary was intrusted 
with the "occupation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus 
the hope of the Serbs uniting their entire nationality, with 
which they had taken up arms in 1876, was cruelly frus- 

ON IN THE Balkans 153 

trated. The Bulgarians were divided into three distinct 
parts. The Macedonian section returned under Turkish 
misrule, destined to be a continual source of vexation, the 
chief cause of the Balkan War in 1912, and of the ensuing 
violent contest between the Balkan allies. The remainder of 
the Bulgarians were separated by a line drawn along the sum- 
mits of the Balkan Mountains. The section to the south of 
it was made an autonomous province of the Turkish Empire, 
called Eastern Roumelia, with a governor appointed by the 
Sultan, while the section to the north, between the moun- 
tains and the Danube, became the Principality of Bulgaria, 
electing its own ruler, but tributary to the Turkish govern- 
ment. This division was manifestly artificial; and in its 
arrangements as a whole, the congress appears to have been 
indifferent to justice, popular desires, and good sense. The 
territorial acquisition of Russia in Asiatic Turkey was re- 
duced. She received a strip containing Kars, Ardahan, and 
Batoum, smaller in area than the cession to Austria, if we 
should reckon Bosnia and Herzegovina as already Austrian. 
Lord Beaconsfield returned to England from this inglorious 
assembly with the announcement that he brought "peace 
with honor." 

Whatever may have been the expectations of Russia that 
she could use the greater Bulgaria as an effective medium 
for the extension of her influence, the prospect of which 
had aroused the fear of Great Britain, subsequent events 
have proved beyond a doubt that a stronger Bulgaria would 
have served as a bulwark for protecting the independence 
and peace of the Balkans, by discouraging the intrigues 
of the powers. The Bulgarian principality as actually 
established at Berlin, with its very much reduced territory, 
asserted its independence, and exhibited a remarkable 
progress. Grateful at first for the sacrifices which Russia 
had made in their behalf, the Bulgarians accepted Russian 

154 The Great War 

advice and assistance. The Sobranje, or popular assembly, 
elected Alexander of Battenberg as their prince, in 1879, 
and admitted many Russians into important civil and mili- 
tary posts. But their arrogance alienated the Bulgarians, 
and the more prominent Russian officials were forced to 
resign in 1883 ; and from that time, Bulgaria strove to free 
herself from Russian tutelage, although she forfeited Russian 
favor by this poHcy, which is a fact of great importance in 
recent Balkan history. By a bloodless revolution at Phil- 
ippopolis, in 1885, the governor was expelled and the people 
proclaimed their union with Bulgaria. This first contra- 
vention of the Treaty of Berlin was an occasion for much 
resentment and discord. The Serbs, complaining that it 
destroyed the equilibrium of power, invaded Bulgaria, 
but suffered an unexpected succession of defeats, and only 
the diplomatic intervention of Austria secured for them a 
treaty of peace reestablishing their position as it had been 
before the war, March 3, 1886. The Bulgarian prince, 
Alexander, resigned in September, perhaps on account of 
the enmity of Russia, and both the Bulgarians and Eastern 
Roumelians elected Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg as 
their ruler, July 7, 1887, which was equivalent to the union 
of the two principalities, although the powers did not offici- 
ally recognize his election until 1896. Under the vigorous 
administration of his able prime minister, Stambuloff, 
Bulgaria prospered greatly. The finances were placed on a 
stable footing, the civil service was made efficient, education 
was fostered, and railways were built. The campaign of 
1885 had established the miHtary reputation of the nation. 
Bulgaria began to be regarded as a Balkan Prussia. The suc- 
cess and progressoftheBulgariansproveincontestably that the 
apprehension of Russian domination in the Balkans, as likely 
to be exercised through the instrumentality of the greater 
Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stef ano in 1878, was groundless. 


I \ 

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^^Vl>®§U^HAREST ^^^ ^ 


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-r^' ^ 




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rianople V 


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Treaty of Bucharest, August 6, 19 13. 

JON IN THE Balkans 155 

But Russia had commercial interests in the Balkan penin- 
sula, and more especially in its adjacent waters, to which 
her political interests are really subordinate. 

The deficiency of the vast Russian Empire in available 
maritime outlets is a commonplace of geography. The 
White Sea scarcely counts; and while the Baltic coast has at 
least one open winter harbor, the center of commercial and 
industrial gravity, as we have already perceived, is inevitably 
moving southwards, so that the acuteness of the problem 
depends in large measure upon the opportunities for external 
communication in that direction. Russia's most productive 
natural sources of wealth are chiefly found in the regions 
which are tributary to the Black Sea. The Black Earth 
Belt of marvellous fertility, the rich grazing lands of the 
steppes, the boundless supplies of coal in the Donetz basin, 
the oil-wells in the Caucasus — the outlet for all these to the 
great international trade-routes is by the Black Sea and the 
narrow passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The 
area within which this movement of southern Russian 
foreign trade takes place is funnel-shaped. The products 
move along converging land or river routes to the Russian 
ports of the Black Sea, then by maritime lines of communi- 
cation drawing ever closer, until they reach the entrance of 
the Bosphorus, where the narrow spout of the funnel begins. 
The passage-way through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles 
is essential to the prosperity of the Russian Empire. Let 
us consider a moment the full significance of this. The; 
population of the Russian Empire amounts to-day to about 
175,000,000, and it will be 600,000,000 at the end of the 
century, if the present rate of increase continues. Russia 
produces more than one-fifth of the world's wheat, about 
one-fourth of the potatoes, more than one-fourth of the 
oats, seven twenty-fourths of the beet-sugar, nearly one- 
third of the barley, and more than one-half of the rye. 

156 The Great War 

The agricultural development is capable of indefinite ex- 
pansion. Russia by intensive farming could probably feed 
the world. All civilized nations are interested in Russian 
exports. A stoppage of the Dardanelles for a few weeks 
sets the price of wheat soaring all over the world. It is both 
unreasonable and undesirable that such a huge productive 
area as we find in southern Russia should depend upon a 
precarious right of way, subject to the humor of a possibly 
hostile power, for access to the great international water- 

Constantinople exercises a traditional spell over the 
imagination of the Russians. They dream of a time when 
the cross will supplant the crescent on the dome of the 
mosque of St. Sophia, where once the Greek emperors were 
crowned. But the practical importance of the city itself 
for Russia is of rather a negative sort. The charm of an 
incomparable situation, and the prestige of a mighty historic 
past maintain Constantinople's superior rank. But it is 
not the natural distributing point for an extensive territory. 
The exports from Constantinople are of limited amount. 
Smyrna in Asia, and Salonica in Europe, have each a more 
extensive economically tributary hinterland. The enormous 
bulk of the tonnage of the shipping of Constantinople is 
deceiving; it consists in large part of steamships of the 
Black Sea lines which merely touch there in passing. In 
accordance with a constant economic law, maritime com- 
merce seeks the ports nearest to the sources of production 
or areas of consumption, which in this instance are in 
southern Russia. Constantinople and Odessa, the most 
important of the Russian Black Sea ports, will eventually 
assume the relative positions of Detroit and Chicago. 
Constantinople's commercially strategic situation enjoys 
consideration which is out of all proportion to its own 
intrinsic, commercial importance. In other words, Con- 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 157 

stantinople, like some important railway junctions, derives 
a reflected commercial glory from the crossing of two great 
trade routes, the water-way from the Black to the Aegean 
Sea, and the land route from central Europe to the interior 
of Asia, without making any considerable contribution to the 
importance of these routes. The practical interest of Russia 
in Constantinople and the Straits is chiefly confined to her 
concern for the freedom of navigation. If Russia possessed 
complete freedom for merchant ships and warships alike, 
and had absolute assurance that liberty of navigation would 
never be restrained, the actual possession of Constantinople 
itself would convey very little additional advantage. But, 
on the other hand, the domination of Constantinople by a 
strong, and possibly unfriendly power, capable of arresting 
the commerce of the Russian ports, would be fatal to the 
prosperity of Russia. The Teutonic combination of powers 
was establishing precisely such a hegemony in Constanti- 
nople, full of peril for Russia. For this reason, we must 
direct our attention forthwith to the origin and rise of the 
Germanic influence in the Balkan peninsula. 

We have observed that Austria-Hungary by her "occu- 
pation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained from the Russo- 
Turkish War more profit than the victors themselves, pro- 
vided the domination of alien peoples is regarded as an 
advantage. By this extension of Austrian authority, the 
policy called "Drang nach Osten" or "pushing eastward," 
found practical expression. It is difiicult to form a defini- 
tive judgment regarding Austria-Hungary's advance into 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the government of Francis 
Joseph was impelled by a desire to find compensation in the 
Balkans for the loss of its Italian provinces, we must con- 
demn emphatically such an unreasonable determination to 
seek aggrandizement in utter disregard of the sentiment of 
the people over whom it insisted upon extending its rule. 

158 The Great War 

It is hardly necessary to state that the people of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have never been invited to declare by plebiscite 
their own inclination respecting their destiny. That method 
of consulting the popular preference has been employed by 
the more enlightened Latin nations only, and by them, as it 
happens, only in instances where the result could be fore- 
seen, and was in conformity with the wishes of the authori- 
ties who left to the people in this way the control of their 

Public opinion is always inclined to condemn Austria- 
Hungary without a hearing. But fairness demands that we 
consider the Austrian assertion, that these provinces were in 
a chronic state of disorder, which made them a constant 
source of annoyance to their neighbor. Moreover, one must 
candidly admit, that during the thirty years of their "occu- 
pation" the Austro-Hungarian government did its utter- 
most to justify its control, bringing about a wonderful 
transformation by establishing an impartial and efficient 
administration, reducing to a coherent system the chaos of 
laws, and building schools, hospitals, highways, and rail- 
ways. The Bosnian landscape took on an appearance not 
unlike that of the parts of Austria where civilization had 
already existed for many centuries. 

The ultimate designs of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans 
were probably never very clearly defined, although it has 
been commonly assumed that the Austrian government 
hoped in some way to extend their power to Salonica, as an 
outlet on the Aegean Sea. 

While the penetration of Austria-Hungary implied from 
the first a definite territorial advance, the penetration by 
Germany was naturally directed towards the attainment of a 
general diplomatic and commercial hegemony. 

With the coming of Mr. Gladstone to the head of the 
British cabinet in 1880, the Turkish government must have 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 159 

been convinced that it could no longer count on British 
support. The scathing denunciations of the Bulgarian atro- 
cities by Mr. Gladstone in 1876 were not the transient effu- 
sions of campaign oratory. Germany gradually assumed 
the place of "disinterested friend," which had thus been left 
vacant. One of the earliest indications of this new element 
in Balkan affairs was the beginning of the re-organization of 
the Turkish army under German management. General 
von der Goltz undertook the task in 1883, and remained in 
charge of the Turkish military establishment until 1895, 
and in consequence many German officers were introduced 
into the Turkish service, whilst many young Turkish officers 
were sent to Germany for their technical education. Ger- 
many began to support Turkish interests diplomatically, 
and to work for, and believe in, the economic regeneration 
of the country. The Germans adopted a tactful attitude 
in their relations with the Turkish government. It was 
easier for Germany to pursue an apparently disinterested 
policy, because, unlike Austria, she was geographically 
remote from Turkey. 

Abdul-Hamid's personality combined the fascination of 
manner, which might naturally be developed amid the 
intrigues of an imperial harem, with unusual intellectual 
alertness and tenacity of purpose. He aimed to consolidate 
his authority by reviving the religious power of the caliphate, 
which had been combined with the Ottoman Sultanate since 
1517, but which had fallen into neglect in recent times. A 
Pan-Islamic propaganda for stimulating the sentiment of 
community throughout the Moslem world was a powerful 
auxiliary in Abdul-Hamid's plan of reinvigorating the cali- 
phate. Abdul-Hamid determined to combat the disinte- 
grating forces, which were undermining the Turkish Empire. 
His quick perception discovered the cause for the retro- 
gression of Turkish dominion in the easy indifference with 

160 The Great War 

which the earlier Sultans had tolerated the existence of the 
individuality of the subjugated peoples. It was now too 
late to amalgamate them with the ruling nationality; but 
Abdul-Hamid, although feigning at times to yield to pres- 
sure, usually thwarted the introduction of such administra- 
tive reforms as might pave the way for the eventual separa- 
tion and independence of individual provinces. The revolt 
and massacres of the Armenians in 1896, when even the 
streets of Constantinople were drenched with blood, were a 
consequence of the Pan-Islamic spirit of fanaticism. 

Abdul-Hamid restored the old-time despotism. He re- 
duced his ministers to the position of vassals or servants, 
from which they had risen to practically independent power 
under his feeble predecessors. He believed that he was 
peculiarly favored by the stars, and therefore called his 
favorite palace on the Bosphorus Yildiz Kiosk, or the Star 
Villa; and there he usually dwelt, in voluptuous oriental 
seclusion, but retained in his clutches all the cords by which 
the different parts of the administration were manipulated. 

Bismarck was apparently indifferent to the opportunities 
afforded by the Turkish Empire. His sole aim in the near 
east was to maintain a useful equilibrium between Austria 
and Russia. But we have already noticed the unusual 
combination in the present Kaiser's character of an ideal or 
romantic vein with a practical appreciation of the forces 
and factors of the economic world of to-day. He endows 
with the compelling quality of picturesqueness the sober 
paths of utility and material profit. Within a year of his 
accession to the throne, William II paid a state visit to 
Constantinople, casting a spell, as it were, to facilitate 
the progress thither of German capital for investment. The 
intimate association of the German financial system with 
industry and commerce is a powerful factor in encouraging 
German enterprise in all parts of the world. In 1888, the 

ON IN THE Balkans 161 

Deutsche Bank took over a short railway running from 
Haidar Pasha, near Scutari, opposite Constantinople, out 
into Asia Minor, and secured a concession for its extension 
to Angora, and the following year the Deutsche Bank and 
Wiirttembergische Bank together founded the Anatolian 
Railway Co., securing a further concession for a line to 
Konia, four hundred and sixty-seven miles from Haidar 
Pasha, which was completed in 1896. Herr von Siemens, 
then chief director of the Deutsche Bank, was the animating 
spirit in this undertaking. The Deutsche Bank, the twin 
brother of the German Empire, as it is called, having been 
born (within the same year) in 1870, is the most prominent 
of the great German banking institutions which finance 
enterprises in foreign parts. 

In the autumn of 1898 the Kaiser, accompanied by the 
Kaiserin, made a much more pretentious journey to the 
Ottoman Empire, ostensibly to dedicate a German Protestant 
Church in Jerusalem, October 31, 1898, when the Kaiser 
concluded an address with the following words : 

"From Jerusalem came the light, in the splendor of which 
the German nation has become great and glorious, and what 
the Germanic peoples have become, they became under the 
banner of the Cross, the emblem of self-sacrificing Christian 
charity. As nearly two thousand years ago, so there shall 
to-day ring out from Jerusalem the cry voicing the ardent 
hope of all, 'Peace on Earth!'" 

A few days later, November 7, the Kaiser declared before 
a gathering in Damascus that "the Sultan and 300,000,000 
Mohammedans, who, scattered over all parts of the earth, 
venerate him as their Caliph, can ever rely upon the 
friendship of the German Emperor." 

The seemingly contradictory light in which the Kaiser 
appeared, the unusual character of this entire affair, and the 
uncertain, but vast, extension of German influence which 

162 The Great War 

his words seemed to betoken brought forth much adverse criti- 
cism and apprehension. To account in part for the general 
surprise, we may recall the fact that these sentiments were 
expressed two years after the Armenian massacres, for which 
the world regarded Abdul-Hamid as partly responsible, and 
the year after the victory of the Turks in a war with Greece, 
whose crown princess was the Kaiser's sister. But above 
all, to explain the startling effect of his speech in Damascus, 
we need only regard the territorial position of the 300,- 
000,000 Mohammedans to whom his protection was thus 
offered, of whom fully 75,000,000 dwell under British, and 
many more millions under French, authority. 

Those who have been admitted to the friendship of the 
Kaiser are impressed by his open-hearted, sympathetic 
nature. His amiable enthusiasm shows itself in his public 
utterances, when he seems to be frequently impelled by his 
warmth of cordiality, or by the inspiration of the moment, 
to employ expressions which are liable to an unforeseen 
interpretation. The Kaiser's intentions on this occasion were 
doubtlessverymuchlessextravagantthanmanyof theextreme 
constructions which were placed upon them. He desired to 
draw near to Turkey, and he did not lose sight of the fact 
that other Mohammedan lands contiguous to the Ottoman 
Empire offered exceptional opportunities for German trade. 
But it will be well for us to keep in mind, from this point on, 
that the Mohammedans inhabit countries which command 
the most important strategic points in the world with respect 
to international trade-routes. 

The events which we have been relating occurred the 
same year as the China expedition and occupation of Kiau- 
Chau by Germany. The Kaiser's Welt-politik was evidently 
moving forward, and events showed that his progress 
through Turkey, which had been inaugurated by a visit at 
the court of the Sultan and superb entertainments, was 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 163 

admirably timed for promoting a practical program, and 
was not barren of results. For within twelve months, a 
concession was obtained from the Porte for the extension of 
the German Anatolian Railway to the Persian Gulf. We 
may note in this connection the fact that the railways in 
European Turkey were already under the control of the 
Deutsche Bank. Reflections of the most far-reaching sig- 
nificance are at once suggested. The commercial supremacy 
of Great Britain, and her empire, were based upon the con- 
trol of sea-power. The sea-route to India was unquestion- 
ably in her hands. But the continental states by the con- 
struction of railways might make themselves independent of 
water-routes. The head of the Persian Gulf was surely not 
the ultimate terminus of the great route contemplated in 
the German line. A glance at the map will convince the 
reader of the expediency, or even inevitableness, of a line of 
railway communication from the west of Europe to India 
and China, crossing the Bosphorus by means of car-ferries, 
following ancient caravan routes, paralleling in effect, and 
lying between, the Trans-Siberian line of Russia and the all- 
sea connection of Great Britain. This would offer a line of 
"peaceful penetration" for German civilization into Asia 
Minor and Mesopotamia, and even Persia, which might lead 
eventually to the demarcation of a German "sphere of influ- 
ence" in these regions. Here was the one suitable outlet by 
land for the expansion of German enterprise, a long narrow 
zone, sandwiched in, as it were, between the spheres of 
Russia and England. 

The prospects of railway extension stimulated the Turkish 
government's interest in the country at the head of the 
Persian Gulf, which was ruled by practically independent 
sheichs under the nominal hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. 
In August, 1901, an attempt was made to land Turkish 
troops at Koweit, a desirable harbor. But the local sheich 

164 The Great War 

appealed to the British Indian government, and a warship 
was despatched, which thwarted the Turkish design. The 
news of this incident was, doubtless, the cause of some 
annoyance in Berlin. It was a palpable declaration that the 
Persian Gulf was included in a British"sphere of influence." 

In 1901, Arthur von Gwinner succeeded von Siemens as 
leading director of the Deutsche Bank, and became one of 
the big figures in the economic struggle for a greater Ger- 
many. He became the guiding genius of Germany's pene- 
tration of the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire. 
Herr von Gwinner is an admirable specimen of the German 
captain of finance. He is a scholar, an art connoisseur, a 
music lover, and above all a prophet and seer. It requires 
the soaring imagination and vision of a prophet to mobilize 
and guide to victory the modern forces of finance. Amid 
the severely prosaic surroundings of his office in the Behren- 
strasse, he could invoke the vision of Babylon and Nineveh 
with their imperial splendor, and the opulent luxury of 
Bagdad, the commercial metropolis of the earth in the days 
of Haroun-al-Raschid and the Arabian Nights; he beheld the 
present desolation of Mesopotamia where nature's lavish 
resources are neglected by the scanty population; and he 
could forecast a future when the valleys of the Euphrates 
and Tigris, brought within five days of Berlin by railway, 
would be repeopled and cultivated, and dotted with German 

The definite concession granted by the Porte, March 5, 
1903, was the charter of the Bagdad Railway Co., the 
Chemin de fer imperial ottoman de Bagdad, as it was officially 
called. The capital of the company amounted to 15,000,000 
francs, of which only one-half was paid up. But with this 
insignificant sum as a basis they undertook to construct a 
line 1025 miles in length from Konia to Bagdad, or 1400 
miles altogether if it were extended to the Persian Gulf. 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 165 

The terms of the contract might excite the envy of our 
most fortunate promoters of public utilities. They show 
why the public contracts are a subject of such earnest con- 
sideration in the semi-civilized countries whose status was 
discussed from time to time in European diplomatic confer- 
ences. The Turkish government agreed to contribute to 
the railway company an annuity of 11,000 francs per kilo- 
meter of line (33396.80 per mile) for ninety-nine years, and 
guaranteed minimum operating receipts of 4500 francs per 
kilometer (31389.60 per mile). Then, to facilitate the 
financing of the project, the government turned over its 
own bonds to the company, as the work proceeded, repre- 
senting a nominal value of 269,110.65 francs for every kilo- 
meter (383,101.35 per mile). The railway company sold 
these bonds, for which the government's annuity provided 
the interest at 4% and redemption at the end of ninety-nine 
years. Furthermore the company received the privilege of 
exploiting mines within a distance of twenty kilometers 
(123>^ miles) on either side of the line, and of cutting timber 
in the neighboring forests, and other valuable rights. At 
the commencement of the war about 360,000,000 had been 
invested in the railway, and its completion to Bagdad was 
expected in 1917. 

Herr von Gwinner, as head of both the Anatolian and 
Bagdad Railway Companies became railway king of the 
Ottoman Empire. The line of the Bagdad Railway, as 
surveyed, and largely constructed, starts from Konia, passes 
near Aleppo, the metropolis of Syria, and through Mosul on 
the site of ancient Nineveh, and then, descending the Tigris 
valley, reaches its termination in a splendid new railway 
station in Bagdad close by the quay of Nebuchadnezzar. 
The contract for the construction of the line was immedi- 
ately granted to a German company, and the first section 
opened for operations in 1904. 

166 The Great War 

The supreme importance of the Bagdad Railway will be 
realized through its eventual extensions, connections, and 
branches. In the first place, it was very clearly designed 
to be the central section of a short route to India and the 
extreme Orient. For this reason the project excited from 
the first the concern, and even apprehension of Great Britain. 
It will be observed in this connection that Russia's attention 
was absorbed at the time with preparations for her struggle 
with Japan, so that she had little time to devote to events 
and developments within the Turkish Empire. The con- 
nection with India for the Bagdad Railway was to be effected 
primarily by an extension of the line from Bagdad to some 
suitable port at the head of the Persian Gulf, a distance of 
three hundred and seventy-five miles. The attitude of Great 
Britain was exemplified by the Koweit affair. The railway 
project from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf remained unsettled 
for a long time on account of the suspicion of Great Britain. 
It was finally agreed in 1914 that this section of railway 
should be under exclusive Turkish control. 

The German penetration of Mesopotamia introduced a 
new factor into the preoccupations of British statesmanship 
regarding the security of India. This was very obviously 
one of the causes of the agreement with Russia in 1907, to 
which reference has already been made. 

The Bagdad Railway added the crowning element of use- 
fulness to a favorite project of the Sultan. Abdul-Hamid 
planned a railway line from Aleppo and Damascus to the 
Moslem holy cities, Medina and Mecca, to be constructed 
by means of the contributions of Mohammedans in all lands, 
as a practical, conspicuous monument of his regime as 
Sultan and Caliph, and an impressivesymbolof Pan-Islamism. 
The Hedjaz Railway, as it is called, has been completed 
from Aleppo to Medina, a distance of about eight hundred 
miles, and was eventually linked to the Bagdad Railway 

ION IN THE Balkans 167 

by a branch of the latter extending to the town of Aleppo. 

Later, the Germans obtained a concession for a branch line 
from Aleppo to Alexandretta, a port on the Mediterranean, 
where a naval base might some time be established, only 
thirty-six hours steaming from the Suez Canal. 

The military advantages of the Bagdad Railway as the main 
trunk of an extensive system must have been as patent to 
the cunning mind of Abdul-Hamid as to Its promoters. Its 
possibilities were so stupendous as to bewilder analysis. It 
was not only an interior system to facilitate the rapid dis- 
position of troops wherever the coasts might be threatened 
from the sea; it not only constituted the most important 
part of a short route to India; but it provided continuous 
railway connections froiii Germany to a point within strik- 
ing distance of Egypt, if only the barriers were lowered in 
the Balkan peninsula. In other words, it could bring the 
German military machine almost down to the Suez Canal; 
and this was, doubtless, the most Insidious danger which it 
held In store for the British Empire. And as though to 
clench the strategic advantage, the Hedjaz Railway ran far 
down the Red Sea, along the flank of the great British trade- 
route, where a site for some future naval base might con- 
ceivably be discovered, as a useful ambuscade. Not un- 
connected with this general program, was Abdul-Hamld's 
attempt In 1906 to occupy the Sinaltic peninsula, and push 
the Turkish frontier nearly up to the Suez Canal, a scheme 
which was thwarted by British initiative in Egypt. 

The British Foreign Office was prompt to grasp the 
dangerous possibilities of this extensive railway develop- 
ment under German control. Its effect on British Indian 
policy was revolutionary. The English abandoned the 
traditional idea of keeping India isolated by land, and 
became convinced that railway communications with their 
greatest dependency were required. Thirty years ago the 

168 The Great War 

cry of alarm was raised in Great Britain, because the 
Russians were "at the gates of Herat," with the design, as it 
was believed, of invading India. And now the presence of 
the Germans at Bagdad, and more especially the possibility 
that the eastern Mediterranean or Suez Canal might be 
closed, were causing similar anxiety. To provide a means 
for the speedy transportation of forces overland to India, 
Great Britain was constrained to put confidence in the 
loyalty of her entente associate, and an agreement was 
practically consummated for the construction of a railway 
across Persia to link the Indian and Russian systems. The 
entire length of line to be constructed, according to this plan, 
from the last station on the present Indian system to the 
nearest Russian station in the Caucasus is 1994 miles. 

Occurrences in Macedonia are palpable evidence of the 
continuity of relationship between the unfortunate measures 
of the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, and the turmoil which 
has convulsed the Balkan peninsula during the past few 
years. The Treaty of Berlin created the Macedonian ques- 
tion by annulling the incorporation of the greater part of the 
territory with Bulgaria, and restoring it to Turkish misrule. 
For the Christians of Macedonia never relinquished the hope 
which had been once evoked, and the prospect of the liberty 
of their brethren in Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece made their 
own situation more intolerable. Macedonia became con- 
stantly restless, and nationalistic societies in the neighboring 
countries contributed continually to this condition of fer- 
ment by providing the material means for insurrection. 
From time to time, as the patience of the Turkish military 
element became exhausted, their exasperation found vent in 
savage reprisals. The Macedonian disturbances at length 
became so excessive that they could not be ignored by the 
powers. The Sultan had promised by the Treaty of Berlin 
to reform the administration of Macedonia and had treated 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 169 

this engagement with the same indifference as many other 
plausible assurances of the same nature. The powers in- 
sisted upon the application of the so-called Miirzsteg 
program in 1903, by which the three districts Salonica, 
Monastir, and Kossovo were placed under the supervision 
of Austrian and Russian civil agents, and the Macedonian 
gendarmerie was reorganized under the able direction of an 
Italian officer, General De Giorgis. The Macedonian 
problem was unfortunately not based upon an ideally 
simple contest where the forces of tyranny are ranged on 
one side and the down-trodden on the other. It was com- 
plicated by the heterogeneous character of the Christian 
population, which is composed of Greek, Serbian, and 
Bulgarian elements. The Turkish sovereignty partly con- 
cealed the really more essential antagonism, which grew out 
of the rivalry of the Christian nationalities, particularly the 
Greeks and Bulgarians. The Greeks claim to be the elite of the 
Balkan peninsula. Proud of the matchless distinction of 
their pedigree and their exalted traditions of civilization, 
they regard with a certain measure of contempt the Bulgarians 
as descendants of "barbarians." The conviction had pre- 
maturely taken root in Macedonia, that in the final partition 
of the territory, political boundaries would be traced along 
the lines of demarcation of the different nationalities. It 
was a policy of timely foresight, therefore, for each nation- 
ality to endeavor to make its allotment as large as possible 
in anticipation by exterminating as much as possible of the 
rival populations. Bands were accordingly organized in 
each of the three countries that had prospects in the partition 
of Macedonia for the purpose of clearing the soil of its com- 
petitors. This irregular warfare was conducted with the 
greatest ferocity by the Greeks and Bulgarians. In fact, 
the second Balkan war was simply the resumption of a 
natural and inevitable condition of hostilities after a brief 

170 The Great War 

interlude for ousting the Turks, incidentally a common aim. 

The Miirzsteg program was inadequate, chiefly, no doubt, 
on account of the incessant activity of the guerilla bands. 
At the time of the meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas II 
at Reval in the summer of 1908, a more radical scheme was 
approved. But before it could be put into execution, the 
most unexpected, the most remarkable, revolution had 
occurred in Turkey almost without bloodshed, so that the 
foreign officials were withdrawn from Macedonia with the 
supreme confidence of the powers that an era of domestic 
reconciliation and brotherhood had dawned for the distracted 
Turkish Empire. 

The progressive partition of the Turkish dominions had 
undoubtedly wounded deeply the pride of the more thought- 
ful Turks. The conviction gained ground that a thorough 
transformation of Turkey from within was the only means 
to counteract the obvious retrogression, and there were not 
lacking men of integrity, with faith in their country, who 
believed that this was possible. Besides, there was an 
increasing army of malcontents and exiles, victims of the 
Hamidian despotism. By the combination of such elements, 
the Young Turk party was constituted with a program of 
liberal nationalism. Its directing organ was the Committee 
of Union and Progress. This committee carried on a pro- 
paganda with the utmost dexterity and success. Many of 
the leading officers in Salonica and throughout Macedonia 
became distinguished members of the committee; among 
them Enver Bey. The prospect of another curtailment in 
the extent of the Sultan's government by the practical inde- 
pendence of Macedonia spurred on the Young Turks to 
prompt measures. A revolution was inaugurated in Mace- 
donia, and two days later it culminated in Constantinople 
with the proclamation by Abdul-Hamid of the restoration 
of the constitution of 1876. The world was astounded, and 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 171 

public opinion, naively prone to be captivated by the para- 
doxical, was ready to predict the speedy regeneration of the 
Turkish nation. It is a fact, however, that the Young Turkish 
leaders gave proof at this time of great capacity and moder- 
ation. Kiamil Pasha, reputed an Anglophile, was appointed 
Grand Vizier, August 6, and intrusted by Abdul-Hamid with 
the formation of the first, constitutional cabinet. 

Unfortunately, the new order was assailed immediately 
with difficulties from without And within. Despite universal 
expressions of sympathy, the prospective heirs of the Otto- 
man Empire really regarded this act of rejuvenation as an 
unwarranted postponement of the demise of the incumbent 
of their rightful inheritance. They undertook with cynical 
haste to forestall a regeneration which might postpone the 
acquisition of their spoil indefinitely. The election of mem- 
bers for the approaching Turkish parliament would be a 
formal act indicative of organic union with the empire. It 
was very likely regarded somewhat as a test of corporate 
unity in the border, or doubtful, provinces. The summon- 
ing of the first parliament probably accelerated, for this 
reason, a series of proclamations declaring specifically the 
exclusion from the Turkish Empire of some of these provinces, 
which must have been a bitter disappointment to the Young 
Turks. Thus, on October 5, Ferdinand, Prince of Bulgaria, 
assumed the title king, or tsar, renouncing thereby the 
suzerainty of the Sultan, and two days later the Cretans 
repudiated their connection with Turkey, and Francis Joseph 
solemnly proclaimed the definitive annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to the Hapsburg dominions. 

The momentous act of the Austro-Hungarian government 
in annexing the provinces which it had been administering 
since 1878 was chiefly due to the spirited policy of Count 
Aerefithal, at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 
Young Turks accepted these repulses in a spirit of modera- 

172 The Great War 

tion, and entered into negotiations with their neighbors on 
the north with a view to the peaceful adjustment of the 
situation. An agreement was finally concluded with Austria- 
Hungary in January, 1909, the principal features of which 
were the Sultan's recognition of the Austrian annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the renunciation by the Austrian 
government of all rights in the sanjak of Novi Bazar, the 
narrow strip of territory which at that time separated 
Serbia and Montenegro, and payment by Austria-Hungary 
of a financial indemnity for the property of the Turkish 
state in the annexed provinces. 

The bitter resentment of Serbia offered the most serious 
problem arising from the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. We have already commented upon the rise of the 
Greater Serbian idea. It is not difficult to appreciate the 
intense feeling of injustice which rankled in the hearts of the 
Serbians. Only about one-third of their particular branch 
of the Slav race was included in the Kingdom of Serbia. 
The transfer of the administration of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina into the hands of the Hapsburg government by the 
Congress of Berlin had been a cruel disappointinent, but 
the measure was ostensibly temporary. Now the definitive 
annexation threatened to perpetuate for all time the polit- 
ically divided condition of the Serbian people. In annexing 
the provinces the Dual Monarchy had usurped a prerogative 
which belonged to the signatory powers of the Treaty of 
BerHn. The Serbian Skupschtina, or parliament, passed a 
resolution demanding the autonomy of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina under the protection of the powers, and for them- 
selves a land connection with Montenegro, which would 
give Serbia an outlet to the Adriatic Sea guaranteeing her 
commercial independence. But the government of Austria- 
Hungary asserted that their annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was an act which concerned the nominal 

The German Empress as a Medi.tval Q^ieen. William II as King of lerusalem. 

When the Emperor and Empress •i.>isited Jerusalem in iSgS the latter chose^ on the Mou?it of 
Oli^veSj the site for a German hospital^ named the Augusta Victoria^ in the courtyard of ^ushich 
are these statues by Moritz Wolff. 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 173 

proprietor of the provinces and themselves alone, and since 
Turkey had already concurred in it, the incident was closed. 
The tension became extreme during the winter months and 
military preparations were made by both parties. But 
Serbia had no prospect of success in the face of the deter- 
mined attitude of her powerful opponent, unless she could 
count on the assistance of Russia. The empire of the Tsar 
had not recovered from the calamities of the war with Japan 
and the disorganizing effects of the revolution. The govern- 
ment hesitated before the likelihood of a European war. Ger- 
many exerted the decisive influence at St. Petersburg, and it is 
said that her representations were peremptory in tone. 
Serbia was constrained to await the decision of the powers 
with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was a formula 
intended to spare Serbia's feelings by disguising what was 
really submission, since the powers were not disposed to 
contest the annexation. On March 31, 1909, the Serbian 
minister in Vienna, on instructions of the Serbian govern- 
ment,made the following declaration to the Austro-Hungarian 

"Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia 
has not affected her rights, and consequently she will con- 
form to the decisions that the powers may take in conformity 
with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the 
advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce 
from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition 
which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since 
last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the 
direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and 
to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." 

The crisis arising out of the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by the Dual Monarchy resulted in a victory 
for German diplomacy. The prompt loyalty displayed by 
the ally was reflected in enthusiastic expressions of gratitude 

174 The Great War 

in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the moral ties 
between the two empires were undoubtedly strengthened. 
We may note in Chancellor von Billow's report of the affair 
before the Reichstag the following passage: 

"The Serbian demands are a perilous adventure; and 
while it would be intolerable to think of European peace 
being threatened on account of Serbia, it would be absurd 
to pretend that Austria-Hungary or Turkey should yield to 
the unreasonable aspirations of Serbia. No war at all, far 
less a European war, should spring from such aspirations." 

It is scarcely necessary to add here that the Serbians did 
not resign their bitterness and sense of injury. 

Germany must have regarded with grave anxiety the 
subversion of the old order of things in the Ottoman Empire 
in 1908. By cultivating the situation for thirty years with 
diligence and tact, the Germans had acquired a position of 
ascendancy, to which a revolution could assuredly add 
nothing; while, on the other hand, the attitude of the leaders 
in the new government was at first distinctly favorable to 
the western powers. 

There was a counter-revolution early in 1909; but it was 
of very short duration. On April 14, mutinous soldiers in 
Constantinople seized the parliament house, and forced the 
Grand Vizier to resign; but the Committee of Union and 
Progress sent a force of 25,000 men from Salonica, under 
Mohammed Shevket, who occupied the capital after some 
severe street fighting, April 25, deposed Abdul-Hamid, 
and elevated to the sultanate his brother as Mohammed 
V, after he had been confined thirty years as a prisoner. 

The Young Turkish revolution had been inspired by a 
passionate desire to regenerate the Ottoman Empire by the 
introduction of parliamentary institutions. Liberalism and 
nationalism were, therefore, intimately associated in the 
program of the Young Turks. The movement had been 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 175 

impelled by the determination to counteract the threaten- 
ing disintegration of the empire. The Young Turks were, 
therefore, opposed on principle to all separatist tendencies 
within the empire, including demands for the special treat- 
ment of particular nationalities or provinces. The fulfil- 
ment of their purpose required that the aspirations of 
separate nationalities should be sacrificed to the liberty 
and prosperity of the empire as a whole. This attitude of 
the new element in power probably facilitated the recovery 
of German prestige and influence, because Germany had 
never embarrassed or annoyed the Turkish government by 
urging special reforms, and no interested motive made her 
the advocate of any of the Christian nationalities in the 
empire. Moreover, Germany had been represented in Con- 
stantinople, since 1897, by a diplomat of rare ability, Baron 
Marschall von Bieberstein. He performed a difficult service 
for the Fatherland, of inestimable value; but he must have 
encountered a situation that taxed his resourcefulness to 
the uttermost, when the war broke out with Italy in the 
autumn of 1911. 

We must be impressed by the heartless waywardness of 
fate, when we reflect that during thirty years under the 
despotism of Abdul-Hamid the peaceful relations of the 
Ottoman Empire were disturbed by only one foreign war, 
and that of brief duration, whilst the generous impulses of 
the Young Turks have exposed Turkey to many acts of 
unfriendliness, constant turmoil, and three foreign wars 
within a period of seven years. It was not enough that 
one of Germany's allies should have rudely humiliated the 
new government of Turkey two months after its establish- 
ment. Before Europe had recovered from the anxious 
tension of the Moroccan controversy, Italy, the other ally 
of Germany, delivered at Constantinople her ultimatum, 
demanding, in terms that precluded procrastination, the 

176 The Great War 

cession to her of Tripoli, a natural goal of Italian policy. 

Tripoli is a territory of possibly 400,000 square miles, 
lying directly opposite the southern extremity of Italy, 
between the eastern confines of the French colonial empire 
in Tunis and the western boundary of the British sphere of 
control in Egypt. It was sparsely inhabited; but its impor- 
tance in ancient times attested the existence of a consider- 
able area of fertile soil. The possession of this nearby 
territory would afford precisely the opportunity which 
Italy required, a field for colonial expansion, where the 
energy of her surplus population could be profitably em- 
ployed, and an added position of strategic importance in 
the Mediterranean. The aspirations of Italy regarding this 
territory had long been recognized by France and Great 

We naturally suspect that the remarkable events which 
have occurred since 1911 in such rapid succession, even 
overlapping one another in a chronological sense, are the 
consequence of a closely related group of causes, perhaps 
the counterplay of the same diplomatic forces. Italy 
launched her enterprise as soon as the probability of a 
French protectorate in Morocco left Tripoli as apparently 
the only territory on the Mediterranean open to fresh 
projects of colonization. But some other circumstances 
must be considered in canvassing the possible causes of the 
situation, and they suggest that larger motives than Italy's 
cupidity were involved in the venture. 

With Tripoli in her hands, it seemed that Italy might be 
regarded as the key to the Mediterranean; and it might 
therefore be assumed that such a position would have been 
considered by Italy's partners in the Triple Alliance as a 
decisive advantage to themselves, and that Italy invaded 
Tripoli with their concurrence, if not at their suggestion. 
But on the other hand, the close union with Turkey was the 

3N IN THE Balkans 177 

very corner-stone upon which the most attractive part of 
German aspirations for expansion had been erected. Italy's 
aggression must have imperilled the influence of her ally in 
Constantinople. It is a brilliant achievement of German 
diplomacy to have recovered its controlling position in 
Turkey. But the fact that German diplomacy weathered 
the gale is no proof that it provoked it. Besides, for Italy, 
membership in the Triple Alliance had been due solely to a 
calculating, unemotional policy. Attachment to it waned as 
the material advantages appeared less obvious, and the in- 
creasing feeling of rivalry between Italy and Austria was a 
positive danger to the continuation of the compact. Austria's 
more favorable naval situation in the Adriatic, the best 
harbors of which are nearly all on the eastern, or Austrian 
side, and her imputed inclination to penetrate farther into 
the Balkans rendered Italy ever watchful and suspicious. 
It was, undoubtedly, another triumph for German diplo- 
macy to have maintained outward harmony so long between 
these uncongenial allies. 

By contemplating these circumstances, and recalling that 
Germany's Moroccan enterprise was regarded in France 
and England as an aggressive operation aimed at their 
entente, we are naturally led to the conjecture that the 
western powers suggested Italy's abrupt action in Tripoli as 
a prompt counter-thrust, calculating that it would embarrass 
hopelessly German foreign policy and break up the Triple 
Alliance. It will appear from all this how delicate and all- 
important must have been the diplomatic task of the German 
representative at Constantinople. And Germany managed 
in some way to reconcile her position as ally of Italy with 
that of friend of Turkey. 

It is foreign to the purpose of this volume to relate the 
events of the campaign in Tripoli. We need only recollect 
that Turkey resisted this further operation of dismember- 

178 The Great War 

ment with unexpected tenacity, and that to reduce her to 
yielding Tripoli, Italy occupied a number of the Aegean 
islands. But before the final settlement between Turkey 
and Italy, a more formidable storm of calamity had broken 
over the unhappy Ottoman Empire. 

The establishment of the constitution by the Young Turks 
was followed by an effusion of goodwill throughout the 
empire. Races which had been inveterate enemies em- 
braced and fraternized. But the disillusionment began 
when the Christian populations lapsed into their congenial 
state of dissension. The spread of liberal ideals intensified 
the spirit of nationality in Turkey. Intolerance was en- 
grafted as a branch on the tree of liberty; and this was just 
as true of the Christians as of the Turks. The Young 
Turkish movement for the redemption of the Ottoman 
Empire was largely a failure because the nationalities com- 
prised within the empire were too distinct, racial barriers 
were too abrupt, for the development of a general, compre- 
hensive patriotism ardent enough to fuse the feelings of 
the particular peoples into an enthusiastic consciousness of 
their common country and community of interests. Accord- 
ingly, the discontent in European Turkey again became 

An insurrection of the Malissori, a Christian tribe of 
northern Albania, in May, 1912, was followed by a mutiny 
of the Turkish troops at Monastir in June, and the fall of 
the Young Turkish ministry. Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha be- 
came Grand Vizier, and Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, 
July 21. The Turkish troops returned to their allegiance, 
but the spirit of insurrection spread from Albania to Mace- 
donia, where it pervaded the three Christian populations. 
The Turkish soldiers committed revolting atrocities, a 
massacre of Bulgarians at Katchana and vicinity in August, 
and of Serbs at Berane and Sienitza. It became very dif- 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 179 

ficult for the governments of the Christian states to resist 
the popular enthusiasm for intervention to rescue their 
brethren in Macedonia. The pressure was especially strong 
in Bulgaria, whither thousands of Macedonians of their own 
nationality had taken refuge. The Balkan powers at length 
became convinced that the time had come for the fulfilment 
of national liberation and the unity of their respective peoples. 

The Balkan League seems to have been conceived in the 
first place as a union of all the Balkan powers including 
Turkey, to support, ostensibly at least, the doctrine of the 
"Balkans for the Balkans." This earlier plan may very 
likely have been a suggestion of the German ambassador in 
Constantinople, in the hope of seeing the Balkan states 
present an undivided front against Russian interference, 
without compromising Germanic peaceful penetration. But 
this project, if ever seriously considered, was soon abandoned. 
It lacked a vital, compelling motive. 

The league for aggressive action against Turkey was 
probably inspired by Baron von Hartwig, the Russian 
ambassador at Belgrade, and Venizelos, the very able Greek 
Prime Minister. It was based officially on a treaty between 
Serbia and Bulgaria, signed February 29, 1912, and another 
between Greece and Bulgaria, signed May 16, 1912. The 
former of these treaties consisted of two parts, one part 
suitable for publication, establishing a purely defensive 
alliance, and a secret part, which is most important, since 
it contains an agreement relative to the division of territory 
between Serbia and Bulgaria in the event of a victorious 
war of aggression against Turkey, and reveals a connection 
of Russia with this proposed movement by naming the Tsar 
as umpire in all questions arising between the allies. 

Relations between the new allies and the Ottoman Empire 
became more and more strained, so that the former com- 
menced mobilization, September 30, and the latter, the 

180 The Great War 

next day. Austria-Hungary announced as the basis of her 
policy in this crisis the maintenance of the status quo, and, 
ostensibly, non-intervention. Austria and Russia issued a 
declaration, October 8, as mandatories of the Great Powers, 
"condemning any measures susceptible of a breach of the 
peace," announcing that the powers would take in hand the 
necessary reforms according to the Treaty of Berlin, and 
adding the solemn admonition that in the event of hostilities 
the powers would "not admit at the close of the war any 
modification of the territorial status quo of European 
Turkey." But the Balkan states were determined to make 
the Treaty of Berlin as obsolete as it had been stupid, and 
the formal declaration of the powers as to the immutability 
of Turkish boundaries was treated with the indiiference 
which the outcome proved that it deserved. The conduct 
of Austria and Russia had not been uniformly of such a 
character as to invest their warning with unqualified respect, 
since the former had herself manifestly slighted the authority 
of the powers in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
latter was apparently entirely cognizant of the aggressive 
intentions of the Balkan states, as the secret treaty seems 
to indicate. It might be urged in this connection that 
since duplicity is assumed in the game of Balkan politics, 
straightforwardness would have the effect of more subtle 
artifice, and might be regarded, therefore, with serious 
moral misgivings. 

Montenegro, the irrepressible, pugnacious bull-dog of the 
Balkans, instinctively impelled against its congenital foe, 
slipped the leash and declared war, October 8, before nego- 
tiations had run their normal course, perplexing, no doubt, 
the counsels of the allies, and causing uneasiness throughout 
Europe. Thus Montenegro precipitated the Balkan War 
with its momentous consequences. The allies followed her 
initiative, October 18, each state throwing its forces into the 

Huuse nf Parliament, Constantinople. 

The Rvissian Embassy at Constantinople. 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 181 

territories adjacent to its own boundaries, chiefly such as 
were inhabited by people of the same nationality. 

The aggregate war forces of the Balkan allied states 
amounted to 790,000 men, and those of the Ottoman Empire 
were supposedly about 700,000. German officers had re- 
organized the Turkish military establishment, as has been 
pointed out, and held important commissions in the armies. 
Austrian officers had in large measure performed the same 
service for the Bulgarians, whilst a French military commis- 
sion had supervised the development of the military organ- 
ization in Greece. The Greeks and Serbs brought the 
Creusot French field-artillery into action against the Krupp 
German guns of the Turks. These circumstances were not 
absent from the minds of the military experts, who followed 
the course of the operations with eager attention. 

A feeling of relief was experienced by all those who felt 
sincere concern for the good name of Italy, when she straight- 
way concluded peace with Turkey without profiting by the 
unfortunate position of her adversary to augment her de- 
mands, October IS. To palliate her submission, Turkey 
retained the privilege of a representative in Tripoli to pro- 
tect the interests of the Mohammedans. Italy pledged her- 
self to restore the islands which she had occupied in the 
Aegean Sea, provided Turkey would grant them autonomy; 
but the rapid progress of the conflict between Turkey and 
Greece made their retention by Italy expedient until their 
eventual destiny should be decided in the final settlement 
after the Balkan war. 

The Serbs quickly overran the greater part of Macedonia 
and northern Albania as far as the coast of the Adriatic Sea. 
The Greeks entered Salonica, November 8, and the Bulga- 
rians arriving before the city a little later exhibited ominous 
signs of dissatisfaction. The more arduous field of opera- 
tions in the direction of the Turkish capital fell to the 

182 The Great War 

portion of the Bulgarians, where their swift, overwhelming 
successes astonished Europe. After their defeats of Kirk 
Kilisse, October 22 and 23, and of Lule Burgas, October 28, 
the Turks fell back to the Tchataldja lines, the outer defenses 
of Constantinople, leaving a strong garrison in Adrianople. 
Their disheartening misfortunes caused a revulsion of feeling, 
the return of the Young Turks to power, and the adoption 
of a pacific attitude. Kiamil Pasha was made Grand Vizier, 
and an armistice was signed, December 3, to which Greece, 
however, was not a party. 

In the mean time Albanian delegates had assembled at 
Valona, November 28, and had set up a provisional govern- 
ment under the presidency of Ismail Kemal Bey. 

The convention of envoys from the Balkan states and 
Turkey for elaborating terms of peace, and a conference of 
the ambassadors of the Great Powers for coordinating their 
own views began their sessions coincidently in London, 
December 16. The vicissitudes of war and negotiation are 
reflected in the petulant course of Austrian remonstrances, 
to which the powers displayed undeniable proofs of the 
utmost consideration. The Dual Monarchy must have 
recognized the impossibility of upholding the territorial 
integrity of European Turkey after Kirk Kilisse and Lule 
Burgas. For a time the Austrians insisted that the sanjak 
of Novi-Bazar must be respected by the belligerents, until 
the occupation by the Serbians of all the territory to the 
south of it deprived the reservation of the sanjak of its 
former significance. 

But the march of Serbia across northern Albania to the 
Adriatic Sea, and her avowed intention of extending her 
boundaries to the coast led to partial mobilization in Austria- 
Hungary, which brought her forces under arms up to about 
1,000,000 men. Russia responded to this measure by the 
concentration of unusual forces on the frontier of Gallcia. 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 183 

In November, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir pre- 
sumptive of the Hapsburg realm, had an interview with 
William II in Berlin to discuss the subject of the military 
cooperation of the two empires in case war with Russia 
should follow, and the nervousness in Austria-Hungary 
showed itself in a financial panic. 

The idea of an independent Albania, as accepted by the 
conference of ambassadors in London, December 20, had 
been devised long before in the consultations of Austria- 
Hungary and Italy regarding their common policy in the pos- 
sible event of a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. It was 
a contrivance for insuring the stability of the existing equi- 
librium of power in the Adriatic Sea. 

The Albanians are the descendants of the ancient lUyrians, 
who were at one time famous as pirates, and they retain 
to-day the turbulent characteristics of their forefathers. 
The hardy mountaineers of Albania were the last of the 
Balkan populations to submit to the Turkish invaders; but 
most of them later became Mohammedans, and furnished 
a vigorous element to the armies of the Ottoman Empire. 
In this respect Albania Is unique among the states which 
have been erected on fragments of the former Ottoman 
territory in Europe. The present Albanians preserve a 
tribal organization which engenders animosity and numerous 
feuds. Robbery and brigandage among them pass over by 
scarcely perceptible degrees into heroic and patriotic war- 
fare, as in the Greece of Homeric days. The Albanians are, 
unfortunately, destitute of some of the necessary requisites 
for political independence on a national basis, such as a 
literature, and common moral ideals. The delimitation of 
the new principality was the thorniest problem with which 
the conference of ambassadors in London had to deal. 

In the first place, Serbia expected at least enough of 
Albania to form a continuous extension of her territory to 

184 The Great War 

the Adriatic Sea. Serbia maintained that an opening to 
the sea was indispensable for her independence, on account 
of Austria's unfriendly tariff policy which aimed to make 
her a commercial vassal. But Austria-Hungary was inflexibly 
opposed to any Serbian maritime outlet whatsoever. She 
even refused her assent to the suggestion of a narrow strip 
of Serbian territory, a "corridor," as it was called, extending 
from the central mass of Serbian territory to some sea-port on 
the Adriatic. Austria-Hungary appeared to have singled out 
Serbia as the special victim of her displeasure with the 
determination of thwarting her purposes at every turn. 
She regarded Serbia as an outlying province of a Pan- 
slavist Russia, and a Serbian port as an available naval 
base for the same power. 

The powers made their decision respecting Albania in 
compliance with the wishes of Austria-Hungary. But it 
was a weighty task to restrain the impetuous Serbians in 
their eager course; and it was probably due to the urgent 
representations of Russia in the cause of concord that her 
Slav protege sorrowfully renounced the most coveted goal 
of her exertions. Eventually the powers confirmed the 
occupation of the eastern part of Albania by Serbia and 
Greece, limiting the new principality to the western part of 
the country, which faces the Adriatic Sea. 

The great obstacle to the conclusion of peace between the 
Turks and allies was the determination of the former not 
to give up Adrianople, a place which was hallowed by Otto- 
man traditions of peculiar sanctity, and was regarded as 
strategically indispensable for the defense of Constantinople. 
It is necessary to point out that, although the Turks had 
everywhere been defeated in the open, their three principal 
strongholds in Europe, Adrianople, Yanina, and Scutari, 
had not fallen. Besides, their forces before Constantinople 
had been constantly strengthened by reinforcements from 


Asia. Accordingly, when Kiamil Pasha was about to yield 
to the demands of the allies, Enver Bey and his companions 
of the war party forced their way into the council chamber, 
and compelled Kiamil Pasha to sign his resignation, January 
23. During this violent incident, Nazim Pasha, the unfor- 
tunate commander-in-chief who had lost the battles at Kirk 
Kilisse and Lule Burgas, was killed. Mohammed Shevket 
Pasha, who became Grand Vizier, will be recalled as the 
general who put down the counter-revolution in 1909. He 
was probably the most able and trustworthy statesman in 
the empire, though of Arabic, not Turkish, nationality. 

As a consequence of the sudden turn of affairs at Con- 
stantinople, the peace convention in London dissolved, 
February 1, hostilities were at once resumed; but Yanina 
surrendered to the Greeks, March 9, and Adrlanople to 
the Bulgarians, March 28. The Montenegrins had been be- 
sieging Scutari since the early part of the war. The second 
armistice between the other combatants, April 20, did not 
check the operations before Scutari. At the demand of 
Austria-Hungary, the powers had decided that Scutari must 
form part of Albania; and for weeks Scutari and Montenegro 
were the storm center. Europe was kept in a constant state 
of nervous excitement by the obstinate insistence of Austria- 
Hungary, and the inflexible perseverance with which the 
Montenegrins pressed the siege. The average observer of 
events might have felt that after the collapse of several 
unreasonable expectations, Austria-Hungary had seized 
upon the case of Scutari in a spirit of irritated perversity, 
determined to win her point, as a satisfaction to disap- 
pointed pride. It is true that Scutari is the only city worthy 
the title within the proposed boundaries of Albania. It is 
the center, moreover, of the Roman Catholic tribes of 
northern Albania, who were under the protection of Austria- 
Hungary. Austria protested emphatically that Albania was 

186 The Great War 

impossible without Scutari; but experience has yet to prove 
that Albania is a possibility with Scutari. 

The Great Powers invited Montenegro to desist from 
besieging Scutari, on April 1, since its capture could bring 
them no profit. But Montenegro continued to besiege 
Scutari in open defiance of the Great Powers, although an 
International squadron proceeded to blockade the two 
villages of Montenegro's sea-board. Finally, Essad Pasha, 
the commander in Scutari, signed the capitulation, April 22, 
and, eager to exchange the role of Turkish general for that 
of prince of Albania, he Issued a proclamation of Albanian 
independence a few days later. 

But King Nicholas of Montenegro, assured, no doubt, by 
Russia, that the situation permitted no alternative, sub- 
mitted to the most painful renunciation which his people 
has ever endured. The possession of Scutari had been a 
hereditary aspiration of the Black Mountain folk, to which 
they had devoted superhuman exertions during the war 
that was just closing. On May 5, the king sent a telegram 
to Sir Edward Grey, placing Scutari In the hands of the 
powers. With sullen resentment in their hearts, the Monte- 
negrin forces withdrew from Scutari, nourishing a feeling of 
intensified bitterness against the harsh Hapsburg neighbor. 

The disagreement between the Balkan allies regarding the 
new boundaries pressed closely upon the heels of the events 
which have been described, keeping the diplomacy of Europe 
constantly distracted. A Greco-Bulgarlan boundary com- 
mission separated, May 9, after having deliberated for two 
months, unable to arrive at any agreement, and the negoti- 
ations between Serbia and Bulgaria were equally unsuccess- 
ful. The basis of the controversy was substantially the 
demand of Bulgaria that the new boundaries should be 
adjusted in harmony with the agreement of 1912, without 
any modification of it to compensate Serbia and Greece for 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 187 

the exclusion of the territory of Albania from their portions. 

A second Balkan peace conference assembled in London, 
May 20, at the initiative of Sir Edward Grey, for the arduous 
purpose of reducing to peaceful equilibrium by calm, dis- 
passionate deliberation the turmoil of conflicting hopes and 
ambitions. This conference accomplished nothing that was 
permanent, although it seemed a substantial achievement 
when a treaty was signed between Turkey and the Balkan 
states. May 30, which established the so-called Enos-Midia 
boundary-line for European Turkey, leaving Adrianople in 
the possession of Bulgaria. But the situation between the 
allies themselves rapidly grew more threatening, and the 
conference separated, June 9, helpless to check the coming 

An urgent telegram from the Tsar, who had been consti- 
tuted mediator by the treaty of alliance, deprecating the 
fratricidal war that impended was of no avail. The in- 
sistent demand of Roumania for a further rectification of her 
boundary with Bulgaria (she had already received Silistria) 
introduced a new element into the situation. With head- 
strong pertinacity, Bulgaria persevered in a haughty, un- 
compromising attitude, and even took the offensive against 
Greece and Serbia, June 30. But Roumania intervened, 
July 9, and Bulgaria could not detach any of her forces to 
resist the advance of the Roumanian army. The Turks 
seized the opportunity to resume hostile activity, and, under 
the leadership of Enver Pasha, they reoccupied Adrianople, , 
July 31. The essential feature of the second Balkan War 
was the disastrous course of Bulgarian operations, and the 
rapid collapse of her military power. The Bulgarians were 
forced to ask for an armistice, July 31, and delegates from 
the belligerent states immediately assembled at Bucharest, 
where a treaty of peace was signed, August 10. The 
changes in area and population brought about by the two 

188 The Great War 

wars, as sanctioned by the Treaty of Bucharest, may be 
briefly tabulated, as follows : 

Before Balkan Wars By Treaty of Bucharest 

- Area in „ , . Area in „ , . 

St"" sq. miles PoP^l^'O-i sq. miles P°Pulation 

Turkey in Europe. . 65,350 6,130,200 10,882 1,891,000 
Greece 25,014 2,975,953 41,933 4,363,000 


Montenegro 3,474 250,000 5,603 516,000 

Serbia 18,650 2,911,701 33,891 4,547,992 

Bulgaria 33,647 4,337,516 43,305 4,752,000 

Roumania 50,720 7,230,418 53,489 7,516,418 

Albania 11,000 825,000 

Note: The populations before the wars are taken from the most recent census in 
each country. 

An agreement was concluded between Bulgaria and the 
Ottoman Empire, September 18, which altered the "Enos- 
Midia" boundary in such a way as to secure for the Turks 
about one hundred square miles of additional territory in 
Europe, including the much-disputed Adrianople. 

An international commission of control for Albania was 
set up by the powers. It assembled at Valona the end of 
September, and selected William Frederick Henry, Prince of 
Wied, as ruler of the new principality of Albania, November 
23, 1913. 

To fully appreciate the significance of the vicissitudes of 
power in the Balkans, we must observe once more the natural 
trade-routes. In connection with the Danube, it is impor- 
tant to note that its upper course is united with the Main 
and Rhine, and the other important waterways of Germany, 
by means of canals, so that it affords the cheapest means of 
transportation from the great industrial centers, as West- 
phalia, to the Black Sea, and thence by the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles to the Aegean Sea. But nature has prepared 
an alternative for the lower Danube, a quite direct route 

< :: 

ON IN THE Balkans 189 

from a point just below Belgrade along the valleys of the 
Morava and Vardar Rivers to Salonica, and a railway 
follows this natural highway. Moreover, a natural route 
proceeds from Sarajevo in Bosnia in a southeasterly direction 
to Uskub, where it joins the Vardar route. The Austro- 
Hungarian government had demanded a concession for a 
railway line along this route a short time before the Young 
Turkish revolution in the Ottoman Empire. These two 
routes from the north, traversing Serbia and Bosnia respec- 
tively, explain the great importance of Salonica. 

Austria-Hungary had imposed her will upon the counsels 
of the powers throughout the Balkan conflicts in the specific 
cases where she considered that her vital interests were 
affected, and had frustrated the most cherished designs of 
the neighboring Slavic states. Yet the crisis left her dis- 
pirited and humiliated, with diminished prestige and 
security; and as an added aggravation, she had no rational, 
concrete grounds for complaint. She had advocated osten- 
sibly the doctrine of the "Balkans for the Balkans," asserting 
that the Balkan states should be left to settle their own 
destiny. This they had presumably accomplished by appeal- 
ing to the verdict of the sword, and with results which were 
satisfactory to the majority of them, at least. Let us 
regard the situation in detail from the Austro-Hungarian 
point of view. Serbia and Montenegro had absorbed the 
sanjak of Novi-Bazar and brought their boundaries to- 
gether. They were, henceforth, virtually a single state as 
regards their foreign relations, and were naturally animated 
with a sentiment of great bitterness towards Austria- 
Hungary. They lay athwart the roads to Salonica, abruptly 
shutting ofF the enticing prospect of Macedonia and an 
outlet onto the Aegean. Moreover, the practical union 
with Montenegro might compensate Serbia for her exclu- 
sion from a doorway to the sea in Albania. For in one of 

190 The Great War 

Montenegro's sea-port villages, Serbia's future emporium 
and naval base might conceivably be created. Austria- 
Hungary had mortally offended her neighbors, and gratu- 
itously too, which is surely a very unsagacious policy. Then, 
the defection of Roumania must be recorded, in associating 
herself with the unfriendly states for the spoliation of 
Bulgaria, who was regarded as almost an ally by the Dual 
Monarchy. In short, a combination of powers, Roumania, 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece, whose policy was incom- 
patible with friendship for Austria-Hungary, was supreme 
in the Balkan peninsula, and Bulgaria and Turkey were 
apparently out of account. 

It was immediately rumored that Austria-Hungary would 
demand the submission of the Treaty of Bucharest to a 
revision by the Great Powers on the ground that it did not 
provide a stable equilibrium, and, therefore, did not offer 
guarantees for permanent peace in the Balkans. It has 
since been shown, that on August 9, Austria-Hungary in- 
formed Italy of her intention of delivering an ultimatum to 
Serbia substantially identical with the memorable message 
actually despatched nearly one year later. Austria- 
Hungary regarded the proposed step as virtually a defen- 
sive measure, which would, therefore, involve Italy's obli- 
gation to render assistance; but Giolitti, whowas at that time 
prime minister of Italy did not view the proposal in the same 
light. Austria-Hungary undoubtedly approached her greater 
ally with this same proposition, and it was doubtless the 
pacific attitude of the Kaiser's government which put off 
the outbreak of the world-war for another year. 

We must never lose sight of Germany's economic interest 
in the Ottoman Empire in its relation to the political situa- 
tion. Serbia alone stood between the Teutonic empires and 
a continuous field for unlimited commercial and financial 
expansion in friendly or economically tributary countries 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 191 

traversed by the Oriental, Anatolian, and Bagdad Railways. 
This view is strikingly illustrated by an article in the 
Frankfurt Gazette, January 7, 1914, as the following extracts 
will show: 

"The states lying between the eastern border of Hungary 
and Asia Minor have indeed no choice; they must be the 
friends and allies of the Triple Alliance, or they must reckon 
with the unflinching hostility of the Triple Alliance in any 

conflict which threatens their independence 

Austria too has no choice. Either the countries on the 
Lower Danube must be her friends or she must exterminate 

them When Bismarck said that the whole Balkan 

peninsula was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian 
grenadier, he could not have foreseen that this territory 
would one day become so essential a route for German 
imports that we should not, if necessary, shrink from a con- 
flict with Russia to maintain our freedom of trade there." 

But the disasters of the German-trained Turkish armies 
had lowered Germany's military prestige, and the results of 
the Balkan conflicts profoundly disturbed the military cal- 
culations of both the Teutonic powers. Intimate relations 
with Turkey had been the essential feature of Germany's 
policy in the Near East. Roumania had been regarded as 
a natural ally on account of her resentment for the loss of 
Bessarabia to Russia, and Bulgaria's friendship seemed to 
be assured by the bonds of self-interest. The friendly 
elements in the Balkan peninsula had apparently more 
than counterbalanced the forces of possibly hostile states, 
so that, in the event of a European war, Austria-Hungary 
would have been able to employ almost all her military 
forces against Russia. Thus the military situation made 
the Triple Alliance, and more particularly the Teutonic 
powers, seem quite secure until the eve of the collapse of 
Turkish power in Europe. Now, however, Turkey was 

192 The Great War 

apparently overwhelmed, Bulgaria was prostrate, and 
Roumanla's conduct permitted no hopes of friendly co- 

It was plain that for Germany to retain the same favor- 
able situation of military security, a material increase in her 
military establishment would be necessary. 

The text of a proposed new army bill was first published 
March 28, 1913, and it called for an increase of 4,000 officers, 
15,000 non-commissioned officers, and 117,000 corporals and 
privates, and 27,000 horses in the standing army, which 
would bring the aggregate forces on a peace footing up to 
870,000 men. There had been 280,000 annual recruits up 
to this time; henceforth there would be 340,000. One note- 
worthy feature of the new bill was its aviation section, pro- 
viding for a station for air-ships and two squadrons of four 
air-ships each, together with one headquarters and six sub- 
sidiary stations for a total of fifty aeroplanes. In all, 1542 
men would be attached to this branch of the service. 

This vast addition to the strength of the army would 
involve a corresponding increase of about 345,000,000 in the 
annually recurring expenses, whilst a non-recurring expen- 
diture of about 3252,000,000 would be required for the 
requisite barracks and material. Accordingly, a finance bill 
accompanied the measure for augmenting the army, provid- 
ing a special tax on all private fortunes from a minimum 
valuation of 30,000 marks (about 37200), the rate increasing 
gradually to 13^%, and a tax on all incomes from 5000 marks 
(about 31200) which are not derived from property which 
would be subject to the tax on capital, the rate increasing 
gradually from 1% to 8%. These extraordinary taxes, 
called the Wehrheitrag, or contribution for defense, were to 
be paid in three equal, annual instalments. 

In his speech justifying these measures before the Reichs- 
tag, the Chancellor explained that events in the Balkans had 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 193 

shifted the balance of power so that in the event of war 
Germany might have to protect herself against several 
enemies on extensive frontiers poorly defended by nature. 
He thought that there would probably be no European war 
in which Germany would not be involved, and it would be 
a struggle for existence. No great power desired war; but 
nobody could be sure that it would not break out at any 
time; for the moderation and feeling of responsibility of the 
powers had alone prevented the strained relations between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia from developing into war. 
Germany enjoyed very friendly relations with Russia, and 
antagonism was not likely to arise of itself in her relations 
with her great Slav neighbor. But the Panslavist move- 
ment had received a powerful stimulus from the victories of 
the Slavs in the Balkans, and they had to consider this In 
planning for the future. The Influence of public opinion in 
determining the policy of nations had increased very much, 
and often a minority element was the most violent and 
obtrusive. But many of the quieter elements in France 
believed that their army was equal or superior to the 
German, and based hopes on their alliance with Russia, 
and perhaps the entente with England. Russia, moreover, 
was reorganizing her military establishment on an unpar- 
alleled scale. 

The army and finance bills were Introduced into the 
Reichstag, April 7, and passed their third reading together, 
June 30. It is a significant fact that only Poles and Social- 
ists voted against the army bill, and even some of the 
Socialists voted for the finance bill, approving the property 
tax on principle. 

In view of the alacrity with which this unforeseen and 
heavy burden was accepted, one Is at a loss whether to 
marvel most at the spirit of unity animating, in this supposed 
situation of great national necessity, the upper and middle 

194 The Great War 

classes in Germany, or at the dexterity with which the 
government manipulates the parties and controls important 
influences moulding public opinion. It is probably safe to 
say that a military measure involving such sacrifices could 
not have been passed in any other constitutional country in 
the world without the incentive of a more imminent, or 
visible, danger. 

It is true that equally radical proposals were immediately 
suggested in France, but solely as a consequence of these 
extraordinary German measures. The feeling was expressed 
quite generally in France that the security of the country 
was menaced by the sudden increase of the German military 
establishment, and that they must return to the term of 
military service for three years to counter-balance the very 
great element of German military superiority due to the 
greater population of the Teutonic empire. There was a 
rupture in the ranks of the Radicals on the question of the 
period of service. The Briand ministry was defeated, and 
M. Barthou was entrusted with the formation of a new 
cabinet, to which three Radical Socialists were called. The 
bill raising the term of service to three years passed the 
Chamber, July 19, in spite of determined resistance. 

On account of the extraordinary military expenses in- 
volved in the operations carried on in Morocco and in the 
installation of the additional class in the army, the govern- 
ment found it necessary to raise 1,300,000,000 francs 
(3247,000,000) by a loan; but they were defeated in the 
Chamber on a matter of detail in connection with this 
financial scheme, and resigned, December 2, 1913. 

To appreciate fully the meaning of the Balkan conflicts 
for Russia, we must regard her diplomatic situation from a 
broader point of view. The agreement of Russia and 
Austria-Hungary on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877-8 relative to compensation for the Dual Monarchy 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 195 

has been interpreted as a virtual recognition by both parties 
of the existence of distinct Austrian and Russian spheres of 
interest in the Balkan peninsula, the former in the west, 
the latter in the east. But the action of the Teutonic 
powers in exercising influence eastward of the supposed 
line of division had long since made this agreement obsolete, 
if it had ever really existed. Each power, or group of 
powers, doubtless regarded the Balkan peninsula as an un- 
restricted field for diplomatic maneuvers, while the influence 
of events in raising or depressing the prestige of different 
powers was effective in all parts of the peninsula alike. 

The vigorous prosecution of her policy in the Far East 
diverted Russia's attention in large measure from the 
Balkan peninsula for many years. But not long after the 
termination of the Russo-Japanese War, a change in the 
direction of Russian policy set in. On July 30, 1907, a 
convention establishing complete concord between Russia 
and Japan was signed at St. Petersburg. In commenting 
upon some speeches of Prince von Biilow about this time, 
the Nevoye Vremya, an influential St. Petersburg paper, 
said that the "international ill-feeling towards Germany is 
explained, not by the envy of her neighbors, but by concrete 

facts the unbroken record of German aggressiveness 

in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Under the mask of traditional 
friendship towards Russia, Teutonic statesmen incited the 
diplomatic novices, in whose hands the fate of our country 
was placed, to pursue a policy of enmity towards our Asiatic 
neighbors. The victor in the Russo-Japanese War proved 
once more to be Germany, who levied an indemnity on us 
in the form of a ruinous commercial treaty. It is this 
method of action that accounts for the moral isolation in 
which Germany finds herself." 

Whatever measure of truth there is at the basis of this 
opinion, the fact of greatest significance is its acceptance 

196 The Great War 

and repetition by intelligent persons in Russia, creating an 
atmosphere of distrust, and a presumption of duplicity in 
considering Germany's conduct. Russia could now devote 
more attention to her very important interests in the 
Balkans. But the next year occurred Austria's high- 
handed annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina without the 
previous authority of the signatory powers of the Treaty of 
Berlin. Russia's military and economic situation at the 
time probably did not permit her to adopt a determined 
attitude, and her prestige In the Balkans must have suffered 
a reverse in consequence. Russia could scarcely forget or 
forgive this humiliation. It was followed by a rapid devel- 
opment of her military and naval preparations. The in- 
fluence of Russia was undoubtedly felt In the Balkans 
during the conflicts in 1912 and 1913. Russian diplomacy 
probably encouraged the formation of the league of the 
Balkan states. But, on the other hand, Russian diplomacy 
had receded before the danger of war, and permitted Serbia 
and Montenegro to be deprived of the most desirable fruits 
of their victories. The result was, that another diplomatic 
repulse in the Balkan peninsula would probably have de- 
stroyed Russia's prestige entirely and endangered those vital 
interests which we have already described. 

Serbia had formally renounced her aspirations for a com- 
prehensive national unity Involving the Incorporation of 
territories under the Hapsburg rule. But she could not so 
easily banish her disappointment. The victories in the 
Balkan Wars reanimated her hopes, and although Austria- 
Hungary again interposed limitations to her expansion, the 
dream of the Greater Serbia seemed to have been brought 
much nearer to realization, and undoubtedly patriotic 
societies, stimulated by hatred, carried on with Increased 
ardor an annoying, and perhaps dangerous, agitation in the 
adjacent Austro-Hungarlan territory. Let us consider a 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 197 

little more closely the area upon which the Great Serbian 
structure was to be erected. If we run our eye westward 
from Roumania and Bulgaria upon the map, we notice in 
succession, Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia and Dalmatia, all in- 
habited by people of similar stock, the Serbo-Croats. The 
Great Serbian aspirations would virtually be confined to 
these regions, to which, therefore, we may restrict our atten- 
tion in endeavoring to estimate the danger involved for the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 

The most striking events were taking place in Croatia. 
Croatia's political situation, with its subordinate diet or 
parliament, in relation to the Kingdom of Hungary might 
be compared with that of Ireland, as estabhshed by the 
Home Rule Bill, to the United Kingdom. The Croatian 
diet sends a delegation of forty representatives to the 
Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, and three to the Chamber 
of Magnates. The supreme importance of Croatia for 
Hungary consists in the fact that only through the dependent 
Croatian territory does Hungary enjoy uninterrupted com- 
munication with the sea. 

We have remarked that Croatia escaped largely the pro- 
cess of Magyarization as applied extensively in the Hungarian 
dominions; but this is true only in a relative sense. For the 
spirit of opposition in Croatia developed chiefly out of com- 
plaints of attempted Magyarization. The governor of 
Croatia is called the Ban, and owes his appointment to the 
Hungarian Crown. The year 1903 was a turning point in 
Croat politics. Until then the government was usually suc- 
cessful in carrying out a policy prescribed in Budapest 
thanks to the limited suffrage and large proportion of official 
employes among the electors. Besides, the party which 
upheld nationalistic Croat aspirations did not cooperate 
with the Serbs. But in that year a coalition was organized, 
that is, one which represented the common sentiments and 

198 The Great War 

ideals of both the Croats and Serbs. This party very soon 
secured the passage of a law enlarging greatly the basis of 
suffrage, and in this way they assured for themselves an 
overwhelming majority in the diet. The government was 
powerless to effect anything against them by the regular 
constitutional means. 

In March, 1908, the prosecution of fifty-three persons for 
high treason was commenced before a court in Agram, the 
capital of Croatia. They were charged with participation 
in a movement for separating Croatia, Slavonia, and Bosnia 
from Austria-Hungary and uniting them with Serbia. This 
trial, rendered famous by its political character, and the 
notably irregular character of the proceedings, continued 
until October 5, when thirty-one of the defendants were 
sentenced to various terms of penal servitude. They 
appealed against this verdict. It has been asserted that 
these proceedings were instigated by certain members of 
the government to make the contemplated annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina appear more reasonable. 

In December of the same year. Dr. Friedjung, a historian 
and friend of Count Aehrenthal, in an article in the Neue 
Freie Presse of Vienna, accused the Serbo-Croat coalition 
deputies in the Croatian diet of conspiring with Serbia. 
Thereupon the forty-nine deputies brought action for libel; 
and it was proved in the course of the trial that Dr. Fried- 
jung's evidence, which had been suppHed by the foreign 
ofiice, was made up of forgeries. 

Finally, in November, 1910, the appellate court reversed 
the treason verdict in Agram, and released the thirty-one 
prisoners who had been convicted in October, 1908. The 
higher court discovered that the court which had condemned 
them had made no effort to test the authenticity of the 

Discouraged at the apparently hopeless majority of the 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 199 

coalition in the election of January, 1912, the Ban then in 
office resigned, and M. de Tchuvaj was appointed to succeed 
him. He adopted a very drastic course, precipitating a con- 
stitutional crisis by dissolving the new diet before it had 
assembled, January 28. It appears that the newly-chosen 
deputies intended to pass a law of separation from the King- 
dom of Hungary, and that one of them sent an address to the 
emperor, and to the heir presumptive. Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand, advocating a union of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, and Dalmatia to form a Slav kingdom under 
the House of Hapsburg. The members of the disbanded diet 
protested that the proclamation of dissolution was illegal, 
and the members of the coalition summoned a meeting of 
their partisans in Agram, February 6, for a demonstration in 
favor of renouncing the union with Hungary. The govern- 
ment had recourse to extreme measures. A royal rescript 
was published in the Official Gazette at Agram, April 3, con- 
ferring dictatorial authority upon Tchuvaj, who issued a 
proclamation the same day announcing the suspension of the 
Croatian constitution. At the same time the censorship of 
the press was estabhshed, and the right of assembly curtailed. 
These measures provoked intense indignation in Croatia, and 
societies were formed throughout the country to carry on 
the nationalist Croat propaganda. A student shot at 
Tchuvaj as he was passing in an automobile in Agram, 
June 8, but missed his aim, killing instead the director of 
education who was riding with the Ban. 

The agitation in Croatia extended to Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, where Hungarian flags were burned as a demonstra- 
tion of sympathy for the Croats. These provinces had 
received a considerable measure of autonomy, February 17, 
1910, with a diet meeting at Sarajevo. The military com- 
mandant acts as head of the civil administration, under the 
ultimate authority of the Austro-Hungarian minister of 

200 The Great War 

finance. The diet passed a resolution of sympathy for the 
Croats, February 21. Constitutional government was not 
restored to Croatia until late in 1913. 

It was commonly believed that the Archduke Francis 
■Ferdinand favored the establishment of a Slav kingdom 
within the Hapsburg territories, involving the expansion 
of the Dual into a Triple Monarchy, by the admission of 
the new kingdom as a partner on terms of equality with 
Austria and Hungary. A prominent statesman has said 
that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is so necessary as an 
element in the European family of states, that if it did not 
exist, it would be created. But it is true, nevertheless, that 
a profound transformation is necessary before it can dis- 
charge effectively its function of usefulness. For, hereto- 
fore, its political energy has been largely dissipated in inter- 
nal dissensions. This constant discord arises from the 
confinement of the national life of the various peoples 
within an unnatural political framework, from which they 
struggle to release themselves with greater determination 
as the consciousness of nationality grows stronger. There 
is no comprehensive movement tending to dissolve the 
general association of lands and peoples under Hapsburg 
rule. The aim of the most passionate struggles has usually 
been to secure liberation from such a relationship of political 
subordination as the subjection of the Croats to the Hun- 
garians, the existence of which history alone can explain, but 
not justify. The substitution of a federal system of union 
would relax these galling and useless restrictions, and the 
adoption of the plan attributed to Archduke Francis Fer- 
dinand would be the biggest step in the direction of federa- 
tion. But the proposal of a federal union would doubtless 
encounter no less determined opposition at the present time 
than it did in 1861, for the predominant nationalities guard 
jealously their historic rights. Perhaps the only hope of 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 201 

salvation for Austria-Hungary by the introduction of a 
federal system has expired with the murdered Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand. 

A fate as appalling and inexorable as that which appears 
in ancient Greek tragedy has pursued the House of Haps- 
burg in recent times. One by one the supports of the 
family have been stricken down, until the Emperor Francis 
Joseph is left at the age of eighty-four almost alone, at the 
twilight of life, in sorrow and gloom. His brother, Maxi- 
milian, was executed in Mexico, in 1867. His only son, 
Prince Rudolf, took his own life, in 1889. Eight years later, 
his sister-in-law perished in the burning of the Opera 
Comique in Paris. His beautiful wife, the Empress Eliza- 
beth, was assassinated in 1898 by an anarchist. His 
brother, Archduke John, has disappeared from public view. 

The Archduke Francis Ferdinand was son of the Arch- 
duke Carl Louis, a brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph. 
He was born in 1864, and married, in 1900, a very beautiful 
and gifted Bohemian lady of Slavic race, the Countess 
Sophia Chotek, upon whom was subsequently conferred the 
title Duchess of Hohenberg. But Archduke Francis Fer- 
dinand renounced for his children the right of succession to 
the throne because his wife was not of royal descent. Francis 
Ferdinand's vigorous, radical temperament had been the 
cause of anxious misgivings in the Dual Monarchy, where 
it was thought to portend a forceful policy of expansion. 
But a riper age had perhaps brought steadier counsels. 
On the other hand, his customary reserve of manner, passing 
at times into a state of melancholy or morbidness, and his 
association with the leaders of clericalism were regarded by 
some as evidences of a fanatical, or reactionary, disposition. 
The Slav policy, which has been ascribed to him, remains 
the most significant thing about him, and this must have 
been regarded with apprehension in precisely two quarters: 

202 The Great War 

in Serbia, because a contented Slav kingdom in the Hapsburg 
realm would deprive the Greater Serbian hopes of their 
foundation, and in Hungary, because the fulfilment of the 
plan would necessarily deprive the Magyars of their Slav 

The Archduke Francis Ferdinand left Vienna, June 23, 
1914, to attend the military maneuvers in the province of 
Bosnia, as commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian 
armies. On Sunday, June 28, accompanied by his wife, the 
Countess of Hohenberg, he paid a visit of ceremony to 
Sarajevo, the seat of the provincial administration. Sarajevo 
lies in a smiling, fertile plain, at the point where the Miljacka 
River emerges from a rugged, mountainous gorge. More 
than a third of the 45,000 inhabitants of Sarajevo are Mo- 
hammedans, and the association of various races in the 
same city, with their sharply contrasted forms of architecture, 
lends a picturesque charm to this meeting place of East and 
West. Sarajevo with its bright, prosperous appearance, its 
attractive streets, its oriental bazaar, and mosques with 
their slender minarets, did not deserve the ineffaceable 
stain of a horrible crime bringing in its train a catastrophe 
which will forever remain proverbial. 

The archduke and duchess narrowly escaped being killed 
by a bomb thrown at their carriage, as they entered the 
town, by a youth, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, who injured thirteen 
bystanders in his murderous attempt. Later in the day they 
were shot by Gavrilo Prinzip with a Browning pistol, as they 
were riding back from a reception at the town hall. The 
crime was evidently the execution of a political conspiracy. 
It was assumed to be an act of revenge for the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, a step which 
Francis Ferdinand had heartily advocated. But it was also 
conceivable that the dominant motive of the conspirators 
was to prevent the fulfilment of the cherished projects 

Unavoidable Collision in the Balkans 203 

popularly ascribed to the archduke. The complicity, or 
instigation, of one of the Serbian secret societies for political 
propaganda and terrorism was suspected at once. 

For nearly a month the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian 
government were shrouded in impenetrable obscurity, 
although it was known that a court-martial at Sarajevo 
proceeded to the examination of Gavrilo Prinzip and twenty- 
one fellow conspirators. It was a period of ominous calm, 
of hushed excitement. All sorts of rumors were afloat. It 
was even whispered in Vienna that the awful murder had 
been instigated in Hungarian circles. 

At length, like a thunderbolt from a clear sky, came the 
ultimatum of the Dual Monarchy to Serbia, July 23, de- 
manding a satisfactory answer within forty-eight hours, 
which was practically an indictment of the whole Serbian 
nation for complicity before the fact, so far-reaching and 
peremptory in its character, as to reveal a deliberate inten- 
tion of forcing war. 


Fruitless Attempts to Localize the Conflict 

Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia. The extent of the Pan-Serbian danger 
to the Dual Monarchy. Motives of Austria-Hungary and attitude of 
Germany. The German communication to the powers defining her posi- 
tion; German view as to localizing the controversy. Russia's attitude. 
Count Berchtold denied that Austria-Hungary intended to annex Serbian 
territory. Sir E. Grey on the Austro-Serbian conflict. The request for an 
extension of the time limit for Serbia's reply. Sir E. Grey's idea of media- 
tion by four powers. Reception of the Austro-Hungarlan note in Serbia. 
Serbia's reply, July 25, and Austria-Hungary's objections to it. Rupture 
of diplomatic relations between Vienna and Belgrade. Sir E. Grey's 
proposal for an ambassadors' conference. Italy and France accepted it, 
Germany refused. Kaiser's return from Norway, July 26. Austro- 
Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia; and German imperial govern- 
ment's message to the German states, July 28. The Kaiser's exchange of 
telegrams with the Tsar. Russian partial mobilization. Russian formulas 
for an agreement with Austria-Hungary. Russian general mobilization. 
German ultimatum to Russia. German declaration of war against Russia, 
August 1. Germany demands statement of French attitude; declaration of 
war against France, August 3. The Kaiser's activity as mediator. Did 
Austria-Hungary adopt a conciliatory attitude at the last moment.' 

Austria-Hungary regarded the consequences of the second 
Balkan War and the resulting elation of the Serbs as a con- 
stant menace. She had undoubtedly been observing the 
conduct of Serbia very closely since the Treaty of Bucharest; 
and any reckless or imprudent step on the part of the Slav 
neighbor, which could in any way be interpreted as a provo- 
cation, was certain to lead to Austrian intervention. Assum- 
ing that active measures to repress the spirit of the Serbs was 
desired by a large and influential element in Austria-Hungary 
— and of the truth of this conjecture there appears to be 
little doubt — we may conclude that the deplorable crime of 
Sarajevo played directly into the hands of this more energetic 
party. Public sentiment generally was favorable to Austria- 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 205 

Hungary. The affliction of the aged emperor excited uni- 
versal sympathy. The powers were prepared to uphold 
Austria-Hungary in any reasonable steps which she might 
consider it necessary to take for protecting herself against 
similar outrages. It was to be assumed that the sentiment 
of monarchical solidarity would assure the unhesitating 
support of William H of Germany, who had been unwilling 
to support Austria-Hungary in extreme measures the year 

The Austro-Hungarian foreign office studied the situation 
deliberately. The view was expressed up to the last, by 
those who shared in its counsels, that there was no reason to 
anticipate a serious turn in affairs. Apprehension was 
quieted to such a degree that the British and Russian am- 
bassadors were absent from Vienna and Berlin at the time 
when the Austro-Hungarian note was finally presented to 

In the mean time the findings of the criminal investigation 
in Sarajevo pointed to the powerful Pan-Serbian society 
Narodna Odbrana as the instigator of the crime, and impli- 
cated persons in high places in Serbia. Serbia's record was 
such as to afford basis for a presumption in support of the 
charges which Austria-Hungary brought against her. Her 
annals contain many regicides. The most recent was the 
assassination of King Alexander, whose policy had been 
favorable to Austrian interests, together with his queen, 
Draga, by a party of officers, in 1903, a crime that was, 
hideous in its details. Thus the present King of Serbia, 
Peter Karageorgevitch, owes his throne to political murder. 

On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that 
the assassin of Sarajevo and his two chief fellow-conspirators, 
all youths under twenty years of age, were Austro-Hungarian 
subjects. Another circumstance of importance in forming a 
judgment of Serbia's position: six days before the crime was 

206 The Great War 

committed, the Serbian minister in Vienna warned the 
Austrian government that the archduke's visit to Bosnia 
would be perilous on account of the probable existence of a 
plot against his life. Austria-Hungary demanded that 
Serbia accept the findings of the Sarajevo investigation, 
and in consequence adopt proposals which seemed to threaten 
her independence, without an opportunity of examining the 
evidence. But was the record of Austro-Hungarian juris- 
diction in cases involving political questions a guarantee for 
absolute confidence in the soundness of the results of the 
Sarajevo investigation ? It could scarcely be maintained that 
it was such a guarantee. A consideration of the character of 
the Agram and Friedjung trials tends to justify Serbia's 
hesitation in accepting without independent enquiry the 
conclusions reached by the Sarajevo court. 

The note began by reminding the Serbian government of 
the declaration made through its minister in Vienna, March 
31, 1909, that Serbia would conform to the decision of the 
powers relative to Bosnia, cease her attitude of protest and 
resistance, change the direction of her policy towards 
Austria-Hungary, and live in future on good neighborly 
terms with the latter. The Austro-Hungarian government 
affirmed that instead of fulfilling these promises Serbia had 
done nothing to suppress a movement aiming to detach 
certain territories from Austria-Hungary, which found ex- 
pression beyond the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia in a 
series of outrages culminating in the horrible crime at 
Sarajevo, June 28. The participation of Serbian officers 
and officials in the intrigues of the societies which directed 
their agitation against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
the violence of the Serbian press, and the unwholesome 
propaganda in education were proof of the culpable toler- 
ance of the Serbian government. The evidence and con- 
fessions of the perpetrators of the outrage of June 28 in- 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 207 

dicated that the murder was planned In Belgrade, that the 
murderers received their arms and explosives from Serbian 
officers and officials, and that their passage across the 
boundary was facilitated by the Serbian frontier service. 
The Austro-Hungarlan government felt bound to put an 
end to these menacing intrigues, and for this purpose they 
demanded that the following denunciation of the subver- 
sive agitation be published by the Serbian government In 
its Official Journal for July 26: 

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propa- 
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that Is to say, the 
general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and 
they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these 
criminal proceedings. 

"The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and 
functionaries have participated in the above-mentioned 
propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly 
relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly 
pledged by Its declaration of March 31, 1909. 

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudi- 
ates all Idea of interfering or attempting to Interfere with 
the destinies of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, 
considers it its duty formally to warn officers and function- 
aries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that hence- 
forward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons 
who may be guilty of such machinations, which it shall use 
all its efforts to anticipate and suppress." 

"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated 
to the Royal Army as an order of the day by His Majesty 
the King and shall be published In the Official Bulletin of 
the army. 

"The Royal Serbian Government further undertakes: 

1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, 

208 The Great War 

and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
whose general tendency is directed against the latter's 
territorial integrity. 

2. "To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society 
Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate its entire means of propa- 
ganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other 
societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves 
with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal 
Government will take the necessary measures so that the 
dissolved societies may not continue their activities under 
another name or in another form. 

3. "To eliminate without delay from the public instruc- 
tion in Serbia, both as regards the corps of instructors and 
the means of instruction, that which serves, or may serve, 
to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 

4. "To remove from military service and the administra- 
tion in general all officers and officials who are guilty of 
propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, 
with a communication of the material which the Imperial 
and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial 
and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate 
to the Royal (Serbian) Government. 

5. "To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial 
and Royal Government cooperate in the suppression of a 
movement directed against the territorial integrity of the 

6. "To commence a judicial investigation against the 
participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on 
Serbian territory. Officials delegated by the Imperial and 
Royal Government will participate in the examinations. 

7. "To proceed at once to arrest Major Voija Tankosic 
and a certain Milan Ciganovic, a Servian state employe, who 
have been compromised by the results of the investigation 
at Sarajevo. 

- : •.*- ' _^<! M ' 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 209 

8. "To prevent through eflFectlve measures the participa- 
tion of the Serbian authorities in the smuggHng of arms and 
explosives across the frontier, and to dismiss those officials 
of Shabatz and Loznica, who assisted the perpetrators of the 
crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier. 

9. "To give to the Imperial and Royal Government ex- 
planations in regard to the unjustifiable utterances of high 
Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not 
hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express them- 
selves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria- 
Hungary after the outrage of June 28th. 

10. "The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply 
from the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on 
Saturday evening, July 2Sth. A memorandum dealing with 
the results of the investigation at Sarajevo, so far as they 
concern points 7 and 8, is enclosed with this note." 

The Austro-Hungarian diplomatic representatives in the 
other countries were requested to communicate the contents 
of this note to the powers to which they were individually 
accredited, accompanying them with the following obser- 
vations as further explanation of Austria's action: that 
directly after March 31, 1909, Serbia became a center for 
criminal agitation, that the societies for creating disorders 
in Austria-Hungary included persons in the highest ranks of 
official and unofficial society, that the press made itself a 
serviceable organ for the propaganda, and that since the 
recent Balkan crisis members of bands formerly operating 
in Macedonia had placed their services at the disposal of 
the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and that the 
Serbian government had not taken the slightest step to put 
a stop to all this lawless conduct. 

"The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in 
the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired 
by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian 

210 The Great War 

Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian government would 
end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's 
friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent 
attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Im- 
perial and Royal Government hoped that the Kingdom 
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct 
on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected 
a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, 
when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal 
Government by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, 
made such a considerable aggrandizement of Serbia possible." 

But this benevolent attitude had exercised no restraining 
effect on the conduct of the Kingdom of Serbia, which con- 
tinued to tolerate the propaganda on its territory with the 
fatal consequences of June 28th. Then the Austro-Hun- 
garian government had been compelled to take the present 
urgent step for its own safety. 

An annex attached to the communication stated the con- 
clusions of the criminal enquiry of the court of Sarajevo, 
which were briefly as follows : 

The plot was formed in Belgrade by Gavrilo Prinzip, 
Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, 
with the assistance of Major Voija Tankosic. 

The six bombs from the arms depot of the Servian army 
at Kragujevac and four Browning pistols, with which the 
crime was committed, were delivered by Ciganovic and 
Tankosic to Prinzip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez at Belgrade. 

By a secret system of transport organized by Ciganovic, 
and with the complicity of the frontier officers at Shabatz 
and Loznica, Prinzip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez had been able 
to cross the frontier of Bosnia and smuggle in their contra- 
band of arms. 

Professor Hans Delbriick, who occupies a famous chair of 
history in the University of Berlin, acknowledges that 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 211 

Austria-Hungary demanded conditions which would have 
placed Serbia under her permanent control, and he justifies 
this action on the ground that the Dual Monarchy was 
moved by the instinct of self-preservation. Our judgment 
of the conduct of the Austro-Hungarian government may 
involve, therefore, a consideration of the extent of the peril 
to which the monarchy was exposed by reason of the Greater 
Serbian propaganda. The Serbian societies for agitation 
probably aimed at the detachment of Croatia and Dalmatia 
as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Hapsburg 
realm, and their incorporation with Serbia to form the 
Greater Serbia which was their cherished dream. The con- 
sequent danger is magnified, if we assume that this Greater 
Serbia would be virtually an outlying part of a Pan-Slavist 
Russia. It is doubtful, however, whether a compact state 
of nearly 10,000,000 Serbo-Croats would be any more sub- 
servient to Russia than the 2,000,000 Bulgarians proved 
themselves to be in the 80's of the last century. But on 
the other hand, we must associate in our minds the danger 
arising from the Greater Serbian aspirations with the menace 
of Italian Irredentism. For the fulfilment of both these 
programs would completely absorb the Austro-Hungarian 
seaboard, excluding the Dual Monarchy from access to the 
Adriatic. In fact, in their utmost territorial extension the 
aspirations of the two nationalities may be said to overlap. 
It would, of course, be intolerable for a realm like the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy to be deprived entirely of its coast- 
line, and thus be reduced, in this respect, to the present 
situation of Serbia. That would be destructive of the vital 
interests of the monarchy. 

But the question arises, whether the realization of the 
Greater Serbian ideal with such an extension is possible. 

The imagined function of the present Kingdom of Serbia 
as nucleus for the proposed formation of a very much more 

212 The Great War 

extensive national state has been compared with that of 
Piedmont at the beginning of the movement for Italian 
unity. This comparison has doubtless encouraged the am- 
bitious Serbs. Both movements threatened the integrity 
of the Austrian Empire. But Professor Delbruck points out 
that circumstances are not favorable to a repetition by 
Serbia of the role of Piedmont as leader in a comprehensive 
movement for national unification. For the community of 
national ideals necessary for the creation of a national state 
does not exist among the Serbo-Croats. The two branches 
of this stock hate each other, according to the eminent 
Berlin authority, and the "majority of the Southern Slavs 
do not want to hear anything about Greater Serbia," and 
"unlike the former Lombardo- Venetians, they are true and 
loyal subjects of the House of Hapsburg." This is doubt- 
less true; for we have already observed that the aim of 
Croatian agitation was to set up a new Slavic kingdom 
under the rule of the House of Hapsburg with the intention 
that it should enter as a third member into the political 
partnership of the present Dual Monarchy. Professor 
Delbruck might have added as further evidence for the lack 
of compatibility of the Serbo-Croats the fact that the Serbs 
are mostly adherents of the Eastern Orthodox Church and 
employ the same alphabet as the Russians, while the Croats 
and Dalmatians are Roman Catholics and use the Latin 
alphabet. These two elements of dissimilarity alone would 
be sufficient to render a harmonious national union almost im- 
possible. Such facts limit the practical extent of the Greater 
Serbian agitation, and the consequent danger to the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 
the Serbs constitute the greater part of the population. 
It follows, therefore, that Austria-Hungary really took 
over this problem with the provinces Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. The Greater Serbian movement would probably 

House of Parliament, Vienna. 

Houses of Parliament, Budapest. 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 213 

have resulted, at most, in the detachment of these provinces 
from the Dual Monarchy. This would doubtless have been 
a humiliation, as such losses of territory are commonly 
regarded even to-day in the lives of nations. The real 
character of such an occurrence must be judged by the in- 
clination of the inhabitants. For history offers abundant 
evidence to prove that the retention of unwilling popula- 
tions is not a source of strength. We conclude that the 
Greater Serbian movement would not have imperilled the 
very existence of the monarchy, as has been so often asserted. 
Although the note of the Austro-Hungarian government 
was transmitted to the Serbian government at six o'clock, 
Thursday evening, July 23, it was not until the next day 
that Austria's action, the text of the note, and the explan- 
atory remarks, which have already been mentioned, were 
communicated to the powers. This left a very short time 
for international consultation or for imparting advice to 
Serbia, and it is very likely that this was precisely the 
purpose of the Austro-Hungarian government In making 
the time limit so brief. They doubtless hoped that the 
incisive, peremptory terms would have the effect of bringing 
forth an immediate, and practically complete, rejection of 
the note or else submission to their demands, excluding in 
this way further negotiations and uncertainty. Austria- 
Hungary was determined to make an end once for all of the 
Serbian propaganda and of Serbian opposition to her policy. 
The Austro-Hungarian authorities had probably determined 
that at least an armed demonstration on Serbian territory 
was necessary for the maintenance of their prestige. Popular 
feeling in Austria as well as the calculations of diplomacy 
seem to have anticipated a rejection of the demands of the 
note by Serbia. The British Ambassador in Vienna, in one 
of his despatches says of the note: "Its integral acceptance 
by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on 

214 The Great War 

the following afternoon, it was at first rumored in Vienna 
that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a 
moment of keen disappointment." 

It is scarcely conceivable that Austria-Hungary took this 
momentous action, which would almost certainly involve her 
in hostilities with Serbia, and would at least lead to danger 
of a general European war, without a complete previous 
understanding with Germany as to the nature and means of 
her policy, and special assurance of German solidarity. 
Whether the actual text of the note had been communicated 
to the Foreign Office at Berlin before it was despatched to 
Belgrade is less certain. The German government formally 
disclaimed any previous knowledge of the contents of the 
note; but this statement, if true, is probably true in only a 
strictly literal sense. The German government lost no time, 
directly the note had been transmitted, in giving it their 
hearty endorsement, and in announcing firmly and unequi- 
vocally their attitude with respect to the Austro-Serbian 
quarrel. Even before the note had been sent, on July 22, 
Sir H. Rumbold, British charge d'affaires at Berlin, tele- 
graphed Sir Edward Grey that Herr von Jagow, German 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in alluding to the 
action which Austria was about to take, had "insisted that 
the question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia 
and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference 
from outside in the discussion between these two countries. 
He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro- 
Hungarian government should be approached by the 
German government on the matter " 

Almost simultaneously with the transmission of the 
Austro-Hungarian note, or ultimatum, to Serbia, the 
German Imperial Chancellor sent instructions to the German 
ambassadors at the capitals of the entente powers, indicating 
very clearly the attitude of the German government, and 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 215 

instructing them to communicate it to the governments to 
which each was accredited. This message declared that the 
publications of the Austro-Hungarian government concern- 
ing the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne 
and his consort proved that Belgrade was the center of a 
propaganda for separating the southern Slavic provinces 
from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; that Pan-Serb chau- 
vinism all but precipitated war in 1909; that instead of 
observing the promise of good behavior made at that time, 
the Serbian government had tolerated the agitation, which 
led to the existing crime and permanently threatened the 
safety of Austria-Hungary; and that for these reasons the 
demands of the monarchy were justifiable, and it must 
renounce its position as a great power unless it were prepared 
to enforce them by every means. The communication 
continued : 

"I have the honor to request you to express yourself In the 
sense indicated above to (the present representative of M. 
Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sazonoff) and therewith 
give special emphasis to the view that in this question there 
is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the limitation to which it 
must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure. 
We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict because 
every intercession of another power on account of the 
various treaty-alliances would precipitate Inconceivable 

"I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report 
about the course of your Interview." 

It may be observed that this communication was sent off 
by the German Imperial Chancellor on the 23 rd, although 
the Austro-Hungarian government did not Inform the other 
powers of their action at Belgrade until the next day. It 
was evidently the Intention of the German government that 

216 The Great War 

their very positive representations, backing up the Austrian 
position, should reach the foreign offices of the entente powers 
at just about the same time as the information from Vienna 
regarding the action of the Austro-Hungarian government. 
The German attitude was thus very clearly stated, and 
there is no evidence to prove that it was in any way altered 
during the whole period of negotiation and discussion. 
Germany insisted that the question at issue was one for 
settlement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone, and 
that there should be no interference from outside in the 
discussions between these two countries. Germany assumed 
that Austria-Hungarj^'s promise not to annex any Serbian 
territory was sufficient to put at rest any reasonable motives 
for uneasiness on the part of other powers. It may be 
observed, however, that by crushing Serbia's military power 
of resistance, or imposing an overwhelming war indemnity 
upon her, or by some other form of interference, Austria- 
Hungary might have reduced Serbia to the position of a 
vassal, while all the time ostensibly respecting her integrity 
with the utmost scrupulousness. History offers abundant 
examples of such proceedings. The representations of 
Germany probably aroused, rather than diminished, the 
apprehension of Russia. Once Serbia should begin to move 
as a satellite in the orbit of Austria-Hungary, Russian 
prestige in the Balkans would experience a sudden and fatal 
decline; and it is not inappropriate to mention in this con- 
nection, that Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador 
in London, remarked to Sir Edward Grey that Serbia had 
heretofore been regarded as within the Austrian sphere of 
influence. Germany's frequently repeated desire for a local- 
ization of the quarrel in the interests of peace signified 
nothing more or less than the demand that Austria-Hungary 
should be left to deal with Serbia without interference from 
other powers. 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 217 

Immediately upon receiving information of the Austrian 
action in Belgrade and the German communication relative 
to it, M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, declared 
that Russia could under no circumstances permit the matter 
to be settled alone between the parties directly concerned. 
We need only recall how popular enthusiasm in Russia was 
the decisive factor in causing the Russo-Turkish War in 
1877, and then the nature of the occurrences in the Balkans 
in 1909, and 1912-1913, to appreciate the fact that public 
opinion would undoubtedly be an important factor in Russia 
during this crisis, when it might appear that the independ- 
ence of fellow Slavs was being threatened. The attitude of 
Russia from the first, therefore, was opposed to that of 
Germany. Still Russia's action was unquestionably moder- 
ate, at least at the beginning. M. Sazonoff immediately tele- 
graphed to the Russian charge d'affaires at Vienna instruct- 
ing him to request that the period allowed for the Serbian 
reply should be extended, to give the powers time to study 
the results of the judicial enquiry at Sarajevo, so that they 
could intelligently offer their advice to the Serbian govern- 
ment. Similar communications were likewise despatched 
to Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy, begging them 
to urge an extension of the time limit. Now it will appear 
at each successive stage of the discussions that the conflict 
between the attitude of Germany and Austria and that of 
Russia regarding the extent of the interests involved in the 
Austro-Serbian difficulty is fundamental for all the issues 
arising in the exchange of views by powers. Thus, for 
example, if the Austro-Serbian quarrel concerned only the 
two original parties, Austria was under no obligation to 
give the other powers time to consult; but if it was a ques- 
tion involving general European interests, then the very 
brief time limit was distinctly a slight to the other great 
powers, since it tended to exclude them from participation. 

218 The Great War 

Count Berchtold explained the Austro-Hungarian attitude 
to the Russian charge d'affaires on the 24th, before the latter 
had received any instructions from St. Petersburg. He 
emphasized particularly the assertion that Austria-Hungary 
would lay claim to no Serbian territory, and he declared 
that he had no intention of bringing about a change in the 
balance of power in the Balkans. Austria-Hungar>''s step 
was intended as a definite means for checking the Serbian 
intrigues. Count Berchtold departed for Ischl, the summer 
residence of Emperor Francis Joseph, early on the 25th, 
and his absence from Vienna at this critical period seems 
very noteworthy, at least. On July 25th, the Russian 
charge d'affaires at Berlin reported that Herr von Jagow, 
the Foreign Secretary, was afraid that in the absence of 
Count Berchtold the Russian request for an extension of 
time would produce no results; and the same day, the 
Russian charge daff aires at Vienna telegraphed to Ischl, 
receiving in reply an official refusal of the Russian request. 

Directly after receiving the Austrian and German com- 
munications on the 24th, M. Sazonofi^ had conferred with 
the French and British ambassadors at St. Petersburg, ex- 
pressing the view that Russia could not be indifferent to 
Austria's action in humiliating Serbia. The French ambas- 
sador promised that France would perform her obligations 
as an ally of Russia, and both he and M. Sazonoff urged 
upon Sir G. Buchanan the expediency of a British declara- 
tion of solidarity with France and Russia in this crisis, 
declaring that if Great Britain would be firm, there would be 
no war. On the following day, M. Sazonofi' told Sir G. 
Buchanan that if Serbia should appeal to the powers, Russia 
would be willing to stand aside and leave the question in the 
hands of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. 

When Sir Edward Grey was informed by the Austrian 
ambassador of the contents of the note to Serbia, he ex- 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 219 

claimed that he had never "seen one state address to another 
independent state a document of so formidable a character." 
He thought the acceptance of the fifth demand would hardly 
be consistent with Serbia's independent sovereignty. Sir 
Edward Grey immediately telegraphed to Sir H. Rumbold, 
British charge (Taf aires at Berlin, stating that if the Austrian 
note to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and 
Russia, he had no concern with it, but he was apprehensive 
of the view Russia would take. He went on to say that 
the only chance of a mediating influence being effective 
would consist in the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, 
and Great Britain working together at Vienna and St. 
Petersburg in favor of moderation. Sir H. Rumbold was 
instructed to communicate this to the German Foreign 
Secretary. Likewise Sir Edward Grey instructed the 
British charge d'affaires in Vienna to support the Russian 
request for an extension of the time limit for Serbia's reply 
to the note. Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, promised on July 25, that if relations 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia became more acute, 
he was ready to fall in with Sir E. Grey's suggestion that 
the four powers work together in favor of moderation at 
Vienna and St. Petersburg. At the same time Russia ex- 
pressed her willingness to stand aside and submit the con- 
troversy to the four powers mentioned. Sir Edward Grey 
worked from first to last with the idea in mind of a mediation, 
or conference, of the four powers not directly concerned in 
the original conflict. This policy was suggested by the 
experience of the ambassadors' conferences in London during 
the Balkan crisis the year before, which had undoubtedly 
contributed to the maintenance of the general peace. 

Prime Minister Pashitch was not in Belgrade at the time 
when the Austro-Hungarian note was delivered, July 23. 
He did not return to the capital until the next day, and in 

220 The Great War 

the mean time the minister of finance begged the Russian 
charge d^af aires for assistance. On the 24th, the prince 
regent of Serbia addressed the following telegram to the 

"Yesterday evening the Austro-Hungarian government 
delivered a note to the Serbian government concerning the 
conspiracy at Sarajevo. Appreciating her international 
obligations, Serbia had declared from the first that she 
condemned the horrible crime and that she was ready to 
institute judicial proceedings within her own territory, if 
the complicity of certain of her own subjects should be 
proved in the course of the process conducted by the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities. Nevertheless, the demands con- 
tained in the Austro-Hungarian note are needlessly humiliat- 
ing for Serbia and incompatible with her dignity as an 
independent state. For instance, they demand in a per- 
emptory manner a declaration by our government in the 
Official Bulletin, and an order of the sovereign to the army, 
expressing our intention of repressing the spirit of hostility 
against Austria and alluding to our criminal weakness with 
regard to our perfidious actions. They demand, likewise, 
the introduction of Austro-Hungarian functionaries into 
Serbia to cooperate with our own officials in the investiga- 
tion, and to superintend the execution of the other conditions 
indicated in the note. We are given a space of forty-eight 
hours in which to accept all, and failing this, the Austro- 
Hungarian legation will leave Belgrade. We are ready to 
accept such of the Austro-Hungarian conditions as are com- 
patible with our position as an independent state, together 
with such as Your Majesty shall advise; all persons will be 
severely punished whose participation in the conspiracy will 
be proved. Some of the demands cannot be executed with- 
out changes in our legislation, a proceeding which requires 
more time. The time granted us is too brief. It is possible 

Belgrade, capital of Serbia, from the Hungarian bank of the Danube 

! niKjSjitiii' Sm''"''"';' 

The Roval Palace at Belgrade. 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 221 

that we shall be attacked at the expiration of the time limit 
by the Austro-Hungarian army which is now being con- 
centrated on our frontier. We cannot defend ourselves and 
we beg Your Majesty to grant us your assistance as soon as 
possible " 

On the afternoon of Saturday, July 25, Serbia returned to 
Austria-Hungary a reply, which appeared to all, except the 
Teutonic powers, to be practically an entire acceptance of 
the demands which had been submitted, subject to delays 
necessary for changes in the Serbian constitution and legisla- 
tion, and subject to an explanation by the Austro-Hungarian 
government of the precise intention of the proposal for the 
participation of officials of the Dual Monarchy in the inves- 
tigations In Serbia. It might seem, at least, to have gone 
far enough to form a basis for further negotiation. Sir 
Edward Grey received a draft of it a short time before it 
was transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian government, and 
immediately expressed the hope to Germany that she would 
urge the Austro-Hungarian government to accept It; but 
the Berlin government seems merely to have passed on 
the expression of Sir Edward Grey's hope to the Austro- 
Hungarian government through their ambassador In Vienna 
without added pressure. 

Nothwithstanding the apparently conciliatory character 
of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, the 
Vienna government promptly declared that it was unsatis- 
factory, simply a play for time. One cannot be surprised 
that the Serbian government, when summoned to reply 
within forty-eight hours to a series of demands which 
Austria-Hungary might have been carefully weighing for 
the greater part of a month, may have displayed a tendency 
to gain time for a fuller consideration of these unexpected 
requirements by avoiding too specific acceptance of all the 

222 The Great War 

The following is an abbreviated version of the Serbian 
reply, each part accompanied by a summary of the Austro- 
Hungarian objections : 

Serbia directed attention to the fact that the expressions 
of protest by representatives and members of her govern- 
ment had ceased since she formally renounced her attitude 
of protest in her note to the Austro-Hungarian government, 
March 31, 1909, and that no attempt had been made since 
that time by the Serbian government or its organs to change 
the existing state of political affairs in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. The Serbian reply attested, moreover, that the 
Austrian government had never made any representation on 
the basis of Serbia's agreement, except one concerning a 
school book, and on that occasion the Austro-Hungarian 
government had received an entirely satisfactory explana- 
tion. It was thanks to Serbia's moderation in the Balkan 
crisis that European peace had been preserved. Serbia 
was not responsible for manifestations of a private character, 
as newspaper articles and the activity of societies. The 
Serbian government was "painfully surprised by the asser- 
tions that subjects of Serbia had participated in the prepara- 
tions of the outrage in Sarajevo. The government had 
expected to be invited to cooperate in the investigation of 
all that concerns this crime, and it was ready, in order to 
prove its entirely correct attitude, to proceed against all 
persons in regard to whom it should receive information." 
The Serbian government was ready to hand over for trial 
any Serbian subject of any rank "for whose complicity in 
the crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof." 

The Austro-Hungarian government objected, in connec- 
tion with this portion of Serbia's note of reply, that the 
allusion to her official faultlessness was calculated to obscure 
the real issue, inasmuch as Austria-Hungary had not re- 
monstrated against positive transgressions but against sins 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 223 

of omission, that is, the failure to suppress the agitation 
against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. According to 
the Austro-Hungarian observations on this part of the note, 
not only do the institutions of modern states commonly 
subject the press and societies to state control, but there 
was provision for the exercise of this control in Serbia's legis- 
lation. Furthermore, the Serbian government had been 
informed that suspicion rested on certain individuals within 
its territory, and should have instituted an investigation 

The Serbian government pledged itself to cause to have 
published in the Official Journal, on July 26, a declaration 
which repeated the text dictated by the Austro-Hungarian 
government with some minor alterations, namely, any sub- 
stituted for the {toute for la in the original French text), and 
two interpolations indicated in the following extract by ( ) : 
"The Royal Government of Serbia condemns (the Austrian 
text), any Serbian reply) propaganda (which may be) 
directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the 
general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, 
and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these 
criminal proceedings. The Royal Government regrets that 
Serbian officers and functionaries have participated (accord- 
ing to the communication from the Imperial and Royal 
Government) in the above mentioned propaganda, and thus 
compromised the good neighborly relations to which the 
Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declara- 
tion of March 31, 1909." 

The remainder is identical with the text prescribed by the 
Austro-Hungarian government, as already given on page 207 
except that the words, "The Royal Government," have been 
unintentionally omitted, as it would appear, from the begin- 
ning of the next sentence, a silent testimony, perhaps, to the 

224 The Great War 

conditions of anxious haste under which the Serbian reply 
was prepared. 

Austria-Hungary objected, with reference to Serbia's 
promised official declaration, that the first change was in- 
tended to imply that a propaganda did not exist, and was 
therefore proof of insincerity, as affording the subterfuge 
for later occasions that Serbia had not specifically acknowl- 
edged the existence of the existing propaganda and dis- 
avowed it. Austria-Hungary likewise expressed her dissat- 
isfaction at the insertion of the words "according to the 
communication from the Imperial and Royal Government" 
on the same ground, claiming that they were added merely 
as a trick, to preserve for Serbia a free hand in future. 

1. "To introduce at the first regular convocation of the 
Skupschtina a provision into the press law providing for 
the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or 
contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking 
action against any publication the general tendency of 
which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria- 
Hungary. The Government pledges itself at the approach- 
ing revision of the constitution to cause an amendment to 
be introduced into article 22 of the constitution of such a 
nature that such publications may be confiscated, a proceed- 
ing at present Impossible under the categorical terms of 
article 22 of the constitution." 

Austria-Hungary declared that these proposals were en- 
tirely unsatisfactory and evasive. She had not demanded 
the passage of laws which might never be enforced, but 
Serbia's pledge effectively to suppress intriguing publica- 
tions. Serbia promised to pass a press law permitting the 
government to punish expressions hostile to Austria- 
Hungary, and an amendment to the constitution to authorize 
the government to confiscate such publications; but she 
offered no guarantee that such legislation would be strin- 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 225 

gently enforced, when once it had been duly enacted. 
One naturally wonders, in reading Austria-Hungary's 
objection, whether a literal acceptance of the first demand, 
that is, a solemn promise of the Serbian government to act 
in violation of its own constitution, would have afforded a 
more reliable guarantee of future conduct. Any guarantee 
short of intervention must depend on the promise of the 
Serbian government, and, if the Austro-Hungarian govern- 
ment had no faith in the pledges of the Serbian government, 
was not its own conduct rather disingenuous in demanding 
promises which would not in any case be satisfactory? 

2. "The Government possesses no proof, nor does the 
note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them 
with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar 
societies have committed up to the present any criminal 
act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their mem- 
berSr Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the 
demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will 
dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, and any other society 
which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary." 

Austria-Hungary objected that this was only a half-way 
concession, because they had demanded that Serbia should 
confiscate the means of propangada of these societies, and 
prevent them from reorganizing under other names and 
forms. Serbia's reply was really, therefore, no complete 
guarantee for putting an end to the agitation. 

3. "The Royal Serbian Government undertakes to remove 
without delay from public educational establishments in 
Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal 
Government will furnish it with the facts and proofs of this 

Austria-Hungary remarked that Serbia first demanded 
proofs of a hostile propaganda in the public instruction. 

226 The Great War 

although it must know that the text-books contained objec- 
tionable material, and that a large portion of the teachers 
belonged to the societies for agitation. The Serbian govern- 
ment did not mention the elimination of the hostile element 
from the teaching force. 

4. "The Royal Government also agrees to remove from 
military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry will 
have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity 
of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 
they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to com- 
municate to them at a later date the names and the acts of 
these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings 
which are to be taken against them." 

Austria-Hungary observed that the Serbian government 
made its promise to dismiss officers and functionaries con- 
ditional upon a judicial investigation for establishing their 
guilt in actions against the territorial integrity of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. She asserted, furthermore, that this 
limitation was equivalent to the non-fulfilment of her 
demand, because such officers and functionaries could not 
be condemned by a judicial procedure. Inasmuch as propa- 
ganda is not punishable by law in Serbia. The reply was, 
therefore, elusive. 

But it seems more likely that the introduction by Serbia 
of this limitation in the scope of the concession as required 
by Austria-Hungary was due to a much more cogent motive 
than the intention of eluding the purpose of the demand by 
a mere evasive trick. Austria-Hungary had reserved to 
herself the right to submit the names of those officers and 
functionaries who should be dismissed for complicity in the 
agitation. But this would have made the whole military 
and civil service of Serbia dependent upon the discretion of 
Austria-Hungary, who would have been in a position to 
paralyze the action of the entire administration by causing 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 227 

the elimination of all the most able officers and functionaries 
on the alleged grounds of complicity in the propaganda. 
The reservation by Serbia of the privilege of an investiga- 
tion previous to their dismissal was an indispensable safe- 
guard for her national independence. 

5. "The Royal Government must confess that it does not 
clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made 
by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall 
undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the 
Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but 
they declare that they will admit such collaboration as 
agrees with the principles of international law, with criminal 
procedure, and with good neighborly relations." 

Austria-Hungary objected that this apparent compliance 
was misleading. "The international law, as well as the 
criminal law, has nothing to do with the question; it is 
purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be 
solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved atti- 
tude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible, and on account 
of its vague general form it would lead to unabridgeable 

But it must be observed that the nature of the demand 
itself was vague and general, very likely intentionally so, 
and capable of a very far-reaching application. It might 
conveniently have served as an entering wedge for a per- 
manent Austrian administrative penetration into the affairs 
of Serbia. Here, less than elsewhere, can we be surprised 
at an attitude of reserve on Serbia's part. 

6. "It goes without saying that the Royal Government 
consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such 
persons as are, or eventually might have been, implicated 
in the plot of the 28th of June, and who happen to be within 
the territory of the kingdom. As to the participation in 
this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities 

228 The Great War 

appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal 
Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an 
arrangement, as it would be a violation of the constitution 
and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in con- 
crete cases communications as to the results of the inves- 
tigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian 

The Austro-Hungarian government asserted that in this 
part of the reply the Serbian government was guilty of a 
deliberate misconstruction of the demand. Austria-Hungary 
had demanded that Serbia institute judicial proceedings 
{enqueU judiciaire) at once against the accessories of the 
plot of June 28, and that Austro-Hungarian delegates should 
collaborate in the investigations {recherches) relating thereto; 
in other words, Austro-Hungarian delegates would share in 
the police investigations, but not in the judicial proceedings. 
By the use of the term enquete in both instances it might 
appear that Serbia understood the sense of the demand to be 
that Austro-Hungarian delegates should intervene in the 
judicial proceedings. Therefore, Austria-Hungary declared 
that Serbia was trying to justify her refusal by making the 
demands seem impossible. 

The distinction of terms upon which this argument is 
based has been regarded by some writers as unreasonably 
petty. There seems, however, that there is a real difference 
between the two expressions. The replies of Serbia to the 
fifth and sixth demands are possibly, but not necessarily, 
elusive or evasive in their nature. These two demands, 
together with the fourth, constitute, undoubtedly, the most 
weighty part of the Austro-Hungarian note. The funda- 
mental problem in connection with the whole note is sug- 
gested by the discussion of these three headings. Was the 
Austro-Hungarian government justified in making such 
demands of an independent state, even though it may have 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 229 

had very serious provocation? 

The Austro-Hungarian government claimed, however, 
that precedents were not wanting for precisely the kind of 
police collaboration which it had really demanded. Accord- 
ing to their view, the feigned misinterpretation and refusal 
of Serbia had as motive, not so much general principles, as 
simply the apprehension of embarrassing results from such 
an international investigation if properly carried out. 

7. "The Royal Government proceeded, on the very eve- 
ning of the delivery of the note, to arrest Major Voislav 
Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a 
subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and who up to 
the 28th of June was employed (on probation) by the 
directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest 

"The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be 
so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary 
form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the 
eventual proofs of their guilt, which have been collected up 
to the present in the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of 
the later enquiry." 

Austria-Hungary represented that Ciganovic did not leave 
Belgrade until three days after the Sarajevo outrage, and 
then by order of the police prefect, who declared afterwards 
in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganovic 
did not exist in Belgrade, and that therefore the Serbian 
reply was disingenuous. 

But this scarcely seems to be the inevitable conclusion 
from the circumstances cited by Austria-Hungary. 

8. "The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend 
the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit 
traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes 
without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry 
and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz- 

230 The Great War 

Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the 
authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass." 

9. "The Royal Government will gladly give explanations 
of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Serbia or 
abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the 
statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were 
hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and 
Royal Government has communicated to them the passages 
in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have 
shown that the remarks were actually made by the said 
officials, although the Royal Government will itself take 
steps to collect evidence and proofs." 

Austria-Hungary maintained that the Serbian govern- 
ment must have been aware of the interviews in question. 
The Serbian request for details and the reservation of the 
right to make a formal investigation are proof of the lack 
of a genuine intention of fulfilling the demand. 

10. "The Royal Government will inform the Imperial 
and Royal Government of the execution of the measures 
comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not 
already been done by the present note, as soon as each 
measure has been ordered and carried out." 

"If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied 
with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that 
it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution 
of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific 
understanding, either by referring this question to the 
decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague, or to 
the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the 
declaration made by the Serbian Government on the 31st 
of March, 1909." 

Austria-Hungary took no notice of the suggestion for an 
arbitration of any remaining unsatisfactory points by the 
Hague Tribunal, but with her declaration that the Serbian 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 231 

reply was a mere playing for time, she refused to accept it. 
Baron Giesl, the Austrian Minister, formally notified the 
Serbian government, at 6.30, the same afternoon, that the 
response had been delivered, and that he was about to depart 
from Belgrade with the personnel of the legation, because he 
had not received a satisfactory reply within the specified 
time. The Serbian government and foreign diplomatic 
corps withdrew the same evening to Nish, which became 
the temporary capital of the country. 

M. Sazonoff informed the Russian representatives in 
France, Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
Italy, on the 27th, that in his opinion the Serbian reply 
exceeded all expectations in moderation and the proof which 
it afforded of a desire to give the most complete satisfaction 
to Austria-Hungary; and that he could not understand what 
further demands Austria-Hungary could make, unless she 
were actually searching a pretext for war with Serbia. 

Sir Edward Grey had received information, July 25, "that 
the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time 
limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and com- 
mence military preparations, but not military operations." 
He remarked to the German ambassador that this would 
interpose a stage of mobilization before the frontier was 
actually crossed, and therefore a further opportunity for 
negotiations. He believed, therefore, that the one chance 
of peace would be for Italy, France, Russia, and Great 
Britain to keep together and to join in asking Austria and 
Russia not to commence hostile action until they had had 
time to arrange matters. This idea of common action by 
the four powers took the practical form of a proposal for a 
conference to be composed of Sir Edward Grey and the 
ambassadors, as embodied in the following message sent to 
the British diplomatic representatives in Paris, Berlin, and 
Rome, July 26: 

232 The Great War 

"Would minister for foreign affairs be disposed to instruct 
ambassador here to join with representatives of France, 
Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference 
immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which 
would prevent complications ? You should ask minister for 
foreign affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bring- 
ing the above suggestion to the notice of the governments to 
which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, 
Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorized to request 
that all active military operations should be suspended 
pending results of conference." 

The French and Italian governments immediately accepted 
the proposal, and on the 27th the Russian government 
signified its approval of the conference in case direct explan- 
ations with Austria-Hungary were impossible. It must be 
explained that on the day previous M. Sazonoff had entered 
into a conversation with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, 
which had been carried on in a friendly tone, and that he had 
transmitted a request to Vienna that a continuation of this 
exchange of views should be permitted. 

But Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, 
was obliged to report Germany's refusal to fall in with the 
idea of a conference of this kind : 

"Secretary of State (for Foreign Affairs) says that con- 
ference you suggest would practically amount to a court of 
arbitration, and could not, in his opinion, be called together 
except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, 
therefore, fall in with your suggestion." The foreign secre- 
tary added that the news from St. Petersburg revealed an 
intention on the part of M. Sazonoff to exchange views with 
Count Berchtold, and it would be best to await the outcome. 

The refusal to take part in this conference has exposed the 
foreign policy of Germany to very severe criticism. It can 
scarcely be supposed that this refusal was due solely to a 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 233 

chivalrous consideration for the feelings of her ally. It may- 
be regarded, no doubt, as part of Germany's policy of 
scrupulously avoiding every appearance of interfering in 
the Austro-Serbian controversy, or recognizing by any act 
or statement that it was an affair which concerned any 
other states. 

The Chancellor telegraphed to Prince LIchnowsky, the 
German ambassador in London, July 27, that it was im- 
possible for Germany to place her ally Austria-Hungary in 
the latter's dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal, 
and that Germany's mediation must be limited to the danger 
of an Austro-Russian conflict. 

Later, the same day, he sent another communication to 
Prince Lichnowsky stating that he had started in Vienna the 
proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia 
in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey; but on the follow- 
ing day he reported that Count Berchtold found the media- 
tion proposal with Russia belated because hostilities with 
Serbia had already begun. Evidently Count Berchtold did 
not observe the rather fictitious distinction between an 
Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian controversy as de- 
fined by the Chancellor. 

The Kaiser returned unexpectedly to Potsdam from his 
Norwegian cruise, July 26. It was generally recognized 
that he had exerted his personal influence, probably with 
decisive results. In favor of the maintenance of peace at the 
termination of the Balkan crisis the summer before. It is 
a problem of great interest and importance to endeavor to 
penetrate the nature of his influence upon the foreign rela- 
tions of Germany during those days of extreme tension 
which directly preceded the war. On the same day the 
Russian Foreign Minister Sazonoff had had a long conversa- 
tion In a friendly tone with the Austrian Ambassador 
Szapory regarding the contents of the Austro-Hungarian 

234 The Great War 

note. This led him to transmit through the Russian am- 
bassador in Vienna the request that the Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador in St. Petersburg should be authorized to carry 
on an exchange of views with him relative to the revision of 
the note by finding a formula acceptable to Serbia and at 
the same time guaranteeing satisfaction to Austria-Hungary. 
But the Russian ambassador replied the next day that Count 
Berchtold was again absent from Vienna so that he had not 
been able to obtain a reply to this message. 

A confidential communication sent by the Chancellor to 
the different state governments of Germany to explain the 
policy of the Imperial government, July 28, at the same time 
that Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, gives no 
indication of change in Germany's attitude. After reciting 
the features of the situation as attested by the Austro- 
Hungarian note to Serbia, the connivance of Serbian officers 
and officials in the fatal agitation leading to the outrage of 
Sarajevo, the moderation of Austria-Hungary in the past in 
the face of Serbian chauvinism, the failure of Serbia to keep 
her promises, and the absolute necessity for Austria-Hungary 
to assume a vigorous attitude, the letter continued as 
follows : 

"The reply of the Serbian government to the demands 
which the Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23 rd 
inst. through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the 
dominant factors in Serbia are not inclined to cease their 
former policies and agitation. There will remain nothing 
else for the Austro-Hungarian government than to press its 
demands, if need be through military action, unless it 
renounces for good its position as a great power. 

"Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a 
matter of course and a task of Russia's activity to become a 
party to Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia. For the European conflagration which would result 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 235 

from such a step by Russia, the "Novoje Vremja" believes 
itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as 
she does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield. 

"The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. 
It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict 
with Serbia, but it is Serbia which, through unscrupulous 
favor toward Pan-Serbian aspirations, even in parts of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, threatens the same in her 
existence and creates conditions, which eventually found 
expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia 
believes that it must champion the cause of Serbia in this 
matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it 
must realize that it makes the Serbian activities its own, to 
undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole re- 
sponsibility if out of the Austro-Serbian affair, which all the 
other great powers want to localize, there arises a European 
war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident and it 
weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially 
declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention 
to acquire Serbian territory or to touch the existence of the 
Serbian Kingdom, but only desires peace against the Serbian 
intrigues threatening its existence. 

"The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question 
is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the Pan- 
Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruc- 
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the scattering or 
weakening of the Triple Alliance, with a complete isolation 
of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest 
therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The 
duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal 
war, points to a support by ourselves of those endeavors 
which aim at the localization of the conflict, faithful to the 
course of those policies which we have carried out successfully 

236 The Great War 

for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the 
peace of Europe. 

"Should, however, against our hope, through the inter- 
ference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to 
support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbor-monarchy 
with all the power at our command. We shall take the 
sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness 
that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring 
upon the peoples of Europe." 

This is the German position stated in the clearest terms, 
and there is nothing to prove that the Teutonic powers 
altered their attitude at any time during the discussion. 
As the German government viewed the situation after the 
declaration of hostilities by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, 
the question remained exclusively one between these two 
powers, and localizing the struggle, and thus guarding 
Europe against a general war, was possible only by allowing 
the Dual Monarchy a free hand. To prevent the interven- 
tion of a third power, as Russia, Germany was prepared to 
support her ally with all her forces. The attitude of Ger- 
many and that of Russia on this point were absolutely con- 
tradictory, and whichever view seems the more reasonable 
or just, it is clear that the German position permitted very 
little room for discussion with Russia. The only practical 
field left open for negotiation in harmony with this view 
lay in convincing Russia of the sincerity of Austria-Hungary's 
formal repudiation of any intention of annexing Serbian 
territory or disturbing the balance of power in the Balkan 

The Kaiser took the initiative in a direct exchange of 
telegrams with the Tsar, reminding him on the 28th that 
they, together with all other sovereigns, had a common 
interest in securing the punishment of all those who were 
responsible for the horrible murder of Archduke Francis 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 237 

Ferdinand, and promising to use his influence to induce 
Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory under- 
standing with Russia. 

The Tsar replied on the 29th : 

"I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this 
serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An 
ignominious war has been declared against a weak country 
and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremend- 
ous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the 
pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to 
take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such a 
calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the name 
of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your 
ally from going too far." 

The Kaiser in his turn telegraphed toward evening, the 
same day: 

"I have received your telegram and I share your desire 
for the conservation of peace. However; I cannot — as I 
told you in my first telegram — consider the action of Austria- 
Hungary as an 'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows 
from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they 
are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. According to 
my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered 
as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of 
Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion 
I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian 
cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain 
at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it 
is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the 
Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most 
terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct under- 
standing is possible and desirable between your government 
and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already 
telegraphed you — my government endeavors to aid with all 

238 The Great War 

possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, 
which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, 
would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid 
and would undermine my position as mediator which — ^upon 
your appeal to my friendship and aid — I willingly accepted." 

Although this exchange of telegrams continued until the 
31st, the Kaiser complained that his action as mediator was 
rendered increasingly difficult by the Russian mobilization. 

In a council of the Russian ministers held in the presence 
of the Tsar, July 25, a measure was adopted to provide for 
an eventual mobilization of thirteen army corps destined to 
operate against Austria-Hungary, which was to be carried 
out only in case Austria-Hungary should attack Serbia, and 
at the discretion of the Russian minister of foreign affairs. 
On the 27th the secretary of war gave the German military 
attache his word of honor that no order to mobilize had as yet 
been issued, and that, although general preparations were 
being made, no reserves had been called and no horses mus- 
tered. He added that if Austria crossed the Serbian frontier 
such military districts as are directed towards Austria- 
Hungary; Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would be 
mobilized, but not those, Warsaw, Wilna, and St. Peters- 
burg, that faced towards the German frontier. This state- 
ment is in accordance with the resolutions of the ministers 
on July 2Sth. 

Austria-Hungary had partially mobilized on the 26th, 
and declared war against Serbia on the 28th. This action 
was reflected in the increased state of international ten- 
sion the next day. All the nations seem to have advanced 
in the direction of war on the 29th. The immediate 
effect of the declaration of hostilities was Russia's partial 
mobilization in accordance with the cabinet decision of the 
25th, in view of the evident absence of a desire on Austria's 
part "to accept any kind of peaceful solution of her conflict 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 239 

with Serbia." The declaration of war by Austria-Hungary 
had been assigned by Count Berchtold as obstacle to any 
consideration of mediation proposals. Upon the return of 
President Poincare and Prime Minister Viviani to Paris on 
July 29, the latter confirmed the assurance of French 
solidarity and complete accord with Russia. 

A telegram of Sir M. de Bunsen, British ambassador at 
Vienna^ 'to Sir Edward Grey on the 30th contains an inter- 
esting statement regarding the purpose of the Russian 
mobilization and the attitude of Russia at this critical time: 

"Russian ambassador hopes that Russian mobilization 
will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz.; a clear intima- 
tion that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of 
Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian government 
are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance 
that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would understand 
that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia 
measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the con- 
tinuance of hostile propaganda from Serbian territory. 
The French ambassador hears from Berlin that the German 
ambassador at Vienna (Herr von Tschirscky) is instructed 
to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian government 
against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European 
war. Unfortunately the German ambassador is himself so 
identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Serbian feeling 
prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of 
peace with entire sincerity. Although I am not able to 
verify it, I have private information that the German am- 
bassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia 
before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German 
Emperor. I know from the German ambassador himself 
that he endorses every line of it." 

On the 29th Count Pourtales, German Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, told Foreign Minster Sazonoff that the German 

240 The Great War 

government was willing to guarantee that Serbian integrity 
would be respected by Austria. But M. SazonofF objected 
that even under those circumstances Serbia might become 
an Austrian vassal, and that there would be a revolution in 
Russia, if the Russian government should tolerate such a 
state of affairs. 

After the partial mobilization in Russia had been reported 
in Germany, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar at one 
o'clock in the morning of the 30th to emphasize the danger- 
ous consequences of Russian mobilization, and to warn him 
that it would threaten, if not render impossible, his role of 

At two o'clock the same morning, the German ambas- 
sador called upon M. Sazonoff again, In a despairing effort 
to preserve peace, and begged him to make some suggestion 
which he could telegraph to the German government as a 
last hope. Accordingly M. Sazonoff drew up the following 
formula : 

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has 
assumed the character of a question of European interest, 
declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the 
points which violate the principle of the sovereignty of 
Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations." 

M. Sazonoff already claimed to have absolute proof that 
Germany was making active military and naval prepara- 
tions against Russia. It was now recognized that if Austria- 
Hungary did not accept the formula proposed by M. 
Sazonoff, Russia would proceed to a general mobilization, 
and a European war would be the inevitable result. On the 
same day the German Secretary for Foreign Afltairs, Herr 
von Jagow, informed the Russian ambassador that he con- 
sidered the Russian proposal inacceptable. 

On the 31st, M. Sazonoff modified his formula, at the 
suggestion of Great Britain, to the following form: 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 241 

"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops 
on Serbian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between 
Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European 
interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the 
matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the 
Austro-Hungarian government without impairing her own 
rights as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia will 
undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." 

This final concession was too late to produce any results, 
and it is by no means certain that Austria-Hungary would 
have been willing at any time to admit that her quarrel with 
Serbia was a question of European interest. Events were 
being impelled irresistibly towards a catastrophe. On the 
31st the Russian government ordered a general mobilization, 
in consequence, probably, of the reported unyielding attitude 
of Austria-Hungary, the announcement of a general mobil- 
ization in that country, and supposed measures of military 
preparation taken by Germany. It had been generally 
recognized from the first that general mobilization by 
Russia would lead almost immediately to the same measure 
by Germany. 

Accordingly, the Chancellor sent the following telegram 
to the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, instructing 
him to deliver an ultimatum to M. Sazonoff: 

"In spite of negotiations still pending, and although we 
have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, 
Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also 
against us. On account of these Russian measures we have 
been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the 
threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobil- 
ization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if 
Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and 
against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours and notifies 
us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at 

242 The Great War 

once to M. SazonoflF and wire hour of communication." 

As was to be foreseen, Russia did not comply with this 
demand, and on August 1, at 12.52 p. m., the Chancellor 
telegraphed to the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, 
Instructing him to deliver the following statement, if by 
five o'clock the Russian government had not given a satis- 
factory reply to the ultimatum demanding demobilization: 

"The Imperial Government has employed every effort 
from the beginning of the crisis to conduct matters to a 
peaceful solution. In compliance with the desire expressed 
to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty 
the Emperor of Germany, in accord with England, had 
undertaken the part of mediator between the cabinets of 
Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia without awaiting 
the result proceeded to mobilize her entire forces on land 
and sea. In consequence of this threatening measure, for 
which there had been no military preparation by Germany 
as justification, the German Empire found itself exposed to 
very serious, imminent danger. If the Imperial Govern- 
ment had failed to safeguard Its interests against this peril, 
it would have compromised the safety, and even the exist- 
ence, of Germany. Consequently, the German Govern- 
ment found itself under the necessity of addressing the 
government of His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, 
to insist that the said military measures should cease. Since 
Russia has refused to comply with this demand, and has 
shown by this refusal that her action was directed against 
Germany, I have the honor, by order of my government, to 
announce the following to your Excellency: 

'His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the 
name of the empire, accepts the challenge and considers 
himself in a state of war with Russia'." 

This declaration was actually delivered to M. SazonoflF at 
7.10 p. m. At the same time that he transmitted the 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 243 

German ultimatum to Russia on the 31st, the Chancellor 
despatched the following message to the German ambassa- 
dor in Paris: 

"Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and 
fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending 
mediation. We have therefore declared the threatening 
state of war which is bound to be followed by mobilization 
unless Russia stops within twelve hours all measures of war 
against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies 
war. Please ask French government whether it intends to 
remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be 
made in eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. 
Utmost speed necessary." 

On the following day, August 1, at 1.05 p. m., Herr von 
Schon, the German Ambassador in Paris, replied: 

"Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France 
would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, 
the prime minister declared that France would do that 
which her interests dictated." 

On the 3rd at 6.45 p. m. the German ambassador pre- 
sented the following note, embodying Germany's declaration 
of war to M. Rene Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of France: 

"The German civil and military authorities have observed 
a number of unmistakably hostile acts committed by French 
military aviators on German territory. Many of the latter 
have manifestly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying 
over that country; one has attempted to destroy some 
buildings near Wesel, others have been sighted over the 
Eiffel region, another has dropped bombs on the railway 
near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. 

"I am directed, and have the honor, to Inform Your Ex- 
cellency that in presence of these aggressive acts the German 
Empire considers itself in a state of war with France, by the 

244 The Great War 

fault of this latter power. 

"I have likewise the honor to inform Your Excellency that 
the German authorities will retain all French merchant 
ships in the German ports; but will release them, if a com- 
plete reciprocity of treatment is assured within forty-eight 
hours " 

During the discussions preceding the war the Kaiser made 
repeated reference to his mediating influence at Vienna; but 
as the correspondence which passed between the German 
and Austro-Hungarian governments has not been published, 
there is no positive evidence for testing the true nature of 
the Kaiser's activity in this direction. He appears to have 
been sincerely desirous of preserving peace. It is commonly 
believed that the Vienna government adopted a conciliatory 
policy at the last moment, when it was certain that other- 
wise a general European war could not be avoided, and that 
they expressed a willingness to treat with Russia on the 
basis of the contents of their note to Serbia. Such a sudden 
revolution in their attitude is ascribed by one group of 
apologists to the Kaiser's beneficent influence, but by the 
other group to Austria-Hungar\"'s timidity or apprehensions 
and conversely, the responsibility for the sudden interrup- 
tion of this auspicious tendency is assigned by one party to 
Russia's mobilization, by the other, to the unwarranted 
German ultimatum and subsequent declaration of war. In 
view of the contents of the circular letter sent by the German 
government to the federated states, July 28, and the fact 
that the Kaiser makes no corresponding allusion in his 
telegrams, it seems very doubtful whether his conciliatory 
advice to Austria-Hungary went so far as to advocate a 
discussion with Russia, or the powers, on the basis of the 
demands in the note to Serbia, the only way in which his 
influence might have been productive of positive results. 

The opinion that Austria-Hungary practically yielded at 

Attempts to Localize the Conflict 245 

the last is supported by the following evidence. Conversa- 
tions between Vienna and St. Petersburg were resumed on 
July 30, and this may very likely have been partly due to 
the influence of the German Kaiser. The Russian ambassa- 
dor in Paris informed the Russian foreign office on August 1 
that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in the French 
capital had declared that his government was willing to 
discuss the substance of its note to Serbia with the other 
powers. Furthermore, Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassa- 
dor in Vienna, reported to his government that he was in- 
formed on August 1 by M. Schebeko that the Austrian 
ambassador in conversation with the Russian foreign 
minister in St. Petersburg had at last conceded the main 
point at issue by announcing that Austria-Hungary would 
submit to mediation the points in her note to Serbia which 
were incompatible with Serbian independence. But on the 
other hand, Count Berchtold informed M. Schebeko that 
Austria-Hungary could no longer recede or enter into any 
discussion of the terms of the note, July 30, and the next 
day M. Schebeko telegraphed the Russian foreign office that 
Count Berchtold insisted that Austria-Hungary must carry 
through her policy in regard to Serbia so as to secure an 
enduring guarantee of peace. 

There is no official document to prove that Austria- 
Hungary yielded, and the Vienna "Fremdenblatt" an in- 
spired sheet stated positively that the Vienna government 
did not change the direction of its policy to this extent. 

Great Britain and the War 

Sir E. Grey's final efforts for peace. Germany's proposal for British 
neutrality, July 29. Belgian neutrality; guaranteed by the powers in 1839. 
Belgian neutrality in 1870; the temporary treaties; Mr. Gladstone's speech. 
Treaty of 1839 still binding. Belgium and the Congo; both were neutral- 
ized territory. Great Britain protests against Germany's demand for free 
passage across Belgium. Ultimatum and declaration of war, August 4. 
German views of causes and motives for Great Britain's intervention. 
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech, December 2, 1914, on Great 
Britain's position with respect to the war. Partial obligation for Great 
Britain to help France. Other possible causes of Great Britain's declaration 
of hostilities; commercial rivalry and alarm at development of German 
naval power. Commercial rivalry not a direct cause. 

After the declaration of hostilities by Austria-Hungary 
against Serbia, July 28, M. Sazonoff informed London that 
this step clearly put an end to the idea of direct communica- 
tions between Austria and Russia, and that action by the 
British cabinet became most urgent in order to obtain a 
suspension of military operations; for, otherwise, mediation 
would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time 
to crush Serbia. 

On the 29th, Sir Edward Grey told the German ambas- 
sador in London that, while he believed that a direct agree- 
ment between Russia and Austria-Hungary would be the 
best possible solution, he had just received information that 
the Austrian government had declined the suggestion of the 
Russian government that the Austrian ambassador at St. 
Petersburg should be authorized to discuss with M. Sazonoff 
the means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict. He 
understood that the German government had said that they 
were favorable in principle to mediation between Austria 

Great Britain and the War 247 

and Russia, but objected to the form in which it had been 
proposed. He urged, therefore, "that the German govern- 
ment should suggest any method by which the influence of 
the four powers could be used together to prevent war 
between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. 
The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was 
ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany 
could suggest." Germany had only to "press the button" 
in the interests of peace. On the 30th, Herr von Jagow 
reported that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian govern- 
ment what would satisfy them, but had received no answer. 
The suggestion was soon lost in the turmoil of events. 

About midnight on the 29th, Sir Edward Grey received 
an ominous communication from Sir E. Goschen, British 
Ambassador in Berlin, throwing a startling light on the 
extent to which the menace of war had already penetrated. 
Sir E. Goschen had been summoned for an interview with 
the Chancellor the same evening, after the latter had re- 
turned from Potsdam. The Chancellor pointed out that 
in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace, a general 
war would become inevitable if Russia attacked Austria. 
He proceeded to bid for British neutrality by declaring that 
Germany was prepared to offer every assurance not to make 
any territorial acquisitions at the expense of France in case 
of victory, provided the neutrality of Great Britain were 
certain. Sir E. Goschen inquired about the French colonies, 
but the Chancellor was unable to make the same promise 
with regard to them. Germany would respect the neutral- 
ity of Holland, and "it depended upon the action of France 
what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in 
Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity 
would be respected, if she had not sided against Germany." 
The Chancellor continued to say that in harmony with his 
policy of a better understanding with Great Britain he had 

248 The Great War 

in mind a general neutrality agreement between the two 
countries, and British neutrality in the impending conflict 
"would enable him to look forward to the realization of his 
desire." Sir E. Goschen replied that he thought Sir Edward 
Grey would desire to retain full liberty of action. 

In reference to the Chancellor's proposals, Sir Edward 
Grey replied to Sir E. Goschen's communication the next 
day, July 30: 

"His Majesty's government cannot for a moment enter- 
tain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind them- 
selves to neutrality on such terms. 

"What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as 
Germany does not take French territory as distinct from 
the colonies. 

"From the material point of view such a proposal is un- 
acceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe 
being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her 
position as a great power, and become subordinate to 
German policy. 

"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us 
to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, 
a disgrace from which the good name of this country would 
never recover. 

"The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away 
whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the 
neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain 

Sir Edward Grey went on to urge that the one way for 
improving the relations between Great Britain and Germany 
was for the two countries to work together to preserve the 
peace of Europe in the existing crisis. 

Sir Edward Grey continued to strive manfully for peace 
up to the very last, refusing to give up hope even when the 

Great Britain and the War 249 

ultimata were being presented. Thus, on the 31st he told 
the German ambassador that if "Germany could get any 
reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that 
Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European 
peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable , 
if they rejected it, he would support it at St. Petersburg 
and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and 
France would not accept it His Majesty's government would 
have nothing more to do with the consequences." He told 
him that otherwise, if France became involved, they would 
be drawn in, too. Herr von Jagow expressed sympathy for 
Sir Edward Grey's continued efforts to maintain peace, but 
said that until they received an answer from their demand 
that Russia should demobilize, it was impossible to consider 
any proposal. 

On the same day Sir Edward Grey addressed identical 
inquiries to the French and German governments through 
the following message sent to the British ambassadors at 
Paris and Berlin respectively: 

"I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but m view 
of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential 
to His Majesty's government, in view of existing treaties, to 
ask whether French (German) government are prepared to 
engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other 
power violates it. 

"A similar request is being addressed to German (French) 
government. It is important to have an early answer." 

The French government replied that they were resolved 
to respect Belgian neutrality unless it were violated by some 
other power. But Herr von Jagow told the British ambas- 
sador at Berlin that he must first consult with the Kaiser 
and Chancellor, and he was very doubtful whether they 
would return any answer, since any reply might disclose a 
part of their plan of campaign. 

250 The Great War 

On the next day, August 1, Sir Edward Grey expressed 
to the German ambassador his regret at the nature of the 
reply of the German government, pointing out how keenly 
the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in Great Britain. 
Prince Lichnowsky inquired whether Great Britain would 
engage to remain neutral if Germany promised not to violate 
Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey could only say that 
the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to 
public opinion, which would largely determine the attitude 
of the government. When the German ambassador asked 
further whether he could not formulate conditions under 
which they would remain neutral, he said that he "felt 
obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral 
on similar terms." He could only say that they must keep 
their hands free. 

The neutrality of Belgium as guaranteed by the Great 
Powers is a factor of such fundamental importance among 
the causes of the war that a reference at some length to its 
origin, and the previous attitude of the powers with respect 
to it, is appropriate. 

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 united what is now 
Belgium with Holland to constitute the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands under the rule of the House of Orange. The 
congress intended to create in this way a stronger buffer 
state, so as to restrict the ambition for aggrandizement of 
France, or any other power. But the populations of the 
two parts of the new kingdom were too dissimilar to combine 
harmoniously into a united national state. The inflexible 
attitude of the government, which preserved its essentially 
Dutch character, aggravated the inevitable discord, and 
resulted in the revolution in Belgium in 1830, which broke 
up the union. The independence of Belgium was finally 
recognized by Holland in 1839. 

Two treaties signed on the same day, April 19, 1839, in 

Great Britain and the War 251 

London, were the basis of Belgian neutralization. Belgium 
and Holland were the parties to one of these treaties. It 
sanctioned their separation and individual independence, 
and contained the following provision : 

"Belgium in the limits above described shall form a state 
independent and perpetually neutral. She shall be bound 
to observe this same neutrality toward all other states." 

Five powers were parties to the second treaty, Great 
Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and for this 
reason it Is called the Quintuple Treaty. By it the powers 
mentioned approved and adopted for themselves the pro- 
visions of the first treaty. A little while later the German 
Confederation also became a party to this treaty. 

The outbreak of hostilities between France and the North 
German Federation in July, 1870, emphasized the importance 
of Belgian neutrality. Early in August, the British Parlia- 
ment was very much aroused by Bismarck's disclosure of the 
draft of a proposed agreement between France and Prussia 
drawn up three years earlier to sanction the eventual annexa- 
tion of Belgium by France under certain circumstances. 
Prussia had finally refused to ratify this agreement. With 
the startling impression of this revelation still fresh, Glad- 
stone ascribed such great importance to the preservation of 
Belgian neutrality that he secured separate but identical 
treaties from the North German Federation and France, on 
the 9th and 26th of August respectively, guaranteeing the 
neutrality of Belgium during the period of the war and for a 
year after its termination. The third article of these treaties 
is of fundamental importance in its bearing upon the ques- 
tion of the continuous validity of the original treaty of 1839. 
It reads as follows: 

"This treaty shall be binding on the high contracting 
parties during the continuance of the present war between 
France and the North German Federation, and for twelve 

252 The Great War 

months after the ratification of any treaty of peace con- 
cluded between these parties; and on the expiration of that 
time the independence and neutrahty of Belgium will, so far 
as the high contracting parties respectively are concerned, 
continue to rest as heretofore on the first article of the 
Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839." 

When the signing of the first of these treaties had been 
announced to parliament, it was criticised by some who 
expressed the opinion that it was an unnecessary addition 
to, or substitution for, the earlier treaty, and by others who 
were afraid that it might involve Great Britain needlessly 
in the war. Accordingly, on August 10, Mr. Gladstone 
made a statement in the House of Commons regarding the 
purpose of these treaties, and a portion of his remarks will 
show us the attitude of the British government at that time 
with regard to Belgium, and reveal in particular their inter- 
pretation of the situation with respect to the guaranteed 
neutrality of that country: 

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty (of 1839). 
It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into 
the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of 
that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine 
of those who have held in this house what plainly amounts 
to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a 
guarantee is binding on every party to it irrespective alto- 
gether of the particular position in which it may find itself 
at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee 
arises. The great authorities on foreign policy to whom I 
have been accustomed to listen — such as Lord Aberdeen and 
Lord Palmerston — never, to my knowledge, took that rigid 
and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of a 
guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an exist- 
ing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and 
a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give 




Article VII of the treaty of 1839 which guaranteed the independence and perpetual 
neutrality of Belgium. 

Last page of the treaty of 1S39 which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, showing the 
seals and signatures of the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Russia, 
and Prussia. 

Great Britain and the War 253 

full and ample consideration. There is also this further 
consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply 
and that is common interest against the unmeasured 
aggrandizement of any power whatsoever. 

"There is one other motive, which I shall place at the head 
of all, that attaches peculiarly to the preservation of the 
independence of Belgium. What is that country? It is a 
country containing 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 of people, with 
much of an historic past, and imbued with a sentiment of 
nationality and a spirit of independence as warm and as 
genuine as that which beats in the hearts of the proudest 
and most powerful nations. By the regulation of its internal 
concerns, amid the shocks of revolution, Belgium, through 
all the crises of the age, has set to Europe an example of a 
good and stable government gracefully associated with the 
widest possible extension of the liberty of the people. Look- 
ing at a country such as this, is there any man who hears me 
who does not feel that if, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite 
for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were 
absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear 
the knell of public right and public law in Europe? 

"But we have an interest in the independence of Belgium 
which is wider than that — which is wider than that which 
we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is 
found in the answer to the question whether, under the 
circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is 
with influence and power, would quietly stand by and 
witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained 
the pages of history, and thus become participators in the 

"But in what, then, lies the difference between the two 
treaties? It is in this — that, in accordance with our obliga- 
tions, we should have had to act under the treaty of 1839, 
without stipulated assurance of being supported from any 

254 The Great War 

quarter whatever, against any combination however formid- 
able; whereas by the treaty now formally before parliament, 
under the conditions laid down in it, we secure powerful 
support in the event of our having to act 

"It is perfectly true that this is a cumulative treaty, 
added to the treaty of 1839, as the right honorable gentle- 
man opposite, with perfect precision, described it 

"The treaty of 1839 loses nothing of its force even during 
the existence of this present treaty. There is no derogation 
from it whatever. The treaty of 1839 includes terms which 
are expressly included in the present instrument, lest by any 
chance it should be said that in consequence of the existence 
of this instrument, the treaty of 1839 had been injured or 

The North German Federation, as we have seen, formally 
accepted, or confirmed, the obligation in regard to Belgian 
neutrality embodied in the treaty of 1839 by signing the 
compact with Great Britain, Aguust 9, 1870, in which it was 
distinctly stipulated that the provisions of the earlier treaty 
should remain in force. It would be mere casuistry, decep- 
tive quibbling, to maintain that the treaty obligations of the 
North German Federation were annulled by its enlargement 
into the present German Empire. The renunciation of 
solemn engagements on this account would suggest the 
cheating of creditors by deceptive business reorganizations. 
Successors in business firms assume the liabilities as well as 
the assets. 

When Germany adopted a threatening attitude towards 
France, in March, 1875, on account of the latter's rapid 
recovery of military strength, Bismarck inquired of the 
Belgian government what measures they proposed to take 
for preserving their neutrality. He may have had in mind 
only the general kind of neutrality of any non-combatant. 
However, the German Empire has never indicated by any 

Great Britain and the War 255 

act or declaration before the outbreak of the present war 
that it did not regard the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 as bind- 
ing upon itself and the other signatory powers. 

The political activity of Belgium has displayed a develop- 
ment during the last generation in a direction entirely 
unforeseen when Belgian territory was declared perpetually 
inviolable in 1839, a development which might seem to 
render the stipulated protection of the Great Powers less 

The Society for the Investigation of the Upper Congo was 
founded in Belgium under the protection of King Leopold II 
in 1878, and an exploration party was sent out to Central 
Africa with Mr. Henry M. Stanley at its head. By this 
means, the society, which became later the .International 
Association of the Congo, established a claim by occupation 
to nearly all the vast area drained by the Congo River. 
Thus, on February 23, 1885, the association was able to 
announce at an international congress held in Berlin for the 
purpose of formulating the public law of Africa that it had 
obtained the recognition of its sovereignty in this region by 
all the powers. Accordingly, the Congo Free State was 
solemnly inaugurated, August 1, 1885, with Leopold II of 
Belgium as its king. This monarch had always looked 
forward to the annexation of the new state to Belgium, 
and prescribed this devolution in the terms of his will. 
Later, it was enacted in 1890 that the annexation should take 
place at the termination of ten years ; but it was not finally 
consummated until 1909, when Belgium came into posses- 
sion of a colonial area of 909,654 square miles with valuable 
natural resources. 

The argument has been advanced that this extension of 
Belgium's sovereignty over a large colonial area is incom- 
patible with her permanent neutrality; that a state which 
enters into political competition with other states has no 

256 The Great War 

right to be shielded from the results of full responsibility 
for its actions. But, on the other hand, the Congo Free State 
was declared neutral by act of the Berlin Congress, February 
26, 1885, at the same time that it was opened freely to the 
trade of all nations, and there seems to be no logical difficulty 
in assuming that the acquisition of a neutral dependency by 
a neutral state has not diminished the neutrality of either. 
Besides, the motive for the neutralization of the Congo Free 
State was not unlike that which suggested the neutralization 
of Belgium. For the Congo territory occupies a central 
position in the heart of the continent between the possessions 
of the other powers; and at a time when the nations were 
eagerly extending their pretensions towards the complete 
partition of Africa, it was certainly a very important pre- 
cautionary measure against possible conflicts to remove this 
large intervening space from the field of international 
rivalry. Therefore, since the neutrality of Belgium and 
the Congo are international interests in the respective con- 
tinents in which they are situated, it is reasonable that they 
should be politically united, so that the first may be the 
advocate and support of the neutrality of the second. 

On August 4, the British government received the follow- 
ing communication, addressed by the King of the Belgians 
to the British King: 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's 
friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly 
attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you 
have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the 
diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's government to 
safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 

In the morning of the same day, since news had been re- 
ceived that Germany had demanded a free passage across 
Belgian territory, threatening in the case of refusal to treat 
that country as an enemy, Sir Edward Grey instructed Sir 

Sir Edward Grty, Secretary ut buic ior Furcign Affairs, Great Britain. 

Great Britain and the War 257 

E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin to request an 
assurance that the demand would not be proceeded with 
and that Belgian neutrality should be respected. During 
the course of the day, information was received that the 
German minister in Brussels had notified the Belgian foreign 
office that the German government would be compelled to 
carry out their proposed measures by force; and then, that 
German troops had entered Belgian territory. 

Accordingly Sir Edward Grey instructed the British 
minister in Brussels to inform the Belgian government that 
the British government expected them to resist by any means 
in their power German pressure to depart from neutrality 
and that it would support them in offering such resistance. 
Later in the same day, he sent the following memorable 
telegram to Sir E. Goschen: 

"We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian 
minister for foreign affairs stating that German government 
will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, 
the measures considered indispensable. We are also 
informed that Belgian territory has been violated at 

"In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Ger- 
many declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium 
as France gave last week in reply to our request made simul- 
taneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, 
and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram 
of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If 
not, you are instructed to ask your passports, and to say 
that His Majesty's government feel bound to take all steps 
in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the 
observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a 
party as ourselves." 

To the representations of Sir E. Goschen, Herr von Jagow 
could only reply in the sense that the German forces had 

258 The Great War 

already entered Belgium and they could not withdraw. 
Accordingly, Great Britain's declaration of war went into 

The violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany 
was the professed cause for Great Britain's declaration of 
war against the latter power. But the Germans deny that 
this is a valid cause or represents the true motive for Great 
Britain's hostility. For, in the first place, they declare that 
they themselves were not under obligation to respect 
Belgium's neutrality, and in the second place, before the 
crisis occurred. Great Britain had practically pledged herself 
to support France against Germany, and she had even ceased 
to maintain an attitude of neutrality before Germany had 
trespassed on Belgium. The German view was formulated 
in a speech delivered by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg 
before the Reichstag, December 2, 1914, on the first occa- 
sion for addressing them regarding the government's foreign 
policy since the commencement of hostilities with Great 
Britain, as follows: 

"The apparent responsibility for the war rests on those 
Individuals in Russia who demanded, and put into execution, 
the general mobilization of the Russian army. But the 
deeper responsibility must be attributed to the government 
of Great Britain. The London cabinet could have made the 
war impossible by declaring in unmistakable language in St. 
Petersburg that England would not permit the Austro- 
Serbian conflict to develop into a continental war of the 
Great Powers. Such an attitude would have compelled 
France to exert herself to restrain Russia from undertaking 
warlike measures. That would have insured the success of 
our efforts to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, 
and there would have been no war. But England did not 
act in this way. England was aware of the bellicose 
intrigues of the partly irresponsible, but powerful, group 

Great Britain and the War 259 

among the Tsar's immediate courtiers. England perceived 
very clearly how the ball was rolling but put no obstacle in 
its path. In spite of all its peaceful protestations, the 
London government allowed it to be understood that 
England stood by France, and, therefore, by Russia. The 
Belgian charge (T affaires in St. Petersburg sent the following 
report to his government, July 30: 

" 'They are convinced in St. Petersburg, and even have 
definite assurance, that England will support France. The 
assurance of this support carries great weight and has con- 
tributed considerably to give the military party the upper 

The Chancellor went on to explain that as late as the 
summer of 1914, the English ministers had affirmed that 
England was not bound by any treaty to participate in a 
European war, and derived the conclusion that "it follows 
necessarily that the London cabinet suffered this terrible 
world-war to develop because it seemed to offer them an 
opportunity, with the aid of their entente friends, of dealing 
a death-blow to their greatest competitor in the world- 

"The Belgian neutrality which the English pretended to 
defend is a mask. On August 2, at 7 p. m., we announced 
in Brussels that the French plan of campaign, which was no 
secret to us, left us no alternative but to march across 
Belgium, as an act of self-preservation. But as early as the 
afterndon of the same day, the 2nd, that is, before London 
could have had any news of our action in Brussels, England 
had pledged her help to France — pledged unconditional 
assistance, in case a German fleet made an attack on the 
French coast. No mention was made of Belgian neutrality 
at that time. How can England maintain that she drew her 
sword because we violated Belgian neutrality? 

"There were already many indications of the guilt of the 

260 The Great War 

Belgian government. I had at that time no documentary 
evidence; but the English statesmen must have been very 
familiar with the proofs of Belgian complicity. Now that 
my publication of the documentary proof found in Brussels 
has revealed how, and to what extent, Belgium had already 
sacrificed her neutrality to England, the whole world is 
convinced of two facts. 

"First: When our troops crossed the frontier of Belgium 
during the night of August 3-4, they entered the territory of 
a state which had given up its own neutrality long before. 

"Second: The profession (by British government) of the 
violation of Belgian neutrality as cause for the declaration 
of war, August 4, was only a subterfuge to conceal the real 
motive from their own people, and neutral nations." 

Some further remarks of a more general nature in regard 
to the Chancellor's policy during the years just passed may 
be added: 

"We still encountered the spirit of revenge in France. 
Fostered by ambitious politicians, it proved to be more 
influential than the desire, which was undoubtedly cherished 
by a part of the French people, of living on good neighborly 
terms with us. We succeeded in coming to an understand- 
ing with Russia on some specific points; but Russia's un- 
shakable alliance with France, her antagonism to our 
ally Austria-Hungary, and an anti-German prejudice nour- 
ished by Pan-Slavic greed for power, rendered impossible 
the establishment of an agreement firm enough to exclude 
the danger of war in periods of political crisis. 

"England was relatively less hampered. There the 
attempt to effect an agreement capable of guaranteeing the 
peace of the world seemed hopeful." 

"Our intercourse (with England) suffered another shock 
In the crisis of 1911. The English people realized over 
night that it had been brought to the verge of a European 

Great Britain and the War 261 

war. Popular feeling forced the government to adopt a 
more conciliatory attitude toward Germany. By weari- 
some efforts it was possible to arrive at an understanding 
regarding some economic points of controversy touching 
Asia Minor and Africa. In this way the potential sources of 
conflict were reduced. The world is large, and offers, unless 
there is a deliberate policy of hindering the development of 
our resources, room enough for both peoples to measure their 
strength in friendly competition." 

These statements of the Chancellor embody the prevail- 
ing opinion in Germany regarding Great Britain's position 
with respect to the war, and we may conveniently employ 
them as a guide to direct our analysis to the indications of 
causes which are significant. 

Our consideration of the history of Belgian neutrality has 
shown, not only that Great Britain had continuously re- 
garded the guaranteed neutrality as valid, but that the 
German Empire was bound by the agreement, unless it pre- 
sumed to repudiate the obligations sanctioned by the North 
German Federation, of whose personality it is the con- 

But, as we have already seen, Chancellor von Bethmann- 
HoUweg declared in the course of his speech in the Reichstag, 
December 2, 1914, that Belgium had really ceased to be 
neutral before the German army entered her territory in the 
night of August 3-4, and this is the almost universal belief of 
the German people. Some documents, which were dis- 
covered in the war department in Brussels and first published 
in the North German Gazette, are the principal evidence for 
the German conviction that a secret agreement existed 
between Great Britain and Belgium directed against 
Germany, which invalidated Belgium's neutrality. The 
complicity of Belgium in a hostile plot against her powerful 
eastern neighbor has been proclaimed as justification of the 

262 The Great War 

forcible occupation of the country by the Germans. Ger- 
many was represented as the victim of a conspiracy, not an 
aggressor, and Belgium as a culprit which merited the mis- 
fortunes which she has suffered. According to this view. 
Great Britain, which posed as the disinterested protector of 
small nations, had really been the first to violate Belgium's 
neutrality by enticing her into a wicked plan for attacking 

The first of these documents is a letter addressed by 
General Ducarme, the Belgian Chief of Staff to the Belgian 
Minister of War, dated April 10, 1906. The general re- 
ported in this communication a summary of a series of con- 
fidential conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Barnardis- 
ton, the British military attache, which had been in progress 
since the middle of January. Ducarme and Barnardiston, 
at the latter's suggestion, had studied certain technical 
problems which would arise if Great Britain should send an 
army to aid in the defense of Belgium against Germany, 
such as railway transportation, the requisitioning of supplies, 
intermediary officers, and interpreters. The British attache 
stated that Great Britain was prepared to despatch an ex- 
peditionary force of 100,000 men, and they would land at 
Dunkirk ^nd Calais. General Ducarme declared that the 
Belgian field army of 100,000 men would be ready for action 
in four days. The document contained the specific state- 
ment of the British representative that the conversations 
had no binding character for the two countries. In a mar- 
ginal addition the statement was made that the British inter- 
vention would not take place before Germany had violated 
Belgian neutrality. 

The second document in the chronological order is doubt- 
less a communication of the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, 
Baron Greindl, of December 23, 1911, in which he warned his 
government that Great Britain and France proposed to make 

Great Britain and the War 263 

Belgium a base for an aggressive action against Germany, 
and protested that a plan ought to be devised against a pos- 
sible violation of their neutrality by the western powers. 

The third and final document shows, that while the 
Belgian authorities may not have shared Baron Greindl's 
preoccupations, they were disposed to insist upon the correct 
observance of their neutrality by Great Britain. It has no 
formal date, but the text mentions April 23, and the year 
was probably 1912. The contents are similar to those of the 
first note. It has no signature. General Jungbluth had 
succeeded General Ducarme as Belgian Chief of Staff, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Bridges had been substituted for Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Barnardiston as British military attache since 
1906. The text of the document is as follows : 

"The British military attache asked to see General Jung- 
bluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23. 

"Lieutenant Colonel Bridges told the general that England 
had at her disposal an army which could be sent to the con- 
tinent composed of six divisions of infantry and eight 
brigades of cavalry, together 160,000 troops. She has also 
everything which is necessary for her to defend her insular 
territory. Everything is ready. 

"At the time of the recent events the British government 
would have immediately effected a disembarkation in 
Belgium, even if we had not asked for assistance. 

"The general objected that for that our consent was 

"The military attache answered that he knew this but, 
that since we were n6t able to prevent the Germans from 
passing through our country, England would have landed 
her troops in Belgium under any circumstances. 

"As for the place of landing, the military attache did not 
make a precise statement; he said that the coast was 
rather long, but the general knows that Mr. Bridges during 

264 The Great War 

Easter has paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostende. 

"The general added that we were, besides, perfectly able 
to prevent the Germans from passing through." 

The German authorities and press have undoubetdly ex- 
aggerated the importance of these documents; but, on the 
other hand, they are not to be entirely ignored. They are 
merely the records of conversations between officers who had 
no authority to make any agreements binding their respec- 
tive governments. The documents are not even signed by 
both parties like contracts or other formal conventions. 
But while possessing no intrinsic importance of themselves, 
they may have great historical value, if they reveal the in- 
tentions of the two governments. 

We may quickly dispose of the first document. It appears 
from it that a British officer conferred with the Belgian Chief 
of Staff as to measures to be taken by Great Britain in case 
Belgian neutrality were violated by Germany. As one of 
the signatory powers of the treaty of 1839, Great Britain 
might justly regard herself as under obligation to intervene 
in such an event, and subsequent occurrences have proved 
that these precautions were not unwarranted. 

But the later conversation, in the third document cited, 
contains indications of more serious appearance. Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Bridges asserted that at the time of some recent 
events, presumably the Moroccan crisis of 1911, the British 
government would have immediately effected a disembark- 
ment in Belgium, even if the Belgian government had not 
asked for assistance. 

A German commentary on the documents possessing 
official endorsement regards the above statement as abso- 
lute proof that the British government had the intention, in 
the case of a Franco-German war, to send troops to Belgium 
immediately, or in other words, to violate Belgian neutrality 
in anticipation of Germany's action. But even if we assume 

Great Britain and the War 265 

that Lieutenant Colonel Bridges was accurately informed as 
to the intention of his government, the sense of this passage 
depends upon the circumstances which are to be understood 
as the condition of the immediate intervention of the British 
forces. For these are not stated. Would the British dis- 
embarkment have immediately followed the declaration of 
war between Germany and France, or the violation of Bel- 
gium's neutrality by Germany? It is quite possible that 
Lieutenant Colonel Bridges meant to say that in case the 
Germans entered Belgium, Great Britain would immediately 
disembark her expeditionary forces in Belgium without await- 
ing Belgium's formal request for assistance. Let us assume, 
however, the most unfavorable construction for British inten- 
tions; let us suppose that Great Britain would have taken 
precisely the same step which Germany took in the present 
conflict, that she would have violated Belgian neutrality to 
anticipate her enemy. With such an interpretation the docu- 
ment would incriminate British intentions; but it would at 
the same time absolve Belgium by showing that General 
Jungbluth insisted that British intervention without Bel- 
gium's consent would be unlawful. This, and the statement 
that Belgium was quite able to prevent the Germans from 
passing through, might be interpreted as indications of an 
attitude in conformity with Baron Greindl's remonstrance. 
The Germans object that Belgium has never made any 
attempt to take, in agreement with the German government 
or military authorities, defensive measures against a possible 
Anglo-French violation of their territory. But it is fair to 
observe that the Anglo-Belgian conversations took place at 
the initiative of the British attache, not the Belgian authori- 
ties. We may certainly assume that Germany never 
proposed any such exchange of views; for if she had, and 
her proposal had not been accepted, the circumstance 
would assuredly have been cited as evidence of Belgium's 

266 The Great War 

complicity by the German government or inspired press. 

Our analysis of the documents leads us to regard their 
contents as insufficient to prove that the neutrality of 
Belgium as guaranteed by the powers was no longer valid 
in the summer of 1914. But to continue our argument to a 
further stage, we may ask ourselves what would have been 
the position of Belgium, if Germany's claim were established. 
The extreme view based on the German assumption regards 
Belgium as an ally of Great Britain, perhaps of France also. 
In that situation Belgium could no longer shield herself 
behind the barrier of the treaty of 1839. Nevertheless, 
until Belgium had committed some hostile act, or declared 
war, she would have been entitled by the law of nations to 
possess her territory inviolate like any other non-belligerent 
power. The alliance with a belligerent power is not in itself 
an adequate occasion for a declaration of hostilities. Ger- 
many did not declare war against France on account of the 
latter's alliance with Russia without alleging specific hostile 
acts committed by France. 

It is true that the German authorities have alleged some 
breaches of neutrality on Belgium's part, such as the presence 
of French officers in Belgium, the flight of French air-craft 
and passage of French automobiles with French officers 
across Belgian territory. But scarcely any allusion is made 
to these occurrences at the time. They were neither men- 
tioned as justification of their step in the public utterances 
of members of the German government, nor cited as motives 
in the course of diplomatic intercourse. At a later time 
these alleged violations of Belgian neutrality were published, 
and the statement was made that the German government 
possessed ample proof for their authenticity. The world 
has waited many months for a publication of this proof. 
But it is doubtful whether the alleged facts, even if proved, 
would constitute a sufficient cause for the German invasion 

Great Britain and the War 267 

of Belgium. For the present, German action in Belgium 
has no other justification than the motives expressed by her 
diplomatic chiefs at the time, considerations of strategic 

Herr von Jagow replied to the remonstrances of the British 
ambassador, August 4, that the Germans "had to advance 
into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able 
to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to 
strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a 
matter of life and death for them, as, if they had gone by 
the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view 
of the paucity of the roads and the strength of the fortresses, 
to have got through without formidable opposition entailing 
great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time 
gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the 
German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German 
asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of 

On the same day, in the course of his speech in the Reichs- 
tag, Chancellor von Bethmann-HoUweg expressed himself as 
follows : 

"Gentlemen, we are now in a position of necessity; and 
necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
burg; perhaps they have already entered Belgian territory. 
Gentlemen, this is in contradiction to the rules of inter- 
national law. The French government has declared in 
Brussels that it is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium 
so long as it is respected by the enemy. But we knew that 
France stood prepared for an inroad. France could wait, 
but we could not. A French inroad on our flank on the lower 
Rhine could have been fatal to us. So we were forced to 
set aside the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian 
governments. The wrong — I speak openly — the wrong that 
we now commit we will try to make good again as soon as 

268 The Great War 

our military ends have been reached. When one is threat- 
ened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how- 
he can hack his way out." 

The Chancellor did not deny that Germany's action was 
morally indefensible. The German government acted on 
the view that the vital interests of a nation supersede its 
international obligations. But even on this last line of 
defense the German position regarding Belgium can scarcely 
be regarded as unassailable. Strategic considerations must 
be postponed for later discussion. But the opinion may be 
expressed in anticipation that the subsequent course of the 
campaign has not proved that the rapid drive through 
Belgium was the only salvation for German vital interests, 
even if the French would otherwise have advanced through 
that country to attack Germany. 

But we are more directly concerned with historical caus- 
ation than moral obligation. However justly the right of 
inviolability could be claimed for Belgium, the violation of 
Belgian neutrality was in only a limited sense the real cause 
of Great Britain's declaration of war, if the British govern- 
ment had practically engaged itself to support France before 
it had become known that Belgian neutrality was threatened. 

It may be remarked that some German apologists have 
allowed themselves to be carried beyond the goal by their 
eagerness to attach moral turpitude to Great Britain's 
motives, so that their argument fails to produce the wished 
for effect. In their eagerness to impute a base motive to 
Great Britain, they deny her sincerity in going to war for 
Belgian neutrality, but to establish this point they proceed 
to prove that she had really been for some time bound by an 
engagement to help France. They do not recognize that 
there is no more disgrace in being an ally of France than an 
ally of Austria-Hungary. Their argument would leave 
Great Britain with an empty formal cause of war, it is true, 

Great Britain and the War 269 

but merely nominal alleged causes are accepted as an inter- 
national conventionality without leaving a very serious 
moral stigma. 

The supposed obligation to support France rests chiefly 
on the following facts: 

The French fleet was concentrated mainly in the Medi- 
terranean Sea, and the British fleet in the North Sea and 
adjoining waters. Trusting in the friendship of Great 
Britain, France left her northern coast unprotected by her 
own navy. 

In 1912 there was the following exchange of views between 
Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, the French Am- 
bassador, relative to the possible military cooperation of the 
two nations: 

Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 
My dear Ambassador, 

From time to time in recent years the French and British 
naval and military experts have consulted together. It has 
always been understood that such consultation does not 
restrict the freedom of either government to decide at any 
future time whether or not to assist the other by armed 
force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is 
not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that 
commits either government to action in a contingency that 
has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the 
present moment is not based upon an engagement to co- 
operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either government 
had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third 
power, it might become essential to know whether it could 
in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either government had grave reason to 
expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something 

270 The Great War 

that threatened the general peace, it should immediately 
discuss with the other whether both governments should act 
together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, 
if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in 
common. If these measures involved action, the plans of 
the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, 
and the governments would then decide what effect should 
be given to them. Yours, etc., 

E. Grey. 
French Embassy, London, 
November, 23, 1912. 
Dear Sir Edward, 

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd 
November, that during the last few years the military and 
naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted 
with each other from time to time; that it had always been 
understood that these consultations should not restrict the 
liberty of either government to decide in the future whether 
they should lend each other the support of their armed 
forces; that, on either side, these consultations between 
experts were not and should not be considered as engage- 
ments binding our governments to take action in certain 
eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, 
if one or other of the two governments had grave reasons 
to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, 
it would become essential to know whether it could count 
on the armed support of the other. 

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to 
state that, in the event of one of our two governments having 
grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third 
power, or some event threatening the general peace, that 
government would immediately examine with the other the 
question whether both governments should act together in 
order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If 

Great Britain and the War 271 

so, the two governments would deliberate as to the measures 
which they would be prepared to take in common; if those 
measures involved action, the two governments would take 
into immediate consideration the plans of their general 
staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to 
those plans. Yours, etc., 

Paul Cambon. 

Finally, when war was practically certain between France 
and Germany, the British government promised that the 
British fleet would protect the exposed French coasts against 
a hostile attack by the German fleet, and on August 2, Sir 
Edward Grey gave the following memorandum to M. Paul 
Cambon embodying the decision taken at a cabinet meeting 
that morning: 

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German 
fleet comes into the channel or through the North Sea to 
undertake hostile operations against French coasts or ship- 
ping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. 

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His 
Majesty's government receiving the support of parliament, 
and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's government 
to take any action until the above contingency of action by 
the German fleet takes place." 

In view of these facts, in spite of the formal statement 
that they did not strictly involve an obligation to bring 
mutual assistance. Great Britain would doubtless have 
exposed herself to accusations of disloyalty if she had 
not assisted France. But they do not constitute absolute 
proof that Great Britain would have gone to war if the 
Belgian cause had not arisen; while, on the other hand, 
British policy for two hundred years shows that Great 
Britain would not have stood idly by and permitted a great 
power to occupy any part of Belgium. For a vital British 
interest is involved in the independence and integrity of that 

272 The Great War 

country, upheld on many a field from RamilHes to Waterloo. 

With a surer instinct for forcible presentation, Chan- 
cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg cites the promise of August 2 
alone as a pledge for Great Britain's eventual cooperation 
with France, so that he lets the intervention of Great 
Britain appear as the result of a sudden impulse to profit by 
a favorable opportunity, not the natural consequence of a 
consistent policy. But the engagement of August 2 was 
clearly consistent with the policy that goes back to the re- 
distribution of the naval forces of the two countries in such 
a way that their joint interests in the Channel were entrusted 
to the British fleet alone. 

We may conclude, therefore, that the understanding with 
France was a very important factor. It is quite possible 
that Great Britain would have eventually joined forces with 
France, even if Belgian neutrality had not been violated. 
This understanding was not the result of an act of sudden 
stealth, but part of a respectable policy of several years' 
standing, the existence of which was generally recognized. 

What were the ulterior causes of Great Britain's partici- 
pation in the war."* Only two, commercial rivalry and 
alarm at the groAvth of the German navy, are generally 
recognized. The Chancellor represents commercial jealousy 
as the prevailing, if not unique, cause for Great Britain's 

It is reasonable to assume that a war could arise from com- 
mercial jealousy only in case the prosperity of one country 
were confined, or seriously threatened, by the commercial 
activity of another nation. Statistics will readily show us 
whether such was the relation of affairs between Great 
Britain and Germany. 

In the table on page 79 the per capita exports of the 
British nation display a very substantial growth from 1891 
to 1911. Now national feelings are the complex product of 

-- o 


Great Britain and the War 273 

the feelings of individuals, and a nation of prosperous in- 
dividuals is not likely to be impelled by dangerous senti- 
ments of hostility on account of commercial jealousy. The 
figures for the aggregate exports of the United Kingdom at 
intervals of five years offer even more striking proof: 

Value of British Exports 

Total exportation 

to Germany 



















During the five years, 1891-1896, British exportation 
declined while German exportation at this time was increas- 
ing. According to the theory that commercial rivalry is a 
cause of hostility between Germany and Great Britain there 
should have been jealousy and international animosity at 
that time. But it is the only period of equal length since 
1891 when the relations between the two countries were 
undisturbed. On the other hand, the situation became 
acute when both countries enjoyed unparalleled prosperity 
and the exports of Great Britain were increasing by leaps 
and bounds. Commercial rivalry may be relegated, there- 
fore, to a remote place among the potential causes. If the 
two countries were going to be led into war as a direct con- 
sequence of commercial rivalry, the conflict would have 
occurred twenty years earlier, not in 1914. 

There remains the apprehension of German naval develop- 
ment, and it is not necessary to repeat what has been shown 
with regard to it in Chapters III and IV. Alarm at the 
growth of the German navy had been the dominating factor 

274 The Great War 

in British foreign policy for a decade. The progress of 
German sea-power occupies a unique position among the 
potential causes of the war. 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 

The accusation against the Teutonic powers. Increase in Germany's 
military establishment. Extension of military railways on the Belgian 
frontier. Opening of enlarged Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, July 1,1914. Russian 
military development. Internal conditions in Russia. Home Rule con- 
troversy in Ireland. The king's conference. Events in Dublin, July 26. 
Militarism; how it endangers peace. Expressions of the militaristic spirit; 
duelling, artificial conception of honor. Dangerous influence on political 
policies by insisting upon exaggerated standards of honor and prestige, 
and subordinating diplomacy to its professional point of view. 

The circles which controlled the foreign policy of the 
Teutonic powers have been arraigned before the court of 
humanity on the charge of having deliberately provoked 
the present war. Obviously we cannot dismiss the subject 
of the causes of the war before we have examined the 
evidence for this indictment, which is brought by responsible 
individuals. For it cannot be denied that no genius in 
statecraft could have chosen a more propitious moment for 
so diabolical an undertaking, a moment when the nations 
of the Triple Entente were less prepared. There were 
alarming strikes in St. Petersburg a week before the com- 
mencement of the European war, which might at any time 
have ignited the inflammable material of widespread discon- 
tent in Russia and generated a revolutionary conflagration. 
President Poincare and Prime Minister Viviani of the 
French Republic were absent from Paris on a visit to the 
Tsar, escorted by the two most effective units of the French 
fleet, which might have been bottled up in the Baltic 
Sea by a rapid German aggressive movement. As it was, 
the president and prime minister did not return to Paris 

276 The Great War 

until July 29, when the crisis was just entering upon its 
final, and most critical, stage. Several of the ambassadors 
of the entente powers in the most responsible positions were 
absent on leave from the capitals to which they had been 
accredited. The question regarding the attitude of the 
Ulster Protestants to Home Rule had taken on a most 
threatening aspect. Clearly these indications which obtrude 
themselves upon us are sufficiently striking to warrant a 
closer examination of the evidence. 

For the sake of convenience we may divide the material 
into active and passive evidence, the first category including 
such positive acts of Germany or her allies as might appear 
to indicate a definite Intention of engaging in hostilities; the 
second, the conditions prevailing in the entente powers or 
their dependencies, or elsewhere, which seemed to promise 
success for a military enterprise undertaken at this time. 
Clearly all possible evidence would be too voluminous for 
exhaustive treatment. In the first class particularly most 
of Germany's measures as related thus far in the present 
volume might be remotely involved. We must confine our 
attention to a few proceedings which may be brought into 
immediate and obvious connection with the war. 

Allusion has already been made to the imposing augmenta- 
tion of the German military establishment, which was well 
under way by the summer of 1914. Such an unprecedented 
enlargement is scarcely conceivable, in spite of the shifting 
of the balance of power in the Balkans, unless the leaders in 
Germany actually believed that a war would soon occur. 

Early in 1914 the Germans completed a remarkable pro- 
gram of railway expansion In the direction of the Belgian 
frontier. Within a territory of 3600 square miles, which has 
the form of a triangle, lying between the frontiers of Belgium 
and Luxemburg and the Moselle and Rhine, the railway 
density was carried from 15.10 to 30.23 miles of line for 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 277 

every hundred square miles of area during a period of five 
years. In particular, several new double-track lines 
were constructed from the Rhine to points of no intrinsic 
importance situated within a short march of the Belgian 
frontier. As this region is thinly populated and possesses 
neither important industries nor mineral deposits, such a 
sudden progress in railway development could have only a 
strategic significance. 

On July 1, 1914, just five weeks before the outbreak of 
the war with Great Britain, the Kaiser proclaimed the 
formal opening of the enlarged canal which bears his name. 
The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, extending from Kiel to the 
lower Elbe, and thus connecting the Baltic and North Seas, 
was first opened for traffic in 1894; but, with the enormous 
development in the size of ships, the dimensions of the canal 
became inadequate. Its commercial importance may be 
judged by the fact that ten times as many vessels pass 
through it annually as through the Suez Canal. In expand- 
ing its capacity its depth was increased from twenty-eight to 
forty-six feet, and its locks were enlarged to an extent that 
would permit them to accommodate the Vaterland, not to 
mention the largest war-ships in the German navy. The 
canal effects an economy of more than two hundred miles in 
the course of ships bound to the Baltic Sea from North Sea 
points lying southwards. From the naval point of view, the 
possession of such a canal is indispensable for Germany in any 
war involving operations by sea, at the same time, against 
Russia and one or both of the western powers. For it per- 
mits Germany to employ her entire naval force inter- 
changeably in the Baltic and North Seas. 

These facts, striking as they seem, may all be interpreted 
as defensive, precautionary measures. The German govern- 
ment always suspected that the real purpose of the Triple 
Entente was offensive. Thus in 1908, after the visit of 

278 The Great War 

President Fallieres at London, and the meeting of King 
Edward VII and the Tsar at Reval seemed to rivet the links 
of the entente, the Kaiser exclaimed at the German military- 
maneuvers at Doberitz: "It really seems as if there is a 
desire to surround and provoke us. We shall know how to 
deal with it. The German has never known better how to 
fight than when he has had to defend himself on all sides. 
Let them come against us, we are ready!" 

There is no doubt that Russia had been putting forth 
every effort since 1909 to augment the strength and efficiency 
of her military establishment. For instance the period of 
military service had recently been prolonged. It had been 
exactly three years, from January 1 until the termination of 
the third year. It was now prolonged until April 1 of the 
fourth year. Thus, if hostilities broke out early in the 
spring, the Russian government would have a very much 
stronger army ready at hand by merely retaining these most 
thoroughly trained fourth-year men under the colors. This 
measure was calculated to provide an active army of 1,840,- 
000 men for the winter of 1913-14 and until April 1, 1914, of 
whom 1,322,000 would be serving in Europe, while there 
would be in all 1,415,000 during the remainder of 1914, with 
1,017,000 serving in Europe. Moreover, Russia was devel- 
oping her naval power with great rapidity. From 1909 until 
1914 her annual expenses for naval purposes had increased 
154%, as compared with 50% in France, 29.6% in Great 
Britain, and 13.8% in Germany. 

The German government was undoubtedly aware that 
there was some kind of understanding between France and 
Great Britain relative to common action in case of hostilities. 
They also viewed with apprehension a possible naval con- 
vention between Great Britain and Russia. Even with the 
enlargement of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal the presence of a 
considerable Russian naval force in the Baltic would be a 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 279 

constant source of uneasiness to Germany. The English 
opposition to the Dutch project of building a modern fortress 
at Flushing to command the entrance of the Scheldt was 
interpreted in Germany as an indication that Great Britain 
contemplated an offensive movement by way of Antwerp. 
The extension of the harbor of Esbjerg on the western coast 
of Denmark, eighteen miles from the German frontier, from 
39 to 100 acres, with a very much larger extension in progress, 
was regarded as evidence of an aggressive design of Great 
Britain in that quarter. 

In view of these circumstances, or, more especially, the 
feeling of alarm which they excited in Germany, the argu- 
ment that the strategic railways and the enlargement of the 
canal, as well as the increase in the German army, were in- 
tended chiefly as defensive measures might appear plausible. 
Accordingly the evidence for Germany's culpability in pro- 
voking the war intentionally is thus far not convincing. We 
turn to the category of passive evidence. 

Notwithstanding the undeniable material progress of 
Russia in recent years, signs and events were not lacking, 
during the months directly preceding the war, which might 
be regarded as indications of widespread dissatisfaction, as 
well as unpreparedness for any great national exertion or 
crisis. These phenomena were noticeable both in the 
borderlands and in the heart of the empire itself. 

Allusion has already been made to the recent reappear- 
ance of the Russian nationalist tendency to undermine 
gradually the liberties of Finland. Stolypin, the forcible 
Russian Prime Minister, under whose administration the 
narrow spirit of nationalism had grown strong again, was 
assassinated in a theater in Kieff, September 18, 1911. The 
Finns had hoped that his successor Kokovtsoff would dis- 
continue the hateful policy of Russification within the grand- 
duchy. But in this they were disappointed. 

280 The Great War 

A law had been enacted in St. Petersburg, June 30, 1910, 
which opened a dangerous breach in the constitutional safe- 
guards of Finnish liberty. It was virtually a reenactment 
of the odious imperial manifesto of 1899; for it reserved to 
the Tsar and Russian Duma the right to legislate on all 
Finnish questions which affected the interests of the empire 
as a whole. This far-reaching measure was never sub- 
mitted to the Finnish Diet, and therefore the Finns refused 
to acknowledge its validity. But on the basis which it 
afforded, the Duma passed a law, February 2, 1912, estab- 
lishing an equality of civil rights for Russians and Finns in 
the grand-duchy. It could be pointed out in justification 
of this law, that while 3,000,000 Finns enjoyed the full 
privileges of citizenship throughout the Russian Empire, 
the 150,000,000 Russians did not possess these rights in 
Finland. The Finns regarded the bill with anxiety, chiefly 
because it opened the civil service to Russians, permitting 
the substitution of Russians for Finns in all the important 
positions and the Russification of the administration. 

Finnish officials refused to obey this law because it had 
not been sanctioned by the diet, and the courts upheld them 
in their defiant attitude. Accordingly, many officials and 
magistrates were taken to St. Petersburg to be tried for 
their contumacy; and, as a climax, the district court in the 
Tsar's capital tried and convicted the entire bench of the 
Viborg court of appeal, twenty-three judges, January. 27, 
1913. They were arrested, September 23, and conveyed to 
St. Petersburg in a special train to undergo their sentence 
of imprisonment, although in the meantime the Finnish 
Diet had passed laws assimilating the legal position of 
Russians to that of Finns In the grand-duchy. These 
judges were released after eight months of solitary confine- 
ment and received a tremendous ovation upon their return 
to Helsingfors. The Russian mounted gendarmes could 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 281 

scarcely disperse the excited crowds, who greeted with 
intense enthusiasm those who had made themselves national 
heroes by their violation of an unrighteous law. These 
occurrences made a deep impression and created a feeling of 
apprehension throughout the entire grand-duchy. 

Of more immediate interest to the members of the opposite 
group of powers were some unmistakable signs of the recent 
progress of the national spirit in Poland. In the second 
Duma, when enthusiasm for the new constitutional regime 
was still fresh, an important group of Polish deputies under 
the leadership of Dmowski had expressed their willingness 
to cast their lot loyally with the Russian Slavs under the 
same constitutional government. But Poland had been 
slighted, together with the other border-lands represented 
in the Duma, in the great reduction of its representation 
embodied in the revision of the election laws, June 16, 1907. 
Furthermore, the third Duma sanctioned a bill, which 
became law, July 6, 1912, wounding Polish national pride 
unnecessarily by transferring the control of the district of 
Kholm from the Governor-General of Warsaw to the 
Minister of the Interior at St. Petersburg, practically violat- 
ing the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Poland, as it 
had been defined by the Congress of Vienna. The sub- 
sequent elections in Poland were clearly a setback for 
Dmowski's party of conciliation and sympathetic coopera- 
tion with Russia. 

A feeling of discontent among the intelligent classes in 
Russia had been nourished by the government's continued 
application in many sections of such restrictive measures as 
are only justifiable in case of serious disturbances and dis- 
order. All the parties in the Duma sharply criticised the 
government in 1913 for its reactionary methods, while at a 
meeting of the representatives of the various cities at Kieff 
resolutions in the same spirit were adopted. 

282 The Great War 

We have observed that there is Hkely to be a dangerous 
connection between labor troubles and political unrest in 
Russia. Therefore, the statistics of strikes may be regarded 
as possible evidence of the popular attitude toward the 
established political order. The 1,051,000 strikers, as 
enumerated in 1905, fell to 142,000 in 1910, but rose again 
to 460,000 in 1913, which might readily be interpreted as a 
menacing portent. 

In the early part of 1914, a letter from some German 
source in St. Petersburg was published in the Cologne Gazette, 
which emphasized the contrast between the existing defects 
and future possibilities of the Russian military resources. 
This article stated that Russia's vast gold reserve was 
scattered, largely lent out to smaller institutions throughout 
the country, so that it could not straightway be made liquid. 
Russia was at present incapable of effective mobilization on 
account of both military and financial weaknesses. The 
natural deduction seemed to be, that the present was pre- 
cisely the time to undertake a preventive war against her. 

The imminence of Home Rule in Ireland, and the deter- 
mined spirit of resistance to it among the Protestant popu- 
lation in Ulster, created a very embarrassing and dangerous 
situation for the British government in the first half of 1914. 

The sending of regular troops to strengthen the military 
depots in Ireland precipitated a crisis in the British army, 
where the rumor quickly spread that these forces would be 
employed to coerce the people of Ulster into accepting 
Home Rule. A large number of officers resigned or de- 
manded assurances from the government that their services 
would not be employed for the purpose of political coercion. 
Colonel Seely, Secretary of War, added to the Cabinet's 
reply to the resigning officers an assurance that the govern- 
ment did not intend to take advantage of its right to employ 
the military forces where it wished for crushing political 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked ? 283 

opposition to its policy or the ■ principles of Home Rule. 
But when Prime Minister Asqulth repudiated Colonel 
Seely's statement, the latter resigned, and with him the 
Chief of Staff, Sir John French, who had supported Colonel 
Seely in his assurance to the officers. Prime Minister 
Asquith very unexpectedly assumed the portfolio of war. 

This spirit of insubordination in the army, or as some 
indignantly called it, attempt at "military dictation to 
parliament," was doubtless regarded with much astonish- 
ment and interest in other countries. Late in April, 40,000 
rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition, "made in Germany," 
were successfully landed on remote parts of the coast of 
Ulster in violation of the embargo which had been placed 
upon the importation of weapons by the government. 

The government suggested as a concession for the purpose 
of a compromise and reconciliation, that the counties of 
Ulster should decide individually by ballot whether they 
would come immediately under the provisions of Home 
Rule, or preferred to be excluded from the application of 
the measure for a period of six years. But the opposition 
declared that this concession was not sufficient. The Home 
Rule Bill passed the House of Commons, as has been ob- 
served. May 25, 1914, the proposed conciliatory amendments 
being reserved for a later amending act, because it was 
necessary that the original bill should have been passed by 
the House of Commons three times in not less than two 
years, so as to overcome the veto of the House of Lords. 

The situation in Ireland was rendered still more critical 
by the organization of bodies of Irish Nationalist volunteers. 
Thus Ireland was divided into two hostile camps, which 
seemed to be only awaiting the suitable occasion to com- 
mence hostilities. Moreover, an apparently hopeless dead- 
lock prevailed in the negotiations for a compromise arrange- 
ment. The Unionists refused to accept the original bill, 

284 The Great War 

and Mr. John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalists 
rejected the conciHatory amending proposals as introduced 
in the House of Lords. 

Finally, King George took the initiative in a new concilia- 
tory movement by calling the leaders of both sides to a 
conference in his presence. The first session of this confer- 
ence occurred on July 21, and it is most interesting, during 
that time, when each day was teeming with significance for 
the nations, to coordinate these proceedings in Great 
Britain with the startling events on the continent. 

The personal initiative of the king was unfavorably re- 
garded by many people on principle; and the king's some- 
what tactless allusion to the "cry of civil war" as being on 
the lips of the people seemed to be among the causes that 
foredoomed this conference to failure. It separated with- 
out accomplishing anything. 

The occurrences on Sunday, July 26, near Dublin, doubt- 
less appeared to German statesmen as the commencement 
of the predicted civil war which would fatally embarrass 
Great Britain's action in world-affairs. The sanginuary 
encounter grew out of an attempt to land a consignment of 
10,000 rifles near Dublin for the Nationalist volunteers. 
Troops were sent to seize these weapons, and upon their 
return march towards Dublin the soldiers were attacked by 
a mob and pelted with improvised missiles. When their 
patience became exhausted, they fired into the rabble, 
killing four persons and wounding about sixty. 

Thus a strong case may be made out against Germany, 
although it rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence. 
On the other hand, against the charges, the argument may 
be off^ered that if the Teutonic powers had intended to 
seize a favorable occasion for a deliberate attack upon the 
rival powers, they would have done this before the military 
power of Turkey, or that of Bulgaria, had been crushed in 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 285 

the Balkan conflicts. The fact that Germany and Austria- 
Hungary did not employ favorable opportunities In 1912 or 
1913 to attain by force the aims which are ascribed to them 
in the present war is evidence that they did not contemplate 
an aggressive action at that time. This argument may very 
reasonably have the effect of narrowing the charge. It was 
not part of the general policy of the Teutonic powers to 
overwhelm the rival group by an unexpected assault at the 
first suitable opportunity. In consequence of this, unless 
we are prepared to accept the sensational theory that the 
murder of the Archduke was part of the larger Teutonic plot 
for sudden aggressive action, intended to provide an appro- 
priate occasion, we are not prepared to admit the existence 
before June 28, 1914, of an Austro-German plan for deliber- 
ately provoking hostilities. 

In judging the motives which came Into play after the 
murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, it is necessary 
to observe that there are strong indications in support of the 
opinion that the Teutonic powers believed that they would 
realize their purpose regarding Serbia, and whatever that 
implied In connection with Influence and prestige In the 
Balkan peninsula, without precipitating a general European 
war; In other words, that In consequence of the weaknesses 
that have been enumerated, the entente powers were not 
merely doomed to succumb In case of actual hostilities, but 
would be unwilling to fight. 

The following extracts from a report by Sir M. de Bunsen, 
British Ambassador at Vienna, of a conversation with his 
German colleague, July 26, may be cited as evidence for 
this attitude: 

"According to confident belief of German Ambassador, 
Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which 
Austria-Hungary Is resolved to Inflict, having received 
assurances that no Serbian territory will be annexed by 

286 The Great War 

Austria-Hungary." "The Russian Minister for 

Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so 
imprudent as to take a step which would probably result 
in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, 
such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian 
questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, 
was not at all in a condition for facing a war." 

Likewise, on July 28, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin 
informed Sir Edward Goschen "that a general war was most 
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to 
make war." The British ambassador believed that the same 
opinion was shared by many people in Berlin. Sir R. Rodd, 
British Ambassador in Rome, made a report on the 29th in 
the same sense, stating the opinion of the Italian Foreign 
Minister "that there seemed to be a difficulty in making 
Germany believe that Russia was in earnest." The Russian 
Foreign Minister Sazonoff expressed the conviction that 
Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna 
and St. Petersburg, since "the former was a violent Russo- 
phobe who had urged Austria on," while "the latter had 
reported to his government that Russia would never go to 

Agajn, Great Britain is represented as the reluctant party 
in the Triple Entente, whose attitude of weakness nourished 
the confidence of the Teutonic powers. The Russian am- 
bassador told Sir Edward Grey on the 27th that the impres- 
sion prevailed in German and Austrian circles that in any 
event Great Britain would stand aside. 

If the theory is adopted that the Germanic powers be- 
lieved that they could win a bloodless, diplomatic victory 
by maintaining an attitude of firmness, this conviction 
supersedes, for the practical purposes of history in dealing 
with the causes of the war, the problem of the existence of 
an intention of provoking a general conflict. 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked ? 287 

We ought to note in this connection the evidence indicat- 
ing a belief on the part of representatives of the entente 
powers that they could restrain their opponents, and thereby 
prevent the outbreak of hostilities, by adopting a steadfast, 
resolute bearing. 

At the outbreak of the crisis the Russian Foreign Minister 
expressed the belief that Germany did not really want war 
but that her attitude was decided by that of Great Britain. 
For, as he declared, if Great Britain took her stand firmly 
with France and Russia, there would be no war; but if 
Great Britain failed them, rivers of blood would flow, and 
she would eventually be dragged into the war. 

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador in Paris, reported to 
Sir Edward Grey on the 30th that the President of the 
Republic was convinced that peace between the powers 
was in the hands of Great Britain; that "if His Majesty's 
government announced that England would come to the 
help of France in the event of a conflict between France and 
Germany, there would be no war." 

In a letter directed to King George, July 31, urging the 
advantage of Great Britain proclaiming herself openly the 
ally of France and Russia, President Poincare declared his 
belief that "if Germany were convinced that the Entente 
Cordiale would be affirmed in case of need, even to the extent 
of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest 
chance that peace would remain unbroken." 

On the same day, M. Cambon in his representations to 
Sir Edward Grey, pointed out that it was the uncertainty 
as to whether Gr^at Britain would intervene which was the 
encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if Great Britain 
"would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and 
France, it would decide the German attitude in favor of 

Thus it appears that the conviction was entertained in 

288 The Great War 

influential circles on both sides that an exhibition of firmness 
was alone necessary for guaranteeing success. 

But the problem of motives is complicated by the presence 
in most or all of the belligerent nations of a factor which we 
have not thus far directly considered — its mention requires 
a definition — militarism. 

Some writers protest that the term militarism is very 
often thoughtlessly or incorrectly employed, and in particu- 
lar, that it is erroneous to impute this quality with its odious 
implication to Germany; because Russia has a very much 
more numerous army, and Great Britain spends much more 
annually on her military and naval establishments. In fact, 
German apologists, in self-defense, have coined the expres- 
sion navalism, which they impute to Great Britain with the 
same unfavorable significance. 

But the true meaning of the term militarism has no 
necessary connection with the size of armies or magnitude 
of military establishments. It denotes a certain attitude of 
mind. The suffix ism very frequently implies an exagger- 
ated or partisan view or support of the quality, attitude, or 
program of conduct indicated by the word to which it is 
attached. Thus militarism may be defined as an arrogant, 
or exclusive, professional military spirit. It may make 
itself noticeable in small military establishments, and yet 
is not necessarily conspicuous in large ones. Like the pro- 
fessional spirit in any other occupation, militarism is likely to 
exhibit extravagant examples in any country. 

The significance of militarism will become clearer as we 
consider the dangers which it involves. There are two ways 
in which militarism may imperil peace. In the first place, 
it encourages both in individuals and states an exaggerated 
sensitiveness, or touchiness, and an artificial conception of 

On August 3, 1905, a so-called Court of Honor at Miilheim, 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 289 

in Germany, dismissed ignominiously from his commission, 
as Landwehr Lieutenant, Dr. Fritz Feldhaus, because he did 
not challenge an officer who had insulted him, notwithstand- 
ing the fact that duels are legally forbidden, and Feldhaus 
had already obtained ample satisfaction by regular judicial 
proceedings. The matter was the subject of an indignant 
interpellation in the Reichstag the following January. The 
Prussian Minister of War observed, in replying to the inter- 
pellation, that although the duel as a means of settlement 
for questions of honor was still recognized extensively 
among the better classes, an imperial decree of 1897 had 
very effectively curtailed the practice among officers, and 
that the prospective revision of the criminal code with the 
introduction of severer penalties against insults would 
reduce it still further. "But as long as the duel is recognized 
in extensive circles as a means for healing injured honor, the 
corps of officers cannot tolerate in their midst any member 
who is not ready to defend his honor sword in hand." 

These words provoked expressions of indignation from all 
parties except the Conservatives. It appeared from the 
minister's remarks that militarism has its own exclusive 
code of morals; and that in upholding an artificial conception 
of honor it disregards law and the common consciousness of 

The practice of duelling among votaries of an unreason- 
able standard of honor is harmless as compared with the 
tyranny of imposing their bigoted standard upon others, 
and subjecting reason and conscience to its haughty re- 
quirements. Their despotic doctrine assumes superiority 
over rational motives and deliberations. It insists that 
under certain circumstances states as well as individuals 
must commit themselves to bloodshed and destruction with- 
out regard to considerations of right and wrong. It enslaves 
reason and justice alike to its exaggerated conception of 

290 The Great War 

honor. It jealously guards the sanctity of this holy of 
holies from the contamination of peace conferences, arbitra- 
tion, and all other vulgar devices for the elimination of 

We considered at some length the incidents of the cele- 
brated Dreyfus case, in consequence of which the militarism 
that had existed in a dangerous form in France received a 
merited rebuke. A military tribunal decided in advance 
that Captain Dreyfus must be condemned, whether guilty 
or not, to maintain military prestige, or satisfy military 
"honor." Such "honor" is as dishonorable as anything in 
this world. It is the foe of truth, reason, and morality. 

Another flagrant exhibition of insolent militarism has a 
special interest as illustrating, in a one-sided way perhaps, 
the popular attitude in Alsace. A feeling of irritation 
existed for some time between the townspeople of Zabern 
and the soldiers of the regiment which was stationed in 
garrison in their midst. The report spread through the 
town that a young officer, Lieutenant Forstner, had an- 
nounced to the recruits in the barracks that anybody 
stabbing a Wackes who insulted him would receive a present 
of ten marks. The term wackes, meaning literally toad in 
the local dialect, is employed by the Alsatians in addressing 
one another as a term of familiarity or endearment, but they 
resent this designation as an affront when it is applied to 
them by outsiders. Indignation was naturally aroused at 
Lieutenant Forstner's words, and, when some officers were 
jeered at on the street in the evening, Colonel Renter ordered 
sixty soldiers with loaded rifles to arrest all civilians who 
did not retire. Twenty-seven persons were arrested in 
this summary fashion, including a local magistrate and a 
member of the fire department who had rushed into the 
street upon hearing the bugle. All these were confined over 
night in the cellars of the barracks. Besides this, Lieutenant 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 291 

Forstner wounded with a sabre thrust a lame cobbler, who 
as he claimed, had insulted him, although this was denied. 

This matter was the subject of an interpellation in the 
Reichstag, December 3. 

The Chancellor, although not denying that the action of 
the military authorities at Zabern had been unjustifiable, 
endeavored to make the affair seem unimportant. He 
announced that Lieutenant Forstner and one non-commis- 
sioned officer would be punished. There was a storm of 
indignation as the Reichstag contemplated this violent 
intrusion of the military into the sphere of civil life, and the 
Chancellor seemed to have failed entirely to treat the really 
serious features of the situation. A resolution of disap- 
proval of the Chancellor's treatment of the affair passed the 
chamber by a vote of 293 to 54. This is the second time that 
a vote of censure against a Chancellor has passed the Reichs- 
tag. Prince von Biilow had received a vote of disapproval 
for the government's Polish policy. In a state with a re- 
sponsible government the cabinet would have resigned 
immediately. Chancellor von Bethmann-HoUweg did not 
resign. Lieutenant Forstner was condemned to forty-three 
days' imprisonment; but Dr. von Jagow, the police president 
at Berlin, deplored Forstner's punishment in an article in 
the North German Gazette, in which he said that "military 
exercises are acts of sovereignty, and, if obstacles are placed 
in the way of their performance, the obstacles must be 
removed in the execution of the acts of sovereignty." 

Perhaps the words of the Kaiser in dedicating a monument 
to Prince Frederick Charles at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder in 
1891 may be cited to illustrate an exaggerated, unnatural 
conception of military honor propagated by the militaristic 
tradition. He declared: 

"We would rather sacrifice our eighteen army corps and 
our 42,000,000 inhabitants on the field of battle than sur- 

292 The Great War 

render a single stone of what my father and Prince Frederick 
Charles gained." 

After making a Hberal discount for rhetorical exaggera- 
tion, the passage must still be interpreted in the sense that 
lives must be lavishly sacrificed, in certain situations, in 
vindication of an empty principle of military honor, without 
any useful purpose. If warfare can alone be justified as the 
final means for deciding important issues, how can the ex- 
penditure of lives and treasure be justified from the moment 
when events have made the result of the conflict certain? 

The thrill evoked by such an address is an inherited, 
traditional kind of thrill, the product of an inveterate 
emotional habit. To the spirit of the present age, if it were 
free from historical bias, the Kaiser's heroic resolution 
would suggest the notion of suicide in consequence of a 
business liquidation where the assets turned out to be greatly 
in excess of the liabilities. Militarism flourishes in the day- 
light of modem ingenuity and efficiency, but it draws 
emotional sustenance from roots cast deep into bygone ages. 

Frequent references to Austrian "prestige" in the diplo- 
matic correspondence suggest that the spirit of militarism 
exercised an important influence upon the attitude of the 
government in Vienna. 

Thus Sir R. Rodd reported as early as July 23, before the 
terms of the Austrian note to Serbia had been published, 
that the Italian Foreign Office expressed the view "that the 
gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro- 
Hungarian government that it was absolutely necessary for 
their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of 
events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite 

On July 28 the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs informed Sir M. de Bunsen that Austria-Hungary 
could not delay military operations against Serbia any 

c p 

" s 

.& s 

Was the War Deliberately Provoked? 293 

longer. "The prestige of the Dual Monarchy was engaged, 
and nothing could now prevent conflict." 

Professor Munroe Smith, in discussing the problem of the 
relations of military strategy and diplomacy with particular 
reference to the events leading up to the great war, points to 
evidence of the existence at Vienna of a "touchiness closely 
related to the soldier's and duellist's sense of honor." Thus 
Herr von Jagow reminded Sir E. Goschen, July 29, that "he 
had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, "as any 
idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause 
them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli." 
He was not sure that his communication of Sir Edward 
Grey's "suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for 
discussion had not hastened the declaration of war" by 
Austria-Hungary. On July 30 the Chancellor told Sir E. 
Goschen "that he was not sure whether he had not gone so 
far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been 
precipitated rather than otherwise." 

Militarism is dangerous, in the second place, because it is 
inclined to regard all issues solely from the professional 
point of view. This danger has increased with the more 
rigid specialization in the military profession coincident with 
the enormous development in the efiiciency and accuracy of 
adjustment of all the parts of the military machine, and in 
the capacity and necessity for rapidity of action. The 
existence alone of a highly organized military machine is a 
menace to peace, unless it is under the control of persons 
who take more than a merely mechanical view of the purpose 
and function of this formidable apparatus. 

To satisfy professional requirements militarism strives to 
impose its will upon the political leadership of the nation. 
It is ready to sacrifice the moral and political advantages of 
a defensive attitude or of deferring hostilities to the strategic 
advantage of the sudden attack. 

294 The Great War 

The Influence of militarism was a dominant factor toward 
the close of the period of discussion which led to the out- 
break of hostilities. 

Thus on July 30, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador 
at Berlin, reported to his government: "The military authori- 
ties urged strongly that mobilization should be decreed on 
the ground that any delay will lose Germany some of her 
advantages. Up to the present, however, it has been 
possible to resist successfully the haste of the General Staff, 
which in mobilization sees war." 

On August 1, Herr von Jagow explained Germany's 
declaration of war against Russia on purely strategic 
grounds, as reported by Sir E. Goschen: 

"Russia had said that her mobilization did not imply 
war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for 
months without making war. This was not the case with 
Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers 
and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany 
should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from 
all parts of her wide dominions." 

Finally, when Great Britain's ultimatum was presented, 
Herr von Jagow explained "that they had to advance into 
France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to 
get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike 
some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of 
life and death for them, as, if they had gone by the more 
southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the 
paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have 
got through without formidable opposition entailing great 
loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time 
gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the 
German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German 
asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of 

Was the War Deliberatley Provoked? 295 

Whatever judgment we form concerning the policy of the 
Russian authorities in taking the decisive step of ordering 
their general mobilization in advance of Austria-Hungary 
and Germany, we can scarcely absolve them from grave re- 
sponsibility. The various aspects of the case will be dis- 
cussed later; it suffices for the present purpose to mention 
the evident existence of disagreement in the higher counsels 
of the Russian imperial government. The Tsar was un- 
doubtedly very much opposed to war; and in his desire to 
maintain a conciliatory attitude, he was supported by the 
diplomatic department of the government, and probably by 
the majority of the cabinet. But this policy was vigorously 
opposed by a military clique, who doubtless regarded 
Russia's military "honor" as at stake since 1909, and who 
probably insisted, from the professional point of view, that 
a further delay in the general mobilization would be court- 
ing disaster. 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 

Transformation of Japan. War with China, 1894-5. Interference of 
Germany, France, and Russia. Japan deprived of her spoil. Russia in 
Manchuria and at Port Arthur. Anglo-Japanese Treaty signed, January 
30, 1902. Russo-Japanese War; its termination by the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth, September S, 1905. Second Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Russo- 
Japanese understanding. Japan's present ministry. Japan's ultimatum 
and declaration of war against Germany. Position of Turkey at the out- 
break of the war. Aspirations of Pan-Islamism. The Turkish ministry. 
Said Halim Pasha, Djavid Bey, Djemal Pasha, Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha. 
German military commission. German influence. British intentions mis- 
represented. Arrival oiGoeben and Breslau, August 10. Turkish duplicity. 
Capitulations abolished. Turkish military preparations. British protests. 
Commencement of hostilities. Jihad, or holy war, proclaimed. Motives 
for Italian hostility for Austria, sentimental, strategic, economic. Italy's 
domestic politics. Declaration of neutrality. Albanian occurrences. Austro- 
Italian negotiations; three stages; the intervention of Prince von Biilow, 
December 20, 1914; Austria's definite offer, March 27, 1915; Italy's counter- 
proposal, April 8; the repudiation of the Triple Alliance, May 4. The 
triumph of the Salandra ministry; the session of the Chamber, May 20; the 
declaration of war. May 23. 

The complete transformation in the national life of Japan 
which took place during the second half of the nineteenth 
century constitutes the most unique chapter in human 
records, one for which an analogy is sought in vain. The 
story of this remarkable transition has become a classic. 
In the seventeenth century Japan shut herself off from 
intercourse with the outside world. Her institutions became 
rigid, her national life stationary. She retained until the 
middle of the nineteenth century a state of feudalism and 
methods of life almost as antiquated as those of med- 
iaeval Europe, and even the inclination for progress was 
absolutely non-existent. The nation was jealously pro- 
tected against any contaminating suggestion of change by 
the stringent legal exclusion of foreigners. 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 297 

The Mikado, or emperor, dwelt in mysterious seclusion 
in a palace at Kioto. Although regarded with a half- 
religious reverence, he possessed only the shadow and title 
of sovereignty. For the Shoguns, who were originally 
ministers, obedient to the Mikado, had gradually appro- 
priated all the actual prerogatives of imperial authority. 
The Shogunate had become hereditary. The Shogun held 
court in Yedo, and stood at the head of the military aris- 
tocracy, the ruling class. The arrival of Commodore Perry 
in command of an American squadron in Japanese waters 
in 1853 broke the enervating spell that had brooded over 
Japan for so long a time. In 1854 two Japanese ports were 
opened to American shipping and commerce, and similar 
arrangements were very soon effected between Japan and 
the other leading commercial nations. 

A fermentation in the national spirit was set in action, and 
it rapidly increased in intensity. The succession of Mutsu- 
hito as Mikado, in 1867, was the signal for the culmination 
of the revolution. He resolutely stepped forth from retire- 
ment and displayed himself to the eyes of his subjects. He 
resumed the absolute authority of his forefathers ages back, 
abolished the Shogunate, and removed his residence from 
Kioto, the old capital, to Yedo, which was afterwards called 
Tokio, in 1868. Within a very few years western civiliza- 
tion was introduced into Japan in the most systematic 

The Japanese nation, whose civilization from the material 
point of view was comparable with that of Europe five 
hundred years ago, and whose life and institutions were 
entirely alien to those of the western nations, set out deliber- 
ately to recast its entire social, political, and industrial 
organization to accord with the most approved European 
standards of the present age. History offers no parallel for 
such a universal acceptance by a whole people of a policy of 

298 The Great War 

transformation affecting profoundly its most essential habits 
of life based solely upon an intellectual, unemotional con- 
viction of expediency. It probably means that the Japanese 
excel all the other peoples in the world in the quality of 
national self-discipline. 

The nineteenth century has recorded many instances of 
national transformations. But of all, the Japanese was at 
the same time the most sudden and comprehensive and the 
most unexpected. It violates all the rules of historical 
likelihood. For, while the transformation of other nations 
has been mainly nothing more than an acceleration of 
progress along national, or at any rate, racial lines, the 
Japanese have adopted with their marvellous capacity for 
assimilation a civilization which was the very antipodes of 
their own. All the customary institutions of a first class 
modern state were quickly introduced, newspapers, national 
schools and a university, scientific codes of laws, railways, 
universal obligatory military service — finally, a constitution 
in 1890. Within thirty years this wonderfully endowed 
people had covered the centuries which separated them from 
the great western powers, and were ready to enter into com- 
petition with them. 

As Japan had an area of only about 140,000 square miles, 
which was so mountainous that only one-sixth was available 
for cultivation, her population of more than 40,000,000 was 
rather crowded in their island home. Japan required an 
opportunity for territorial expansion. 

A question of suzerainty over Corea involved Japan in a 
war with China in the autumn of 1894; and as the vast 
Chinese Empire was still in the backward condition from 
which Japan had only begun to emerge about thirty years 
earlier, the result of the conflict could not long remain 
doubtful. Japan suffered the loss of scarcely more than 
five hundred soldiers killed in action in reducing an empire 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 299 

of about 400,000,000 souls to sue for terms of peace. The 
exaggerations of romance must yield the precedence to 
reality when compared with the facility with which this 
important enterprise was performed. By the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, China recognized the inde- 
pendence of Corea, and ceded Port Arthur with the Liao- 
tung peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands to 

At this time Germany, France, and Russia began to dis- 
play an unusual solicitude for the welfare of the peoples of 
the Far East, like some officious individuals who are appar- 
ently more concerned about the weal of others than those 
others are about themselves. Russia as the spokesman of 
this trio represented to Japan in a quite friendly spirit that 
Port Arthur was the key to Peking and to the heart of China, 
and that its occupation by the Japanese would be a 
perpetual menace to permanent peace in the Far East. In 
consequence of this diplomatic intervention of the three 
powers mentioned, Japan was excluded from a foothold on 
the continent of Asia. Japan always believed that Germany 
was the instigator of this action of solicitude for the "per- 
manent peace in the Far East," just as she was thought to 
have encouraged Russia in a campaign of expansion and 
adventure in that direction. If this suspicion is true, one 
might say that just as mankind is condemned before birth 
by an act of original sin, so the doom of Kiau-Chau was pre- 
determined by a fatal act of transgression before this German 
colony came into existence. For Japan waited nineteen 
years to satisfy her resentment against Germany for the 
disappointment inflicted upon her in 1895. 

It was not long before the western powers, which had 
interceded in China's behalf, began to assume rewards for 
their magnanimity. Russia was then engaged pushing 
forward her Trans-Siberian Railway across Asia towards 

300 The Great War 

Vladivostok, a port on the Sea of Japan. She obtained a 
concession from China for building the main Hne across 
Northern Manchuria, and also for the construction of a 
branch line from Harbin to Talienwan in the Liao-tung 
peninsula, an ice-free harbor. This concession included the 
privilege of guarding these lines on Chinese territory with 
Russian soldiers, under cover of which Russia threw large 
forces into Manchuria. On March 5, 1898, Germany con- 
cluded a convention with China for a ninety-nine year 
lease of Kiau-Chau and adjacent territory, which virtually 
brought the Province of Shantung under her sphere of in- 
fltience. Just about three weeks later, Russia concluded a 
lease of the district of Kwangto for a period of twenty-five 
years, and began to fortify the important position, Port 
Arthur, included in her leasehold, which, as she had declared 
to Japan, commands the approach to Peking and the heart 
of China. About the same time, France and Great Britain 
obtained similar leaseholds for themselves on the coast of 
China. The speedy disintegration of the Chinese Empire 
was predicted, and it is quite likely that this expectation 
was one of the chief motives for the greater naval activity 
of Germany which began at just this time. 

But after the Boxer movement in China in 1900, and the 
international expedition to relieve the besieged legations in 
Peking, the powers guaranteed the integrity of the Chinese 

The occupation of Southern Manchuria by Russia and 
the impending penetration of Corea by the same power not 
only threatened to exclude Japan from her normal field of 
expansion, but seemed even to menace her safety at home. 
The Japanese put forth every exertion to prepare for the 
impending struggle with the mighty colossus of the north. 

Russia promised to withdraw from Manchuria when order 
was established, but that might very likely be a mere sub- 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 301 

terfuge for continued occupation; and the conduct of Russia 
in the Far East was not calculated to inspire confidence in 
the sincerity of her protestations. At this time Great 
Britain and Japan became convinced of their common 
interest in restricting the aggrandizement of Russia and 
maintaining the status quo in the Far East. 

A convention embodying terms of an Anglo-Japanese de- 
fensive alliance was signed in London, January 30, 1902. 
The treaty set forth the desire of the two governments to 
maintain the general peace in the East and the independ- 
ence and territorial integrity of China and Corea, and to 
secure equal opportunities in those countries for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations. It contained, also, a 
mutual recognition of the special interests of the two con- 
tracting parties. 

The reciprocal obligations of the contracting parties were 
defined in the second and third sections as follows: 

2. "If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of 
their respective interests as above described, should become 
involved in war with another power, the other high con- 
tracting party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its 
efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities 
against its ally. 

3. "If in the above event any other power or powers 
should join in hostility against that ally, the other high 
contracting party will come to its assistance and will con- 
duct the war in common and make peace in mutual agree- 
ment with it." 

An alliance on an equal footing with one of the leading 
nations of Europe was naturally a source of pride to the 
Japanese. It likewise gave them greater assurance by 
eliminating the likelihood of a hostile coalition of powers 
against them in case of war with Russia. 

Negotiations relative to the occupation of Manchuria 

302 The Great War 

were carried on between Japan and Russia from August, 1903, 
until February, 1904, when the Japanese, convinced that 
it was futile to continue them any longer, made a sudden 
attack without any declaration of hostilities, torpedoing 
several war vessels in the harbor of Port Arthur during the 
night of the 8th and 9th. In August, 1904, the Japanese, 
in separate naval engagements, crushed the Russian fleets 
which had been stationed at Port Arthur and Vladivostok 
respectively, and on January 1, 1905, General Stoessel 
surrendered Port Arthur to General Nogi. Allusion has 
already been made to the startling effect of this disaster 
upon the temper of the Russian people. A sanguinary 
battle near Mukden continuing for several days resulted in 
a momentous victory for the Japanese. Finally, the Russian 
fleet which had been sent out from the Baltic, was shattered 
by the Japanese during an engagement in Tsushima Straits, 
May 27, 1905. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed Septem- 
ber 5th, recognized Japan's paramount interests in Corea. 
Both Russians and Japanese pledged themselves to evacuate 
Manchuria. Russia ceded to Japan the southern half of 
the island of Saghalin, and her lease of Kwangto, the southern 
extremity of the Liao-tung peninsula, which includes the 
seaports of Port Arthur, Dalny, and Talienwan. The 
possession of Kwangto includes also the control of the 
Southern Manchurian Railway. 

A new treaty of alliance between Japan and Great 
Britain was signed, August 12, and published, September 27, 
1905. It described the objects of the alliance as the defense 
of the "open door" in China, the maintenance of peace in 
Eastern Asia, and the protection of the special interests of 
the two contracting parties. The second article defined the 
reciprocal obligations of the contracting parties as follows: 

"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action 
wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 303 

either contracting party should be involved in war in defense 
of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the 
preamble of this agreement, the other contracting party will 
at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct 
the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement 
with it." 

By 1907 Japan and Russia had arrived at complete 
harmony of views respecting the Far East, and on June 30 
of that year a convention between them was signed at St. 
Petersburg, by which each power pledged itself to respect 
the territorial integrity and treaty rights of the other, ex- 
pressed its formal recognition of the independence and terri- 
torial integrity of the Chinese Empire "as well as the principle 
of equal opportunity in commerce and industry for all 
nations in the said empire." 

The volume of the economic life of Japan is still modest 
as compared with that of the most prominent European 
nations. Her area amounts to 140,191 square miles, or, 
including the dependencies, 235,886; her population was 
50,052,798 in 1908, and including her dependencies, 67,142,- 
798. Her annual budget balances at about the equivalent of 
3300,000,000 in American currency. Her total foreign trade 
represents an annual value of about 3550,000,000. There 
were 5606 miles of railway lines in Japan proper in 1913. 
The present Mikado, Yoshihito, who was born August 31, 
1879, and succeeded Mutsuhito at the latter's death, July 
30, 1912, is an able and progressive ruler, and he is surrounded 
by a group of statesmen of keen intelligence and ample 

But the records of Japan's internal affairs during quite 
recent years do not display the same harmony and un- 
animity which have characterized the Japanese people in 
the most critical periods. This is due to the struggle of the 
popular parties against bureaucracy and militarism and in 

304 The Great War 

favor of complete parliamentary control of the government. 
The prime minister does not owe his appointment to the 
prevailing party in the popular house of the legislature; he 
is chosen by the Council of Elder Statesmen. There was a 
cabinet crisis at the end of 1912, when the question of 
popular influence was involved. The people demanded a 
reduction of the heavy taxation which had prevailed since 
the war with Russia. The Prime Minister, Saionji, was 
favorable to a policy of retrenchment, but the minister of 
war refused to consent to the proposed economy in military 
expenditure. The bureaucratic influence was rendered very 
emphatic by the customary reservation of the portfolios of 
war and marine to representatives of distinct clans. Saionji 
resigned, and Prince Katsura formed a ministry, which lived 
only until February, when it was overthrown by parliament. 
Then Admiral Yamamato was entrusted with the formation 
of a new cabinet. Popular dissatisfaction accompanied by 
reported scandals in the government continued, and the 
Yamamato ministry resigned March 25, 1914. The cabinet 
was then formed which is still in existence. Count Shigenobu 
Okuma is prime minister, one of Japan's foremost statesmen, 
and so well known throughout the world, that he is commonly 
regarded by foreign nations as the leading authority on the 
affairsof his own country. He was born in 1838, and wasoneof 
the foremost advocates of the abolition of the former super- 
annuated institutions and the introduction of constitutional 
government. He organized the Progressive party, the fore- 
runner of the present National party. He has been finance 
minister altogether during eleven years, and was premier for 
a short period in 1898, after which he retired for a time from 
active party leadership, founded Waseda University and 
became its president. Baron Taka-akira Kato holds the 
portfolio of foreign affairs in the Okuma ministry. He was 
born in 1859, served in London as minister plenipotentiary, 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 305 

1894-99, and again as ambassador, 1908-12, and had already 
been minister of foreign affairs three times, the last time in 
the short-lived Katsura cabinet, before he was summoned to 
the same post in the present ministry. 

The Japanese^had always felt a sense of annoyance at the 
presence of the Gernians in Kiau-Chau, similar, no doubt, 
though less intense than their resentment at the Russian 
occupation of Port Arthur. They welcomed the opportunity 
afforded by the present war to rid themselves of unwelcome 

According to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1905, which 
was still in force, if either contracting party should be 
involved in war in defense of its interests in the Far East 
in consequence of an unprovoked aggressive action of 
another power, the other contracting party should come to 
the aid of the first. It required a somewhat broad inter- 
pretation of the circumstances, perhaps, to construe the 
presence of the Germans at Kiau-Chau as a casus belli 
under the terms of the treaty of alliance with Great Britain. 
Still, it was conceivable that the presence of this hostile 
base injured British interests. After previous consultation 
with Great Britain, on Monday, August 16, 1914, the 
Japanese government directed its ultimatum to the German 
government In the following terms: 

"We consider it highly important and necessary in the 
present situation to take measures to remove the causes of 
all disturbance of peace In the Far East, and to safeguard 
general interests as contemplated in the Agreement of 
Alliance between Japan and Great Britain." 

"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern 
Asia, the estabHshment of which is the aim of the said 
agreement, the Imperial Japanese government sincerely 
believes It to be its duty to give advice to the Imperial 
German government to carry out the following propositions : 

306 The Great War 

1. "To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese 
waters the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all 
kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be with- 

2. "To deliver on a date not later than September 15th 
to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or 
compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau, with 
a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." 

"The Imperial Japanese government announces at the 
same time that in the event of its not receiving by noon on 
August 23 rd an answer from the Imperial German govern- 
ment signifying unconditional acceptance of the above 
advices offered by the Imperial Japanese government, Japan 
will be compelled to take such action as it may deem neces- 
sary to meet the situation." 

When no answer had been received at the expiration of 
the appointed time, August 23, the Japanese government 
declared war on Germany. 

We turn our attention to another party playing a secondary 
role in the great drama, this time an ally of the Teutonic 

The entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the struggle as 
an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary, although appar- 
ently justified by no provocation on the part of the allied 
powers of the opposing group, may be regarded as the natural 
and almost inevitable outcome of tendencies which have 
been described in the fifth chapter. It may eventually 
come to be considered a fortunate occurrence, by making 
the scope of the final settlement at the termination of the 
war more inclusive. The Teutonic powers counted from 
the first, no doubt, upon the participation of Turkey as their 
ally in the war, and contemplated with eagerness, very 
Hkely, the prospect of the proclamation of the Jihad, or 
holy war of the Moslems against the foes of Islam, with the 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 307 

terror-inspiring effect which that would presumably have on 
their opponents. 

Turkey's military power had been very much curtailed in 
the rude buffeting inflicted upon her during the Balkan 
War. She had lost great quantities of military arms and 
stores. She was probably not able to put more than 
125,000 trained soldiers into the field, and her fleet was 
unimportant and poorly manned. The Ottoman Empire 
still embraced 694,860 square miles and contained 20,180,000 
people. Its great advantages were its incomparable strategic 
position, and the boundless but vague possibility of inflaming 
the fanaticism of the millions of Mohammedans living in the 
dominions of the entente allies, in India, Russia, Egypt, and 
French northern Africa. We have noticed that the railway 
system, as planned chiefly by Germans, was admirably 
adapted for the disposition of troops either for offensive or 
defensive purposes. Railway communication with the 
Teutonic empires remained open by way of Bulgaria and 

The dreams of Pan-Islamism for the aggrandizement of 
the Sultan's empire were supported by the solid facts of 
history. During at least four different periods the world's 
greatest commercial center had lain within the territory 
which the Sultan still possessed or claimed. In remotest 
times Babylon and Nineveh were the converging points of 
the great trade routes. In a later period Alexandria, near 
the mouth of the Nile, was the teeming metropolis of com- 
merce, industry, and wealth. 

Then, after an interval of several centuries, the star of 
commerce hovered over Constantinople, whose opulence 
cast its spell over the great barbarian world of the Slavs. 
And, finally, before the glory of Constantinople had been 
eclipsed, Bagdad made herself the central point in the vastly 
remunerative trade of east and west. Turkey in the twen- 

308 The Great War 

tieth century thought that she saw wonderful opportunities 
almost within her grasp, and the enticing prospect of the 
Suez Canal and the possibilities of Egypt must have been 
the most stimulating incentive to the more ambitious spirits 
in the Turkish nation. Undoubtedly the recovery of Egypt 
was the most cherished aspiration of the leaders of the 
Pan-Islamic movement, and with this project their German 
friends would be heartily in accord. The seizure of the 
Suez Canal would be a most effective blow at the commercial 
life of Great Britain and the British Empire. The coopera- 
tion of the Ottoman Empire with the Teutonic powers 
appeared, therefore, most reasonable. 

But German calculations were disappointed in some other 
respects, as we have already observed, and Turkey was only 
drawn into the war after nearly four months of uncertainty 
and hesitation. The external occurrences during this period 
of vacillation are characteristic of the evasive, procrastinat- 
ing nature of Turkish political dealings with the usual uncon- 
sciously humorous exhibitions of plausible gravity as a 
transparent mask of deception. But behind these outward 
facts there was a mysterious background of factional 
intrigue and the conflict of rival ambitions, which would 
probably prove to be a drama of absorbing interest, if it 
were ever revealed. 

The Turkish ministry whose existence had been ushered 
in by the coup d'etat of January, 1913, and the murder of 
Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, was terminated also by a 
political murder. Shevket Pasha, the Grand Vizier, was 
shot and killed by an assassin as he was riding to the Sublime 
Porte in a motor-car, June 12, 1913. But the Committee 
of Union and Progress, representing the Young Turkish 
party, which had recovered its authority by the acts of 
violence in January, 1913, survived the loss of Adrianople, 
which it had pledged itself not to give up, survived the 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 309 

assassination of Shevket Pasha, and received increased 
prestige by the recovery of Adrianople in the summer of 
1913. Said Halim Pasha succeeded Shevket Pasha as 
Grand Vizier. Germanophile sentiments held the ascend- 
ancy in the Committee of Union and Progress, although the 
Grand Vizier professed to be opposed to Turkey's participa- 
tion in the war and was regarded by the British ambassador 
as sincere in his deprecations of German intrigues. But 
four other members of the cabinet, of marked ability and 
apparently greater force of character, claim our attention. 
Djavid Bey, possessing an active, adaptable mind, directed 
the financial affairs of the empire. Djemal Pasha was 
minister of the navy. Talaat Pasha, Minister of the Interior, 
was endowed with tact, poise, intelligence and other valuable 
qualities of statesmanship. Most conspicuous of all was 
Enver Pasha, the son-in-law of the Sultan, Mohammed V, 
who was young, spirited, and ambitious. Enver Pasha's 
career had been a suitable preparation for playing a popular, 
heroic role in the present crisis. He had been in training as 
military attache in Berlin. He had commanded the Young 
Turkish army which suppressed the counter revolution in 
Constantinople, he had organized the resistance of the Arab 
tribes in Tripoli against the Italians, and he had derived the 
chief credit for the retaking of Adrianople in 1913. Thus 
his name was associated with thrilling, patriotic actions. 
At the beginning of the great European struggle he was 
Turkish minister of war at the age of thirty-five. He un- 
doubtedly aspires to play a great role; and we may assume 
that the assassin of Nazim Pasha is a character of inflexible 
resolution and unscrupulous as to his means. He is des- 
tined to be a factor for good or evil to his nation. His pro- 
German sympathy was very marked. 

The German military commission, with General Liman 
von Sanders at its head, did not depart from Turkey when 

310 The Great War 

hostilities commenced between the Great Powers. The 
Grand Vizier explained that "the retention of the German 
miHtary mission meant nothing and had no political signi- 
ficance. As they had ofi"ered to remain, it would have been 
ungracious to refuse." But it appears that German officers 
were continually arriving, and a German officer was entrusted 
with the command of the Dardanelles, where the forts 
received German garrisons. The German ambassador, 
General Liman von Sanders, and Enver Pasha really had 
the key to the situation in their hands from the beginning, 
through the control of the army by the pro-German element, 
although they probably experienced much difficulty in 
winning over several personages, perhaps the Sultan him- 
self, to their policy. 

From the first there was an obvious tendency to arouse 
the people by imputing hostile motives to the entente powers. 
On August 3, the British government announced its inten- 
tion of requisitioning two battle-ships which were being 
constructed for the Ottoman government at a yard on the 
Tyne in England. The news of this measure was adroitly 
manipulated so as to inflame popular indignation. The 
practice, of which this step of the British government is an 
example, is not unusual; and full requital was promised for 
any loss that should be incurred by the Turkish government. 
Finally, the British government sent a formal communica- 
tion to the Sultan stating "that the exigencies of the defense 
of the king's dominions are the only cause of the detention of 
these ships, which His Majesty hopes will not be for long, it 
being the intention of His Majesty's government to restore 
them to the Ottoman government at the end of the war, in 
the event of the maintenance of a strict neutrality by 
Turkey." The conviction spread, however, that Great 
Britain contemplated some unfriendly act, either the annex- 
ation of Egypt, or an attack upon Turkey herself. 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 311 

On August 18, the British ambassador assured the Turkish 
government that the allied powers would uphold Turkey's 
independence and integrity against any enemies that might 
take advantage of the general situation to attack her. But 
two days later, apparently in reply to this communication, 
the Turkish government submitted a list of terms to the 
British ambassador to serve as basis for Turkish neutrality. 
This proposal included the abolition of the Capitulations, 
the immediate consignment to Turkey of the requisitioned 
battle-ships, the renunciation of all interference with the 
internal affairs of Turkey, the promise of the restoration of 
western Thrace to Turkey, in case Bulgaria should intervene 
against the Triple Entente, and the restoration to Turkey of 
the Greek islands whose fate still remained undecided. 

Sir Edward Grey did not entirely reject these proposals. 
He was willing to make them the subject for discussion. 
On August 22, the entente powers offered to give a joint 
guarantee in writing to respect the independence and in- 
tegrity of Turkey if she maintained neutrality, and Sir 
Edward Grey repeated this same offer on September 16. 

During all this time the Turkish government was repeat- 
edly protesting its intention of remaining neutral. But 
evidence was continually accumulating to contradict these 
protestations and test the forbearance of the entente powers. 
In fact, the Turkish government acquiesced in various 
actions In violation of most of the rules of conduct incumbent 
upon neutral powers. The most conspicuous violation of 
neutrality occurred in consequence of the arrival in the 
Straits of two German war-vessels. 

The battle-cruiser Goeben and armored-cruiser Breslau were 
in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of hostilities. After 
causing annoyance along the coast of Algeria, they were 
pursued by a superior French and English squadron and took 
refuge in the Straits of Messina; then, eluding their pursuers. 

312 The Great War 

they safely arrived at the Dardanelles, August 10. 

The affair of the Goeben and Breslau assumed the character 
of a comedy of transparent dissimulation. By international 
law the Turkish government should have insisted that these 
belligerent ships depart within twenty-four hours, or else 
intern, that is, disarm and go out of commission for the 
duration of the war. But the Turkish government displayed 
no inclination to enforce such a requirement. The two war- 
vessels, armed and fully manned with their German crews, 
continued to enjoy the hospitable protection of the Straits. 
First, the Turkish government announced that it had pur- 
chased the Goeben and Breslau, adroitly giving out that this 
measure was necessary, to replace the two battle-ships which 
had been building for Turkey in an English yard. At this 
time the Grand Vizier requested that the British naval 
commission under Admiral Limpus should be permitted to 
remain, and Sir Edward Grey replied that this would be 
allowed, if the German crews should be sent back to Ger- 
many immediately, so that the two German ships should 
receive Turkish crews as proof that the transfer had been a 
genuine transaction. The minister of marine assured Admiral 
Limpus that Turkish crews would be provided for the two 
vessels as soon as possible. On the very next day, however, 
Admiral Limpus and all the other British officers composing 
the commission for the reorganization of the Ottoman navy 
were removed from their active positions in the fleet and 
requested to confine their activities within the ministry of 
marine. In spite of this palpable slight the British naval 
commission was not withdrawn until September 8th. 

Meantime the German crews remained on the two vessels, 
and on August 18th the Grand Vizier excused this breach of 
neutrality by the deficiency in available Turkish sailors. 
He promised to send off the German crews gradually as soon 
as a transport came from London with Turkish crews. 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 313 

Although the Turkish transport arrived on the 22nd the 
German crews remained and were actually reinforced from 
Germany. The British ambassador reported evidence, 
moreover, that the two ships had never been sold to Turkey. 
On September 21st the Sultan explained that the German 
crews "had been kept for a short time to train the Turkish 
crews. The German crews would be sent away in five or 
ten days, and the officers also." But these solemn assur- 
ances were never fulfilled. 

In addition to the unfriendly conduct of the Turkish 
government in harboring the two war-vessels, extensive 
supplies of war material were constantly arriving from 
Germany, while the number of German officers and men 
was increasing. The British ambassador reported his 
observation to the Grand Vizier on September 20 that 
"Constantinople and the neighborhood formed nothing 
more nor less than an armed German camp. Many more 
German officers and men had arrived, and there must now 
be between 4,000 and 5,000 German soldiers and sailors 
here. We all, including his Highness, were at the mercy of 
Liman Pasha (General Liman von Sanders) and the minister 
of war." 

On September 9 the Grand Vizier announced to the powers 
the intention of the Turkish government of abolishing the 
Capitulations, this measure to go into effect October 1. 
These Capitulations may be regarded as the continuation 
of concessions to the commercial communities of western 
Europe made by the rulers of Constantinople before the 
Turkish conquest. In their existing form they were con- 
ventions based upon treaties between the Ottoman govern- 
ment and many of the leading nations, guaranteeing to the 
citizens of the latter, while residing in Turkey, such privileges 
as exemption from taxation and jurisdiction in their own 
consular courts, and imposing a limitation upon the percent- 

314 The Great War 

age of customs duties levied upon imported merchandise. 
The Capitulations were a restriction upon the full exercise 
of sovereignty by the Turkish government. Their existence 
implied the assumption on the part of the western powers 
that the persons and property of their own citizens could not 
safely be entrusted to the unlimited authority of the Turkish 

They were the visible mark of political inferiority, which 
was galling to the more spirited element among the Turks, 
those who aspired to see their country occupy a respected 
position among the progressive states. Ever since the 
institution of the constitutional regime the Young Turks 
had cherished the vision of securing the abrogation of the 
Capitulations as the crowning step in the recognition by the 
greater powers of the political equality of the Ottoman 
Empire. In addition to the detriment to their national 
pride, the financial limitations imposed by the Capitulations 
may very likely have occasioned a practical embarrassment 
to the Turkish government. For the immunity of foreigners 
had as natural counterpart a greater burden of taxation for 
Turkish subjects, and in spite of the universal tendency for 
the financial requirements of governments to increase, the 
Turkish government could not augment the rate of import 
dues without the consent of the great commercial powers. 
However, the nations protested generally at this high- 
handed, one-sided method of annulling treaties. The 
choice of an occasion for this action by the Turkish govern- 
ment, a time when most of the Great Powers were too much 
absorbed in a struggle for existence to be able to divert 
much attention to relatively secondary matters, excited a 
feeling of annoyance among most of the nations whose 
privileges were thus abolished. 

Although the German ambassador disclaimed authorship 
for this move of Turkey, and joined in the protest of the 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 315 

powers against it, the belief is quite commonly entertained 
that Germany really encouraged Turkey to take this defiant 
step, hoping to involve her in this way in a conflict with 
the entente powers. But the latter exhibited the same for- 
bearance as in the Goeben and Breslau affair. Sir Edward 
Grey announced that if Turkey maintained her neutrality, 
the British government would "be prepared to consider 
reasonable concessions about Capitulations." The powers 
of the entente may have believed that a conciliatory attitude 
regarding this question might strengthen the position of the 
peace party in Turkey, of which the Grand Vizier was 
represented as being the leading spirit. 

The Turkish government had ordered a partial mobiliza- 
tion as soon as the European war had been announced, 
which they explained as a precautionary measure against 
any hostile movement on the part of Bulgaria. But as 
early as the end of August there was evidence of a contem- 
plated attack on Egypt. Extensive movements of Turkish 
troops in the direction of the province of Hedjaz were re- 
ported. On September 23, in making representations to 
the Grand Vizier concerning the extraordinary concentration 
of Turkish troops in Syria, which seemed to threaten the 
security of Egypt, the British ambassador observed that the 
proceedings in Turkey might afford Great Britain ample 
justification for protesting against the violation of neutrality. 
The fact that she had not taken such action was to be ascribed 
to her hope that the peace party would win the day. 

During this time numbers of German officers were being 
sent to Syria to superintend the preparation of troops and 
the concentration of supplies. Evidence collected in various 
quarters seemed to reveal a very widespread Turco-German 
campaign of anti-British propaganda, emissaries having 
been sent to India, Yemen, Senoussi, and Persia, as well as 
to Egypt for this purpose. The belief was systematically 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 317 

and the notorious Sheich Aziz Shawish, who has been so well 
known as a firebrand in raising Moslem feeling against 
Christians, has published and disseminated through Syria, 
and probably India, an inflammatory document urging 
Mohammedans to fight against Great Britain. Dr. Priifi'er, 
who was so long engaged in intrigues in Cairo against the 
British occupation, and is now attached to the German 
Embassy in Constantinople, has been busily occupied in 
Syria in trying to incite the people to take part in this 

But on October 26, a force of 2000 armed Bedouins 
advanced to a point twenty miles within the Egyptian 
frontier on their way to attack the Suez Canal; and actions 
taking place on October 29 definitely closed the long period 
of uncertainty as to Turkey's eventual conduct. Before 
dawn Turkish torpedo-boats raided Odessa harbor, and 
bombarded the town, and on the same day the Breslau and 
Hamidieh shelled other Russian places along the Black Sea 
coast. According to Turkish reports, on the other hand, 
Russian war-vessels opened fire without provocation on a 
Turkish fleet maneuvering in the Black Sea, and in the 
ensuing naval combat the Russians lost the mine-layer 
Pruth, which had been sent to strew mines at the entrance 
of the Bosphorus. 

On the afternoon of the 30th the Russian, French, and 
British ambassadors at Constantinople asked for their pass- 
ports. Official notice of the existence of a state of war 
between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire appeared 
in the Times, November 5, and at the same time the British 
government proclaimed the annexation of Cyprus. Great 
Britain had "occupied" and administered this island since 
the time of the Treaty of Berlin in a manner analogous to 
the position of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

In a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guildhall, 

318 The Great War 

November 9, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, 
undertook to explain that the Allies were not making war 
on Islam, but the political dominion of the Turkish govern- 
ment. The most significant passages in his speech are the 

"It is not the Turkish people, it is the Ottoman govern- 
ment that has drawn the sword, and which, I do not hesitate 
to predict, will perish by the sword. It is they and not we 
who have rung the death knell of the Ottoman dominion, 
not only in Europe, but in Asia. With their disappearance, 
at least, will disappear, as I at least hope and believe, the 
blight which for generations past has withered some of the 
fairest regions of the earth. 

"We have no quarrel with the Mussulman subjects of the 
Sultan. Our sovereign claims amongst the most loyal of 
his subjects millions of men who hold the Mussulman faith. 
Nothing is further from our thoughts or intentions than to 
initiate or encourage a crusade against their creed. Their 
holy places we are prepared, if any such need should arise, 
to defend against all invaders and keep them inviolate. 

"The Turkish Empire has committed suicide, and dug 
with its own hands its grave." 

Consistently with the erroneous notion that the Moham- 
medan religion was being attacked, which had been so dili- 
gently cultivated, the Jihad was proclaimed by the Sheich- 
ul-Islam, the spiritual head of the Mohammedan religion. 
This is a holy war for the extension of the religion of Islam, 
which usually offers the victims the choice of conversion or 
the sword or submission to a heavy tax. Under some cir- 
cumstances the non-believer is offered no alternative for 
extermination; and in the present Fetwa, or decree, there is 
only reference to the killing of English, French, and Russians 
and the seizure of their property. This decree expressly 
declares it to be the duty of the Mohammedan subjects of 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 319 

Great Britain, France, and Russia to wage the Jihad, and 
anathematizes any Mussulman who might serve in the armies 
of the AUies against the powers friendly to the Turkish Empire. 

It may not be inappropriate to observe, by way of antici- 
pation, that the effect of the Jihad was disappointing to 
those who had planned it; for it was received with compara- 
tive Indifference throughout the Ottoman Empire, and was 
probably even more barren of results in the Moslem lands 
elsewhere. This was partly due to the decadence of the 
old spirit of religious fanaticism. Then, the causes of the 
war were purely political, and this could not be entirely 
concealed from the Mohammedan population. It was 
fundamentally a struggle between different groups of 
Christian states, in which the Mohammedan religion was 
neither in any way directly involved nor threatened. 
Perhaps also, the jealousy of the Holy City, Mecca, for the 
upstart religious authority of Constantinople and the 
impatient spirit of the Arabs under Turkish domination are 
partially accountable for the diminished effect of the decree. 

In analyzing the motives for Italy's much-debated entry 
into the field of hostilities we must traverse a long stretch 
forwards along the chronological pathway of events. The 
hostility of Italy for Austria-Hungary was due to senti- 
mental, strategic, and economic causes. But the process 
by which this hostility was translated into action was a 
deliberate one. 

Allusion has already been made to Italia Irredenta, Un- 
redeemed Italy. This expression with its special, local 
significance has become so familiar that a term of universal 
application has grown out of it; and so, irredentism in the 
general sense may be defined as a movement to secure the 
union with a national state of contiguous territories in- 
habited by people of the same race and speaking the same 

320 The Great War 

About 800,000 Italians were living in the regions of the 
Austrian Empire adjacent to Italy at the outbreak of the 
European war, chiefly in the southernmost part of Tyrol 
about Trent, the district known as the Trentino, in Trieste, 
and in Istria. There were 373,000 in the Trentino; three- 
fourths of the 161,000 inhabitants of Trieste were Italians, 
the rest being mainly Slavs. The coast of Istria was Italian, 
while in the interior Slavs predominated. It is hardly 
necessary to add that these Austrian subjects of Italian 
nationality desired political union with the Kingdom of 
Italy, and that in many ways the attitude of the Austrian 
government by its lack of tact had intensified their yearning. 

Italy's unfavorable strategic position was a cause of con- 
tinual preoccupation. The general character of her exten- 
sive coast-line presented an unusually difficult problem of 
defense, which was greatly aggravated by the special features 
of the situation to the east. The balance of power in the 
Adriatic was vital for Italy's safety, and this balance was 
chiefly determined by the state of affairs on the eastern 
shore of the sea. For the Adriatic is controlled in a naval 
sense by the important positions on its eastern margin. 
The Adriatic coast of the Italian peninsula is almost without 
suitable harbors to serve as naval bases; but along the 
eastern shore of the same sea the condition Is quite the 
reverse. Pola in the north and Valona in the south are 
ports of inestimable naval Importance; and between these 
two the Islands of the Dalmatian archipelago form a veritable 
labyrinth of sheltered, navigable passages. The greater part 
of the coast-line is therefore a continuous harbor. In ancient 
times the Roman conquest of the lUyrlan coast, as this shore 
was then called, the nest of piratical tribes, the forefathers 
of the present Albanians, was a necessary measure for the 
security of Italy. Later the possession of Dalmatia became 
a necessary guarantee for the commercial supremacy of 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 321 

Venice, and the vestiges of the proud republic of St. Mark 
are still in evidence along the entire coast. At present the 
possession of Pola and Valona by the same great power 
would destroy the independence of Italy; and therefore, 
since Italy has not been, heretofore, in a position to insist 
upon the annexation of Valona, she associated herself with 
Austria-Hungary in the plan of establishing an independent 
Albania, so as to eliminate that part of the coast from the 
possible elements forming the balance of power between her 
ally and herself. 

On Italy's northeastern frontier the course of the Austro- 
Italian boundary was favorable to Austrian military inter- 
ests, since it left the dominating positions in Austrian hands, 
and marked out Southern Tyrol in the shape of a wedge 
driven far into Italian territory, a sally-port from which the 
Dual Monarchy might at any time launch a mortal blow. 

The strategic cause for Italy's hostility was, therefore,' her 
failure to possess natural, strategic boundaries and the fact 
that Austria-Hungary everywhere blocked the road to 
their attainment. 

During the last fifteen years the development of Italian 
industry has been increasing in velocity at a very satis- 
factory, if not astonishing, rate. The possession of exten- 
sive sources of power in the waterfalls, rendered available 
by the progress of electrical invention, the presence of a 
numerous, industrious, laboring class, and the admirable 
situation of the country for purposes of commerce have all 
contributed to this happy result. With scarcely any native 
deposits of coal or iron Italy supplies her own steel rails and 
electrical machinery, and competes in the markets of the 
world in the products of her textile industries, which gave 
employment in 19 11 to 657, 190 persons. The Balkan penin- 
sula and Asia Minor constitute a very important market for 
Italian products; but precisely in these regions Italy en- 

322 The Great War 

counters the stiffest competition of Austria-Hungary, and 
the latter's rivalry is rendered especially formidable by the 
policy of her government to establish a kind of commercial 
hegemony by means of political and diplomatic pressure. 

During the forty-four years of her national existence since 
securing Rome as her capital, the oscillation in Italy's 
foreign policy has been determined by the balance of the 
conflicting sentiments of apprehension and hostility for 
France and Austria-Hungary respectively. 

In the early years of the Third Republic, when the con- 
servative or reactionary elements were most influential in 
France, the temperament of the French government kept 
alive the suspicion in Italy that Napoleon Ill's policy of 
upholding the papal claim to secular authority would be 
reasserted. The feeling of apprehension respecting the 
designs of France rose to a climax with the French annexa- 
tion of Tunis, when Italy united with Germany and with 
Austria-Hungary, her former enemy, in the Triple Alliance, 
as a measure for self-protection. After this the Italian 
government was naturally compelled to adopt an attitude 
of formal disapproval of Irredentist yearnings; and, in fact, 
the spirit of Irredentism seems to have waned for more than 
twenty-five years. 

But in recent years the balance of feeling in Italy regard- 
ing the neighboring powers has undergone a remarkable 
alteration in consequence of the evolution of political ten- 
dencies in France and Austria-Hungary. Thus in France a 
spirit of violent hostility to the influence of the church had 
supplanted the former ultramontane sympathy, whilst 
clericalism had become so strong in the court of Vienna that 
Francis Joseph never paid a visit to the royal court of Rome 
for fear of offending the Vatican. 

Germany and Austria-Hungary had adopted a more 
energetic attitude in their foreign relations, for which they 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 323 

could not claim the support of Italian interests, as was 
apparent at the Algeciras Convention. But Italy's attitude 
of indifference was converted into one of suspicion and 
jealousy with respect to the policy of Austria-Hungary 
when a succession of events seemed to afford proof of a 
design of extending the Hapsburg sphere of influence in the 
Balkan peninsula. 

When war between the central powers and Russia and 
France became practically inevitable, Italy assumed pre- 
cisely the attitude which was to be expected. The Marquis 
di San Giuliano, then Italian Foreign Secretary, informed 
Herr von Flotow, the German Ambassador, that as the war 
undertaken by Austria, especially in view of its possible 
consequences, had an aggressive character, and was not in 
accordance with the purely defensive purpose of the Triple 
Alliance, Italy could not take part in it. 

Professor Hans Delbriick affirms that if Great Britain had 
remained neutral, Italy would have taken her stand by the 
side of her associates in the Triple Alliance; but in view of 
the general trend of events this scarcely seems probable. 
It may be remarked, moreover, that the statement of the 
Italian foreign secretary was made on July 31, whereas Great 
Britain took no step indicating an intention of intervening 
against Germany before August 2. 

No considerable party in Italy advocated military cooper- 
ation with the Teutonic empires. The field for discussion 
was practically reserved for the controversial combat of the 
Neutralists and Interventionists, the latter supporting an 
active combination with the entente powers. An overwhelm- 
ing majority of the nation were in favor of peace, but at the 
same time an overwhelming majority were determined that 
some concession must be made toward the satisfaction of 
Italy's national aspirations. 

A very brief survey of some of the salient features of 

324 The Great War 

Italy's internal political situation will aid us in comprehend- 
ing the influences which were effective in molding the foreign 
policy of the kingdom in this critical period. 

Formerly the Conservatives and Liberals, or the Right 
and Left, were distinct, and individually fairly coherent, 
political parties. But these parties have gradually disin- 
tegrated into smaller groups. A very large majority of the 
deputies in the Chamber at present call themselves Liberals; 
but the Liberal party as such no longer plays any distinctive 
role. The various groups into which the older parties have 
been dissolved are frequently made up of the adherents of 
prominent political leaders. But some observers in Italy 
have attributed this evolution to the rising political con- 
science of the nation and the consequent revolt from the 
thraldom of party. Undoubtedly the progress of socialistic 
doctrine has been an important factor in the transition; and 
it may be remarked, as proof of the general progress in ideas, 
that views which were regarded as subversive socialistic 
heresies in 1898 had become a part of orthodox liberal 
doctrine in 1914. 

Signor Giolitti was the dominating spirit in Italian politics 
for more than ten years. In political integrity and sagacity 
he occupied a relatively respectable position among the 
offspring of an unheroic age. He combined discretion in 
policy with the popularity and adroitness which secured for 
him a position of almost dictatorial authority. Under his 
influence the electoral law of 1913 was passed, which in- 
creased the number of voters from 3,500,000 to 8,500,000. 

Giolitti withdrew from the premiership in the spring of 
1914 in consequence of a defection of the Radicals. He was 
succeeded by Signor Antonio Salandra, who was at first 
believed to be nothing more than Giolitti's creature or lieu- 
tenant, but who in reality, as we shall presently observe, 
has displayed a remarkable degree of independence. 

? ^ 

-^ 1^ — 

Turkey and Italy 325 

The Italian Chamber of Deputies during the first year of 
the war was the first one elected on the basis of the new 
electoral law of 1913. The supreme question of peace or war 
brought about a curious alignment of parties in this assembly. 
For the Socialists and Clericals ranged themselves together 
in favor of neutrality, while the Reformed Socialists, Repub- 
licans, and Nationalists advocated active participation in the 
war on the side of the entente powers. The Nationalists are a 
group of recent formation. The expansion of national ambi- 
tion encouraged by the conquest of Tripoli nourished the so- 
called "nationalist" movement, the program of which was 
at first extensive but vague. The outbreak of the Euro- 
pean war naturally focused the attention of the Nationalists 
on Italia Irredenta. As a matter of fact, the Nationalists are 
recruited from all the parties and are but loosely united. 

Signor Giolitti made himself the leading advocate of con- 
tinued neutrality. He believed that Italy was not ready for 
war, and that she could obtain adequate concessions from 
Austria-Hungary without abandoning her attitude of 

One circumstance of importance for the general situation 
may as well be mentioned here, without implying any im- 
mediate connection with the context. German investments 
in Italy have increased very rapidly of late years, and are 
said to amount in value at the present time to about 

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who had been foreign 
minister since 1905, and had always been favorable to the 
maintenance of the Triple Alliance — it had been renewed in 
1912 during his tenure of the foreign office — died on October 
16, 1914. His successor was Baron Sydney Sonnino, who 
had formerly been leader of the parliamentary opposition 
to Giolitti. 

It is necessary at this point to mention an event which 

326 The Great War 

was not without an influence on the international situation 
in relation to Italy. After a troubled reign of about eight 
months William of Wied issued a rather ambiguous proclam- 
ation to his Albanian subjects in August, placed the royal 
seals on the doors of the palace in Durazzo, and departed 
for Germany, where he shortly joined his old regiment in 
the war against France, and finally abdicated by formal 
announcement the throne of Albania. 

William's life as ruler of Albania during several months 
must have resembled that of Otho, King of the Hellenes, 
whom Thackeray represents as going "out to drive (revolu- 
tions permitting) at five." The prediction made by the 
same authority might just as well have been applied (mutatis 
nominibus) to Durazzo and William: "It was a farce to 
make this place into a kingly capital ; and I make no manner 
of doubt that King Otho, the very day he can get away 
unperceived, and can get together the passage-money, will 
be off for dear old Deutschland, Fatherland, Beerland!" 

There were halcyon days in Rome in the spring of 1914 
when one could lounge at one's ease in the cafes and experi- 
ence a varied round of fresh sensations from the daily 
accounts of stirring events in Albania; treason, conspiracy, 
insurrection, coups d'etat, royal flights, which lost nothing 
by their narration in the pages of the Messagero or the 
Corriere della Sera; all conducted on a scale commensurate 
with actions in famous Pumpernickel, and involving vastly 
more actual danger than the court intrigues in that worthy 
capital. While these premonitory ebullitions in Albania 
served for the time as a harmless, but not too remote source 
of entertainment, one little suspected the formidable erup- 
tion which impended over Europe. 

At the outbreak of the general conflict the powers with- 
drew their detachments from Scutari. Albania was abandoned 
to her own turbulent factions, and Prince William found 

Turkey and Italy 327 

himself without resources or support. There was nothing 
left for him except to depart as gracefully as he could. In 
October, Essad Pasha perceiving the opportunity for which 
he had apparently been waiting since the capitulation of 
Scutari, hurried to Durazzo at the head of his followers and 
had himself chosen head of a provisional government by the 
Albanian senate. 

Albanian affairs remained unsettled, and the Italian 
government sent out an expedition which occupied Valona. 
It is safe to predict that, as in the case of the Dodecanese, 
much time will elapse before conditions permit the with- 
drawal of the Italian troops from Valona. 

With the aspirations of Italian Irredentism in mind, it is 
natural to assume that the Austro-Italian crisis created by 
the war was a very simple one; that Italy regarded the 
European conflict as a favorable opportunity for satisfying 
her national ambition by completing the process of unifica- 
tion, and demanded the cession of the Italian districts in the 
Austrian Empire as the price of her neutrality. It would 
follow from this assumption that the conduct of Italy could 
only be justified if judged on the basis of a standard of 
political ethics transcending the literal provisions of treaties 
and the formal rules of international law; in other words, 
that the case for Italy would rest solely upon the ideal 
Principle of Nationalities, and the revolutionary doctrine 
that the exercise of sovereignty in defiance of popular 
inclination, as in the Trentino and Trieste, is tyrannous and 
ipso facto indefensible. 

But the actual situation revealed by the official corres- 
pondence is different. For the fact is, that throughout their 
entire course, the negotiations between the two governments 
were conducted on the basis of a particular article in the 
secret treaty which regulated, in a very important respect, 
the relationship of Italy and Austria-Hungary within the 

328 The Great War 

Triple Alliance. Italy took her stand upon the formal terms 
of an international agreement. 

Article 7 of the treaty referred to provided for the main- 
tenance of an equilibrium between the two allies on the 
Adriatic and Aegean Seas and in the Balkan peninsula by 
establishing that, if either should acquire territorial or other 
advantages in the regions mentioned, such acquisition, even 
though temporary, would give the ally the right to compen- 
sation. It provided, moreover, that the nature of the 
compensation should be settled by previous accord between 
the two parties. Thus if Austria-Hungary, for instance, 
proposed to undertake operations in the Balkans from which 
any advantage whatsoever might be derived, the treaty 
placed upon her the obligation of inviting Italy to an ex- 
change of views for the purpose of settling the question of 
immediate compensation. And so, like a hunter, Austria- 
Hungary was obliged to settle for the license before taking 
her chance at the game. But this limitation, which was 
reciprocal, must not be regarded as an instrument for extor- 
tion. It was an indispensable guarantee for the maintenance 
of the Triple Alliance. The observations already made have 
shown how the security of Italy was involved in the balance 
of power to the eastward of the Adriatic. Even with the 
protection of this guarantee, the Italian government felt 
that the situation demanded unceasing vigilance; for there 
was manifest danger that Austro-Hungarian influence might 
advance in a manner so subtle as to evade the formal 

It may appear surprising that the interpretation of an 
article so short and specific could have afforded matter for 
negotiations lasting more than four months. We shall 
discover, however, that this famous article 7 left a consider- 
able margin for controversy. Discussion turned upon the 
questions of whether the actual situation called for compensa- 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 329 

tion, where the compensation was to be provided, when it 
was to be delivered, and what was to be its extent. The 
course of the negotiations may be divided roughly into three 
general periods; the first extending from December 9 until 
December 20, 1914, before Austria-Hungary had admitted 
that the actual situation called for compensation ; the second, 
when the question of the location of the compensation was 
uppermost, from the intervention of Prince von Biilow, 
December 20, 1914, until the submission of definite proposals 
by Austria-Hungary, March 27, 1915; and the third, when 
the principle of a cession of Austrian territory had been 
admitted, from the latter date until Italy's repudiation of 
the Triple Alliance, May 4, 1915. 

Baron Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister, inaugurated the 
discussion, December 9, 1914, by instructing the Italian 
ambassador in Vienna to inform Count Berchtold that the 
invasion of Serbia by Austria-Hungary must necessarily be 
the subject for examination by the Italian and Austro- 
Hungarian governments on the basis of article 7 of the 
treaty. Baron Sonnino represented that Italy has a fore- 
most interest in the preservation of the independence of 
Serbia, and that the Dual Monarchy had violated article 7 
by her invasion of the Slav kingdom without previous agree- 
ment with Italy. He called attention to the fact that the 
said article covered temporary occupations of territory in 
the Balkan peninsula, and even gave Italy the right to 
compensation for advantages to Austria-Hungary of a non- 
territorial character. The situation demanded a satisfac- 
tory compact between the two powers, and this would invest 
their alliance with the mutual feeling of cordiality which was 
desired by both parties. 

When the matter was presented in this light to Count 
Berchtold, he observed that in the varying course of military 
operations the Austro-Hungarian forces had evacuated the 

330 The Great War 

places which they had previously occupied, and that it was 
manifestly preposterous to demand compensation for an oc- 
cupation of such a transitory character. When the Duke of 
Avarna reminded him of the presence of Austro-Hungarian 
troops in Belgrade, he represented that they also might 
soon be compelled to evacuate the position which they 
were holding. The Italian ambassador declared that 
article 7 granted Italy, unequivocally, the right to compensa- 
tion for the mere invasion of Serbia, since that tended to 
disturb the balance of power in the Balkan peninsula. 
Austria-Hungary, as proof of the justice of Italy's position, 
had invoked article 7 at the time of the Italo-Turklsh War 
to restrain her ally from executing certain military and 
naval operations against European Turkey. Count Berch- 
told asserted that the two cases were not analogous. The 
proposed action by Italy during the war against Turkey 
would have been actually aggressive in its nature, and would 
have endangered the existence of the Ottoman Empire. 
The present operations of Austria-Hungary, on the other 
hand, were really defensive in character. This conversa- 
tion constitutes an interesting revelation respecting the 
diplomatic situation during the Italo-Turkish War. For the 
world was informed at the time that Italy's scrupulous 
abstention from attacking Turkey in Europe was the con- 
sequence of her own sense of moderation and of a feeling of 
loyal friendship for the Ottoman Empire which was proof 
against every provocation. 

The Duke of Avarna insisted that the action of the Dual 
Monarchy was destroying the equilibrium in the Balkan 
peninsula (one might have supposed from Austria's protes- 
tations in 1913 that there was no equilibrium left to destroy). 
It appeared that as far back as July 25, 1914, the Duke of 
Avarna had notified Count Berchtold that Italy would regard 
as a violation of the Triple Alliance any occupation, however 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 331 

temporary, of Serbian territory, without the required 
previous understanding with herself. Count Berchtold took 
cover behind the argument that the presence of Austro- 
Hungarian troops in positions on Serbian soil in the course 
of the rapidly shifting operations of a campaign did not 
constitute even a temporary occupation in the sense of 
article 7. In fact, a finer distinction must be made between 
temporary occupations of Balkan territory as covered by 
article 7 and momentary occupations which are not included 
within the scope of this provision. Who would hesitate to 
affirm that the rude spirit of militarism has no place in 
'diplomacy's atmosphere of clear discernment? What 
soldier "jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel" 
would have any perception for such subtleties as these? 

Baron Sonnino, replying to Count Berchtold's representa- 
tions through the medium of the Italian ambassador in 
Vienna, declined to accept the distinction of temporary and 
momentary occupations of territory. In the Italo-Turkish 
War Italy had been compelled to abstain, not only from 
momentary occupations, but even from bombarding points 
on the coast of European Turkey. The attitude of Austria- 
Hungary, as based upon article 7, had prolonged the war by 
prohibiting decisive measures by Italy. It appeared that 
Count Aehrenthal had vetoed the bombardment of Salonica 
and the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Baron 
Sonnino represented, moreover, that the treaty prescribed 
that the agreement with Italy should be previous to, and not 
contemporary with, or subsequent to, the military action 
which made article 7 effective. 

On December 20, 1914, the Duke of Avarna reported 
that Count Berchtold was willing to enter into an exchange 
of views regarding compensation. On the same day, further- 
more, Prince von Biilow, who had come to Rome as Ger- 
man ambassador, and more particularly as special envoy for 

332 The Great War 

effecting a reconciliation, had his first audience with Baron 
Sonnino. On this day the negotiations entered upon their 
second stage. Prince von Billow's intervention introduced 
a new element into the discussion, — Germany's desire for a 
fair accommodation between her two allies. 

Prince von Biilow had accumulated a broad diplomatic 
experience at Germany's legations and embassies in St. 
Petersburg, Paris, Rome, and Bucharest, before he was called 
to Berlin as foreign secretary in 1896. He was very much 
at home in Italy. His wife is an accomplished Italian lady 
and he owns Villa Malta in Rome, where many an admiring 
tourist has gazed at St. Peter's dome, appearing as in a 
circular composition with perfect balance, through the key- 
hole of the prince's garden-gate. 

Prince von Biilow approached the present situation with 
his customary affability of manner. He was soon convinced 
that it would be practically impossible for the Italian 
government to maintain an attitude of neutrality without 
obtaining satisfaction for some of the national aspirations. 

On January 7, 1915, Baron Sonnino suggested to Baron 
Macchio, the Austrian Ambassador in Rome, the delicate 
question of a possible cession to Italy of territories actually 
belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Baron 
Macchio made the counter-suggestion that compensation 
for Italy might be provided in Albania. Baron Sonnino 
replied that Italy's sole interest in Albania was the negative 
one that no other power should gain a foothold there. 
Baron Macchio declared that any agreement regarding 
compensation would have to be made dependent on the 
ultimate results of the war. But Baron Sonnino insisted 
that there must be a fixed minimum of definite advantages 
for Italy, and he expressed the reassuring conjecture that 
a self-inflicted amputation of her Italian districts by Austria 
might eventually contribute to the health and welfare of the 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 333 

Dual Monarchy (a worthY object of friendly concern). 

On the 14th, von Biilow came forward with his own 
proposition, which contemplated the cession of the Trentino 
to Italy, the transaction to remain secret until the end of 
the war. But Baron Sonnino informed him that the 
Trentino alone was not enough; Trieste must be added. 
The German ambassador entreated him not to make the 
additional demand, because he was convinced that Austria 
would fight rather than part with her prominent seaport. 

A few days later Baron Burian, who had replaced Count 
Berchtold in the Austro-Hungarian foreign office, suggested 
that Italy ought to be willing to accept eventual compensa- 
tion in territory then possessed by Austria-Hungary's 
adversaries. But Baron Sonnino was of the opinion that 
such an agreement would be in effect a departure from 
Italy's neutrality. 

Prince von Biilow urged that Italy should herself formu- 
late her requirements; but Baron Sonnino objected that 
until Austria-Hungary admitted that the discussion was to 
be conducted on the basis of a cession of Austrian territory, 
it would be futile for Italy to formulate her demands. 

The Duke of Avarna explained to Baron Burian on the 
28th that the Italian government was compelled to respond 
to popular aspirations in directing its national policy. He 
reiterated the principle that Austria-Hungary's accord with 
Italy ought to be preventive, and not contemporary with, 
or consecutive to, the action in the Balkans contemplated 
by the treaty. He inquired whether the Austro-Hungarian 
foreign minister accepted the principle that the question of 
compensation be discussed on the basis of a cession of 
Austrian territory. Baron Burian replied that he accepted 
the general principle of a compensation for Italy, but that 
the cession of Austrian territory was a very serious question 
requiring further reflection by the competent authorities of 

334 The Great War 

Austria and Hungary separately as well as conjointly. 

On February 9, Baron Burian advanced the counter- 
claim that the treaty imposed upon Italy the obligation of 
a preventive agreement for her occupation of Valona and 
some of the Aegean islands, Rhodes and the so-called 
Dodecanese. But the Duke of Avarna maintained that Italy 
had occupied Valona merely as agent for the Great Powers, 
being the only one whose hands were free to uphold the 
arrangements of the London Conference, and that the 
islands were being held pending the fulfilment of the terms 
of the Treaty of Lausanne by Turkey. Baron Burian 
abandoned Berchtold's distinction of temporary and momen- 
tary occupations, but insisted upon the relevancy of his 
claim respecting Valona and the islands. 

In view of this new departure in the negotiations. Baron 
Sonnino cited a statement by Count Berchtold, made on 
May 23, 1912, renouncing the right of compensation for the 
Italian occupation of Rhodes and the Dodecanese, provided 
the Italians did not proceed any further. In consequence, 
Italy had abstained from occupying Chios and Mitylene, 
renouncing precisely the additional strategic advantage 
which might have forced Turkey to come to terms at once. 
By prolonging her occupation of the islands, Italy had 
rendered an important service to Turkey, since, like Chios 
and Mitylene, these islands would have inevitably fallen a 
prey to the Greeks, if not protected by Italian garrisons. 

As the Austro-Hungarian government seemed to be pro- 
longing the discussion Intentionally, merely to avoid an 
issue, the Italian foreign office withdrew all its earlier pro- 
posals, and Italy took her stand firmly on article 7 of the 
treaty by declaring solemnly that she would consider any 
action taken henceforth by Austria-Hungary in the Balkan 
peninsula without a previous agreement with herself regard- 
ing compensation as a violation of the treaty. Italy affirmed 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 335 

that the attitude of Count Aehrenthal in prohibiting her 
action against the remaining islands of the Aegean or the 
shore of European Turkey was precedent and full justifica- 
tion for her own position in the present circumstances. 

Baron Burian undertook to uphold his claim for an under- 
standing on the subject of Italy's occupation of the islands 
by asserting that if Count Aehrenthal ever waived the right 
to compensation it was really in the sense of a postponement 
of the privilege. He declared, however, that he was going 
to Buda-Pesth the next day to discuss with Count Tisza the 
question of an agreement with Italy, and that Austria- 
Hungary would keep in mind the requirements of article 7 
in the event of a renewal of the war against Serbia. 

On February 27, Baron Burian advanced the view that 
the actual existence of a state of hostilities between Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia must be accepted as influencing the 
degree of priority of the discussion about compensation. 
It ought to be sufficient, in these circumstances, that the 
negotiations should have been inaugurated before the 
commencement of fresh operations against Serbia. If 
military action had to be put off until the negotiations were 
completed, Austria-Hungary would in the meantime be 
rendered defenseless against the Serbs. The Austro- 
Hungarian foreign minister insisted that the compensation 
should be proportionate to the advantages obtained by the 
Dual Monarchy, and still refused to admit, as a basic prin- 
ciple, the cession of Austrian territory. Later, on March 3, 
he declared that the question of compensation was not 
pressing, because Austria-Hungary did not contemplate an 
immediate resumption of activity in Serbia. Since it was 
recognized that negotiations must be initiated before 
military operations were resumed, a limit to delay was set 
which must be reached automatically, so long as Austria- 
Hungary continued to be at war with Serbia. The Duke of 

336 The Great War 

Avarna reiterated the Italian view that the conclusion of 
the negotiations must be reached before operations were 
undertaken. Baron Burian promised to do all he could to 
hasten their conclusion, but would not bind himself to put 
off military operations in the meantime. The Duke of 
Avarna advised Baron Sonnino that he considered that the 
attempt to bring Baron Burian to the Italian point of view 
was hopeless. 

Accordingly, the next day. Baron Sonnino formulated the 
Italian position in the following declarations : that an agree- 
ment in accordance with article 7 must be concluded before 
Austria-Hungary should undertake further military action 
in Serbia, and that a violation of this requirement would be 
regarded as an open violation of the treaty; that no arrange- 
ment for compensation would be acceptable unless it were 
based on the cession of territory possessed by Austria- 
Hungary; that a minimum compensation was requisite for 
the fact alone of operations against Serbia, without exclud- 
ing further compensation in proportion to the advantages 
derived by Austria-Hungary; and that the compensation 
must be immediately effective. 

On March 27 we arrive at the commencement of the third 
and final stage in the negotiations, when Austria-Hungary 
made her first definite proposal involving a cession of 
Austrian territory to Italy. On condition of the mainten- 
ance of benevolent neutrality throughout the war, an agree- 
ment by Italy to grant Austria-Hungary full liberty of action 
in the Balkans, except in Albania, and the renunciation in 
advance of any additional compensation for Austro- 
Hungarian advantages, the Dual Monarchy was prepared 
to cede territory in Southern Tyrol, Including Trent, to 
Italy. But Austria-Hungary could not admit that it was 
reasonable to expect that the actual transfer of territory 
should be effected until the equivalent, Italy's neutrality 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 337 

until the termination of the war, had become a reality. 
Baron Sonnino formulated on April 8 the conditions which 
Italy considered indispensable. They included the cession 
of the Trentino; the rectification of the Italian boundary in 
the north-east so that it would pass to the eastward of the 
Isonzo River, embracing Gradisca and Gorizia within the 
kingdom, and terminate at the sea near Nabresina; the 
erection of Trieste and its surroundings into an independent 
state with its territory extending northv/^ard as far as the 
Italian boundary at Nabresina, and southward so as to 
embrace a considerable portion of Istria; the cession to 
Italy of the Curzolari islands off the Dalmatian coast, com- 
prising Lissa, Lesina, Curzola, Lagosta, Cazza, Meleda, and 
Pelgosa; the immediate transfer of the ceded territory to 
Italy; recognition by Austria-Hungary of Italian sovereignty 
in Valona; the relinquishment by Austria-Hungary of her 
interest in Albania; and the renunciation by Austria-Hungary 
of the right to demand compensation for the Italian occupa- 
tion of the Dodecanese. In return for these concessions 
Italy offered to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 lire In gold 
($38,600,000), to bind herself to neutrality throughout the 
war, and to renounce any further right to compensation for 
advantages derived from the war by Austria-Hungary. 

Austrian authorities point to these demands as proof that 
the government at Rome no longer desired a pacific accom- 
modation with the former ally, but had determined to throw 
in its lot with the entente powers. The demands relating to 
the Trentino, the Isonzo valley, and Trieste might be justi- 
fied on nationalistic grounds. But the population of the 
Curzolari islands Is almost exclusively Slavic. The attempt 
to justify the demand for the cession of these islands could 
be based solely on the strategic argument of securing an 
outlying bulwark for the protection of the exposed Italian 

338 The Great War 

On the 16th, Baron Burian reported that the demands 
relative to the correction of the frontier, the city of Trieste, 
and the Curzolari islands could not be accepted by Austria- 
Hungary; and on the 21st, Baron Sonnino rejected the 
Austro-Hungarian proposals. The negotiations came to a 
deadlock, and all the diplomatic skill of von Biilow was 
apparently incapable of bridging the chasm which separated 
the minimum demands of Italy from the maximum conces- 
sions of Austria-Hungary. 

Accordingly, on May 4, the Salandra ministry took the 
ominous step of repudiating the Triple Alliance. In announc- 
ing its decision the Italian government declared that the 
alliance, which had been formed as a means and guarantee 
of peace, had been violated by Austria-Hungary in present- 
ing the ultimatum to Serbia without communicating her 
intention to Italy or heeding the latter's advice. Austria- 
Hungary had gone to war to put into execution a program 
directly opposed to the interests of her ally. The Italian 
government had striven for months to devise a basis upon 
which friendly relations might be reestablished, but all its 
efforts had been shattered by the resistance of the Austro- 
Hungarian government, which finally, after many months, 
had offered an entirely insufficient concession. Italy was 
accordingly compelled to withdraw all her proposals, resume 
her entire liberty of action, and declare her treaty of alliance 
with Austria-Hungary to be void and henceforth of no effect. 

Although it was believed that this measure would bring 
the negotiations to a definite conclusion, another proposal 
of more comprehensive scope was made by Austria-Hungary, 
elicited no doubt by an earnest appeal of von Biilow, backed 
by the approval of the German government. In playing this 
final card, von Biilow appears to have invoked the coopera- 
tion of Signor Giolitti, and to have submitted to his private 
consideration Austria's final proposal before it was com- 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 339 

municated to the Italian government. This proposal em- 
braced the cession of the Trentino and the Italian part of 
the Isonzo valley, the modification of the political status of 
Trieste Into an imperial free city of the Austrian Empire, 
the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Valona, and the 
relinquishment by Austria-Hungary of her interest in Albania 
and of any claim for compensation arising from the Italian 
occupation of the Dodecanese. In return Italy was to 
remain neutral and waive in advance the right to any further 
compensation for advantages which Austria-Hungary might 
acquire in the war. The cession of territory was to be 
effected as soon as practicable. The Italian government 
made no reply to these proposals. 

Signor Glolitti returned to Rome with the intention of 
casting the weight of his influence into the scales in favor of 
reconciliation and the maintenance of peace. The question 
of war or peace had reached its crucial stage. The 
passionate manifestations in support of the rival policies 
throughout the country raised popular excitement to fever 
heat; but it was clear that the balance of popular feeling was 
now In favor of energetic measures. 

The majority of the Chamber, which had been elected 
when Glolitti was In power, seemed disinclined to support 
the cabinet's policy of persevering In the demands of April 8. 
Accordingly, Signor Salandra and his colleagues tendered 
their resignation to the king. 

The supposed Interference of Ambassador von Biilow in 
the field of domestic politics irritated Italian sensibility. 
Professor Ferrero wrote in the Radical organ, // Secolo: 

"Since the time had passed for making new proposals to 
the ministry, Prince von Biilow entered into an alliance 
with a group of politicians who were eager to overthrow the 
ministry and take their place, and of journalists whose 
services were enlisted in their behalf, and thus succeeded In 

340 The Great War 

overthrowing the cabinet for the time being, but not in 
reversing the current of public opinion. Such methods have 
been employed by European diplomacy at Constantinople, 
and at Fez before Morocco was placed under the protection 
of France. An ambassador who presumed to conduct him- 
self in any European capital as von Biilow has done in Rome 
should be recalled immediately at the request of the power 
to which he has been accredited. This formidable crisis 
ought to be made an object lesson for all the world to show 
whether Italy will submit to the same sort of treatment as 
Turkey from German diplomacy; whether she will tolerate 
the failure to distinguish between Rome and Byzantium." 

The passage has been reproduced with a view more 
especially to illustrate the temper of a large part of the 
Italian people at this decisive moment as expressed in the 
words of an individual of international reputation. It is 
fair to add that no less a personage than the German Chan- 
cellor affirms that representatives of the entente powers were 
actively engaged in a campaign of intrigue in Rome at this 
very time. 

Signor Giolitti's intervention did not succeed. His fol- 
lowers dropped away, and the Salandra ministry returned to 
power in triumph. In a solemn session of the Chamber, 
May 20, full powers were conferred on the cabinet by a vote 
of 407 to 74 to carry out their policy, by extreme measures, 
if necessary. 

In the course of an address, which was greeted with tre- 
mendous applause. Prime Minister Salandra expressed 
himself as follows: 

"The government has striven patiently through long 
months to devise some compromise which should restore to. 
the alliance the fundamental basis which it had lost." 

When it appeared that the negotiations were being delib- 
erately prolonged to evade the issue, "the Royal (Italian) 


William II, King of Prussia and Gemian Kniperor. 
In field uniform. 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 341 

government was compelled to announce to the Imperial and 
Royal (Austro-Hungarian) government, on May 4, the 
withdrawal of all its proposals, the repudiation of the 
treaty of alliance, and the declaration of Italy's complete 
liberty of action. 

"It was impossible, moreover, to leave Italy in a position 
of isolation, deprived of guarantees and prestige, at precisely 
the moment when the world's history is traversing a decisive 
stage " 

"Without arrogance or pride, but with a profound sense 
of our responsibility in this crisis, we feel that we have satis- 
fied the noblest aspirations and the most vital interests of 
our fatherland; whose name, with the devotion due it, we 
invoke in our fervent appeal to parliament, and through par- 
liament to the whole nation, to let all discord cease 

"From to-day onwards, forgetting all other considerations, 
let us remember only this : that we are all Italians, and love 
Italy with the same passionate devotion." 

It had been regarded as an axiom of diplomacy that 
Austria and Italy must be either allies or foes, and the events 
in May, 1915, served to confirm this conviction. For on the 
4th, Italy renounced the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and 
on the 23rd, presented her declaration of war at Vienna. 

We pause to determine our impression of the whole series of 
proceedings between the two former allies. The subject per- 
mits no impromptu judgment. It is not an ideally simple 
conflict, where right and reason are arrayed on one side and 
falsehood and injustice on the other. Italy, it is true, 
seems never to have violated the letter of her compact with 
Austria-Hungary. She may have held her allied rival in- 
exorably to a hard bargain; but Austria-Hungary had be- 
come a party to the agreement deliberately, without com- 
pulsion, and presumably in full possession of her faculties. 
She appears to have been satisfied with the bargain for more 

342 The Great War 

than thirty years, having renewed it in 1912. We need not, 
therefore, be more Austrian in our solicitude than the 
Austrians themselves. Von Billow's acknowledgment, as 
early as January, 1915, of Italy's right to a considerable 
territorial compensation from Austria-Hungary is very 
strong evidence for the correctness of Italy's attitude in so 
far as that important point is involved. The weakest 
element in Italy's position, and at the same time the most 
difficult feature to judge in the whole discussion, is the 
question of the extent of Italy's proper compensation, and 
whether it ought to bear a proportionate relationship to the 
increase of Austro-Hungarian influence in the Balkan penin- 
sula. After all, we come back to the 800,000 Italian subjects 
of Austria as a determining factor in this phase of the 
problem. Should historical title-deeds or popular inclina- 
tion constitute the more valid claim to sovereignty.'' This, 
like some other weighty questions of political ethics, after 
all the histories have been written, must still be left to the 
discretion of the individual reader. 

In scrutinizing the official correspondence one is apt to be 
impressed by the seemingly narrow margin which separates 
the Italian demands of April 8 and the Austro-Hungarian 
proposal conveyed to the Italian government after its re- 
pudiation of the Triple Alliance. The Austro-Hungarian 
offer failed to cover the Italian demands relating to the 
Curzolari islands, Trieste and its environs, and a part 
of the disputed territory in the northeast. But this 
discrepancy must in reality be reduced by the extent of 
the value which we ascribe to the Trieste concession and 
the omission of an indemnity in the Austro-Hungarian 
proposals. One might be led to suspect that Austria- 
Hungary's final proposition would have been accepted 
if it had been offered earlier; and if this is true, 
Austro-Hungarian diplomacy committed the fatal blunder 

Motives of Japan, Turkey and Italy 343 

of misinterpreting the degree of determination in the 
Italian attitude. After May 4th the question of peace or 
war in Italy was complicated, and possibly somewhat 
obscured for a time, in consequence of the intervention of 
Giolitti, by the political animosity which his name and 
personality provoked. Besides, the Italian government 
seems to have concluded a provisional agreement with Great 
Britain acting for the Allies, on April 25, which defined the 
terms of Italy's eventual association with the powers of the 
Triple Entente, in case she declared war against Austria- 
Hungary before May 25. After May 4 the Italian govern- 
ment very likely felt that their honor as well as safety 
involved them with the cause of the Allies. 

Other considerations support the view that Italy would 
in no case have accepted the Austro-Hungarian proposals. 
The formula of April 8 had been offered as an irreducible 
minimum of Italian pretensions, which the Italian govern- 
ment probably regarded as modest, as falling far below the 
reasonable expectations of the results of a successful war. 
The Italians doubtless estimated the concession to Trieste 
as of small significance; and may have distrusted that, if 
defeated, the Teutonic powers would be unable to execute 
all the stipulated points, and if victorious, would discover 
some pretext for evading them. 


General Conclusions 

Potential causes: Principle of Nationalities not thoroughly realized; problems 
of Austro-Hungarian populations, and their possible solution; geographic 
and ethnographic boundaries will not always harmonize; rivalry of Ger- 
many and Great Britain; German aspirations and British and French im- 
perialism; war viewed as a biological necessity; the saner German attitude; 
exaggerated notions relative to foreign commerce, the trade of the United 
States with China, South America, and Canada furnishing an example; 
reasonableness of German Welt-politik; the development of German sea- 
power excessive in view of the commercial and political situation; 1911 a 
turning point. Positive causes: the conflict of the Teutonic powers and 
Russia in the Balkans; Constantinople the pivotal point; speculation on 
possible arrangements and the corresponding difficulties; outbreak and spread 
of the conflagration. 

It remains for us to collect and appraise the more im- 
portant fragmentary conclusions to which the successive 
stages of our investigation have conducted us. We divided 
the causes of warfare into potential and positive, and in our 
examination of the former we discovered that the outward 
peace in Europe concealed many latent sources of conflict. 

Professor Burgess has defined the ideal state as a national 
unit in a geographic unit, the two coinciding. The nine- 
teenth century carried Europe a long way in the direction 
of a system of states on such an ideal basis. But the 
Principle of Nationalities had not attained universal applica- 
tion. Thus the Christian peoples of the Balkan peninsula, 
in particular, had only partially achieved national independ- 
ence and unity; the Polish nation remained in a condition of 
almost complete political effacement; and the very existence 
of Austria-Hungary seemed to be a defiance of the principle. 

The nationalistic aspirations which threatened the in- 
tegrity of the Hapsburg realm fall into two classes, accord- 

General Conclusions 345 

ing as their sources lay outside or inside the monarchy. 
Thus the movement among the Italians, Serbo-Croats, 
Roumanians in Transylvania, and Ruthenians tended to 
detach these populations from the monarchy and unite 
them with states outside, and the same would be true of 
Polish ambitions in Galicia, if an independent Poland 
existed. On the other hand, the extreme nationalistic 
parties among the Magyars or Czechs aimed to establish 
greater independence for political units which were included 
entirely within the Hapsburg realm. 

The solution of the Austro-Hungarian internal problems 
will demand broad statesmanship and an unusual spirit of 
forbearance on the part of rulers and subjects. The mon- 
archy stands before the supreme trial of its political adapta- 
bility. Its complicated situation is a veritable Gordian Knot 
for political progress, a fateful riddle of failure or achieve- 
ment, which the rude process of war will probably not 
succeed in unfolding. We have considered the enlight- 
ened policy commonly ascribed to the assassinated Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand. We have observed that the separatist 
tendencies within the Hapsburg dominions are really limited 
in their geographical extent. We conclude that the future 
security and reputation of the monarchy must be won by a 
resolute, unprecedented, forward progress, by discarding 
out-grown convictions, and the encumbering prejudices, 
jealousies, and deceptive sentiments which tradition has 
woven about the notions of patriotism and allegiance, and 
by reerecting the political structure as a federal union, an 
imperial Switzerland, on the reliable basis of sober reason 
and popular consent. Unfortunately, traditional habits of 
thought and emotion, erroneous notions with regard to 
political values and the proper ethics of sovereignty — in 
short, a narrow, stupid conception of patriotism, will oppose 
almost insurmountable barriers to this process. The stub- 

346 The Great War 

bornness of the Magyars alone, in sustaining their historic 
rights against the Hberation of the Southern Slavs, is a forcible 
example of the difficulties which would be encountered. 

The fact that natural geographic boundaries do not 
always coincide with the demarcation of nationalities is an 
unavoidable element of imperfection in any territorial ad- 
justment of European states. Poland, if reconstituted, 
could have no natural boundaries, except on the south, for, 
as has been mentioned, the great central Russian plain 
sweeps right across this territory, and practically includes 
northern Germany as its extreme projection. The lack of 
natural barriers between Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks in 
Macedonia was a cause of the second Balkan War. There 
are instances, moreover, where the position of the ethnic 
boundary, and consequently its relation to the geographic 
frontier, is uncertain. The Vosges Mountains, as has been 
indicated, are the natural boundary between France and 
Southern Germany; but the French people never became 
entirely reconciled to the annexation of Alsace by Germany, 
although it lies on the eastern, or German, side of these 
mountains. Who, moreover, can accurately define the 
nationality of the Alsatians? Russia seeks the Carpathian 
Mountains as her natural geographic boundary towards 
Austria-Hungary; but it follows by no means that the popu- 
lation intervening between her ante-bellum frontier and the 
crests of this conspicuous range would assimilate with the 
Russian people. The Polish population would directly 
associate with their brethren who are already included in 
the Russian Empire, adding strength to a tenacious national 
element whose feeling of spiritual community with the 
Russians has scarcely proceeded beyond a visionary stage. 

The most absorbing factor In the international situation 
in western Europe has been for a number of years the rivalry 
between Germany and Great Britain. The Germans as a 

General Conclusions 347 

people felt a legitimate pride in their national vitality and 
capacity. The more intelligent and leading classes were 
animated with a feeling of assurance in contemplating the 
past achievements and actual efficiency of the nation in 
nearly all the lines of human activity which lead to profit 
and glory. Germany was a veritable storehouse of concen- 
trated energy, and her institutions, by means of their 
skilful adjustment and effective cooperation, were a mar- 
vellously effective system of machinery for regulating and 
applying this energy. Far from relaxing the national vigor, 
the rapid accumulation of riches, which was still a quite 
recent phenomenon, stimulated and mobilized the laborious 
exertions of the people by exhibiting the prizes of industry 
and furnishing a more abundant banking capital. German 
enterprise spread to all parts of the world, and such institu- 
tions as the Deutsche Bank became synonymous with the 
dauntless march of the nation's economic forces. 

In the confidence of their youthful vigor, the more im- 
petuous elements in Germany regarded the Russians as 
decadent before reaching maturity, the English as effete 
and nerveless, sinking into the slough of selfish commercial- 
ism and self-indulgence, and the French as doomed to 
gradual extinction. They compared their own inadequate 
territorial allotment with the vast patrimony of their un- 
worthy rivals. The British Empire extended to every 
quarter of the globe and contained immeasurable oppor- 
tunities for development. The French colonial empire had 
been extended under the Third Republic to nearly nine 
times its extent and eight times its population. But the 
British Empire had been largely obtained by good luck, and 
the British nation had never exhibited the disposition to 
make the far-reaching sacrifices by which military and im- 
perial supremacy is truly merited; whilst the French had so 
declined in vitality that they could scarcely sustain their 

348 The Great War 

population at home, not to mention colonizing extensive 
new areas. 

It cannot be denied that comparisons of this sort were 
calculated to arouse a feeling of restlessness and dissatis- 
faction. Scholars and professors proclaimed that the forces 
of evolution must provide for the survival of the fittest in 
political organisms, and that strife was nature's purifying 
medium, by which a suitable readjustment of the existing 
unhealthy situation might be expected. It would be 
immoral to thwart nature's beneficent process. Even 
ancient historians, it may be remarked, reflected the current 
preconceptions and aspirations by showing that a profes- 
sional army, like England's, as distinguished from a universal 
compulsory levy, as in Germany, had been a main cause for 
the destruction of Greco-Roman society. "It is precisely 
political idealism that demands wars, while materialism 
condemns them," exclaimed von Treitschke, and von 
Bernhardi affirms that war is a biological necessity. 

The more moderate, and probably more influential, 
personalities among the leaders of public opinion in Germany 
recognized that the greatest part of the world was already 
unalterably allotted, and that it was futile for them to expect 
to obtain further extensive colonial territories for themselves, 
that the brightest hope for their future commercial expan- 
sion outside of Europe was associated with the preservation 
of the "open door" and the economic penetration of such 
regions as Asia Minor, where Germany could hope to secure 
a commercial, rather than a political, supremacy. 

The political idealism of the Anglo-Saxons — as contrasted 
at times with their practice — rejects the doctrine of a dis- 
tinction between public and private morality, that is, that 
states are not amenable to the same standards of conduct 
as individuals. It abhors, for instance, the view that dis- 
parity in the territorial possessions of nations may rightfully 

General Conclusions 349 

be equalized by force. It applies identical notions of 
justice to the territorial sovereignty of states and the real 
property of private persons. It regards with composure, 
for example, the contrast of Japan with her 50,000,000 
inhabitants crowded into 140,000 square miles of territory, 
and Australia with her 5,000,000 people lost within an area 
of 3,000,000 square miles and refusing to relieve the conges- 
tion of the Japanese by admitting them as individuals to the 
vast spaces which her own people are unable to utilize. 

The Anglo-Saxons, as the greatest landed proprietors of 
the world, are naturally most zealous in their support of 
established rights; and the assize of the nations accepts 
generally their attitude, notwithstanding the violations of 
their own canon, which they themselves in the past have 

We observe, however, that even English private law has 
relaxed somewhat the rigidness of its conception of the 
sacredness of property, in submitting to such devices as the 
taxation of unearned increments, the compulsory sale and 
division of large estates, and other measures intended to 
restrain the expansion of over-grown fortunes and temper 
the excessive discrepancies inflicted by chance. And, 
tempted by analogy, we are led to ask, whether in the 
world-wide society of nations some similar restraining in- 
fluences cannot reasonably be applied in a conciliatory 
spirit to moderate the expansion of the gigantic empires for 
the benefit of the disinherited, and to mitigate the unfairness 
of circumstances? 

Could not the nations which have been so lavishly endowed 
be expected to display, if not the spirit of charity, at least 
the virtue of moderation in mapping out spheres of exclu- 
sive political influence beyond the limits of their already 
unwieldy possessions? And as partial compensation for 
fortune's shabby treatment of energetic nations like the 

350 The Great War 

German, should not a little more consideration have been 
displayed, when a fresh division of territory was to be made, 
and should not the tranquil development of their special 
commercial interests in the regions like Asiatic Turkey, 
where no prior rights were being molested, have been cheer- 
fully conceded? 

The significance of all observations based on commercial 
ambitions will be more truly appreciated if we consider 
them in connection with a characteristic element of exagger- 
ation in the attitude of the age in which we live. 

The Kaiser once said that we live in the present age under 
the star of commerce. If he had wished to define more pre- 
cisely the charmed influence that captivates the imagination 
of men, he might appropriately have said the star of foreign 
commerce, or better, commerce with distant countries. 
An example will make clear our meaning. The internal 
commerce of France is estimated to amount in value to ten 
times her foreign commerce, and this ratio would probably 
not appear abnormal if compared with the corresponding 
ratio in many other countries. Yet economists persist in 
gauging the prosperity -of nations according to their volume 
of foreign trade, regardless of the character of their natural 
resources and the extent of their dependence on other lands 
for their necessary supplies. Exports and imports usurp 
the attention almost exclusively in economic comparisons. 

It is the spectacular element in foreign trade which exer- 
cises the most potent fascination and even sways the policy 
of nations to an absurd extent. The memories of the old 
East India merchantmen, the legendary traditions of the 
gorgeous riches of the Orient still dominate the fancy; the 
opulent fertility and alluring opportunities of tropical and 
remote lands are unquestionably prominent in the counsels 
of traffic and finance. 

It is not necessary for us to go abroad to discover striking 

General Conclusions 351 

examples of this eccentric attitude. For a chorus of voices 
here in the United States would reecho the words of Count 
von Billow, when he said: 

"The Chinese Empire with its population of nearly 400,- 
000,000, is one of the richest markets of the future. We 
cannot allow ourselves to be excluded from this market, 
upon which our economic and material progress depends." 

Besides this, the possibilities of South America loom ever , 
larger in our imagination. The encouragement of govern- 
ment and press is ready at hand to stimulate a propaganda 
of exhortation for improving the nation's commercial oppor- 
tunities in those quarters. An elaborate equipment of 
steamships, banks, commercial houses, and fleets is de- 
manded for the extension and protection of these interests 
lying beyond the seas, and "dollar diplomacy" has been 
designed in their behalf. But in comparison, trade with 
Canada, which only has to traverse a common boundary, 
is unheralded and unrenowned. By the side of the splendid 
allurement of far-away places, the interchange of goods with 
near-by Canada seems colorless and commonplace. And 
yet, as regards their profitable character, these three fields 
for American commercial enterprise suggest the caskets 
where Bassanio's fortune was concealed. For the "meager 
lead" of our exportation to Canada amounts in value to 
fourteen times the "gaudy gold" of our shipments to China, 
and nearly three times the sum of our exports to all the 
South American countries; and this contrast, moreover, is 
increasing rather than diminishing. 

This example from right at home is a very palpable illus- 
tration of a serious confusion of judgment as to economic 
values which is common in the commercial nations to-day. 

Germany, as we have seen, caught the prevailing infection 
of inordinate eagerness for this romantic element in com- 
merce; and although her economic development has been 

352 The Great War 

characterized by consistency and balance, as could have 
been inferred from facts already cited, the interest in remoter 
opportunities has been a very lively factor in shaping the 
government's policy. 

We have discovered that Germany's Welt-politik, as 
described by her leading statesmen, embraced no unreason- 
able elements. She demanded the preservation of the 
"open door," wherever it still existed, in other words, that 
the remaining areas where the nations could compete on an 
equal footing should not be further restricted, and also that 
the general balance of colonial possessions should not be 
disturbed so as to diminish her own relative position. 

Ostensibly for upholding these principles and protecting 
her sea-borne commerce, Germany undertook to create very 
rapidly a powerful navy; which is a capital fact for the in- 
vestigation of the potential causes of the war. Nobody 
denies the right of Germany to construct as large a navy as 
her resources permitted, but the problem of its expediency 
inevitably confronts us. The German ministers steadfastly 
asserted that their program of construction was based solely 
on a general consideration of the nation's requirements 
without reference to the naval forces of any other power, 
although the preamble itself of one of the earlier naval bills 
suggested a comparison, by affirming that "Germany re- 
quires a fleet of such strength that a war against the 
mightiest naval power would involve risks threatening the 
supremacy of that power." 

The size of the German naval establishment would in- 
evitably be compared with the British in respect to the 
importance of the interests which each was expected to 
defend, and the sincerity of Germany's pacific professions 
would accordingly be judged on the basis of this comparison. 
The more moderate representatives of German naval policy 
expressed the opinion that the German navy should main- 

General Conclusions 353 

tain the ratio of strength of 10:16 in comparison with the 
British, and although the government had never made any 
official recognition of such a standard, it probably answers 
roughly to the relative naval forces of the two countries in 
the most recent period. One would not be very far wrong in 
comparing the extent of the functions to be discharged by 
the two navies with reference to this basis. Now the 
colonies and dependencies which required the protection of 
the German navy were small and unimportant in comparison 
with those which depended upon the protection of the British 
navy. The foreign commerce of Germany amounted in 
value to about three-fourths of that of the United Kingdom. 
But it must be noted that about one-half of Germany's trade 
was carried on with countries with which Germany was 
connected by land routes, and did not directly depend upon 
the protection of the fleet, while the entire volume of Great 
Britain's foreign commerce was dependent upon naval pro- 
tection. Upon the basis of the relative commercial interests 
requiring protection, therefore, the German navy should 
have had a strength of only three-eighths (3^X^), instead 
of five-eighths (10:16) of the British navy. But, most 
important consideration of all, the British navy was the 
indispensable guarantee for the very existence of the British 
nation and the sustenance of the people, whilst Germany 
could subsist, as the war itself has proved, if deprived of all 
the interests which her fleet was intended to guard. 

It was above all the rapidity with which the German 
navy had been constructed and was being continually 
augmented which alarmed public opinion in Great Britain. 
Germany had been the strongest military power on land for 
fifty years; and now an additional effort for naval power, 
an exertion so intense and sustained, seemed capable of but 
one explanation: that it was intended for a definite, aggres- 
sive enterprise. Germany's entire annual expenditure for 

354 The Great War 

naval purposes had increased from less than 340,000,000 in 
1900 to more than 3116,000,000 in 1913; Great Britain's, 
from somewhat less than 3150,000,000 to somewhat more 
than 3237,000,000 during the same interval. The situation, 
as presented by these figures, may not appear so threatening 
for Great Britain, unless we take into account that the 
Germans were devoting nearly one-half of the annual ex- 
penditure to new constructions and had very nearly over- 
taken the British in this respect. In fact, Germany's 
annual expenses for naval construction had increased 247% 
during twelve years, while Great Britain's had only advanced 

The tremendous expansion of the German naval establish- 
ment was excessive from both the commercial and political 
point of view. Germany's best customers were Great 
Britain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the United States. 
A fleet would be serviceable only for protecting the American 
commerce. And yet, while German exports to Great 
Britain had advanced to the astonishing annual value of 
3471,283,460 in 1913, having increased about 40% in five 
years, the German government were persistently engaged in 
creating uneasiness for their country's best customer by 
busily increasing their own naval armament, and seemed 
ever ready to risk this enormously lucrative trade by insist- 
ing to the last extremity upon some point involving colonial 
interests of comparatively slight pecuniary significance, or 
perhaps only potential advantages. 

Whatever was the ultimate intention that actuated the 
development of German naval power, it produced the effect 
of a challenge for naval supremacy in driving the British to 
increased activity and precipitating thereby a wasteful race 
in naval armaments. Until Germany built her navy. Great 
Britain held aloof from both the continental groups, of powers. 
To push forward this vast naval program, exciting thereby 

General Conclusions 355 

the antagonism of a great power with which Germany had 
had no fundamental grounds for conflict, while the conti- 
nental situation was not free from elements of hostility, may 
very reasonably impress the observer as an unsound policy. 
It was the most important factor in breaking down Great 
Britain's isolation and impelling her to enter into intimate 
relations with the powers opposed to Germany. 

But in the eyes of the public the present war has assumed 
too exclusively the character of a conflict for commercial 
supremacy between Great Britain and Germany. A state 
of tension had existed between the two countries largely 
in consequence of policies which were intimately related 
with commercial considerations, it is true, but the immedi- 
ate, positive cause of the war must be sought elsewhere. 
It is not likely, moreover, that Germany, France, and Great 
Britain would have been impelled to hostilities without an 
incentive from outside. The crest of the wave of warlike 
peril in the west had been passed at the termination of the 
Morocco crisis in 1911, and signs were not wanting that 
relations were becoming much less acute. The year 1911 
is, therefore, a turning point. Down to that year the 
movements and events that portended an approaching 
universal conflict arrange themselves naturally with refer- 
ence to the relations of the western powers, but with that 
year the center of interest is shifted, and henceforth the 
continuity of events must be traced in the east. 

Austria-Hungary had long cherished an interest and 
aspirations in the Balkans, and Germany virtually indorsed 
her policy by joining with her in the defensive alliance in 
1879. Bismarck, however, shrinking from the dissipation of 
forces upon erratic undertakings, always insisted that 
Germany had no direct concern in the regions of the Otto- 
man Empire. It was part of his discerning policy to main- 
tain an equilibrium in that quarter between the interests of 

356 The Great War 

Austria-Hungary and Russia, whose friendship he cultivated. 
The entry of Germany in a leading role upon the Ottoman 
stage was, like the creation of the new navy, an achievement 
of the reign of the present Kaiser. In consequence, the 
Sultan was gradually reduced to a state of practical subjuga- 
tion to German influence and commercial ambition. The 
war between Italy and Turkey and the subsequent critical 
events drew attention to the prominence of Teutonic 
interests, although endangering them, and emphasized the 
essential rivalry of the Teutonic powers and Russia. 

Although both these parties professed the conviction that 
the Balkan states should regulate their affairs independently 
of outside interference, and perhaps sincerely desired it, 
the intricacy of their own interests, their extreme sensitive- 
ness to every impression that disturbed the balance, and 
the resulting condition of nervousness, involved them almost 
unavoidably in a conflict for supremacy, which was virtually 
being waged by diplomacy and intrigue during the negotia- 
tions and conventions which accompanied the course of the 
Balkan Wars. 

It was desirable in the general interests of progress that 
Germany should have an unembarrassed opportunity for 
developing the interior of Asia Minor, and that she should 
to this end exercise enough political influence with the Porte 
for assuring the security and welfare of her pioneers of 
civilization. Yet Russia, like the owner of a great estate, 
could not remain indifferent as long as her right-of-way 
from the highroad was subject to the discretion or caprice 
of a possibly hostile power. The winding water-way through 
the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles is Russia's 
tendon of Achilles, the vital artery for her economic life. 
Constantinople, where the Teutonic line of communication 
crosses this route, is naturally the pivotal point in the 
collision of the rival interests. 












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General Conclusions 357 

An impartial and efficient administration was needed on 
the Straits, one capable of guaranteeing the security of 
navigation and traffic. The weak and visionary character 
of the Turkish government invited the intrigues of the 
powers, and afforded no assurance of a consistent, indepen- 
dent policy, calculated to inspire confidence. A satisfactory 
regulation of affairs in the region of the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles must be based upon the frank recognition of 
the supremacy of the major interests of international 
commerce. An abstract, detached view of the situation 
might suggest an international condominium, with an 
administrative commission responsible to the Great Powers 
as the direct organ of government. The members of such 
a governing board might suitably be chosen from one or 
more of the smaller, neutral states, such as Switzerland. 
But amid the vicissitudes of war, the difficulties of adjusting 
the views and expectations of allies, and the exigencies of 
negotiation, so disinterested an arrangement has small 
chance of realization. 

The military problem of defending the Straits is not in- 
considerable; for the length of the navigable channel from 
the entry of the Bosphorus to the point of exit from the 
Dardanelles into the Aegean Sea is nearly two hundred 
miles, and the occupation of any one commanding point by 
an enemy intent upon blockading the passage would render 
useless the possession of all the remaining course. Besides, 
the deep indentation of the Gulf of Saros, which exposes the 
European defenses of the Dardanelles to attack from the 
rear, is a serious element of weakness. These considerations 
make it doubtful whether Greece or Bulgaria could defend 
successfully the extensive position ; and it is certain that an 
arrangement by which one of these Christian states and the 
Turkish Empire confronted each other emulously on opposite 
sides of the Straits would offer less security for Russian 

358 The Great War 

commerce than that which existed with the ante-bellum 
situation. All indications point, therefore, to the consum- 
mation of the Russian dream of centuries, in the event of 
Turkish defeat, the control of Constantinople by Russia. 

The suspicion and rivalry of the Teutonic and Slavic 
forces in the Balkans had reached such a degree of intensity 
as practically to exclude the possibility of a compromise or 
understanding. The occasion for the outbreak of the great 
war grew out of the bitter hatred so often engendered by 
conflicts in which the passionate desire for the assertion of 
nationality is involved. A hideous outrage, cutting Austria- 
Hungary to the quick, inspired, very likely, by the spirit of 
Serbian nationalistic aspirations, occasioned a demand by the 
Dual Monarchy to be allowed tointerfere in the internal affairs 
of Serbia. But Russia could not afford to be ostentatiously 
ignored in an intervention by Austria-Hungary in Balkan 
affairs, or to acquiesce in the reduction of Serbia to a depend- 
ent position. This would have destroyed Russian prestige 
throughout the peninsula, and might have undermined the 
vital interests of Russia at the Straits. A blow against 
Serbia had the effect of a blow against Russia. 

Europe, as we have seen, was well stocked with masses of 
explosive or inflammable material, the potential causes of 
the cataclysm. The antagonism of Slav and Teuton in the 
Balkans was the agency that applied the torch; international 
friendships and alliances became the media for the trans- 
mission of the destructive forces; and the spirit of militar- 
ism, impelled by an inhuman and unnatural conception of 
honor or professional duty, fanned the flames, until the 
conflagration became general. 



1SS2. Bishopric of Metz annexed by France 16 

1581. Russian occupation of Siberia began 17 

1697. Alsace became French territory .... IS 

1700. Russia secured the port of AzoflF 147 

1703. Peter the Great founded St. Petersburg .... 18 

1711. Russia forced to give up Azoff 147 

1739. Black Sea closed to Russian Navigation 147 

1766. Lorraine united with France .16 

1772. First partition of Poland 19 

1774. Russia regains freedom of the Black Sea 147 

1792. Russia acquires the site of Odessa 148 

Second partition of Poland 19 

1795. Third partition of Poland .... .... 19 

1803. War between Great Britain and France ... 2 

1809. Russia took Finland from Sweden .... 18 

1815. Confederation of thirty-eight German states formed 8 

Congress of Vienna 8 

Kingdom of the Netherlands formed 21 

General settlement of European boundaries made . . 25 

1819. Tariff union established under lead of Prussia ... 8 

1820. Revolution in Italy 5 

1829. Greece acquires independence .... ... 148 

1830. Belgium begins revolt which made her independent of 

Holland .■ ■ • 250 

Virtual annexation of Poland by Russia ... .20 

1831. Revolution in Italy ... 5 

1832. Franchise given middle class in England ... 35 
1834. ZoUverein of seventeen German states formed 8 

1839. April 19. Two treaties guaranteeing perpetual neutral- 

ity of Belgium signed by five powers in London 251 

1840. First cotton factory built in Russia .... 56 
1848. Piedmontese army defeated at Custozza 6 

Whirlwind of revolution in Europe 10 


360 Chronological Table 


1849. Hungary crushed by the Hapsburgs 22 

Piedmontese army defeated at Novara 6 

Italians defeated at Magenta and Solferino . 6 

1850. Triumph of the industrial revolution in Germany 33 
1853. Commodore Perry induces Japan to open ports for com- 
mercial relations with rest of world 297 

1856. War in the Crimea between Russia, Great Britain, 

France, and Piedmont 148 

1858. William I of Prussia takes steps to accomplish German 

unity 10 

1859. Intervention of Napoleon III in the affairs of Italy . 2 
Napoleon III intervenes against Austria on behalf of 

Italy 6 

January 27. Kaiser William II born . . ... 81 

1860. May 11. Garibaldi landed at Trapani 6 

October 1. Neapolitan Bourbons defeated on banks of 

the Volturno .... 6 

1861. Austria conciliates Hungary 22 

Bismarck carries out plans for German unity ... 10 
March 17. Victor Emanuel ascends throne of Kingdom 

of Italy 6 

1863. Bismarck delivers "Blood and Iron" speech .... 12 

1864. Regulation of situation of Schleswig and Holstein 12 

1866. War between Prussia and Austria . . . . 13 

Battle of Sadowa or Koniggratz 13 

Austrian disaster and exclusion from the German Con- 
federation 23 

Annexation of Venetia to Kingdom of Italy .... 7 

Austro-Hungarian compromise 23 

1867. Magyar deputies finally consent to attend the Austro- 

Hungarian parliament . ... ... 22 

North German Federation formed 13 

Franchise given laborers in England 35 

1870. National school system created in England ... 35 
Irish land act passed in England .... 35 
Withdrawal of French garrison from Rome .... 7 
July 19. Franco-Prussian War began .... 13 
August 9. North German Federation signs compact with 

Great Britain confirming the treaty guaranteeing the 

perpetual neutrality of Belgium 254 

September 4. Second French Republic formed ... 42 

1871. January 18. William I declared German Emperor at 

Versailles . ... 14 

May 10. Treaty of peace signed by France and Germany 
at Frankfort. Alsace and Lorraine ceded to Germany 
and France agreed to pay indemnity of five billion 

francs 13 

Chronological Table 361 

date page 

June 9. Alsace and Lorraine become part of German 

Empire • • 1^ 

July 31. Congress of Berlin signs the treaty relating to 

the Balkans 152 

1872. Citizens of Alsace and Lorraine required to decide whether 

to become German citizens or remain French 16 

September. Interview of the three emperors at Berlin . 30 

1875. England secures control of the Suez Canal .... 35 
Bill for re-organization of French army causes protest by 

Germany _• 31 

Germany's intention to crush France prevented by Russia 

and Great Britain 32 

July. Herzegovina revolts against Turkey .... 149 

1876. January 31. Turkey promises reforms in the Balkans . 149 

1877. Great Britain annexed the Transvaal ... . . 36 
Queen Victoria proclaimed Empress of India ... 36 

Russia begins war on Turkey 151 

Constitution and parliament granted Turkish people 150 

1878. March 3. Treaty of San Stefano signed by Russia and 

Turkey 151 

1879. Alexander of Battenburg elected ruler of Bulgaria 154 
Bismarck introduces protective tariff in Germany . 69 
Potash syndicate or "trust" formed in Germany with 

government approval 74 

Alliance of Germany and Austria formed 31 

1880. The Boers revolt 36 

Gladstone became head of the British Cabinet . . 158 

1881. Tunis annexed by France 31 

March 13. Tsar Alexander II assassinated .... 49 

February 27. Boers defeated British at Majuba Hill . 36 

Signing of the Pretoria Convention 36 

1882. Socialist program announced at Erfurt 70 

1883. Italy joins alliance of Germany and Austria .... 31 
General von der Goltz undertakes re-organization of the 

Turkish armies 159 

1884. September. Re-insurance treaty signed at Skiernevice . 32 

South African Republic restored 36 

London Convention gives control of foreign affairs of 

South African Republic to Great Britain 36, 91 

Germany secures Kamerun and Togoland .... 81 

Extension of franchise in England 35 

1885. Congo Free State inaugurated with Leopold II of Belgium 

as its king 255 

February 26. Congo Free State declared neutral by 

Berlin Congress 256 

1886. April 8. First Home Rule Bill introduced in British 

Parliament 40 

362 Chronological Table 


1887. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg elected ruler of the Bulgarians 

and Roumelians 154 

1888. Germany secures German East Africa 81 

June IS. Kaiser William II ascends the throne ... 82 

Germans begin building of railways in Asiatic Turkey 161 
German policy substituting German for Polish farmers in 

Province of Posen adopted 27 

1889. Kaiser William II makes state visit to Constantinople . 160 

1890. March 18. Bismarck's resignation as Imperial Chan- 

cellor turning point in the history of the modern 

German Empire 83 

England cedes Heligoland to Germany 100 

Beginning of industrial revolution in Russia .... 33 

Germany refuses to renew the re-insurance treaty of 1884 32 

Caprivi becomes Chancellor of the German Empire . 84 

1891. Building of the Trans-Siberian railway begun ... SO 

1892. Count Witte becomes Minister of Finance and Commerce 

in Russia S6 

1894. Hohenlohe becomes Chancellor of the German Empire . 84 

Dreyfus case excites France 46 

Japan and China involved in war over Corea . . . 298 

1895. April 17. China makes concessions to Japan in treaty of 

peace .... 299 

December 29. Jameson raid occurs in South Africa. 37, 90 

1896. January 3. Kaiser sends congratulatory telegram to 

Kriiger 90 

Massacres of the Armenians occur as a result of Pan- 
Islamic spirit .... 160 

Alliance between France and Russia formed .... 32 

1897. Manufacture of coal-gas dyes begun in Germany . 74 
President Faure visits St. Petersburg and Franco-Russian 

alliance is announced 85 

September 1. Kaiser's "divine right" speech delivered at 

Coblentz 85 

November 1. News of murder of two Catholic mission- 
aries in China reaches Berlin 91 

December IS. Kaiser's "mailed fist" speech made at 

banquet to Prince Henry at Kiel 91 

1898. "Place in the sun" demanded by Count von Biilow . . 96 
Admiral von Tirpitz appointed chief of Staff of German 

Navy 97 

Fashoda incident creates tension between France and 

Great Britain 101, 109 

Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro recover their in- 
dependence 148 

Germany demands concession of territory from China in 

compensation for murder of two missionaries . . 94 

Chronological Table 363 

date page 

March 5. Germany secures from China lease of Kiau- 
Chau which gives her dominant influence in province 

of Shantung 300 

Kaiser and Kaiserin make state visit to Jerusalem and 
Kaiser declares the Mohammedans can ever rely on 

his friendship 161 

Russia secures lease of Kwangto from China and begins 

fortification of Port Arthur 300 

1899. Kaiser's strong naval policy speech delivered at Hamburg 89 
Germany purchases islands in Pacific from Spain . . 97 
Bill providing for large German navy passed .... 95 

October. Second Boer war begins 37 

Russia abrogates Finnish constitution 19 

1900. February 8. Bebel, chief of Socialists, predicts that a 

conflict with England would be greatest calamity 

that could befall Germany 100 

von Biilow becomes Chancellor of the German Empire 101 

German laws codified 72 

Boxer uprising occurs in China 300 

Bebel, Socialist leader, opposes in Reichstag proposed 

navy increase for purpose of war against England . 125 

1901. Turks attempt to gain territory from Persia, but Great 

Britain interferes 163 

1902. January. Prince of Wales, now George V., visits Berlin 

on occasion of Kaiser's birthday 105 

January 30. GreatBritain and Japan sign convention of 

alliance 301 

1902. Polish children punished for refusing to recite the Lord's 

Prayer in German 27 

1903. King Alexander of Serbia assassinated 205 

Germans secure concession from Turkey for railway to 

Bagdad ..... 164 

Prussia makes large appropriation for purchasing Polish 

lands for use of German colonists 28 

1904. February. War begins between Japan and Russia . 50, 302 
April 8. Anglo-French Convention consummates the 

Entente Cordiale 109 

July 28. Germany takes advantage of Russia's conflict 
with Japan to force Russia to sign treaty very favor- 
able to German commerce 108 

October. France and Spain sign agreement relative to 

their interests in Morocco 109 

1905. January 1. General Stoessel surrenders Port Arthur to 

General Nogi 104, 302 

January. France tries to induce Sultan of Morocco to 
assent to reforms and the principle of the "Open 
door" lis 

364 Chronological Table 

date page 

March 10. Russians defeated by the Japanese at Mukden 115 
March 23. Kaiser's speech at Bremen refers to his dream 
of world dominion and states "We are the salt of the 

earth" 112 

The Sultan of Morocco, at suggestion of Germany, calls 
for a conference of signatories to the Madrid Con- 
vention ... 118 

Great Britain's alleged promise to support France in 

Morocco claimed by the Matin 123 

Distribution of French and British fleets arranged to 

afford mutual protection 110 

May 27. Russian fleet defeated by Japanese in the 

Straits of Tsushima 114,302 

August 12. New treaty of aUiance between Japan and 

Great Britain signed 302 

September 5. Treaty of peace between Japan and Russia 

signed at Portsmouth, U. S. A 50, 302 

October 2. Building of the first Z)r^atfwoMgA< begun . . 124 
Russia restores to Finland her liberties and privileges . 19 
October 30. Tsar of Russia promises people right to par- 
ticipate in legislation 51 

Kaiser visits King Alfonso and goes to Tangier . .113, 115 
Delcasse, French Foreign Minister, forced through Ger- 
man intrigue to resign and the Kaiser rewards von 
Biilow 118 

1906. January 16. Conference to consider Moroccan affairs 

convenes at Algeciras 120 

Belgian and British military experts study technical 

problems of British aid to Belgian army in event of 

German invasion 262 

Universal suffrage of both sexes granted the Finns by 

Russia . . 19 

First Duma in Russia convened 51 

British government aids Irish to purchase land ... 28 

Self government granted the Transvaal 38 

November 10. First Dreadnought launched .... 124 

1907. Universal suffrage granted in Austria 24 

Self government granted Orange River colony ... 38 

Mulay Hafid rebels against Abdul Aziz in Morocco . . 133 
Great Britain and Russia settle their differences in Asia 

by agreement 129 

New treaty between Japan and Russia brings complete 
harmony of views in respect to China and the Far 
East 303 

1908. Mulay Hafid recognized by the Powers as Sultan of 

Morocco 134 

Chronological Table 365 

date page 

German Bill providing for compulsory expropriation of 

Polish lands becomes law . 28 

Ferdinand of Bulgaria assumes the title of Tsar . . . 171 
Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 

Serbia, under pressure of the Powers, assents . . 171 
Kaiser in speech at Doberitz claims a desire of other 

nations to surround and provoke Germany . . 278 

October. Kaiser in Daily Telegraph interview attempts 

to allay the suspicions of the British 131 

Triple Entente formed by Great Britain, France and 

Russia, becomes a factor in European diplomacy . 130 
Edward VII and Nicholas II have important meeting at 

Reval 170 

1909. February 9. Germany recognizes by agreement the 

special interest of France in Morocco .... 134 
Compulsory potash syndicate or "trust" formed in 

Germany 72 

July, von Bethmann-Hollweg became Chancellor of the 

German Empire 84 

Revolution in Turkey forces Abdul-Hamid to resign, and 

his brother, Mohammed V., becomes Sultan . . 174 
Congo Free State becomes annexed to Belgium . . 255 

1910. South African Union formed ... 38 

Pan German League and Navy League formed in Ger- 
many to encourage acquisition of greater colonial 
empire 125 

1911. An Imperial Parliament proposed for British Empire 38 
Italy begins the war on Turkey which secures Tripoli 

for her . 175 

April. France finds it necessary to send troops to Fez to 

maintain order there 134 

May 31. Local self government granted Alsace and 

Lorraine by the German government .... 14 

July 2. Germany sends gunboat Panther to Agadir in 

Morocco 135 

Germany on verge of war with Great Britain and France . 136 

Belgian Ambassador at Berlin informs his government 

that Belgium's neutrality may be violated . 263 

July 21. Lloyd George in speech at London shows that 

Great Britain is prepared to stand by France 136 

September 18. Stolypin, Russian prime minister assas- 
sinated . . 279 

November 4. Germany and France settle their differ- 
ences about Morocco by mutual concessions. 136 

November 9. The German Crown Prince in Reichstag 

applauds bitter speech against England .... 137 

1912. Russians and Finns given equal rights in Finland 281 

366 Chronological Table 


Great Britain and France agree to act together to prevent 

aggression and to preserve peace 270 

July 30. Yoshihito becomes Emperor of Japan . . . 303 

War in the Balkans brought about by Turkish atrocities. 179 

1913. Germany provides for great increase in her army . . 192 
Coup d'etat and revolution in Turkey by Young Turks . 308 
War in the Balkans renewed after peace conference at 

London fails ... 185 

August 10. Treaty of peace ending the Balkan war 

signed at Bucharest 187 

Constitutional government restored to Croatia . . . 200 

1914. Germany completes her remarkable system of strategic 

railways on Belgian frontier 276 

April. Arms and ammunition made in Germany landed 

in Ireland for use in revolt 283 

May 25. Home Rule bill finally passed by House of 

Commons . 42 

June 22. Six days before the assassination the Serbian 
minister at Vienna warns Austrian Government that 
the Crown Prince's visit to Bosnia would be perilous 
on account of probable existence of plot . . 205 

June 28. Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand of Austria 

assassinated at Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia 202 

July 1. Kaiserformally opens the enlarged Kiel canal . 277 

July 23. Austria-Hungary accuses Serbia of complicity 
in the murder of the Archduke and demands satis- 
faction 203 

July 23. Austro-Hungarian government sends ultima- 
tum to Serbian government and demands answer 
before 6 o'clock of the evening of July 2Sth . 209 

July 24. Austria-Hungary informs the powers that 
ultimatum has been sent to Serbia, thus leaving only 
one day for any effort to have matter adjusted . 213 

July 25. Italy notifies Austria-Hungary that she would 
regard any occupation of Serbian territory, however 
temporary, as a violation of the terms of the Triple 
Alliance .330 

July 26. Home rule troubles in Ireland culminate in 
attacks on soldiers, who fire and kill four and wound 
sixty . 284 

July 26. The Kaiser returns to Potsdam from Norwegian 

cruise .... 233 

July 26. Austria-Hungary mobilizes 238 

July 26. British government proposes conference to dis- 
cuss Serbian affair and France and Italy at once 
accept . . .231 

July 27. Russia approves plan of proposed conference 232 

Chronological Table 367 


July 27. Germany declines to participate in proposed 

conference 233 

July 28. Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia . 143, 238 

July 28. Austrian Ambassador at Berlin informs Sir 
Edward Goschen "That a general war was most un- 
likely as Russia neither wanted war nor was in a posi- 
tion to make war" 286 

July 29. The Tsar telegraphs the Kaiser that public 
indignation would force him to protect Serbia against 
Austrian aggression and asks Kaiser to restrain his 
ally 237 

July 30. The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar remonstrat- 
ing against alleged mobilization of Russian army 240 

July 31. Sazonoff, Russian minister of foreign affairs, 
agrees to maintain waiting attitude if Austria would 
check advance of her troops on Serbian territory. On 
Austria's refusal Russian government orders general 
mobilization 241 

August 1. Germany declares war against Russia . 143 

August 1. The Kaiser announces that he considers him- 
self in a state of war with Russia 242 

August 1. The Kaiser informs France that Germany is 
at war with France because of Russia's attitude to- 
ward Austria 243 

August 4. Herr von Jagow replies to remonstrance of 
British ambassador that Germany had to get into 
France "by the quickest and easiest way" . . 267 

August 4. Germany announces state of hostilities be- 
tween herself and Belgium* 142 

August 4. King of the Belgians appeals to British gov- 
ernment to safeguard the integrity of Belgium . . 2S6 

August 4. Great Britain declares war against Germany 142 

August 4. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg acknowl- 
edges wrong done to Luxemburg and Belgium and 
promises reparation 267 

August 6. Austria-Hungary declares war against Russia. 142 

August 7. Montenegro declares war against Austria- 
Hungary 142 

August 10. France declares war against Austria-Hungary 142 

August 12. Montenegro declares war against Germany. 142 

August 12. Great Britain declares war against Austria- 
Hungary 142 

August 12. Belgium declares war against Austria- 
Hungary 142 

August 14. Japan sends ultimatum in regard to Eastern 

affairs to Germany 305 

August 23. Japan declares war against Germany . . 142 

368 Chronological Table 


September 21. Turkey promises that violations of neu- 
trality by her in favor of Germany will cease, but 
these promises were never kept 313 

August 22. The Entente powers guarantee independence 

and integrity of Turkey if she remains neutral . . 311 

September 23. Great Britain protests against Turkish 

concentration of troops threatening Egypt . . 315 

October 16. Marquis di San Giuliano dies .... 325 

October 24. Great Britain again protests against hostile 

acts on part of Turkey 316 

October 29. Turkish troops cross the Egyptian frontier. 317 

October 29. Turkey commences hostilities which in- 
volved her in war with Russia, France, and Great 
Britain 142 

October 30. The Entente ambassadors leave Constan- 
tinople 317 

November 5. Great Britain announces that a state of 

war with the Ottoman Empire exists . 317 

December 2. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in 
speech in Reichstag claims England fostered the war 
in order to deal a death blow to her greatest commer- 
cial competitor 259 

December 20. Prince von Biilow, in Rome, endeavors 
to adjust the critical situation between Italy and 
Austria 329, 331 

December 14. Italy informs Austria that she has a fore- 
most interest in the preservation of Serbian inde- 
pendence 329 

December 20. Austria-Hungary offers exchange of views 

as to territorial compensation due Italy . . . 331 
1915 January 7. Direct negotiations between Austria and 
Italy looking toward compensation to Italy begin at 
Rome 332 

March 15. Final state of negotiation between Austria 

and Italy entered 336 

March 27. Austria admits Italy's right to compensation 

underexisting treaty and offers concession of territory 329 

May 3. Italy renounces her position in the Triple 

Alliance 329 

May 4. Italy repudiates the Triple Alliance on the 
ground that Austria-Hungary had gone to war with- 
out consulting her 338 

May 20. Italian Chamber of Deputies grants full powers 
to the cabinet to take such steps as may be deemed 
necessary 340 

May 23. Italy presents at Vienna her declaration of war 

on Austria 341 


Abdul-Hamid, personality and policy of, 
159-160, 166, 167J proclaims constitu- 
tion for Turkey, 171; deposed, 174. 

Adrianople, 181, 187, 188. 

Afghanistan, Russian and British agree- 
ment concerning, 130. 

Albania, provisional government estab- 
lished in, 182; independence of granted, 
183; the struggle for Scutari, 185-1S6; 
created a principality, 188; area and 
population of, 18 8 j Prince William of 
Wied abandons, 326; provisional gov- 
ernment for, 327. 

Alexander of Battenberg, elected prince 
of Bulgaria, 154; resigns principality, 
J 54 J assassination of, 205. 

Algeciras Conference, The, terms of, 1 20- 
121; inefficiency of its agreement, 132; 
its powers confirmed, 134. 

Alsace, ceded to Germany, 13; govern- 
ment of, 15; original acquisition of by 
France, 16. 

Anatolian Railvfay, the German, conces- 
sion for, 161, 163. 

Annenia, massacres in, 160, 162. 

Australia, imperial defense measures of, 39. 

Austria-Hungary, rule of in Italy before 
liberation, 5; cedes Lombardy to Italy, 
6; Venetian province lost by, yj Italia 
Irredentia in, 7; dominance of in the 
German confederation, 8, 9; conflict 
with Denmark, 12; war with Prussia, 
1866, 13; political organization conflicts 
with principle of nationalities, 20; Haps- 
burg domestic policy, 215 status of 
Hungary in the empire, 22-25; extent, 
languages, and population of, 25; Slavic 
peoples of, 25; alliance with Germany, 
31; declares war against Russia, 142; 
against Serbia, 143, 238, 246; France 
and Great Britain declare war against. 

142; also Belgium, 142; Montenegro, 
142; and Serbia, 143; opposes extension 
of Slav power in the Balkans, 149; agree- 
ment to "occupy" Bosnia and Herze- 
govina by, 150, 152, 157; mobilizes 
against Russia to secure Balkan territory, 
152; mediates peace between Serbia 
and Bulgaria, 154; annexes Bosnia and 
Herzegovinia, 171; partially mobilizes 
against Serbia in 19 12, 182; marked 
hostility of toward Serbia, 185, 189, 190; 
notifies Italy in 1 9 1 3 of intended ultima- 
tum to Serbia, 190; Archduke Francis 
assassinated in Bosnia, 202; sends ulti- 
matum to Serbia, 203; presents demands 
to Serbia, 205-208; probable understand- 
ing with Germany as to Serbia, 214-215; 
scope of demand on Serbia, 218, 235; 
rejects Serbia's reply, 222-231; partially 
mobilizes, 238; immediate eff^ects of 
declaration of war against Serbia among 
the powers, 238-239; did Austria con- 
sent to refer Serbian question to the 
powers > 245 ; refuses to discuss Austro- 
Serbian difficulty with Russia, 246; 
negotiates with Italy on compensation 
for her neutrality, 327-339. 
Aviation, Germany establishes military 
section of, 192. 

Bagdad Railway, The, Germany obtains 
concession for, 164; economic and polit- 
ical importance of, 164-166; military 
advantages to Germany of, 167. 

Balance of Power, principle of, 3; its 
relation to principle of nationalities, 3; 
origin of in diplomacy, 29; international 
alliances to maintain, 30; the Austro- 
German, 31; theTriple, 31, 80; Franco- 
Russian, 32, 81; agreement between 
Austria, Germany, and Russia, 32; 



The Great War 

entente of France, Russia, and Great 
Britain, 8ij endangered by defeat of 
Russia by Japan, 114. 

Balkans, The, underlying cause of "The 
Great War," 143; geographic and polit- 
ical conditions in, 144-146; Russian 
interests in, 145, 148, 358; Abdul- 
Hamid's policy toward peoples of, 160; 
boundary conflicts in, 180-186; peace 
conferences as to, 182, 187; the Danube 
in relation 10,188-189; states of inimical 
to Teutonic influence, 190. 

Baltic Provinces, 19. 

Belgium declares war against Austria- 
Hungary, 142; Great Britain declares 
war against Germany for violation of 
neutrality of, 142; Germany notifies 
Great Britain of her attitude toward, 
247; Britain refuses Germany's pro- 
posals toward, 248; France promises to 
respect neutrality of, 249; Germany 
evades similar promise, 249; neutrality 
of protected by the Quintuple Treaty, 
251; Great Britain reassures neutrality 
of, 251-254; appeals to Britain for 
intervention, 256. 

Bessarabia, part of granted to Roumania, 
148; again recovered by Russia, 148, 

Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 10-14, 3'> 
61, 67, 69, 71, 80, 81, 82, 83, 160, 

191. 355- 

Black Sea, closed to Russia and re-opened, 
147; closed to Russian warships, 148; 
re-opened to them, 148; economic im- 
portance of to Russia, 155; opening of 
the war between Turkey and Russia 
in, 317. 

Boer Rebellion, The, 36. (See also South 
African War.) 

Bosnia, administration of by Austria- 
Hungary, 25; Russia and Austria agree 
that latter shall "occupy," 150; the 
Powers grant Austria "occupation" of, 
152, 157; objects and effects of occu- 
pation, 158; definitively annexed by 
Austria, 171; demonstrations in against 
Hungary, 199; Archduke Francis Ferdi- 
nand assassinated in, 202. 

Bosnians, The, population and location 
of, 146. 

Bosphorus, The, importance of free navi- 
gation of to Russia, 155, 356- 

Boundaries, national, what best consti- 
tutes, 15; conflict of ethnographic and 
geographic, 346. 

Breslau, The, 311, 312, 317. 

Bulgaria, receives autonomy, 148; Turkish 
"atrocities" in, 149; principality of 
created, 153; elects Alexander, as prince, 
154; relations of with Russia, 154; 
Philippopolis united witli, 154; invasion 
of by Serbia, 154; Prince Alexander 
resigns and Ferdinand elected, 154; de- 
clares independence, 171; allies with 
Serbia and Greece against Turkey, 179; 
acquires Adrianople, 187; makes war 
upon Greece and Serbia, 187; signs 
boundary agreement with Turkey, 188; 
area and population gained, 188. 

Bulgarians, The, population and location 
of, 146; under Turkish rule in Mace- 
donia, 153. 

Bulow, Prince von, announces Germany's 
Asiatic policy, 94, 96-97; and her 
aspirations, 99; is appointed imperial 
chancellor, loi; discloses his military 
cult, 104; declarations as to Moroccan 
affairs, 113, 116; created a prince, 119; 
propounds Germany's world interest, 
119; explains Germany's naval con- 
struction policy, 129; conveys reproof 
of Reichstag to emperor, 132; efforts to 
secure neutrality of Italy, 332, 333,351. 

Canada, imperial defence measures of, 39. 

Caroline Islands, The, Germany ac- 
quires, 97. 

Causes of the conflict, potential and posi- 
tive, 2, 358. 

Cavour, Emilio, 6. 

China, Germany gains leased territory in, 
9 3 ; Japan at war with, 29 8-299 ; western 
powers acquire territorial concessions in, 
299-300; the Boxer rising, 300. 

Congo Free State, 255-256. 

Constantinople, not the fitting seat of gov- 
ernment for the Balkan countries, 144; 
Russian aspirations toward, 147; eco- 
nomic importance of to Russia, 155- 
'57, 307. 356. 

Corea, 298, 299, 300, 302. 

Crete, disclaims connection vnth Turkey, 

Crimean War, The, nations involved in, 



Croatia, political status of, 23, 24, 197- 
198; disaffection of toward Hungary, 
198-199; national aspirations of Serbo- 
Croats, 345. 

Cyprus annexed by Great Britain, 317. 

Dalmatians, The, population and location 
of, 146. 

Danube, The, freedom of navigation of 
established, 148; economic importance 
of, 188. 

Dardanelles, The, importance of free navi- 
gation of to Russia, 155-157, 356; 
command of entrusted to a German 
officer, 3105 German warships har- 
bored in, 311; problem of defence of, 


Delcasse, Theophile, informs Germany 
of Franco-British Convention as to 
Morocco, 113; his policy fails, 118; 
urges alliance with England and fore- 
shadows triple alliance with Russia, 119; 
discloses grounds for his foreign policy, 

Denmark, conflict with Prussia and Aus- 
tria, 1 2; German intolerance of language 
of, 29. 

Dreyfus case. The, 46-47. 

Dual Alliance, of Germany and Austria, 
3'> 3S5) of France and Russia, 32, 8i. 

Duma, first election of, 51; suffrage basis 
on which elected, 51-52; hostility of 
toward Finland and Poland, 280, 281. 

Eastern Roumelia, receives autonomy, 148, 
153; elects as ruler Prince Ferdinand 
of Saxe-Coburg, 154. 

Egypt, England occupies, 36; France 
accedes to British dominance in, 109; 
Turks menace, 315. 

Entente CordiaU, The, France and Great 
Britain arrange, 109; promoted by Ger- 
man naval increase, 131. 

Enver Bey, 170, 185, 187. 

Finland, acquired by Russia, 18; its polit- 
ical status, 19; restriction of privileges 
of Finns, 52; resents Russian policy, 

France, aids Italy against Austria, 6; war 
with Prussia, 1870, 13; isolation of after 
war, 31; Dual Alliance with Russia, 
32, 81, 85; a Republic proclaimed, 42; 

adopts a republican constitution, 44; roy- 
alist and military intrigues, 44-45; the 
Dreyfus case, 46-47; entente established 
with Great Britain, 81, 109; attitude of 
during South African War, 102; takes 
up restoration of order in Morocco, 
114; is opposed by Germany therein, 
1 15-1 19; her policy toward Morocco, 
120; military intervention in, 133-134; 
makes agreement with Germany as to 
Morocco, 134; another military expedi- 
tion to Morocco, 134; Germany seeks 
compensatian for French predominance 
in Morocco, 135, 136; declares war 
against Austria-Hungary, 142; her 
former support of Turkey, 147, 148; 
follows Germany in military increase, 
194; assents to British proposal to 
compose Austro-Serbian difficulty, 232; 
assures Russia of her accord, 239; Ger- 
many declares herself in a "state of 
war" against, 243; Germany promises 
Britain integrity of as price of British 
neutrality, 247; engages to respect Bel- 
gium's neutrality, 249; reaffirms Bel- 
gium's neutrality in 1870 by special 
treaty with Great Britain, 251; military 
entente of 1912 with that power, 270- 
271; Great Britain assures naval pro- 
tection to, 271; visit of president and 
prime minister to Tsar, 275; believes 
that firmness of the Entente Powers 
would avoid war, 287; acquires terri- 
torial rights in China, 300. 
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, interview 
with Emperor William, 183; is supposed 
to have favored a Slav kingdom within 
Austrian Empire, 200, 345; visit of to 
Sarajevo and assassination, 202, 285, 

345. 358. 
Frederick William IV, 9. 

Galicia, apportioned to Austria, 25 ; limits 
of, 26; Slavic peoples of, 26; aspiration 
of Poles in, 344, 345. 

Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 6. 

German Confederation, 8, i 3. 

German East Africa, 81. 

German Southwest Africa, 81. 

Germany, political organization of the 
Confederation of, 7-13; William I pro- 
claimed emperor of, 14; North German 
Confederation established, 1 3 ; Triple 


The Great War 

Entente with Russia and Austria, 30; 
alliance with Austria, 3 1 ; Italy joins 
Austro-German alliance, 3 1 ; makes 
neutrality agreement with Russia, 32; 
and refuses to renew it in 1890, 32; 
Prussia the dominating force in, 60-62; 
fundamentals of the German constitu- 
tion, 61-64; political organization of 
Prussia, 64-68; characteristics of people 
of, 71; economic status in, 72-78; Afri- 
can colonization begins, 8 1 ; William II 
becomes emperor, 82; Bismarck criti- 
cises the emperor and resigns, 8 3 ; change 
of foreign policy follows, 84; visions 
of world-empire for, 86-88; the em- 
peror's significant response to the Boer 
government, 90; naval expedition sent 
to China, 92-93; adopts extensive naval 
provision, 94-97; acquires Caroline 
and Ladrone islands, 9 8 ; further naval 
expansion, 97-101; attitude of dur- 
ing the South African War, 102; 
army worship in, 103-104; suspicion 
of Great Britain intensifies in, 104-106; 
shows very benevolent neutrality to Rus- 
sia during Russo-Japanese War, 107- 
109; the emperor disavows aspiration 
for world power, 112; significant policy 
of in respect to Morocco, 113, 11 5-1 1 6 ; 
approves new conference as to Moroccan 
affairs, 118; participates in conference at 
Algeciras, 1 20-1 21; effect of expansion 
policy on emigration from, i 22; alleged 
policy of Great Britain and France stirs, 
123; increases her naval strength, 124- 
125, 127, 128, 353-354; views rap- 
prochment of Great Britain and Russia 
as inimical, 130; efforts of to calm 
British apprehension, 131-132; Reich- 
stag and emperor conflict, 132; alone 
of the signatory powers recognizes the 
Moroccan usurper, 133; makes agree- 
ment with France as to Morocco, 134; 
sends war vessel to Morocco, 135; 
asks compensations for French domi- 
nance in Morocco, 135; makes treaties 
with France as to Morocco and German 
compensations in return, 136; harsh 
criticism of government's Moroccan 
treaties, 137; stability of constitution 
of, 138; international relations of in 
1890, 138; fundamental principles of 
her "world-policy," 139-140, 351, 

352; Japan declares vrar against, 142; 
Montenegro also, 142; undertakes mili- 
tary reorganization of Turkey, 159; 
acquires valuable commercial concessions 
in Turkey, 1 6 1 -i 6 7 ; attitude of toward 
Serbia on Austrian annexation of Bosnia, 
174; general policy of toward Turkey, 
175, 191; Serbia stands in way of her 
Oriental expansion, 190, 191; adds 
greatly to her war strength in 191 3, 
192-193; immediately supports Aus- 
trian demands on Serbia, 211-215, 234- 
236, 239; refuses to join in efforts to 
compose Austro-Serbian trouble, 232- 
233, 234; sends ultimatum to Russia, 
241; declares "state of war" with Rus- 
sia, 143, 242; and with France, 142-143, 
243 ; Britain urges her cooperation in 
favor of peace, 246-247 ; offers terms to 
gain neutrality of Britain, 247-248 ; 
makes treaty with Britain in 1870 reaf- 
firming Belgian neutrality, 25 1 ; threatens 
Belgian neutrality, 256; declares hostili- 
ties and enters Belgium, 142,257; Great 
Britain delivers ultimatum to, 257; 
Britain declares war against, 258; charges 
Belgium and Britain with insincerity, 
260; and Britain with responsibility for 
the war, 260-264; makes official ex- 
planations of violation of Belgian neu- 
trality, 267-268 ; extraordinary military 
preparations of, 276; expansion of rail- 
ways toward Belgian frontier, 276; 
opening of enlarged Kiel Canal, 277; 
views Great Britain with suspicion, 279; 
ambassadors of doubt that Triple En- 
tente powers would go to war for Serbia, 
285-286; justifies war against Russia on 
strategic grounds, 294; and similarly her 
advance through Belgium and Luxem- 
burg, 294; acquires lease of Kiau-Chau 
and adjacent territory, 94, 300. 

Giolitti, Signor G., 190, 324, 325, 338, 
339. 340, 343- 

Gladstone, W. E. , policy of toward Tur- 
''syi '59; on Belgian neutrality, 252- 

Goeben, The, 311, 312. 

Great Britain, political and economic con- 
ditions in during nineteenth century, 
33-35; Irish legislation, 35; secures 
influence in Egypt, 3 5 ; annexes Trans- 
vaal, 36; Queen Victoria proclaimed 



Empress of India, 36; Boers rebel, 36; 
grants independence to the Transvaal, 
3 6 ; the Boer War, 3 7 ; South African 
Union constituted, 38; movements to 
promote imperial solidarity, 38-39; en- 
acts Irish land legislation, 40 ; and Home 
Rule for Ireland, 42; entente established 
with France and Russia, 8 1 ; resents Ger- 
man emperor's telegram to Kriiger, 91- 
92; holds a German mail steamer, 98; iso- 
lation of during the South African War, 
1 01; her policy leading to the Triple 
Entente, loi; popular feeling in aroused 
by continental criticism, 103; suspicion 
of German policy grows, 104-106; 
Entente Cordiale is established with 
France, 109; alleged policy of in the 
Moroccan crisis, 123; builds the Dread- 
nought, 124; her pacific policy disclosed 
by decreased naval construction prior to 
1909, 126; subsequent increase of her 
fleet, 127-129; composes differences 
with Russia on Asiatic questions, 129, 
166; Lloyd George asserts British stand 
for prestige and place, 135-136; causes 
of her seeking the Triple Entente, 1 40 ; 
declares war against Austria-Hungary, 
142; supports Turkey against Russia, 
1853-1856 and 1877, 148, 150-151; 
influence of in Turkey supplanted by 
Germany, 159; opposes Turkish de- 
signs on the Persian gulf, 162; takes 
alarm at German expansion in Asiatic 
Turkey, 166, 167; efforts of to com- 
pose Austro-Serbian differences, 219, 
231-232; Russia urges her to secure 
suspension of military operations, 246; 
peace suggestion to Germany by, 246- 
247, 248-249; Germany bids for neu- 
trality of, 247-248; declines to sacri- 
fice France or Belgium, 248 ; seeks 
pledges as to Belgian neutrality, 249- 
250; secures special treaties (in 1870) 
from France and Germany to respect 
Belgian neutrality, 251-254; requests 
Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, 
257; pledges support to Belgium, 257; 
sends ultimatum to Germany, 257; de- 
clares war against Germany, 142, 258; 
military entente with France of 191 2, 
269; assures France of naval protec- 
tion, 271; Ulster troubles distract, 42, 
276, 282-284; acquires territorial rights 

in China, 300; makes treaty of alliance 
with Japan, 301 ; makes new treaty with 
Japan (1905), 302; Turkey shows hos- 
tility toward, 310-312; offers to guar- 
antee Turkey's independence for her 
neutrality, 311; warns Turkey against 
German influence, 316; state of war in 
respect of Turkey announced, 317; 
annexes Cyprus, 317. 
Greece, Slavic elements in, 146; inde- 
pendence of established, 147; allies with 
Bulgaria against Turkey, 1 79 ; Bulgaria 
makes war upon, 187; area and popu- 
lation after Balkan War, 188. 

Hapsburg, House of, fatalities of, 201. 

Heligoland, Great Britain cedes to Ger- 
many, 139. 

Herzegovina, administered by Austria- 
Hungary, 25; insurrection in, 149; 
Austria-Hungary to "occupy," 150; 
the Powers give occupation of to Aus- 
tria, 152; ''occupation" of by Austria, 
157; objects and effects of, 158; defi- 
nitely annexed by Austria, 171; demon- 
strations against Hungary in, 199. 

Hohenlohe, Prince of, 95. 

Hostilities, declaration of by various bel- 
ligerents, 142-143. 

Hungary, political status in the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, 21, 22-25; restric- 
tions on non-Magyar nationalities, 24; 
Slav peoples of, 25 ; disaffection of Croats 
toward, 197-199. (See also Austria- 

lalia Irredenta, 7, 319, 325. 

Italy, political organization before unifica- 
tion of, 4; rule of Austria in, 5 ; revolu- 
tions and final liberation, 5-7, 145; the 
ally of Prussia against Austria, 7; 
Italian populations in, 7; joins Triple 
Alliance, 3 1 ; supports France in Moroc- 
can conference, 121; demands Tripoli 
from Turkey, 175; occupies islands in 
the Aegean, 178; concludes peace with 
Turkey, 181; Austria announces in- 
tended ultimatum against Serbia in 1 9 1 3 
to, 190; assents to British proposal to 
compose Austro-Serbian trouble, 232; 
Austrian designs arouse suspicion of, 
323; notifies Germany of Austria's 
breach of treaty conditions, 323; 


The Great War 

negotiates with Austria for neutrality 
conditions, 3^7-338; repudiates the 
Triple Alliance, 338; ignores Austria's 
final compensatory offer, 339; the cham- 
ber endorses the ministry, 340. 

Japan, transformation of national life of, 
296-Z98; war with China in 1894, 
Z98-299; is excluded from territorial 
concessions in China, 299; treaty of 
alliance (1902) made with Great Britain, 
301; a new treaty (1905), 302; opens 
war upon Russia, 50, 195, 302; signs 
convention (1907) with Russia, 303; 
presents ultimatum to Germany, 305- 
306; declares war against her, 142, 306. 

Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, 123, 277, 278. 
Kaiser Wilhelm' s Land, 81. 
Kiau-Chau, occupation of by Germany, 94, 
300, 306; Japan demands cession of, 306. 
Kiel Canal. (See Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. ) 
Kriiger, Paul, 90, 102. 

Ladrone Islands, The, Germany ac- 
quires, 97. 

Lombardy, 5, 6. 

Lorraine, cession of part of to Germany, 
13; government of, 14; economic im- 
portance of, 15; first united with 
France, 16. 

Macedonia, conflict of nationalities in, 
169, 346; revolution in, 170. 

Magyars, The, 21; political aims of, 345 ; 
opposition to Slavic aspirations, 346. 

Manchuria, 50, 300, 301, 302. 

Militarism, inimical influences and spirit 
of, 288-294, 358. 

Modena, 5. 

Montenegrins, The, population and loca- 
tion of, 146. 

Montenegro, declares war against Austria- 
Hungary, 142 ; against Germany, 142 ; 
acquires independence, 148; at war with 
Turkey, 1 876, 149 ; declares war against 
Turkey, 19 12, 180 ; struggle for Scutari, 
185-186; area and population after Bal- 
kan War, 188. 

Morocco, Great Britain accedes to French 
dominance in, 109; spheres of influence 
of France and Spain in, 109; material 
and political importance of, 114; France 

seeks to establish affairs of, 1 1 5 ; Germany 
propounds her interests in, 119; the 
claims of France in, 1 20 ; the Aigeciras 
conference, 120-121; renewed troubles 
in, 132-136. 

Narodna Odbrana, a Pan-Serbian Society, 
205, 208. 

Nationalities, general principle of, 3 ; de- 
velopment in France, 3 ; in Italy, 4-7 ; 
in Germany, 7-17; in Russia, 17-20J in 
Austria, 20-25 i nineteenth century ad- 
vance In recognition of, 344. 

Navy League, the German, objects of, 125. 

Nihilism, 49, 50. 

"Open Door," The, 94, ii6, 119, 121, 
34-8, 350. 351- 

Pan-German League, The, objects of, 125. 

Parma, 5. 

Persia, British and Russian spheres in ad- 
justed, 130. 

Philippopolis, revolution in, 154. 

Piedmont, struggle of against Austria, 
6-7; participates in Crimean War, 148. 

Plevna, siege of, 151. 

Poland, partitions of, 19; Russian domin- 
ion in, 20 J Prussian territory in, 25; 
Austrian, 25; Prussian intolerance in, 
27-29; hostility toward in Russia, 52; 
obstacles to reconstitution of, 346. 

Port Arthur, 50, 93, 114, 299, 300, 302. 

Posen, 25, 27. 

Potential causes, general, operating toward 
war, 143-144. 

Prussia, Italy an ally of in 1866 against 
Austria, 7 ; and the Zollverein, 8 ; King 
of refuses imperial crown, 9 ; military and 
political aspirations of, 10; conflict with 
Denmark, 12; war vfith Austria, 1866, 
1 3 ; war vfith France, 1 3 ; influence of 
in affairs of Germany, 60, 64; polit- 
ical organization of, 64-68; class influ- 
ences on the great war, 68-69 i approves 
opening of Black Sea to Russian war- 
ships, 148. (See also Germany.) 

Quintuple Treaty, The, 251, 255. 

Reichsland, The, territorial title of Alsace- 
Lorraine, 14; economic importance 
of, 15. 



Rome, occupation of by national army, 7. 

Roumania, autonomy of wrested from 
Turkey, 1 47 ; acquires part of Bessa- 
rabia, 148; loses it again, 148 ; acquires 
independence, 148; allies with Russia 
against Turkey, 151; makes war on 
Bulgaria, 187; area and population after 
Balkan War, i8g. 

Roumanians, The, Slavic element among, 
146 J national aspiration of, 345. 

Russia, differing nationalities of empire, 
1S-19; its government of Finland, 19; 
long amity with Prussia, 30; makes 
neutrality agreement with Germany, 3 1 ; 
Dual Alliance with France, 32; domes- 
tic politics of since 1855, 48-52; war 
against Japan, 50; Duma, or parliament, 
granted, 51; economic resources of, 53- 
59; Entente with France and Great 
Britain, 8 1 ; Germany seeks closer rela- 
tions with, 107-109; losses in war with 
Japan, 114; composes Asiatic differ- 
ences with Great Britain, 130; Austria- 
Hungary declares war against, 142; 
Germany declares war against, 143; 
the Danublan plain physically linked 
with, 145; early interest of In the 
Slavic nations southward, 147; wars of 
with Turkey since seventeenth century, 
147-148; supports Balkan Insurrection 
and declares war against Turkey, 1877, 
1 50-1 51; acquires territory In Asiatic 
Turkey, 153; population and economical 
Interest of in the Balkans, 155-157, 195- 
196, 358; reorganizes her army, 193; 
suspicion of Germany in, 196; Austria's 
demand on Serbia arouses, 216; invokes 
delay on behalf of Serbia, 217-218; ap- 
proves Serbia's reply, 231; assents to 
British proposal to compose Austro- 
Serbian trouble, 232, 233-234; notifies 
Germany of possible partial mobiliza- 
tion, 238; explains purpose of mobili- 
zation, 239; agrees to stop military 
preparations conditionally, 240, 241 ; 
orders general mobilization, 241; Ger- 
many sends ultimatum to, 241; "state 
of war" agsunst declared by Germany, 
242 ; urges Great Britain to secure sus- 
pension of military operations, 246 
is unprepared for war, 275, 279-282 
strengthens military establishment, 278 
arouses Finnish disaffection, 280, 281 

effect of mobilization by, 294-295; ac- 
quires territorial rights in China, 300, 

Russo-Japanese War, The, 50, 195, 302. 

Ruthenians, The, 26, 345. 

Salandra, Antonio, 324, 339, 340. 

Salonica, 181, 189. 

San Gluliano, Marquis de, 323, 325. 

Sarajevo, assassination at, provocative of 
Austrian enmity to Serbia, 204; inves- 
tigation of assassination at, 205, 208, 

2io» 345- 

Schleswig, annexation of by Denmark, 12. 

Scutari, 184, 1S5, 186. 

Serbia, Austria-Hungary declares war 
against, 143 ; the one independent cause 
of the great war, 143; acquires in- 
dependence, 148; movement toward a 
Greater Serbia, 149; declares war against 
Turkey, 1876, 149; national aspirations 
restricted In 1878, 152; opposes Aus- 
trian annexation of Balkan States, 174; 
but recognizes It under compulsion, 175; 
allies with Bulgaria and Greece against 
Turkey, 179; Bulgaria makes war upon, 
187; area and population after war, 188; 
Austria shows marked hostility against, 
185, 189, 190, 196; an obstacle to 
Teutonic Oriental aggrandizement, igo- 
191; her aims for extended territory, 196, 
197; Austria suspects complicity of in 
assassination of Francis Ferdinand, 203 ; 
and sends ultimatum, 203; bases of 
Austria's enmity against, 205-206; Aus- 
tria presents demands upon, 206-208; 
appeals to Russia for support, 220-221 ; 
replies to Austrian demands, 221-222, 
223-231; Austria declares war against, 
238; did Austria consent to refer Ser- 
bian question to the powers? 245. 

Serbo-Croats, The, population and location 
of, 146, 197. 

Shantung, territory in leased to Germany, 

93-94, 3°°- 

Siberia, Russian occupation of, 17; tail- 
road construction across, 50, 299. 

Slavs, The, of Austria-Hungary, 25, 26; 
conflict with Teutons for Balkan suprem- 
acy, 143, 144; early populate the Balkan 
peninsula, 145; nationalities of in Bal- 
kans, 146; subjected to Turks, 146. 

Slovenes, The, population and location 
of, 146. 


The Great War 

Sonnino, Baron Sydney, 325, 319, 336, 

South African Republic. (See Transvaal.) 
South African Union, The, constitution of, 

38; creation of widens breach between 

Great Britain and Germany, 105-106. 
South African War, attitude of Germany 

during, 102, 104, 105. 

Teutons, conflict with Slavs for supremacy 
in Balkans, 143, 144. 

Thibet, Russian and British agreement 
concerning, 130. 

Tirpitz, Admiral Alfred von, becomes 
Germany's minister of marine, 97; de- 
clares the naval policy of Germany, 100; 
explains Germany's naval construction 
policy, 129. 

Trans-Siberian Railway, 50, 299. 

Transvaal, The, annexed to Great Britain, 
36} the Boers rebel, 36; independence 
recognized, 36; gold discovered in, 36} 
outsiders discriminated against in, 37; 
Jameson's raid, 37; Boer War breaks 
out, 37J Germany coquets with, 90-92, 
102; Emperor William refuses to receive 
the Boer delegates, 102, 131, (See also 
South African Union.) 

Transylvania, 23, 24. 

Treaty of Berlin, 151-153, 154, 168, 180, 

Treaty of Bucharest, 187-188. 

Treaty of San Stefano, 151, 154. 

Triple Alliance, The, Germany, Austria, 
and Italy form, 31, 80. 

Triple Entente, The, establishment of, 81; 
steps leading to, 1 01 -102; importance 
of in European diplomacy, 130, 140. 

Tripoli, Italy demands cession of, 175; 
economic and political advantages of, 
176; ceded to Italy, 181. 

Turkey, begins hostilities (1914), 142, 
317; natural and political unfitness of 
to govern the Balkans, 144; religious 
hostility toward Russia, 147; wars with 
Russia since seventeenth century, 147 j 
her "atrocities" in Bulgaria, 1876, 149; 
constitution proclaimed for, 150; war 
of 1877 with Russia, 151-152; Germany 
becomes "disinterested friend" of, 159; 
personality and diplomacy of Abdul- 
Hamid, 159-160; commercial conces- 
sions by to Germany, 161-167; Young 
Turk Party is constituted, 170; the 

constitution restored, 170; recognizes 
Austria's annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 172; Abdul-Hamid is de- 
posed, 174; Italy demands Tripoli, 175; 
insurrections against in AJbania and 
Macedonia, 178; Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Greece in alliance against, 179; Balkan 
War against begins, 180; peace with 
Italy, 181; peace treaty with Balkan 
States, 187; again takes up arms, 187; 
new peace treaty, 187; agreement with 
Bulgaria, 188; area and population of 
in Europe after the Balkan War, 188; 
importance of as ally of the Teutonic 
powers, 307; German influence in, 310; 
popular sentiment directed against Great 
Britain, 310; insincerity of professed 
neutrality of, 311; protects the German 
warships Goeben and Breilau, 312; de- 
clares purchase of these ships, 312; Ger- 
many sends officers and troops to, 313; 
announces abolition of the "Capitula- 
tions," 313; begins mobilization, 315; 
activity of German officers in, 315-316; 
sends expedition against Suez Canal, 
317; drops neutral mask and bom- 
bards Odessa, 317; the Jihad pro- 
claimed, 318. 
Tuscany, 5. 

Ulster, disturbances in, 42, 276, 282-284. 

Valona, conference at establishes provisional 
government for AJbania, 182; occupied 
by Italy, 327, 334, 337. 

Venetia, annexed to Italy, 7. 

Victor Emanuel, becomes King of Italy, 6. 

West Prussia apportioned to Prussia, 25; 
importance of to Germany, 26; expro- 
priation laws for, 28. 

W^ied, William, Prince of, elected ruler of 
Albania, 188; abdicates, 326-327. 

William I, proclaimed Emperor of Ger- 
many, 14. 

William II, personality of, 82, 160, 162; 
breach of with Bismarck, 82; abandons 
Russian alliance, 84; his Divine Right 
assumption, 85-87; cherishes plans of 
world-empire, 89; congratulates the 
Boers on their defeat of the Jameson 
raid, 90; imperial designs of, 92-93; 
disavows world-dominion and foreign 



expansion, 1 1 2; his national egoism, 113; 
visits Morocco and assails diplomatic 
conventions, 116; proclaims his amity 
toward England, 131-132; is reproved 
by the Reichstag, 132; unfortunate 
influence of speeches of, 139; Ger- 
many's "vrorld-policy" concurrent with 
reign of, 139; visits Constantinople, 
160, 161; speeches of at Constantinople 
and Damascus, 161-162; monarchical 
leaning of favors Austria, 205, 236; 
seeks to gain the Tsar's acquiescence 
in war on Serbia, 237-238; warns 
the Tsar of consequence of Rus- 
sian mobilization, 240; what was the 
peace influence of with Austria? 244- 
245; speech of at Konigsberg, 85; at 

Coblentz, 85; at Berlin, 86, 89; at 
Hamburg and Stettin, 89; at Frankfurt, 
Witte, Count Sergius de, 50, 56. 

Young Turk Party, formation of, 170; 
revolution against, 174; make Mo- 
hammed V sultan, 174; principles of, 
175; establish a constitution, 178; 
party overthrown, 178; restored to 
power, 182 J favor abolition of the 
' ' ' Capitulations,' ' 314. 

Zabem aflair. The, 290-291. 

Zanzibar, protectorate of given to Great 

Britain, 139. 
ZoUverein, 8.